Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 6

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Phaedo
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The paper discusses Moses Mendelssohn’s work Phaedo and its Polish translation which was published in 1829 by Jakub Tugendhold. Although this book did not exert impact on Polish philosophy, Tugendhold, the translator, aimed to use Mendelssohn’s biography and his Phaedo as an instructive example for those representatives of Jewish community who wanted to free themselves from isolation and undergo social and economic, though not religious, assimilation into their Polish and Christian surrounding. Moreover, the author briefly compares Plato’s and Mendelssohn’s Phaedos.
2
Content available remote

K interpretácii Sókratových posledných slov

100%
EN
The article addresses various approaches to the interpretation of Socrates’ last words in Plato’s Phaedo 118a7–8. Some of the traditional interpretations read his final statement literally and understand it as being about an unfulfilled debt to Asclepius. The majority of modern interpretations, however, give his last words an allegorical meaning, but each understands them differently. The article shows that, on the basis of linguistic analysis and the overall context into which they are inserted, we can see them as being a demand to have an unceasing concern for oneself and others, which relates not only to Socrates and his closest students, but also to us, the readers of Plato’s dialogue.
DE
Der Artikel befasst sich mit verschiedenen Interpretationsansätzen der letzten Worte des Sokrates in Platons Phaidon 118a7–8. Ein Teil der traditionellen Interpreten liest Sokrates wörtlich und versteht seine Worte als unerfüllte Schuld gegenüber Asklepios. Die meisten modernen Interpreten verstehen Sokrates´ Worte allegorisch, wobei jedoch jeder ein anderes Verständnis hat. Der Artikel zeigt, dass wir Sokrates’ letzten Worten auf Grundlage einer Sprachanalyse und des Gesamtkontextes, in den sie eingebettet sind, die Bedeutung einer Aufforderung zur beständigen Sorge um sich selbst und um Andere zuschreiben könnten, was jedoch nicht nur Sokrates und seine Schüler, sondern auch uns, die Leser von Platons Dialog betrifft.
SK
Článok sa zaoberá rôznymi prístupmi k interpretácii posledných Sókratových slov v Platónovom Faidónovi 118a7–8. Časť tradičných interpretov číta Sókratove slová doslovne a chápe ich ako nesplnený dlh Asklépiovi. Väčšina moderných interpretov však dáva Sókratovým slovám alegorický význam, ale každý z nich ich chápe inak. Článok ukazuje, že na základe jazykovej analýzy Sókratových posledných slov a celkového kontextu, do ktorého sú zasadené, by sme im mohli dať význam požiadavky neustálej starosti o seba a druhých, ktorá sa týka nielen Sókrata a jeho najbližších žiakov, ale aj nás, čitateľov Platónovho dialógu.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
|
2014
|
vol. 5
|
issue 1
199-212
EN
While the aim of the present paper is to analyze Olympiodorus’ commentary to Plato’s Phaedo, particular attention will be paid here to the role of hēdonē. The first part of the text presents the four conceptions of the pleasure that can be found in Plato’s dialogue. Although pleasure does not play the most prominent role either in the Plato’s dialogue or in the Neoplatonic commentary, Olympiodorus’ attitude to this issue reveals an important change and difference between the philosophical views of Plato and those of Olympiodorus. The latter does not seem to discern the possibility that pleasure can have its spiritual dimension (which Plato regards as possible). Thus, the experience of hēdonē is reduced solely to the sphere of the senses and even in this area its role needs to be minimized: in this form it has to be carefully measured and controled. Furthermore, Olympiodorus does not see that so-called hedonistic calculus: whilst it is not strictly speaking connected with virtuous actions, it still can have some significance for the the philosopher’s life.
EN
This paper presents Olympiodorus’ and Damascius’ explanations of the philosopher’s practice of dying in Plato’s Phaedo. It also includes a presentation of Ammonius’ exegesis of the practice of death (meletē thanatou). The Neoplatonic commentators discern two kinds of death, the bodily or physical death and the voluntary death. Olympiodorus suggests that bodily death is only an image of voluntary death and cannot be recognized as an original death, because original death presupposes the preparation for death and the constant effort for the purification of the soul during the philosopher’s life-time. Only preparation for death and purification can ensure the complete separation of the soul from the body. Relative to this distinction is that between apothnēskein and tethnanai; these infinitives denote the dual meaning of death: death as an event or a process and death as a state. Our study examines thoroughly the subtle distinctions made by Olympiodorus and Damascius and offers a comparative analysis of the two definitions of death as well as that of purification. It reaches the conclusion that apothnēskein is a necessary condition of tethnanai, i.e. of a definitive release and parting of the soul from the body. On the other hand, the process of eventual purification, a notion which betrays the religious character of purification, can be identified with apothnēskein, which is the practice of dying by the true philosopher. Finally, our study also emphasizes and explains the difference between the voluntary philosophical death and the voluntary unphilosophical suicide; the latter guaranteeing only bodily or physical death.
EN
In the De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, Aristotle aims to achieve the confirmation of his theory of the necessity of the efficient cause. In this chapter he sets out his criticism on the one hand of those who wrongly attributed the efficient cause to other kinds of causality and on the other, of those who ignored the efficient cause. More specifically Aristotle divides all preceding theories which attempted to explain generation and corruption into two groups: i) those which offered an explanation by using the formal cause ii) those which provided an explanation by using the material or the instrumental causes. According to Philopo­nus, when Aristotle reproaches the other philosophers for adducing no proper notion of the efficient cause he alludes to both Anaxagoras and Plato. Regarding Anaxagoras, in our view this cannot be confirmed by internal textual evidence. In terms of Plato, in this chapter we trace an explicit and an implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes. Aris­totle’s implicit criticism is that the Forms are not at all active causes. We can understand better the grounds for this criticism if we also consider his relevant arguments in Book Lambda of his Metaphysics. His explicit criticism, articulated in two arguments, is formulated in GC 335b18–24. We examine the different lines of its interpretation in the second­ary literature, but primarily we focus on Philoponus’ exegesis, which contributes significantly, not only to the clarification of Aristotle’s thinking, but also to the manifestation of the arguments articulated in defence of the Platonic theory of the Forms. In this paper, through the analysis of Philoponus’ exegesis we set out to prove that Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic causes can be construed from the perspective of either Aristo­telian theory or the Platonic and Neoplatonic influence. Finally, based on Philoponus’ exegesis, we examine Aristotle’s criticism of those who posited matter or instrumental causes as efficient causes.
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Darwin and Design

58%
EN
The argument from design, the proof of the existence of God from the design-like nature of the world, especially organisms, dates back to Plato in the Phaedo. Despite problems, namely the existence of evil, thanks particularly to Archdeacon William Paley’s Natural Theology, the argument was highly influential in British thought at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection, as given in his Origin of Species, challenged this hegemony. It is important to note what Darwin did and did not challenge. He accepted fully that or ganisms are design-like; that, in the language of Aristotle, they show “final causes”. Natural selection explains why this is so. He denied that this feature demands the hypothesis of a designing consciousness, namely God. Darwin was an agnostic, so did not want to deny the existence of God as such. Rather, he thought that the argument failed to prove this. Darwin’s conclusion has led to much subsequent discussion. Generally, however, the world - including Christians - agrees with him. In the words of the English theologian John Henry Newman, as a Christian one can accept that God explains design, one cannot accept that design proves God.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.