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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 4
325 – 327
EN
The students’ argument against the possibility of a surprise exam assumes that the following combination would not occur: the teacher decides to give the exam on a certain day; the teacher believes that the exam would be a surprise on that day; but, actually, the exam would not be a surprise on that day. The author gives a reason to reject this assumption, and he points out that an attempt to reformulate the surprise exam paradox in order to allow for the assumption does not result in an acceptable argument.
EN
It is quite plausible to say that you may read or write implies that you may read and you may write (though possibly not both at once). This so-called free choice principle is well-known in deontic logic. Sadly, despite being so intuitive and seemingly innocent, this principle causes a lot of worries. The paper briefly but critically examines leading accounts of free choice permission present in the literature. Subsequently, the paper suggests to accept the free choice principle, but only as a default (or defeasible) rule, issuing to it a ticket-of-leave, granting it some freedom, until it commits an undesired inference.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 7
531 – 545
EN
The article aims at answering two questions: 1) Is scepticism still a problem worth the attention of philosophers? 2) Is sceptical attitude true? It also sheds light on current local discussion of scepticism and offers some critical commentaries on it. Ad 1): The difference between scepticism and sceptic argument is underlined as well as the necessity to focus on explicitly articulated sceptic arguments. Ad 2): There are several scepticisms that are to be differentiated if we want to judge their truth values. In general, the interesting forms of scepticism are not true (this judgment depends on conceiving interesting sceptical arguments as paradoxes). Finally, some of the short-comings of otherwise valuable writings on sceptical arguments in current discussion are indicated, due to which the solutions they offer cannot be satisfactory.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 5
451 – 457
EN
The article provides an analysis of the confrontation with the limits of reason in Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. For both thinkers such a confrontation denotes some sort of “running up against the paradox” that helps human beings to constitute themselves as ethical and/or religious subjects. In contrast with the so-called “austere” interpretation of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard (Conant and others), the seemingly futile running up against the absurdity is presented as a necessary ingredient of a certain view of language and life, i.e. a view that conceives life and language merely as a succession of events and a description of facts. However, the meaning of a certain subset of events and propositions shows itself only if these events are valued in terms of the totality of individual life or state of affairs and if these propositions are accompanied by a wholesome way of living and a wholesome attitude towards the world. For both authors the confrontation with the absurdity is also closely related to the confrontation with madness as a far limit of reasoning.
EN
The article deals with Cantor’s diagonal argument and its alleged philosophical consequences such as that (1) there are more reals than integers and, hence, (2) that some of the reals must be independent of language because the totality of words and sentences is always countable. The author´s claim is that the main flaw of the argument for the existence of non-nameable (hence unrecognizable) objects or truths lies in a very superficial understanding of what a name or representation actually is. The article concludes by offering solutions to some famous semantic paradoxes based on the diagonal construction as corroboration for this claim.
EN
The study analyses the significance of paradox in the ecclesiological vision of Henri de Lubac (1896-1991) based on some of his writings. The French theologian presents paradox in an original way in order to find ways of drawing on biblical and patristic insights and to address the issues raised by the modern world for the Church. Paradox allows one to see the union of opposites while maintaining their individual distinctions. From the paradoxical point of view, de Lubac defines the Church as a mystery, keeping her human and divine elements in tension. This Church is relational in the divine, mystical, sacramental, historical, and social dimension. In it, there arise and live the paradoxes of the natural and supernatural dignity of man, of individual and collective salvation, of his temporal-eternal and visible-invisible aspect, of holiness and sin. The “paradoxical” Church is the missionary Church on the road to holiness – the Church that proclaims God's salvation to all.
EN
Douglas Hofstadter (born in 1945) is a peculiar scholar: a Pulitzer-prize winner and a specialist in cognitive science, he is nevertheless quite fond of translation, to the point of practicing (and studying) it in several publications since 1997. Our essay focuses on his latest work in this field, That Mad Ache / Translator, Trader (2009). It is a double book, with two covers and two reading directions: on the one hand, readers will find Hofstadter’s retranslation of Françoise Sagan’s 1965 novel La Chamade (1965); on the other hand, turning their book, they will be faced with a long essay on the translation of that book into English. It is truly a double book, with theory and practice of translation going one towards the other, highlighting all along the role of the translator, too often underestimated in the Anglo-American publishing scene. Analyzing such a peculiar book, we should try to sketch an unconventional figure of a (re)translator and translation scholar: he is fascinated by the paradoxes and possibilities of translation, and his fame, together with his excellent vulgarization skills, manage to renew the charms of translation and share them with a larger audience.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 1
27 – 37
EN
The paper discusses Kierkegaard’s account of faith as ‘the new immediacy’. After considering the term ‘immediacy’ with respect both to its ambiguity and to the different ways in which it can be used, i.e. as an epistemological assumption and as an ontological assumption, the author will argue that this very distinction can provide a hermeneutic key for an understanding of Kierkegaard’s account of faith.
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