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RICOEUR AND THE EXISTENTIAL CONCEPTION OF THE ETERNAL PRESENT

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Jakubowski J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2005
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issue 1
75-86
EN
According to the analysis presented in this article, in Paul Ricoeur's works there is an evident evolution of views on the existential conception of the eternal present. The direction of this evolution is not accidental. Its stages are marked out by acceptance, expressed in the early Ricoeur's works (monographs about Jaspers and Marcel), and then more and more evident distancing from this conception. The change in Ricoeur's view is related to his indirectly demonstrated conviction that the existential conception of the eternal present and the future-centered philosophy of hope are reconcilable. This statement becomes clearly evident in the light of the Ricoeur's considerations on personal identity in his later works. The existential conception of the eternal present merely indicates a momentary 'point' identity, reduced to individual 'atoms of eternity'. Based on this conception, it is difficult to develop a principle that binds together these individual 'atoms of eternity' into the perspective of a uniform 'self'. However, the philosophy of hope may be easily correlated with the concept of the personal identity based on the fidelity to established commitments that guarantee the quality personal endurance despite the physical changes.
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REFLECTED VIEW ON THE PERSONAL AFTERLIFE

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Krchňák D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2018
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vol. 25
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issue 2
196 - 214
EN
The author tries to argue that, from the methodological position of reflected equilibrium, it seems to be reasonable to build a theory of personal identity that enables a person to continue her existence after the biological death of her body. This conclusion is supported by the argument that our practice reflects that our identity-pre-supposing concerns reach beyond biological continuity. We have also good reasons to maintain such concerns and practices. As the best candidate to implement such concerns in a theoretical account of practical identity, he will identify the person-life view, where personal identity depends to a great extent on social conditions. The author also shows how this theory can implement the classical belief in the afterlife, and how it could conceptualize the difference of the afterlife from a physical and a theistic point of view.
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PERSONAL IDENTITY AND WHAT MATTERS

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Joaquin J. J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2017
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vol. 24
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issue 2
196 - 213
EN
There are two general views about the nature of what matters, i.e. about the metaphysical ground of prudential concern, the ground of the concern we have for our own future welfare. On the one hand, the identity - is – what - matters view tells us that prudential concern is grounded on one’s continuing identity over time; I am concerned with my own future welfare because it is my own future welfare. On the other hand, the identity – is – not – what - matters view tells us that prudential concern is not grounded on such continuing identity; rather, it is grounded on some continuity - relation, which only coincides with identity. In this paper, the author explores a primary motivation for the latter view — viz., Parfit’s fission case — and show that there are interesting ways to resist it.
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VON DER AUFLÖSUNG DER PERSON: DAS SELTSAME PROBLEM DER PERSONALEN IDENTITÄT IN NEUEREN DEUTSCHSPRACHIGEN AUTOPATHOGRAPHIEN

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Mikuláš R., Mikulášová A.
World Literature Studies
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2023
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vol. 15
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issue 4
33 – 49
EN
Texts from the field of autopathography are close to the professional discourse of the medical sciences and offer alternative ways of conceptualizing and thinking about illness. The recent autopathographic works that are analysed in this article describe illnesses that are no longer evaluated as consequences of social developments, as was usually the case in the “new interiority”; rather, pathologies are interpreted as part of an individual life. Since the associated experiences and the consequences of the disease are serious for the individual life, the question of personal identity is often raised. The question of self is always relevant when people who express this question do not know or no longer know who they are (or have become), or when they no longer have a sense of unity. This concerns not only external orders (i.e. uprooting of any kind), but also internal disruption. These insecurities are thus the trigger for questions about identity that are posed in the analysed texts.
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METAPHYSICAL AND MORAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DISCUSSION ABOUT INTERRUPTION (Metafyzicke a moralni predpoklady debaty o interupci)

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Belohrad R.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2009
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vol. 16
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issue 2
214-237
EN
The work analyzes two competing arguments in the issue of abortion and shows that each requires a different theory of personal identity. Further, the author analyzes those theories and he shows what moral premises they are compatible with and what implications there are for the abortion debate.
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ĽUDSKÉ EMBRYÁ AKO INDIVÍDUÁ A OSOBY

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Volek P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 6
538-551
EN
In his paper, the author argues that human embryos are individuals and persons. He accepts the critique of the non-individuation argument of human zygote and refutes the possibility of understanding blastomeres as individuals. Finally, realism in the understanding of personal identity is accepted on the basis of an argument justifying substantial form as a principle of personal identity.
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Wyśmiej stereotyp! Czynniki redukujące zagrożenie stereotypem

