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EN
The target of publication is presenting and analysis of content the message Radio Olsztyn relating wars in Persian Gulf. Messages from Iraq dominated regional inquiry services at the beginning of 2003, together with beginning of armed conflict between coalition of international powers and army of Iraq. Inquiry services on all the world gave Information from that battle-field. In article considered themes like: beginning of occupation of Iraq, conquest Bastra and Bagdad, imprisonment two Polish correspondents of: Polish Radio and television TVN24, and next liberation of them. After end of activities war – radio informed about social situation in Iraq, catching Saddam Husajn and continued occupation of country by international powers. Analysis the message of Radio Olsztyn showed, that political information from world was 30 pct in year 2003. So detailed remittance from war – activities in Iraq disturbed regional character of broadcasting station.
PL
Celem opracowania jest zaprezentowanie i analiza treści wiadomości Radia Olsztyn dotyczących wojny w Zatoce Perskiej. Wiadomości z Iraku zdominowały regionalne serwisy informacyjne na początku 2003 roku, wraz z rozpoczęciem konfliktu zbrojnego między koalicją sił międzynarodowych a armią Iraku. Informacje z pola walki podawały serwisy informacyjne na całym świecie. W artykule poruszane są takie tematy, jak: rozpoczęcie okupacji Iraku, zdobycie Basry i Bagdadu, uwięzienie dwóch polskich korespondentów: Polskiego Radia i telewizji TVN24 oraz ich uwolnienie. Po zakończeniu działań wojennych radio informowało o sytuacji społecznej w Iraku, schwytaniu Saddama Husajna i dalszej okupacji kraju przez siły międzynarodowe. Analiza wiadomości Radia Olsztyn wykazała, że w roku 2003 informacji politycznych ze świata było 30 proc. Tak szczegółowy przekaz z działań wojennych w Iraku zaburzył regionalny charakter rozgłośni.
EN
The purpose of the article is to show economic, political, and geopolitical factors that have influenced relations between Iran and the countries of the Persian Gulf on the other. It is material that they are examined separately at the level of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and separately for the individual Arab states that belong to the Council. The article suggests that each state in the Gulf runs its individual policy toward Iran, and a different one as part of cooperation within the Council. In result, the Council itself is weakened and its balancing role in the region is decreasing. Policies of Arab states outside the Council are more critical for the relations with Iran than the policy of the Cooperation Council itself.
EN
Although Iran borders with many states and has direct access to the Caspian Sea as well as the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf region seems to be the most vital area to its security and prosperity. Yet since the 70’s Iran’s relations with the Arab states in the region have been rather strained and complex. The main reason for that had been the success of the Islamic revolution in 1979 which later resulted in a new dimension of Sunni-Shia rivalry. Moreover, post-revolutionary Iranian authorities also intended to maintain the regional hegemony from the Imperial State of Iran period. As a result, successive Iranian governments competed for hegemony in the Persian Gulf with the littoral Arab states which consolidated their regional positions due to close links and intensive cooperation with the West especially with the United States. Despite some political and economic initiatives which were undertaken by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, this rivalry was also evident between 2005–2013. The main aim of this article is to find out whether Iranian foreign policy towards the Arab states in the Persian Gulf region has undergone any significant changes since Hassan Rouhani became the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in August 2013. According to Mohammad Reza Deshiri, the Iranian foreign policy after 1979 can be divided into so-called waves of idealism and realism. During dominance of idealism values and spirituality are more important than pragmatism while during the realistic waves political as well as economic interests prevail over spirituality. Iranian idealism is connected with export of revolutionary ideas, Shia dominance as well as the restoration of unity among all muslims (ummah). On this basis both presidential terms of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad can be classified as ‘waves of idealism’, albeit some of his ideas were very pragmatic. The question is if Hassan Rouhani’s foreign policy represents a continuity or a change. Is the current Iran’s foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region idealistic or rather realistic? The main assumption is that there will be no Arab-Iranian rapprochement in the Persian Gulf without a prior normalization of political relations between Iran and the West especially the United States.
