Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 10

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  PUWP
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The article aims to verify whether, in the 1980s, there was a significant decrease in the involvement of the regional communist party structures in charge of economic affairs in Poland. The analysis is made on the case of the Warsaw Committee (KW) of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP). Archival documents gathered in the State Archive in Warsaw were used to perform the analysis. The protocols of the meetings of the Executive and Secretariat 1970–1989 were collected, described and analysed. Moreover, the analysis was supplemented by the Statistical Yearbooks of Warsaw (GUS, 1957–1974), the Statistical Yearbooks of the Capital City of Warsaw (GUS, 1976–1981) and the Journal of Laws of the People's Republic of Poland 1970–1989. A statistical analysis of economic activity of the KW of the PUWP in the context of macroeconomic variables and economic activity of central authorities was performed. The correlation coefficient between macroeconomic performance and Party activity indicates the convergence of both trends in the 1970s and the lack of correlation in the 1980s. The decline in engagement after 1978 was unprecedented. In this period, there was a discrepancy between the activities of the central government and the Party apparatus, which remained in place until the end of the system. Institutional mechanisms in the Principal–Agent relation weakened significantly in 1980s.
EN
According to its bylaws, the plenary sittings of the Central Committee of the PUWP were the highest authority in the party between the latter's conferences. Although in the 1970s they were convened almost one and a half times as frequently as in the Wladyslaw Gomulka years, it is difficult to ascertain whether this change signified that the importance of this body was reduced or enhanced. Supplementing the plenary debates by issue-oriented debates, carried out in working groups, was undoubtedly a significant contribution made by Gierek to history of this institution. The role performed by the plenary sitting of the Central Committee in the political system of PPR may be considered on two planes. Most researchers agree that the meetings of the full members and alternate members of the Central Committee, held every few months, were a manifestation of the ritualisation of official life; they were thus a typical example of a 'feigned institution', as described by professor Jan Lutynski. The long, but generality-filled speeches, devoid of a punch line, and the unanimous voting, all this is persuasive of the argument that the plenary sittings served neither decision making nor agreeing positions but were rather more an imitation of 'collegiality' in running the party and the state. On the other hand, the significance of the plenary sittings increased in times of crisis. It was at the sittings of the CC that 1st Secretaries were recalled and their successors were appointed. It was not by accident that, in the periods of social disturbance, both Gomulka and Gierek attempted to prevent the plenary sittings to be convened. A careful analysis of the transcribed reports also indicates that not all the CC's sittings proceeded according to the leaders' expectation. These conclusions are confirmed in the reminiscences of the former PUWP dignitaries. They admit that the ritual of the plenary sitting made it possible for the participants to communicate their expectations and opinions to the Politburo. Every plenary sitting thus had its hidden dimension, visible only to those observers who belonged to the political elite and were well familiar with the nuances of party Newspeak. A CC meeting was a unique institution, in view of its multilayered structure, which served to establish, as described by Krzysztof Dabek, 'a fragile hierarchy of influence' among the members of the elite.
EN
The article is devoted to highlighting the position and actions of various political forces and the world community regarding the socio-political processes in Poland in the mid-1950’s. In world history, 1956 was marked by significant historical events in countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Especially deep changes occurred in the Soviet block. The Polish October (the first socio-political crisis in the Polish People’s Republic) occupies a significant place in the social and political life and in the international relations of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the mid-1950 s. The study of the events of 1956 in the Polish People’s Republic as a phenomenon of domestic political and international life becomes particularly relevant due to geopolitical changes in Central and Eastern Europe, which took place at the end of the twentieth century. An analysis of the reaction of leading world powers to the events in Poland suggests that the Polish October played a significant role in relations between the western countries and the USSR, as well as in a certain change of the latter’s policy towards to the countries of the socialist bloc. On the whole, Polish October weakened international tension. A certain balance of power was established on the international scene. The peaceful overcoming of the crisis in Poland solved the problem of stabilizing the situation in the center of the confrontation of the two military-political blocs. A comprehensive analysis of the events of 1956 in Poland indicates a systemic crisis in the countries of the Soviet bloc. The Polish socio-political crisis is not only a top priority in the history of Poland, but also acquired world significance. The peculiarity of Poland’s October is that crisis phenomena, exacerbated within the country and reinforced by foreign policy factors, were resolved peacefully. It was precisely this event that helped to maintain a delicate balance between Western countries and the USSR. For the global world, the Polish events of 1956 did not start the change in the East-West coordinate system, but they significantly influenced the political climate in Europe. The experience of solving international problems accumulated in this period became the basis of the construction of international relations on the European continent, which retained its main features almost until the end of the 1960’s and subsequently found its embodiment in the policy of détente.