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Dreszer J., Bedyńska S.
Psychologia Społeczna
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2006
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vol. 1
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issue 2(2)
182-189
EN
People who are stereotyped by the society as less able minority members, perform poorly when the stereotype threat is present. Numerous research has shown that the content of the stereotype can be automatically activated by information even remotely connected with it. The paper describes the empirically documented factors that can reduce the stereotype threat. Seeking similarities to more successful members of the group, using sense of humor in reducing stress, and changing beliefs concerning human intelligence, as well as processes of individuation, they all seem to play an important role in eliminating the stereotype threat effect.
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ROBERT SPAEMANN AND ONTOLOGY IN ETHICS (Robert Spaemann i ontologia w etyce)

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Kakol T.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2009
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vol. 37
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issue 3
211-222
EN
In the article the author inquires whether Robert Spaemann's naturalistic arguments for the claim that every human being is a person (in his book 'Persons: The Difference Between 'Someone' and 'Something' (Personen. Versuche ueber den Unterschied zwischen 'etwas' und 'jemand'); let us call it 'the personalistic thesis') are successful and whether it is possible to support Spaemann's ethical intuitions in the absence of the personalistic thesis. In particular, he discusses several ontological interpretations of the twin fission phenomenon. He concludes that although Spaemann's arguments are not valid, an alternative argumentation is possible on the basis of the moral importance of the (personal) identity relation and the moral importance of the 'person-making' teleology.
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EMOTION, EXPERIENTIAL MEMORY AND SELFHOOD

100%
Yang S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 1
18 – 36
EN
Recently, emotion has attracted much attention in many areas of philosophy. In the philosophy of mind, some argue that emotions are individuated and identified with reference to feelings, beliefs, desires, or perceptions. Furthermore, they are often claimed to be changeable, unstable, and ambivalent. However, despite their instability, emotions are sometimes long-standing. They have, in addition, perspective. These characteristics of the emotions help us in solving one of philosophy’s most enduring problems, that is, the problem of personal identity. In order to illustrate this claim the author elaborates on the conception of ‘experiential memory’ suggested by Wollheim. To understand memory as experiential, we need to understand the affective element attached to some memories. The author argues that memory affects not only our past thought but also our past emotions, and those emotions deriving from the past stay on to affect our whole being and our future. Hence, the experiential memory is not just confined to the recalling of events or experiences that the subject has experienced, but concerns the narrative structure of a person’s life as a whole.
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Pamięć autobiograficzna jako podstawa kształtowania tożsamości na przykładach ze współczesnej literatury autobiograficznej

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Czempka-Wewióra M.
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2011
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vol. Świat i Słowo 2011, nr 1 (16)
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issue Świat i Słowo 2012 nr 2 (17)
55-66
EN
We are what we remember. Memories give shape to identity on the individual level as well as the social one. Events from the past create personal history, which is put in narration in order to emphasise the coherence of human life and its reasonableness. In this story a special role is played by the recalling subject, who is not always identical with the main character. The most common form of autobiographical narration is expressed in the first person singular. However, sometimes it takes a plural form or seems to be impersonal, particularly if it concerns a character that is significantly different in age or appearance form the speaker. The subject, looking at a photograph of himself/herself, is sometimes surprised and seems to be a totally different person. For analytical purposes a category of the point of view is useful. It helps to describe frequent changes of perspective as regards the presentation of a character and events.
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DELAYED FISSION AND THE STANDARD PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

88%
Yi H.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue 2
173 – 191
EN
Consider a specific type of fission where psychological continuity takes a branching form, and one of the offshoots comes into being later than the other offshoot. Let us say that the earlier offshoot comes into being in the left branch at t, and the later offshoot comes into being in the right branch at t+1. With regard to the question how many persons are involved in this case, three answers are worth considering: (i) the original subject persist up to t; a distinct person comes into being immediately after t and continues to exist in the left branch; and the third person comes into being in the right branch at t+1. (ii) The original subject persists up to the moment immediately before t+1; a distinct person comes into being at t+1 and continues to exist in the left branch; and the third person comes into being in the right branch at t+1. (iii) The original subject continues to exist in the left branch; a distinct person comes into being in the right branch at t+1. For those who hold that personal identity consist in psychological continuity of some sort, the aforementioned three options exhaust the sensible ways of understanding how one persists in delayed fission. Hence, delayed fission poses a challenge for the psychological approach to personal identity.
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MINULÉ ŽIVOTY JOHNA LOCKA: MORÁLNA ZODPOVEDNOSŤ A PAMÄŤOVÉ KRITÉRIUM OSOBNEJ IDENTITY

