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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 5
434-450
EN
The postclassical conception of phenomenality, which represent the new French phenomenology is marked by an 'expropriation' of phenomena, certain autonomy of appearing as related to the subject of the (intentional) consciousness, as well as by certain autonomy of appearing as related to the world. A twofold question is asked about the appearing as such; it is this question the paper tries to outline: 'a phenomenon and nothing else but it' (M. Richir) and 'giving the phenomena themselves' (donation) (J.-L. Marion). In spite of their different starting points and different ways these and other authors deal with the problems they share one point: fundamentally appearing is an event: in its origin a phenomenon is not an instantiation of something else, i. e. a particular case of becoming, an actualization of some general, structure of potentialities, given in advance (i. g. of world, being, life, consciousness). Therefore it is always its own principle and so, in a sense, an 'ultimate' principle of Phenomenology.
EN
Time and music both impart a certain sense of continuity and succession on our imagination. Moreover, music always begins from a few first notes that activate our inventiveness and make us imagine how the melody will run further on. Similarly our conscious life begins from a few initial presupposition that we can develop and continue in different directions. In both cases the beginnings are of utmost importance. They promise more that life usually permits, introduce a sense of rhythm and order, open new horizons and probe the limits of our liberty. It is also interesting that both time and music are open to retrospective reinterpretations. The actual point of departure is to some extent arbitrary and/or conventionally imposed. The continuation is exposed to a risk of dissonance or a wasted opportunity. But it can also lead to unexpected or undeserved satisfaction. Finally the effect can mean many different things to different people.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 4
315 – 322
EN
The paper tries to shed light on the development of the phenomenological thinking of two founding fathers of phenomenology: Brentano and Husserl. Through the criticism of psychologism it approaches the classical modern thesis articulated already by Descartes in his Meditations, namely that our inner being and consciousness are given to us more directly than the being of nature. This psychic/physical dualism as well as holding the psychic independent of its physical environment (i.e. Husserlian preserving a transcendental position), were ever more inconsistent. It was approaching the objectified soul in the same exact way as the nature that paved the way to empirical psychology. Husserl’s aiming at so called “pure psychology”, even though underpinned by the transcendental subjectivity, resulted in the rise of a phenomenological stream, which hoped to justify its claims by recourse to the original encounter of humans with things within the pre-scientific frame of natural world.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 8
221-231
EN
The paper remembers some features of the Husserlian conception of the phenomenon in order to show the ways of the inversion imposed to it by Levinas, namely in his book 'Totalité et infini' and in his article 'Intentionnalité et sensation'. In these texts it is still possible to maintain a fundamental description of the phenomenon as 'experience/vécu/Erlebnis' even with 'intentionality' and 'sensation' as its components. The rejection of the concept of 'representation' as the very fundament of appearance by Levinas does not make obsolete any use of those concepts which locate an important dimension of the phenomenality to the interiority of the experience, in the subjectivity. Even if the subjectivity in Levinas seems to admit no homogeneous unity and seems to be constituted by the different kinds of the relations to an exteriority the phenomena implicated in these relations remain inner sensual experiences.
EN
This study is conceived as a partial contribution to the extensive literary-theoretical issues of the so-called poetics of the inexpressible, and at the same time to a reflection on the phenomenology of the French philosopher Jean-Luc Marion. The study is attentive to his inspirational concept of the saturated phenomenon and aims to explore its interpretive potential in relation to literary texts capturing the mystical experience. The literary-theoretical interpretation of the mystical experience is anchored in the Christian spiritual tradition, especially in the texts of St. Catharine of Genoa and St. Theresa of Avila, as well as in selected biblical narratives. The key to the interpretation is the concept of the so-called infused love – he understands it as the ontological heart of the mystical experience. In the context of Marion´s phenomenology of giveness, infused love be identified as „given“, i.e. what the mystic receives in abundance in the experience of theophany, more precisely to an extent that exceeds it and which intensity and distinctive quality force him to resign to the opportunity to speak about its experience in a humanly intelligible way. This knowledge motivates the expressive attainment of mystical writing as well as the creation of a special type of narrative.
EN
The paper is an interdisciplinary study, which describes the results of applying phenomenological analysis in Sartre's analysis of being, as well as the main emphases in Merleau-Ponty's explorations of body/consciousness problem. It also shows the possibilities of applying the phenomenological approach in psychotherapy, in particular in the logotherapy of Victor Frankl. The author's intention is to show the relationship between the intentional consciousness with its possibilities and limits and the conception of phenomena, which differs strongly with the respective thinkers. While for Sartre the phenomenon is a means of self-alienation and for Ponty is a means of embedding the embodied consciousness, for Frankl the phenomenon is a medium of meaning for the intentional consciousness itself.
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