EN
The Persian Gulf region is one of the most important areas in current global security system. Vast energy resources located in the region are essential for world’s economic stability and development, which also brought constant foreign penetration of the Persian Gulf system.The Gulf Cooperation Council has been established in 1981 and since then it plays an important role as one of the regional security mechanisms. In the article the reasons behind organization’s formations are described, as well as an evolution of the integration processes is shown in historical perspective. Also, the socio-economic and military positions of the GCC members are analyzed and the main challenges faced by the organization are pointed out. The GCC still serves as coordination agenda rather than strict integration organization but in the last years we may notice growing efforts to strengthen the GCC’s mechanisms.
PL
Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
EN
Although regional states don`t seek war, it cannot be ruled out that an unfavourable development in the international arena could lead to an unintended outbreak of a full-scale conflict, which would either di­rectly or indirectly involve the Arab monarchies. In response to several threats within their proximity, these states have, for years, been pursuing several initiatives aimed at increasing their deterrence potential and inter­operability in case of a crisis. The main goal of this article is to present and assess the GCC’s threat perception, followed by an analysis of the multilat­eral and unilateral responses. The main research question concerns the de­gree to which the GCC states are able to establish a joint and effective military bloc within the Persian Gulf.
EN
Although almost every sea was dominated by Royal Navy, it couldn't reach every single place in the world. Trade company's ships and fully armed merchant ships many times had to take care of themselves. The East India Company had an independent policy that goes beyond the subcontinent. During the first decade of 19th century, the most difficult problem to solve (except the problems of India) was the Persian Gulf, which appeared to be the source of many profits and problems, that wasn't easy to solve and took a lots of time to conclude. The Treaty of 1820 solved the problems of sea and overland campaigns. The times before signing the agreement and the way, it was created are included in this article.
EN
The British Empire had tried to build its dominant position in the Persian Gulf from the second half of the 18t century. The region was seen as a key position for the security of the naval routs between Great Britain and the Indian Sub-Continent. During the 19th century, the British Empire managed, using the so-called Exclusive Treaties, to cease its control over the Arab sheikdoms of the Gulf. The Gulf ’s significance for the British Empire has risen in the eve of the Great War. After the end of WWI, Great Britain became a dominant power in the Middle East. This situation forced the British Empire to establish new rules of the political and imperial engagement in the Middle East. This process was finished in the end of the 1920s. The rules of the imperial policy towards this region that had been established that time were executed till the end of the 1940s.
PL
Począwszy od połowy XVIII wieku Imperium Brytyjskie było zaangażowane w budowanie silnej pozycji mocarstwowej w obszarze Zatoki Perskiej. Obszar ten był traktowany jako istotny dla zabezpieczenia morskich szlaków komunikacyjnych pomiędzy metropolią a Indiami Brytyjskimi. W XIX wieku Wielka Brytania zdołała w oparciu o tzw. traktaty na wyłączność uzależnić od siebie arabskie szejkanaty Zatoki, obejmując je nieformalnym protektoratem. Rola Zatoki Perskiej dla Imperium Brytyjskiego wzrosła w przededniu wybuchu I wojny światowej, z uwagi na znaczenie znajdujących się tam zasobów ropy naftowej dla Royal Navy. Zakończenie I wojny światowej i objęcie przez Wielką Brytanię pozycji dominującego mocarstwa na Bliskim Wschodzie wymusiło konieczność opracowania nowych zasad polityki imperialnej wobec tego obszaru. Wypracowanie zasad tej polityki zostało zakończone pod koniec lat 20. XX wieku. Przyjęte wtedy rozwiązania określały podstawy brytyjskiej polityki wobec subregionu Zatoki do końca lat 40. XX wieku.
EN
Hatrā was a city in Upper Mesopotamia which gained strategic importance in Irano-Roman border zone in 2nd century AD and managed to successfully resist the attempts of capturing by the Roman army. Power shift in Iran which resulted in taking over of Iranian throne by Ardašīr I (224-242) changed the situation of Hatrā. Below considerations are an attempt to analyze economic, political and first of all military factors which allowed capturing the city in 240/241 by the Sasanian army.