88%
Rozemberg A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 6
458 – 468
EN
One of the John Locke´s most controversial claims is that we should not be held responsible for the deeds of which we genuinely have no recollection as performed. We are only responsible for the acts of which we are conscious. The reason behind is the assertion that the personal identity equals the identity of consciousness. This concept of person is the background of Locke´s claim that the immaterial substance (IS) is irrelevant for personal identity. I argue, that if we had only a very unclear idea of IS and could not give any clear explanation of the relationship between IS and a person, the excluding of IS from the identity discourse would be highly dubious. Further, I argue that the memory criterion of the personal identity is problematic for many reasons, and that the missing continuity of memories between lives is compatible with the idea of justice and practical concerns.
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FENOMÉN SVEDOMIA A PERSONÁLNA IDENTITA ČLOVEKA

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Korený P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 3
275-285
EN
The inaugural explores the phenomenon of conscience as including the reference to the first person and his/her identity: the conscience is intrinsically mine. The word mine refers here not only to the fact, that the voice of conscience comes from inside of me, but also to my being addressed by it and connected through it with my genuine Self as a distinctive individual. In the first instance the voice of conscience is directly related to our actions, but if we let it to develop in its full strength, it can make us to reflect on who we essentially are. It is the concept of personal identity enforced 'in one's own production' which enables us to explain this linkage. In conclusion the author shows the difference between the genuine conscience of an individual, created in living contacts with a community of morals, and a wrong individuality of conscience, which is just a subjective feeling or a believing heart of a lonely individual rooted entirely in herself/himself.
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Amor e violencia na obra de Vergilio Ferreira

88%
Morais A.
Studia Iberystyczne
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2010
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vol. 9
233-244
EN
The relation between love and violence is a difficult theme to restrain. It was the leading point of my research in what cornced my Master Thesis. In that thesis I investigated the way how Vergilio Ferreira kept a relation between love and violence in all his work. In the present paper I intend to present, brifely, the result of my research, trying to answer to the folowing question: how is the relation, the ways of contamination and inter conection between love and violence on Vergilio Ferreira’s work?
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Wokół fenomenologii podmiotu Adama Węgrzeckiego

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Pyka M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2018
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vol. 46
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issue 2
21-35
EN
Professor Adam Węgrzecki’s philosophical research, as well as his other works, concentrate mainly on philosophical anthropology and the problem of man. It was with these issues in mind that he continued his research into the phenomenology of values and developed a Polish version of the philosophy of encounter. In this paper I discuss his study of the phenomenology of the subject (the self). Whereas Husserl and Ingarden introduce the idea of the self in the context of epistemology, Adam Węgrzecki analyses it from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. I attempt to place his results in a wider horizon which includes both phenomenology and analytic philosophy. I argue that his results contain a narrow idea of the self (as the source of activity) as well as a wider idea of the self, and both of these are necessary. These results can be placed in the center of recent debates on the problems of the self and of personal identity, and they constitute an important contribution to these debates. In particular, they can be used against those who want to ignore or even deconstruct the idea of the self.
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PERSONAL IDENTITY AS DETERMINED BY A SELF WITH A FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE (Ja z pierwszoosobowa perspektywa jako wyznacznik tozsamosci osobowej)

88%
Kakol T.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2008
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issue 7
71-87
EN
In this article the author presents a theory of personal identity (PI) that appeals both to Lynne Baker's approach and to Antonio Damasio's neurophilosophical theory. He discusses Damasio's theory of self relevant to the problem of PI (from his work The Feeling of What Happens) and Baker's description of first-person phenomena. Her distinction between making and attributing first-person reference and critical remarks related to her conception that have appeared are also pointed out. Finally, taking into account ontogenetic development of a human being, the author sketches a theory of PI according to which PI is determined by a so-called self with a first-person perspective. He uses here Ingarden's notion of a core/coreless object.
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SUBJECTIVE THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY AND PRACTICAL CONCERNS

