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1

PATOČKOVA PŘEDNÁŠKA O HEGELOVĚ FENOMENOLOGII DUCHA ZE ŠKOLNÍHO ROKU 1949/1950

100%
Sobotka M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 6
420 – 428
EN
The article deals with Patočka’s lecture on Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit from the school-year 1949/50, which remained uncompleted. The lecture was a response to the post-war interest in Hegel, which found its expression in Hyppolite’s translation of Phenomenology of the Spirit (1939, 1941) as well as in his book Genesis and Structure of Hegel’s "Phenomenology of Spirit" (Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy) (1946), and first of all in A. Kojeve’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (1947). The lecture evolves from introducing the commentaries on Hegel’s book to author’s original considerations. Hegel was a subject of interest also for later Patočka; his translation of Phenomenology of the Spirit appeared in 1960, although his Introduction has not been included and is preserved only partially.
2

PATOČKOVA PÉČE O DUŠI MEZI SÓKRATEM, PLATÓNEM A ARISTOTELEM

100%
Blecha I.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 6
409 – 419
EN
The paper investigates the structure of Patočka’s interpretation of „the care of the soul“. From Patočka’s analyses as well as from the commentary works it is obvious, that Patočka’s eminent interest was to render the soul as open, unconceivable, problematic and as such forcing a person to live in a positive uncertainty, i.e. in a moral condition which makes her responsible for her own deeds. In ancient tradition this stand seems to have been adopted by Socrates whom Patočka on this very ground prefers to Plato, who on the contrary made the care of the soul as a part of his metaphysical theory of ideas. Some Patočka’s accounts suggest, however, that this Socratic conception did not comfort the later Patočka either. Thus the conception which he personally appreciated at most goes back to Aristotle who was the first who introduce the concept of action. As far as the author knows, this point is not taken into account sufficiently in secondary sources, although it substantially changes the pattern of Patočka’s care of the soul and makes new interpretations of his conception possible.
3

PATOČKA, HEIDEGGER A OTÁZKA BYTIA

100%
Leško V.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 6
429 – 439
EN
Patočka considers Heidegger’s dealing with the question of Being in his famous Being and Time as a premature problem; and he thinks similarly about the solutions which Heidegger offered in his later thought. Being is always a Being of beings and Patočka is in the right contrary to Heidegger. Heidegger’s attempt at re-thinking Being as Being without beings undermines philosophy in a substantial way. Heidegger’s later reducing philosophy to metaphysics is acceptable; it doesn't follow, however, that we should accept also all its consequences assumed by Heidegger. There is a key difference between Patočka’s concept of philosophy, with man and history as its focus, and Heidegger’s concept of philosophy focused on the problem of Being. Patočka offers the insight according to which Being, when thought in itself, is a hypostatized Being. Therefore, it should be completely abandoned, simply because there is no such Being. This insight questions the fundamental thesis of Heidegger’s philosophy, which should unconditionally be rejected as groundless.
4

„ŽIVOT V IDEI“, IDEA AKO ŽIVOT U JANA PATOČKU

86%
Sivák J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 6
449 – 457
EN
The paper deals with early Patočka’s writings, namely the one embodying his main philosophical intention which even today is still worthy attention. It makes us remember that the work of a philosopher requires freedom and courage, if we are to rise to the challenges and ideologies which Patočka did not live to see.
5

KOLEM PATOČKOVY POLITIKY DUCHOVNÍHO ČLOVĚKA

86%
Chvatík I.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 6
458 – 464
EN
In his political fight for freedom Patočka sacrificed his life. His action was in full accord with his teaching. The key concept of his philosophy of history was the upswing over the level of mere sustenance of life. In the ancient Greece, this upswing gave simultaneously birth to politics and philosophy. This was the starting point of history. Patočka’s concept “solidarity of the shaken” is interpreted as the solidarity of those who have lost their belief in the possibility of an absolute meaning of this world, those, who know, what is the meaning of history, namely facing up a slide into meaninglessness of the mere sustenance. If history is the history of upswings, i.e. the repeated fight against sliding into non-historicity, if it is an endeavour rooted in freedom, then the problem of history cannot be resolved once and for all; we have to make repeatedly our efforts to solve it.
6