EN
Włodzimierz Sokorski is regarded as one of the most colourful characters associated with the power elite of the Polish People’s Republic, although there are no scientific attempts to verify his real position among politically influential people and his relations with them. The latter could have had a significant impact on the degree of the party apparatus’ interference with the work he was performing on different positions he held. The purpose of the article is to fill in these gaps for the period when Włodzimierz Sokorski was a president of the Radio Committee (1956–72). Basing on the analysis of both archival and printed sources, the author outlines the circumstances related to Sokorski’s appointment to the chairmanship of the Committee together with the importance of his relations with Władysław Gomułka and Zenon Kliszko for his future political career, and the reasons for which he was dismissed from the Committee under Edward Gierek team. A considerable place is devoted to the reflections on President Sokorski’s attitude in crucial moments for the government system (‘Polish months’). On the margin of the article, a problem of personnel purges in the Polish Radio and Television was raised, the largest taking place during his tenure in 1957–59 and in March ’68.
PL
Włodzimierz Sokorski uchodzi za jedną z barwniejszych postaci kojarzonych z elitą władzy PRL, choć brakuje – jak do tej pory – naukowych prób weryfikacji, jaką naprawdę pozycję zajmował w gronie wpływowych politycznie osób i jakie relacje go z nimi łączyły. Te ostatnie mogły mieć znaczący wpływ na stopień ingerencji aparatu partyjnego w pracę na zajmowanych przez niego stanowiskach. Artykuł stawia sobie za cel wypełnienie tych luk w odniesieniu do okresu, kiedy Włodzimierz Sokorski pełnił funkcję prezesa Radiokomitetu (1956–1972). Na podstawie analizy źródeł archiwalnych i już opublikowanych autor zarysował okoliczności związane z powołaniem Sokorskiego na stanowisko, znaczenie relacji, jakie łączyły go z Władysławem Gomułką i Zenonem Kliszką, dla dalszego biegu kariery politycznej oraz powody, dla których został odwołany z Komitetu już za rządów ekipy Edwarda Gierka. Istotne miejsce w tekście zajmują rozważania na temat postawy prezesa Sokorskiego w chwilach przełomowych dla systemu władzy („polskie miesiące”). Na marginesie artykułu poruszono ponadto wątek czystek kadrowych w Polskim Radiu i Telewizji, które największe rozmiary przybrały za jego kadencji w latach 1957–1959 oraz w okresie Marca 1968 r.
EN
Artykuł dotyczy tzw. struktur poziomych w PZPR, będących nieformalnymi, pozastatutowymi formami współpracy między Podstawowymi Organizacjami Partyjnymi. Zjawisko było charakterystyczne dla kryzysu z lat 1980–1981 i stanowiło część liberalnego nurtu w partii. W tekście przybliżono działalność Partyjnej Komisji Koordynacyjnej Warszawskiego Środowiska Naukowego – zakres podejmowanych przez nią zagadnień związanych z „odnową” PZPR, relacje z aparatem warszawskim i centralnym oraz proces pacyfikacji środowiska po wprowadzeniu stanu wojennego. Communist horizontal structures in the Warsaw academic community in 1980–1981After the agreement concluded with the “Solidarity” in summer of 1980, it was obvious that the crisis would also have an impact on the relations between members of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP). The Political Bureau of the Central Committee as well as the rest of the apparatus divided into two wings. Liberals wanted further cooperation with the Solidarity and democratisation of the Party’s structures. Conservatives (also called dogmatics) were eager to fight against the opposition and therefore maintain discipline in their own ranks in order to be more efficient in that struggle. Meanwhile, ordinary members massed in the Basic Party Organizations along with their leaders from the lower level of the apparatus started to articulate their disappointment and criticism of the PUWP policy and leadership. The phenomenon was most apparent at the universities and the most numerous industrial party cells. Basic organizations started to cooperate with each other, making the so-called “horizontal structures” (in opposition to vertical structures regulated in the Party’s statute). One of that structures was the Party Coordination Commission of the Warsaw Scientific Community. It was established in November 1980 and consisted of representatives of the universities and the Polish Academy of Sciences as well as representatives of workers invited to the Commission. The main issue discussed during the Commission meetings was general democratization, especially of the PUWP. The head of capital’s communist apparatus Stanisław Kociołek supported that movement but probably it was a tactical decision made to please own members in order to have a free hand to deal with the “Solidarity” regarded as the main threat to hegemony of the Party. This uncomfortable partnership lasted almost until the introduction of martial law in December 1981 which delegalized any informal (both dogmatic and horizontal) structures.