Mäetagused
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2014
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vol. 58
147-180
EN
War has always constituted an important part of politics in the Middle East. Evidences of wars in southern Mesopotamia (Sumer and Akkad) and in the region of the Persian Gulf can be found in written sources that date back to the Early Dynastic Period (in Sumer), approximately since 2700 or 2600 BCE. This region around the Persian Gulf (modern southern Iraq, south-western Iran, Oman, Bahrain, etc.) has always been a very important territory, both strategically and geopolitically, and a crossing point of different cultures, religions and ethnic groups since very early times. This region of the Middle East (Persian Gulf) has always been rich in different resources. In ancient times it was an economically important region because of its frankincense, woods, stones (diorite), and metals (especially copper); today it is known for oil and gas. The Persian Gulf is the territory where the first wars for economic reasons took place already 5000–4500 years ago. Many Sumerian and Akkadian rulers tried to conquer this region, since Magan (modern Oman) and Dilmun (modern Bahrain) had deposits of copper, diorite, etc. Elam, which was located in south-western Iran, was a very important area quite rich in resources, and kings of Elam were often rivals of Sumerian and Akkadian kings in their ambitions to control the region of the Persian Gulf and the Zagros Mountains. This was the reason why in this region many military conflicts and wars between the Elamites, Sumerians and Akkadians took place.
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Jemen - the Proxy War

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EN
The military operation in Yemen is significant departure from Saudi Arabia's foreign policy tradition and customs. Riyadh has always relied on three strategies to pursue its interests abroad: wealth, establish a global network and muslim education and diplomacy and meadiation. The term "proxy war" has experienced a new popularity in stories on the Middle East. A proxy war is two opposing countries avoiding direct war, and instead supporting combatants that serve their interests. In some occasions, one country is a direct combatant whilst the other supporting its enemy. Various news sources began using the term to describe the conflict in Yemen immediately, as if on cue, after Saudi Arabia launched its bombing campaign against Houthi targets in Yemen on 25 March 2015. This is the reason, why author try to answer for following questions: Is the Yemen Conflict Devolves into Proxy War? and Who's fighting whom in Yemen's proxy war?" Research area includes the problem of proxy war in the Middle East. For sure, the real problem of proxy war must begin with the fact that the United States and its NATO allies opened the floodgates for regional proxy wars by the two major wars for regime change: in Iraq and Libya. Those two destabilising wars provided opportunities and motives for Sunni states across the Middle East to pursue their own sectarian and political power objectives through "proxy war".
EN
The development of the Chinese economy in recent years and the changing international situation has led to the People’s Republic of China increasingly seeking stable sources of energy that could feed its developing economy. The countries of the Middle East, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran, occupy a significant place in China’s energy security policy, but in the second decade of the 21st century, Beijing’s intensification of relations with Arab monarchies from the Gulf Cooperation Council can be observed. This article aims to show the role of energy security in Sino-Arab relations in the second decade of the 21st century and the importance of oil imports for the development of the economy of the People’s Republic of China.
RU
Развитие китайской экономики в последние годы и изменение международной обстановки привели к тому, что Китайская Народная Республика все чаще стремилась к стабильным источникам энергии, которые могли бы обеспечить ее развивающуюся экономику. Страны Ближнего Востока, особенно Исламская Республика Иран, занимают важное место в политике Китая в области энергетической безопасности, но во втором десятилетии ХХI века наблюдается усиление интенсификации отношений Пекина с арабскими монархиями из Совета сотрудничества стран Персидского залива. Эта статья пытается показать роль энергетической безопасности в китайско-арабских отношениях во втором десятилетии XXI века и значение импорта нефти для развития экономики Китайской Народной Республики.
EN
The countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are among the world’s largest hydrocarbon producers. Possessing of rich fossil fuels deposits has contributed to their impressive economic growth in recent decades. While oil and natural gas remain the main components of the region’s GDP, national economic policies are increasingly focused on the diversifi cation of the economy and energy production sources. The natural conditions create the prospect of increasing use of renewable energy sources, whose share in the GCC countries is still relatively small. Increasing the share of RES in the regional energy mix creates many economic and environmental benefi ts, both through the release of domestic energy production for export and the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Some GCC countries are also developing nuclear energy programs, seeing it as a method to diversify the energy mix. Energy transformation is associated with real socio-economic benefits, such as increasing energy independence and flexibility of the energy system, creating jobs in new branches of the green economy as well as mitigating climate change effects and health impact. It should be expected that renewable energy sources will play an increasingly important role in the production of electricity in the GCC countries.