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Bělohrad R.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2015
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vol. 22
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issue 3
82 – 301
EN
This paper focuses on three theories of personal identity that incorporate the idea that personal identity is the result of a person’s adopting certain attitudes towards certain mental states and actions. The author calls these theories subjective theories of personal identity. He argues that it is not clear what the proponents of these theories mean by “personal identity”. On standard theories, such as animalism or psychological theories, the term “personal identity” refers to the numerical identity of persons and its analysis provides the persistence conditions for persons. He argues that if the subjective theories purport to provide a criterion of numerical personal identity, they fail. A different interpretation may suggest that they purport to provide a non-numerical type of identity for the purpose of providing plausible analyses of certain identity-related practical concerns. The author argues that the criteria the subjective theories provide fail to capture several of the identity-related concerns. As a result, this interpretation must be rejected as well.
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Zagadka miłości Anny Kareniny (próba analizy egzystencjalnej)

75%
Jakubowski J.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 3(18)
145-166
EN
The article aims to interpret Anna Karenina’s love from the perspective of generally understood existential philosophy. The article’s leitmotif is related to the sources of Anna’s unhappiness within the role of a mistress. Her affection appears to be a puzzle, as the unhappy trait of her feeling is impossible to be explained with the mere help of a cliché: the lovers yearn to be together, but they are hampered by external circumstances. The unhappiness in Anna’s love results from the internal, not external, reasons. Anna fears that she may lose the devotion of her Beloved, and that very fear shows itself as no less than an obscured existential anxiety. However much effort Anna makes to veil the anxiety felt with the love towards Count Vronsky, she cannot succeed, for she fails to realize that both phenomena, the love to Vronsky and the anxiety, are entangled in the question „who am I?” concerning the issue of personal identity. Anna does not understand that as long as she does not face the question, it will be difficult for her to release her mind from the distractive experience of the continual recurrence of the anxiety in the background of her love towards Vronsky.
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THE CRITIQUE OF COMMUNICATIVE REASON. COMMUNICATIVE ACTION AND PERSONAL IDENTITY (A kommunikativ esz kritikaja. Kommunikativ cselekves es szemelyes identitas)

75%
Sik D.
Szociologiai Szemle (Sociological Review)
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2009
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vol. 19
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issue 3
43-63
EN
The following essay is aimed at confining the scope of The Theory of Communicative Action apropos of the problem of personal identity. For Habermas the notion of personal identity may be derived directly from the conclusions of his social theory: it is the specific part of the lifeworld (the meanings connected to the self) reproduced via communicative action. As communicative action is the mechanism of social integration as well, it is impossible to describe theoretically a personal identity that is distinct from the social in the Habermasian approach. This problem is solved in the paper with the help of Foucault's ideas on social power and subjectivation. Foucault introduces a constitutive dimension of power: he originates the modem subject from the individualization of power relations. By examining the subject in its opposition to social power, he offers an opportunity to describe a personal identity that is distinct from the social. In the author's opinion, by approaching to the concept of communicative action from a Foucaultian perspective, certain elements of power in the series of speech acts (that is certain dogmatic language uses) may be introduced as the expressions of the opposition against the logic of action coordination referring to the contours of personal identity. These dogmatic language uses may be specified based on the Kohlbergian-Habermasian ideas on moral development. In these cases the dogmatic language use does not require emancipation as it refers to personal identity, in this sense it reveals the limits of the scope of communicative rationality. In the final part of the paper the recognition-theoretical presuppositions of personal identity are introduced.
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PAMÄŤ, REKOGNÍCIA A OSOBNÁ IDENTITA V KLASICKEJ INDICKEJ FILOZOFII

75%
Rozemberg A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 3
224 – 234
EN
The problems of the self (ātman) and personal identity over time were thoroughly analysed in the classical Indian philosophy. The Buddhist philosophers rejected the Brahmanical commitment to a permanent unitary self which persists through changes of body and mind, and held that the self is a mere conceptual or thought construction (prajñāpti): there is no reality in the self; when we look more closely at what we call ‘I’, we will find only a stream of perceptions. Contrarily, the orthodox (āstika) philosophers argue that many common phenomena like memory or recognitive perception (pratyabhijñā) could not take place, if the rememberer and knower were different. One must endure through time as the same identical subject to be able to remember, have desire, commitments, responsibility etc. In favour of the classical Brahmanical position the author argues that if a person is nothing more than a bundle of different fleeting psycho-physical states, none of them can be plausibly explained. The paper brings out also some connections between the Indian and the Western debates over the personal identity problem.
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