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EN
Techniques presented as psychotherapies without evidence for effective treatment constitute a long-standing and under-researched issue within clinical psychology. We report on an exploratory study using a cross-sectional sample (N = 538) to find predictors and profiles of use of Complementary and Alternative Psychotherapies (CAP). Five well-established constructs were assessed: help-seeking preferences, psychiatric scepticism, mental health literacy, psychological mindedness, and psychotherapy expectancy. Religiosity, help-seeking, distrust in mental health care, interest in psychological phenomena, expectations of relationship with the psychotherapist, and belief in the effectiveness of alternative psychotherapies positively predicted use of CAP. Parallel analyses of evidence-based psychotherapies and alternative medicine revealed that some of these predictors are specific to CAP. Latent profile analysis identified three profiles among users of alternative psychotherapies, conceptualized as religious, unmotivated, and analytical. We discuss our results in relation to these profiles, suggesting various implications and lines of research.
Psychologia Społeczna
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2008
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vol. 3
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issue 4(9)
336-339
EN
T. Witkowski’s provocation has shown three groups of mechanisms (irrational, rational, and socio-economic) of building pseudoscientific “theories” at the junction of scientific psychology and practice. This paper is focused on rational mechanisms. It is argued that pseudoscientific concepts are often accepted on the basis of an implicit assumption that they are guaranteed by experts and the research in other domains from which they borrow their terminology. This assumption is a consequence of the division of labor in science. A complementary mechanism is the tendency to build false conceptual dichotomies, illustrated in the commentary by the concept of explicit/implicit memory (Bedford, 1997), as well as the dichotomized assignment of mental function to brain hemispheres, inspired by works of Sperry and his colleagues on the “split brain”. Finally I try to show how these mechanisms together may lead to the false feeling of understanding and belief that functions of the mind can be controlled.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 10
735 – 751
EN
The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. We can think of normative solutions to it only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem.
EN
This article is a continuation of the discussion started by Witkowski and Fortuna. Both authors deserve recognition for bringing to our attention how relatively easy it is to popularize pseudo-scientific methods. On the other hand, it does not mean that these pseudoscientific methods will immediately find wide recognition among psychotherapists. The author of this commentary wonders why some pseudo-scientific methods can be popularized so easily. The authors’ argument, that the functioning of pseudo-therapy is possible due to the indifference of academic psychologists, is an oversimplification. The author discusses the various roots of this phenomenon such as, for example, lack of dialogue between practitioners and academics. The language of science is often too insular for practitioners who look for concepts that can be implemented in their work and not those that meet criteria of science. The role of academics does not consist in supervising psychotherapists but in answering questions posed by practitioners and by providing assistance in assessing which methods used in psychotherapy are evidence-based.
EN
The critique by Witkowski and Fortuna of pseudoscience which sometimes serves as a theoretical basis of psychotherapy is valid, but the authors should take into account that the border between pseudoscience and academic psychology is vague and difficult to define.
EN
In this commentary I argue that the Author of the provocation showed moral courage, however he did not escape the sin of over-generalization in evaluating reactions of the academic community to the provocation. The observed lack of unambiguous support to the Author’s effort may be explained in a number of ways. First, psychotherapy tends to be perceived as not scientific, due to its tradition, the way it is practiced, and the prevalent optimistic bias as to its effects. Second, forces of a free market create demand for the pseudoscientific practices that promise improvement of life quality. Third, the deep irrationality as revealed in a general acceptance of beliefs that contradict scientific knowledge may lead to higher tolerance of pseudoscientific concepts.
EN
The article deals with the relationship between academic psychology, pseudoscience and psycho-business. The first part discusses possible methods of eliminating pseudoscience. Described is the first Author’s provocation carried out in 2007 in the popular science journal “Charaktery”. Its main purpose was to demonstrate that it is possible for pseudoscience to be judged credible by journal editors and its readers. In the next step, reactions of the academic community to the provocation were classified and analyzed. Four basic strategies were described: ignorance, playing down, reorientation, and exploitation. In the further parts of the article there are presented results of a short study in which a group of students was asked to judge how credible and how interesting the therapy described in the provocation was. In readers’ opinions the text was credible. Based on these results the authors conclude that it is relatively easy to introduce a new fake therapy into everyday practice. The authors believe that the indifferent attitude of the psychological community may play a crucial role in this process.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 7
530 – 544
EN
The demarcation of science is discussed in a wider context of differentiating the elements of scientific knowledge from non-scientific or pseudoscientific cognitive fields. The traditional epistéme/doxa approach fails in differentiating the scientific from non-scientific. To resolve the problem of demarcation the arguments of the demarcation relation have to be made explicit. The heuristics of the explication is seen in the concept of the theory of science. It is suggested that the pluralistic character of the contemporary science should not be conceived as a hindrance to solving the problem of demarcation. Further, the specification of the objects of demarcation on both sides of the demarcation relation makes the possibilities as well as limits of demarcation more visible.
EN
The article is an answer to the commentaries on our article On psycho-business, tolerance and responsibility, or strategies of pure scientists. In the first part we summarize and comment upon the few proposals that have been made of how to counteract pseudoscience and psycho-business. In the next part we express our doubts as to the role and tasks of science that have been described by participants in the discussion. An analysis of the so-called junk science produced by the scientific community is presented in justification of our doubts. The subsequent part of the article is devoted to controversies related to differences in understanding of the concepts of pseudoscience, quasi-science and proto-science by the authors of the commentaries. We also analyzed the legal aspect of the provocation and discussed the issue of responsibility for its results, as well as answered the criticisms re: the placebo effect, limiting of the discussion solely to the area of psychotherapy, and the methodology of the research presented in the original article. A part of our article was devoted to answering some individual accusations and doubts expressed by the authors of the discussion. In summary, two points of view were juxtaposed. On the one hand the picture that emerges from the opinions shared by participants of the discussion is that threats presented in the original article were exaggerated and pseudoscience is difficult to define and control. In answer to this point of view, we presented facts that testify to the presence of pseudoscience in many high education institutions as well as in official curricula.
Communication Today
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2014
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vol. 5
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issue 2
4-19
EN
In this article, the author addresses some challenges to information searches and information evaluation which were brought by the Internet. Large segments of audience are exaggerating their awareness and do not realize that their online behavior is driven more by emotions than by critical assessment of primary sources. The result is growing popularity of conspiracy theories, pseudoscience, propaganda, and alternative medicine. These are all examples of biased reasoning. Due to scientists, scholars, teachers, and journalists, this trend can be considered as a potential threat to public health and democracy. Publics incapable of informed choices can be manipulated to support radical political utopia or to reject evidence based treatments. Some basic principles of media literacy, scientific literacy and critical thinking are outlined. They can be used as tools for raising awareness, enhancing reasoning and adopting more objective perspective. This article is based on assumption that behind irrational beliefs there often lies anxiety, precondition for distrust derived from childhood. Not only general users of the Internet tend to overestimate their competence in domains of their interest (so called Dunning-Kruger effect), their behavior may be affected by unrecognized emotional agenda (cautious monitoring of environment for danger, suspicious attitude towards authority figures and official sources of information). The article is enclosed with some recommendation how to evaluate information sources on the Internet and how to be more empathetic in online discussions in order to inspire to reasonable and healthy choices.
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