PL
Państwa Rady Współpracy Arabskich Państw Zatoki należą do największych na świecie producentów węglowodorów. Posiadanie bogatych złóż paliw kopalnych przyczyniło się do ich imponującego wzrostu gospodarczego w ostatnich dekadach. Podczas gdy ropa naftowa i gaz ziemny pozostają głównymi składnikami PKB regionu, narodowe polityki ekonomiczne w coraz większym stopniu są ukierunkowane na dywersyfikację gospodarki i źródeł produkcji energii. Warunki przyrodnicze stwarzają perspektywę wzrostu wykorzystania odnawialnych źródeł energii, których udział w państwach RWAPZ jest wciąż stosunkowo niewielki. Zwiększenie udziału OZE w regionalnym koszyku energetycznym stwarza wiele korzyści gospodarczych i środowiskowych zarówno poprzez uwolnienie krajowej produkcji energii na eksport, jak i ograniczenie emisji dwutlenku węgla (CO2). Niektóre państwa RWAPZ rozwijają także programy energetyki jądrowej, upatrując w niej metodę na dywersyfikację energy mix. Transformacja energetyczna wiąże się z realnymi korzyściami społeczno-ekonomicznymi, takimi jak zwiększenie niezależności energetycznej i elastyczności systemu energetycznego, tworzenie miejsc pracy w nowych gałęziach zielonej gospodarki, a także łagodzenie skutków zmian klimatu i wpływu na zdrowie. Należy oczekiwać, iż energetyka odnawialna będzie odgrywać coraz większą rolę w produkcji energii elektrycznej w państwach RWAPZ.
EN
This article aims to show the impact of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic on international relations and state policy in the Persian Gulf through the prism of realism theory. COVID-19 became a game changer for the domestic politics of the Persian Gulf countries and for the balance of power in that subregion. The application of realism reveals the statecraft of the Arab Persian Gulf during the pandemic to be a struggle for power and its consolidation. Therefore the hypothesis of the article holds that the authoritarian Arab Gulf states used the global COVID-19 pandemic crisis to consolidate and strengthen regime power and conduct humanitarian/mask/COVID-19 diplomacy toward the regimes most affected by the pandemic, shifting the geopolitical landscape. The first part of the article presents the general assumption of the analysis and the theoretical framework. The second and the third respectively discuss domestic and foreign policies of the Arab Persian Gulf states in the face of the pandemic, highlighting strengthening authoritarian tendencies and authoritarian bilateral cooperation. The fourth part relate to the Gulf Cooperation Council and its reaction on COVID-19. The last part draws on the theoretical framework adopted in the article offer conclusions that answer research questions.
EN
This paper looks at the most important SMU GROM (Special Missions Unit GROM) combat operations conducted in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The analysis of SMU GROM participation has been conducted chronologically, taking into account the several changes that have taken place within the Polish Armed Forces. The fundamental capabilities, whose achievement was possible thanks to the involvement in numerous combat missions, have been highlighted too. The high level of SMU GROM Combat Teems professionalism and recognition achieved in international environment has been underlined, with special attention paid to the issue of the initially low level of skills of Poland’s top commanding structures of how to use special forces according to its combat dedication. The relevant conclusions have been added at the end of the study.