PL
Artykuł stanowi pierwszą naukową próbę nakreślenia portretu politycznego Jerzego Łukaszewicza jako działacza z najwyższych kręgów władzy partyjnej. W oparciu o kwerendę archiwalną oraz analizę ogólnodostępnych źródeł odtworzono okoliczności, jakie towarzyszyły jego nominacji na stanowisko sekretarza propagandy KC, a także zbadano wybrane aspekty działalności Łukaszewicza w KC PZPR. W tekście znalazły się rozważania na temat zróżnicowanego podejścia sekretarza do poszczególnych instytucji medialnych czy stosunku do kwestii reformy modelu propagandy, o którą w 1975 r. zabiegali jego podwładni. Autor stara się naświetlić pozycję polityczną Łukaszewicza w ówczesnym obozie władzy i przedstawić powody jego politycznego upadku.
EN
The article is the first scholarly attempt to sketch a political portrait of Jerzy Łukaszewicz as an activist from the highest circles of the party leaders. On the basis of an archival query and analysis of available sources, the article’s author reconstructs the circumstances that accompanied his nomination as the secretary of propaganda of the Central Committee, and examine selected aspects of Łukaszewicz’s activity in the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP). The text contains my reflections on the secretary’s diverse approach to individual media institutions, or his attitude towards the reform of propaganda model his subordinates wanted to implement in 1975. The author tries to shed light on Łukaszewicz’s political position in the power camp of the era and to present the reasons for his political fall.
EN
The conclusion of the state commission addressed in 1972 to Zakopane was: “in Zakopane, the state is in a position worse than in capitalism. It has been reduced to the role of not even a night-watchman, but of an unpaid street-sweeper”. The peculiar “autonomy” of Podhale-Region was affected by historical, social, cultural and geographical conditions that are usually mentioned, on the other hand the state was also an important actor and nowise ambiguous. The tendency to take a strict supervision of sectors decisive for the image and the importance of Zakopane and the Tatra region – tourism and sport, existed at the central level since the mid of ‘50s to the ‘80s, but at the regional level, the policy encountered very strong limitations. On the one hand, the reason for that was the emergence of specific social networks linking the private sector with the structures of local government, state and party, or even with the police and judicatory, on the other only thanks to them it was possible – under the organizational inefficiency of the state – to fulfill the modernizing society needs for leisure and related services, that were instantly growing after 1956. Only in the first half of 70s the socialist state was able to provide a relatively rational program, thanks to being an influential factor for modernization mostly thanks to still being in disposal of material resources. However, in the period of disintegration of the system, in the end of ‘70s and in the ‘80s, state’s program was no longer a barrier and alternative for the social actors.
PL
W konkluzji partyjnej komisji wysłanej w 1972 r. do Zakopanego stwierdzano, że „państwo w Zakopanem zostało postawione w sytuacji gorszej niż w kapitalizmie, bowiem zostało zepchnięte na pozycje nawet nie nocnego stróża, ale bezpłatnego dróżnika i zamiatacza ulic”. Na tę swoistą „autonomię Podhala miały wpływ uwarunkowania historyczne, społeczne, kulturowe i geograficzne, typowe dla społeczeństw (wysoko)górskich na całym świecie. Z drugiej strony ważnym aktorem było pod Tatrami również państwo, które od początku lat 50. do końca lat 80. XX w. próbowało objąć ścisłym nadzorem turystykę i sport, sektory decydujące o wizerunku i znaczeniu Zakopanego i regionu tatrzańskiego. Polityka taka napotykała jednak na szczeblu regionalnym na bardzo silne ograniczenia i sprzeciwy. Z jednej strony przyczyną tego stanu rzeczy były specyficzne sieci społeczne łączące sektor prywatny ze strukturami samorządowymi, państwowymi i partyjnymi, a nawet z milicją i wymiarem sprawiedliwości. Z drugiej zaś tylko dzięki przymknięciu oczu na często sprzeczną z obowiązującym prawem aktywność gospodarczą aktorów społecznych, zarówno górali, jak i przyjezdnych, było możliwe – przy niewydolności organizacyjnej państwa – zaspokajanie rosnących błyskawicznie po 1956 r. potrzeb modernizującego się społeczeństwa na usługi rekreacyjne. Dopiero w pierwszej połowie lat 70. socjalistyczne państwo było w stanie, dzięki zwiększonemu finansowaniu, zapewnić w miarę racjonalny rozwój infrastruktury turystycznej (np. Hotel Kasprowy). Jednak już od drugiej połowy lat 70. strukturalny kryzys systemu i w następnej dekadzie jego całkowita dezintegracja doprowadziły do sytuacji, w której instytucje państwowe musiały ustąpić pola aktorom społecznym.
