Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  PRACTICAL REASON
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

Kant: Rationality as Practical Reason

100%
O'Neill O.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 4(52)
125-145
EN
Practical reasoning must provide other persons with reasons for action. It must, consequently, refrain from all presuppositions that are not available to them. This observation offers an insight into what Kant meant by the concept of legislation that is made by moral subjects. In Kant's philosophy autonomy should not be interpreted as self-expression exercised by persons who make law. Instead it is a practice of adopting maxims or 'laws' that are in no way derivative or dependent on one's preferences. Practical reason imposes on practical maxims a certain modal demand which is to be found at the foundation of his criticism of heteronomy in ethics and which supports his arguments for various formulations of the categorical imperative to warrant its adequacy with respect to rationality, autonomy and obligation.
2

Relacja między Kantowską filozofią teoretyczną i praktyczną w świetle dwóch pierwszych Krytyk

88%
Jabłoński P.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2010
|
vol. 38
|
issue 3
133-154
EN
The analysis of the problem designated in the title consists of two parts. The first, which is preparatory, presents Kant’s essential notions in theoretical and practical philosophy. The second part is an attempt to disclose the subtlety of his construction. The considerations concentrate on the following issues: 1. The key distinction for practical and theoretical cognition is the contradiction between two types of mindset rather than between two objective domains. 2. Theoretical and practical reason strictly cooperate with each other. Theoretical philosophy not only prepares the field for practical considerations, but also enriches its own activity by incorporating the latter’s achievements. 3. Since practical reason represents its own object, which turns out to be the subject, practical cognition is an effort of being the best possible version of ourselves. 4) Kant does not require that theoretical reason disclaim its eligibility to speculate about God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul, but he only notes that it is necessary to be aware of the inability of theoretical cognition in resolving these matter.
3

HUME ON THE LIMITS OF REASON IN THE REALM OF THE PRACTICAL: SOME ARISTOTELIAN OBSERVATIONS

75%
Kuna M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2007
|
vol. 14
|
issue 3
303-319
EN
This essay examines critically the impact of Hume's conception of reason on ethics. In Hume's empirical ethics, the role traditionally attributed to reason is played by sentiment. Hume's conception of reason and its ethical implications are presented and possible objections to the limits he imposed on the role of reason in ethics are indicated. This analysis relies on Aristotelian arguments, and suggests that reason seems to play a more significant role in human action than Hume claimed. The paper concludes that showing Hume's restrictions on reason in human action as incorrect remains a genuine possibility.
4
Content available remote

Klíčové a diskutabilní partie v Akvinského koncepci lex naturalis

75%
Caha A.
Studia theologica
|
2005
|
vol. 7
|
issue 3
1-17
EN
The article deals with the basic features of the natural law theory according to Thomas Aquinas and the open questions that follow from this conception. The most important features of the natural law theory according to Thomas are the participation of natural law in eternal law, the natural law grasped as the law of reason and natural inclinations. His conception also contains many issues that are always open and controversial. This article presents three issues: a complete list of common precepts of the natural law, the meaning of the eternal law for the natural law, and the problem of the good - how we shall understand the good within the context of natural law.
5

RICOEUR O PRAKTICKOM ROZUME

63%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 4
295 – 306
EN
The article deals with Ricoeurʼs idea of how we use reason in our praxis, i.e. with what in Kantian vocabulary is referred to as practical reason and in Aristotelian terminology as practical wisdom (phronesis). The question is whether this mode of reason, as incommensurable with the rigorous theoretical reason as it is, can be taken as valid. Can Ricoeurʼs approach, trying to reconcile the two incompatible conceptions mentioned above, be of help in resolving this question? Here we have to test the arguments in support of two Ricoeur’s ideas: 1) Practical reason is to be preserved as a specific mode of reason, which is irreducible to any other one. 2) The role of practical reason is not implemented by keeping its distance from practical experience (as demanded by Kant), but rather by being a prudent moral judgement in a particular situation. This, however, does not mean disregarding the morality of duty.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.