PL
Celem artykułu jest analiza najważniejszych operacji bojowych prowadzonych w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku przez JW GROM. Została ona przeprowadzona chronologicznie z uwzględnieniem przemian zachodzących w Siłach Zbrojnych RP. W ocenie wskazano zasadnicze zdolności, których osiągnięcie było możliwe dzięki doświadczeniom zdobytym w czasie prowadzenia wielu operacji bojowych. W analizie podkreślono wysoki profesjonalizm Zespołów Bojowych JW GROM, jak również renomę, którą zyskała jednostka w środowisku międzynarodowym. Wspomina się również o początkowo słabej umiejętności w zakresie wykorzystania jednostek wojsk specjalnych zgodnie z ich bojowym przeznaczeniem przez wyższe organy dowodzenia. Opracowanie zostało zakończone wnioskami.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza polityki monarchii Zatoki Perskiej w Rogu Afryki. Bliskie więzy historyczne między dwoma regionami dały początek głębokiej współpracy między państwami afrykańskimi i arabskimi. Monarchie Zatoki Perskiej przez długi czas rywalizowały o pogłębienie swojego wpływu politycznego, gospodarczego i bezpieczeństwa w regionie. Wzmocnienie więzi gospodarczych z Rogiem Afryki pomogło zwiększyć bezpieczeństwo żywnościowe w Zatoce Perskiej. Inwestycje arabskich monarchii w modernizację portów w Sudanie, Erytrei, Somalii i Dżibuti pomagają poprawić infrastrukturę logistyczną w północno-wschodniej Afryce. Jednocześnie szybka militaryzacja regionu spowodowana utworzeniem wielu baz wojskowych państw Zatoki Perskiej w Rogu Afryki zwiększa poziom konfliktów generowanych w regionie. Zarówno Morze Czerwone, jak i Zatoka Adeńska mają strategiczne znaczenie dla zbrojnego wsparcia kampanii wojskowej koalicji Arabii Saudyjskiej i Zjednoczonych Emiratów Arabskich w Jemenie. Dlatego też Róg Afryki również zyskał strategiczne znaczenie ze względu na konflikt w Jemenie, a ambitne państwa Zatoki Perskiej coraz bardziej angażują się w regionalną geopolitykę. Arabia Saudyjska i Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie, jako główny sojusznik Rijadu w Zatoce Perskiej, coraz częściej postrzegają Róg Afryki jako swoją „zachodnią flankę bezpieczeństwa”. Łączy je chęć zapobieżenia rosnącym wpływom Turcji, Iranu i Kataru w tej części świata. Rywalizacja między Arabią Saudyjską, Zjednoczonymi Emiratami Arabskimi, Katarem i Iranem pomaga przyciągnąć inwestycje, utrzymać ogólną stabilność i poprawić sytuację bezpieczeństwa w Rogu Afryki. Mediacja w konfliktach i gromadzenie aktywów w Rogu Afryki umożliwiły Arabii Saudyjskiej, ZEA i Katarowi ustanowienie wpływów politycznych w regionie. Państwa Zatoki Perskiej wykorzystują swoje rosnące wpływy gospodarcze, bezpieczeństwa i dyplomatyczne w Afryce, aby zmniejszyć wpływy konkurentów i uzyskać międzynarodowe poparcie na arenie światowej.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze the policy of the Gulf monarchies in the Horn of Africa. Close historical ties between two regions have given rise to deep cooperation between African and Arab states nowadays. Gulf monarchies competed for a long time to deepen their political, economic and security impact in the region. Strengthening economic ties with the Horn of Africa has helped increase food security in the Persian Gulf. Investments by Arab monarchies in modernizing ports in Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti are helping to improve logistics infrastructure in the Northeast Africa. At the same time, the rapid militarization of the region due to the establishment of a number of Gulf states military bases in the Horn of Africa is increasing the level of conflict-generating in the region. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden both have strategic importance for the armed support for the military campaign of the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates coalition in Yemen. That is why the Horn of Africa has also gained strategic importance due to the conflict in Yemen, and therefore the ambitious Gulf states have become increasingly have become increasingly involved in the regional geopolitics. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as the main ally of Riyadh in the Persian Gulf, are increasingly seeing the Horn of Africa as their “western flank of security.” They are united by the desire to prevent the growing influence of Turkey, Iran and Qatar in this part of the world. The competition between Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Iran helps to attract investments, maintain general stability and improve the security situation in the Horn of Africa. Conflict mediation and asset build-up in the Horn of Africa have enabled Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar to establish political influence in the region. The Gulf states are using their growing economic, security and diplomatic influence in Africa to reduce the influence of competitors and gain international support on the world stage.
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