JAK VZNIKÁ NĚCO NOVÉHO? ZALOŽENÍ A TRANSCENDENCE

86%
Puc J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 4
259 – 270
EN
The paper shows different approaches to creativity, i.e. emergence of new meanings, in Merleau-Ponty and Patočka. The comparison is based mainly on Merleau-Ponty’s lectures L’institution dans l’histoire personnelle et publique (1954/55) and Patočka’s project Negative Platonism (1953). Despite some similarities evident in the key concepts “institution” and “transcendence”, there is a decisive difference between the two approaches concerning the temporality of creation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty likens the temporality of institution to future perfect tense, emphasizing the intertwining of present and future events, Patočka understands novelty as something totally different from present state of affairs. In his eyes, the question of how something new can arise equals the question of how attitude of distance to existing traditions can be achieved. Contrary to Patočka, Merleau-Ponty argues that any living tradition tends towards its own transformation and presents a case of self-transcendence, because it is governed by the principle of divergence (écart). Finally, we argue that some aspects of these two approaches both complement each other, and also show the limits of each other.
7

RORTYHO KONCEPCIA SPOLOČENSKEJ ROLY INTELEKTUÁLOV

86%
Višňovský E.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 8
704 – 715
EN
The paper gives a concise account of Rorty’s conception of intellectuals and their role in society, politics and culture. This topic is an integral part of Rorty’s writings, in particular those on ethics and politics since the 1990s. The author describes his attitude towards Central-European intellectuals such as Patočka and Havel; his views on the contemporary leftist intellectuals in relation to the problem of the poor; his cultural typology of intellectuals as related to cultural politics; his concept of post-philosophical culture. In conclusion he depicts Rorty’s hope in future intellectual culture radically different from that of our days.
8
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SÓKRATOVSKO-PLATÓNSKÁ A KŘESŤANSKÁ PODOBA PÉČE O DUŠI

72%
Cajthaml M.
Studia theologica
|
2011
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vol. 13
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issue 2
18-31
EN
The aim of this paper is to expound upon the relationship between the Socratic-Platonic form of the care of the soul and its Christian pendant. This relationship is considered essential in Jan Patočka’s late concept of the spiritual roots of Europe. Patočka, however, does not develop this theme systematically. The attempt to develop this theme presented in this paper is inspired by Patočka’s interpretation of the Socratic-Platonic care of the soul, but it breaks with this interpretation in important ways, as well. The difference in both approaches, however, is left implicit as the focus of the paper is on a systematic analyses of the relationship between the Socratic-Platonic and the Christian form of the care of the soul as such, not on its Patočkian interpretation. The paper analyses this relationship by trying to delineate agreements and differences between the two forms of the care of the soul in the three following respects: (1) fundamental spiritual attitudes present in each of the two; (2) the notion of dialogicity implicit in them; (3) the views on the place of humans in reality as a whole and on their dignity.
9

K ONTOLOGII POHYBU EXISTENCE. SROVNÁNÍ PLATÓNOVA A PATOČKOVA POJETÍ ČLOVĚKA

72%
Ritter M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2015
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vol. 70
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issue 6
440 – 448
EN
The study compares two approaches to human being: Plato’s concept of three (parts of) souls and Patočka’s concept of three movements of existence. The aim of this contrastive study is to evaluate Patočka’s effort to make the concept of human being a-subjective and non-substantive. Special attention is dedicated to two key problems: the concept of body and the relationship between a part (an individual) and the whole (the world). The comparison of the thinkers indicates Patočka’s underestimation of the objective organization of body including its incorporation in the world. The presentation of the relationship between an individual and the whole provides an opportunity to discuss realistic moments of Plato’s approach and speculative moments of Patočka’s phenomenology of existence. Finally, these findings make it possible to articulate the main difficulties of an ontological interpretation of the phenomenology of movement.
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