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Analiza i egzystencja w ujęciu Tadeusza Czeżowskiego i Mariana Przełęckiego

100%
Łukasiewicz D.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 15
11- 25
EN
The article presents Tadeusz Czeżowski’s and Marian Przełęcki’s conception of the role of metaphysics in philosophy. In particular, the stress is laid on the concept of existence which is considered from the ontological as well as axiological point of view. These two approaches to existence are essential constituents of the metaphysical understanding of the world. In such a context, there appears the problem of the meaning of the human existence and of the world itself. It seems that human experience of existence and of the sense of the world cannot be expressed in an adequate way in a language acceptable to the analytic philosophy, whose eminent representative was Czeżowski. In order to express the metaphysical content it is necessary to introduce to the philosophical language some new forms of expression, in particular, metaphors. Czeżowski, however, was not clear about the role of metaphors in philosophical discourse. It was Marian Przełęcki, another eminent Polish analytic philosopher and logician, who accepted metaphors as an important tool of metaphysical cognition and whose doctrine of metaphors is briefly discussed as a completion of Czeżowski’s conception of metaphysics.
2
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Analiza i egzystencja w ujęciu Tadeusza Czeżowskiego i Mariana Przełęckiego

100%
Łukasiewicz D.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 15
11-25
EN
The article presents Tadeusz Czeżowski’s and Marian Przełęcki’s conception of the role of metaphysics in philosophy. In particular, the stress is laid on the concept of existence which is considered from the ontological as well as axiological point of view. These two approaches to existence are essential constituents of the metaphysical understanding of the world. In such a context, there appears the problem of the meaning of the human existence and of the world itself. It seems that human experience of existence and of the sense of the world cannot be expressed in an adequate way in a language acceptable to the analytic philosophy, whose eminent representative was Czeżowski. In order to express the metaphysical content it is necessary to introduce to the philosophical language some new forms of expression, in particular, metaphors. Czeżowski, however, was not clear about the role of metaphors in philosophical discourse. It was Marian Przełęcki, another eminent Polish analytic philosopher and logician, who accepted metaphors as an important tool of metaphysical cognition and whose doctrine of metaphors is briefly discussed as a completion of Czeżowski’s conception of metaphysics.
3

Wokół intuicjonizmu metaetycznego Mariana Przełęckiego

94%
Jedynak A.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
|
2019
|
issue 67
63-81
PL
Choć Marian Przełęcki uważał poznanie moralne za nienaukowe, poglądy na nie modelował według swoich wcześniejszych poglądów na poznanie w naukach empirycznych. Nauka wychodzi od zdań jednostkowych, opartych na poznaniu zmysłowym i doświadczeniu, a następnie je indukcyjnie uogólnia, dochodząc do zasad. Poznanie moralne zaś wychodzi od jednostkowych ocen, których źródłem jest intuicja czy zmysł moralny, po czym uogólnia je indukcyjnie do postaci zasad etycznych. Swoje stanowisko metaetyczne nazwał zatem indukcjonistycznym intuicjonizmem. Niniejszy tekst przedstawia trzy refleksje, do jakich motywuje przemyślenie tego stanowiska: 1. Granica między intuicjonizmem a naturalizmem jest nieostra. Co więcej, wbrew rozpowszechnionemu przekonaniu i przekonaniu samego Przełęckiego, każde z tych stanowisk musi zawierać jakąś przymieszkę drugiego. 2. Istnieją pewne interesujące analogie (wykraczające poza projekt Przełęckiego) między złudzeniami zmysłowymi a złudzeniami intuicji moralnej. 3. A także analogie, dotyczące relacji, w jakie rozum wchodzi z jednej strony z poznaniem zmysłowym, a z drugiej – z intuicyjnym poznaniem moralnym.
EN
Although Marian Przełęcki considered moral cognition as non-scientific, he shaped his views on its sources and structure according to his earlier views on cognition in natural sciences. The starting point in the latter are individual sentences based on experience and sensual cognition, which are then generalized as empirical principles or laws. On the other hand, the starting point in moral cognition are individual assessments rooted in intuition or moral sense, next generalized inductively as moral principles. Therefore, Przełęcki named his metaethical views an inductive intuitionism. The paper presents three reflections evoked by those views: 1. In metaethics, the border between intuitionism and naturalism is vague. Moreover, in spite of the common view and Przełęcki’s conviction, each of those two concepts must include an admixture of the other. 2. There are some interesting analogies (going beyond Przełecki’s project) between sensual illusions and moral-sense illusions. 3. As well as there exist analogies dealing with the relations between the reason and, on the one hand, empirical cognition, and on the other hand, intuitive moral cognition.
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