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FREGE'S CRITICISM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

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EN
The paper reconstructs Frege's criticism of the ontological argument for the existence of God on the basis of various remarks scattered in his writings. The material is organized in such a way as to: (a) reveal a logical structure of the argument; (b) show and discern various presupposition of a logical, semantical and ontological character; and (c) indicate some essential weaknesses of the ontological argument. It is argued that Frege's critical commentaries on this argument are essentially connected to four solutions, stating that: (1) the difference between a name and a predicate is categorical; (2) the existential judgement possesses a different logical structure than the singular judgement; (3) in the characteristic of concepts marks and properties should be distinguished; (4) the ascription of number contains the statement about a concept. In order to make Frege's argumentation as understandable as possible it is confronted with Kant's criticism of ontological argument. The analysis carried on in the above-described way reveals a number of shortcomings which discredit the ontological argument. For example, the paper shows that the analysis of predication of oneness (Einzigkeit) does not lead to the affirmation of God's existence. Moreover, it shows that in that argument the term God is used in two different semantic roles; that some theses that should constitute the argument's conclusion, are already assumed; and that sense-condition and truth-conditions are not distinguished.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2011
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vol. 39
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issue 4
117 - 132
EN
The article is an attempt to present the overall consideration on God, which is, in a sense, the core of Jerzy Perzanowski's philosophical theory. Although a number of issues are considered, the most attention is paid to Perzanowski's critical analysis of some well-known ontological arguments and to the presentation of his own version of the argument.
EN
The paper offers an outlook on St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument (stated famously in the Proslogion) which is a result of reconsidering the possibility that being a subject of the laws of logic (especially the laws that are relevant for the argument itself), constitutes itself a perfection (assuming, understandably, with many modern defenders of the ontological argument, that there is a sense of the term ‘perfection’ applicable within the line of thought in question). The more or less obvious parts of the historical context of such a hypothesis are noted, and some of its variants or alternatives, including negation, are assessed as well. It is argued that one of them, which states that God is “logically transcendent” (in a sense specified in the paper) may be perhaps of some use in defense of St. Anselm’s Argument, or indeed any argument of that sort.
EN
A critical analysis of Perzanowski’s attempt to develop an ontological argument based on the degree of reality shows that the comprehension axiom needs to be reinforced and that the family of all perfections is logically closed. This means that the P6 axiom is unnecessary. Moreover, the replacement of the reduction axiom by a strengthened instantiation axiom increases the number of degrees of reality and the class of consistent sets of qualities.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 10
842 – 852
EN
Herder’s earliest philosophical writing, the essay fragment Versuch über das Sein, explores the concept of Being (Sein) in dialogue with Kant’s pre-critical Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. In this often critically omitted work, Herder arrives at a number of insights that would be determinative for the development of his later thought. This examination details Herder’s concept of Being as the transcendent ground of predication, his contention that Being can never be experienced directly, and his consequent conclusion that the shape of philosophical inquiry should not be one of abstract speculation, but instead one of non-foundational, historically aware, empirical observation. Then, this consideration briefly addresses how the concept of Being informs Herder’s philosophy of science, history, language and religion.
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