EN
This article attempts to present the attitudes of Warsaw workers between 1955 and 1957 and the functioning of party organisations in the industry during crisis time. The source base for the study, apart from the literature on the subject, was the archival material of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) of various levels, from factory units to voivodeship ones, mainly of ten large Warsaw factories (kept in the State Archives in Warsaw, branch at Milanówek). The subject of research was the behaviour and opinions of workers and the functioning of basic party cells and their evolution in the wake of the most important political events. The analysis also focused on the factors shaping the situation in Warsaw factories, the main stages of the crisis and the post-October ‘normalisation’ of workplace party cells, and the main models of attitudes of their members. The bottom-up perspective also made it possible to formulate conclusions about the sources of the crisis inside the PZPR, the course of factional fights, and the post-October PZPR leadership policy.
PL
Artykuł jest próbą przedstawienia postaw warszawskich robotników w latach 1955– 1957 oraz funkcjonowania organizacji partyjnych w przemyśle w momencie kryzysu. Podstawę źródłową badań, oprócz literatury przedmiotu, stanowiły materiały archiwalne PZPR różnych szczebli od zakładowego po wojewódzki, głównie dziesięciu dużych warszawskich przedsiębiorstw (są przechowywane w Archiwum Państwowym w Warszawie, ekspozytura w Milanówku). Przedmiotem badań były zachowania i opinie robotników oraz funkcjonowanie podstawowych organizacji partyjnych i ich ewolucja w rytm wyznaczany przez najważniejsze wydarzenia polityczne. Przedmiotem analizy były także czynniki kształtujące sytuację w warszawskich fabrykach, najważniejsze etapy kryzysu i popaździernikowej „normalizacji” zakładowych organizacji partyjnych, główne modele postaw ich członków. Oddolna perspektywa pozwoliła też na sformułowanie wniosków co do źródeł kryzysu wewnątrz PZPR, przebiegu walk frakcyjnych i polityki popaździernikowego kierownictwa PZPR.
EN
In the political system of Peoples’ Republic of Poland, Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) for more than four decades has played a key role in all areas of country’s policy. In the end of the 80’s, as a result of changes in Poland, fractures within the Party deepened. They were a result of differences in understanding of the requirements for, the scale and pace of reforms both in the party and the country. The article follows the last few months of functioning of PZPR when, after the June ’89 elections, a deep division within the party took place. Consequently it has been dissolved during the 11th Congress, fated by, inter alia, crisis of confidence in own arguments, strength and own leaders. This moment is a major key in the process of destruction of political system, that has been functioning in Poland since 1940’s.
PL
W systemie politycznym PRL PZPR przez ponad cztery dekady odgrywała kluczową rolę we wszystkich sferach polityki państwa. W końcu lat 80., w wyniku zachodzących w Polsce procesów, podziały wewnątrz PZPR pogłębiały się. Wynikały one ze zróżnicowanego rozumienia potrzeb, skali oraz tempa reform tak w partii, jak i w państwie. Artykuł przybliża ostatnie miesiące funkcjonowania PZPR, kiedy to po wyborach w czerwcu 1989 roku nastąpił w niej głęboki podział. W efekcie na XI Zjeździe została rozwiązana, o czym przesądził m.in. ogromny kryzys zaufania we własne racje, siły i kierownictwo ugrupowania. Moment ten stanowi istotny element w procesie destrukcji systemu politycznego funkcjonującego w Polsce od lat 40. XX wieku.
EN
The article presents the social characteristics of the Żerań Passenger Car Factory (PCF) staff in 1956 against the background of the nationwide working class. Their profile was similar to the ‘old’ industrial centres. The staff composition, made up of a relatively large number of workers of the proletarian productive type, cultivating traditional values and capable of collective action in defence of their interests, could have had a significant impact on the attitude of the PCF workers (both those belonging to the party and non-party staff) in 1956. This was reflected in the election, against informal guidelines, of a young worker, Lechosław Goździk, as secretary of the PCF Works Committee, and in the rejection of official trade unions and support for the ‘Żerań’ project to create a workers’ self-government.
PL
Artykuł przedstawia społeczną charakterystykę załogi FSO na Żeraniu w 1956 r. na tle ogólnopolskiego środowiska robotniczego. Jej profil był zbliżony do „starych” ośrodków przemysłowych. Skład załogi, złożonej z relatywnie dużej liczby robotników typu proletariacko-produktywnego, pielęgnujących tradycyjne wartości i zdolnych do działań zbiorowych w obronie swoich interesów, mógł mieć duże znaczenie dla postawy robotników FSO (partyjnych i bezpartyjnych) w 1956 r. Jej przejawem był wybór na sekretarza Komitetu Zakładowego FSO, wbrew nieformalnym wytycznym, młodego robotnika Lechosława Goździka oraz odrzucenie oficjalnych związków zawodowych i poparcie „żerańskiego” projektu utworzenia samorządu robotniczego.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.