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1

WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE: THE INDETERMINACY THESIS

100%
Leszczynska D.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2007
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vol. 35
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issue 2
23-44
EN
The aim of the paper is to give a partial but systematic account of Willard van Orman Quine's philosophical work. At the beginning the influence of neopositivism on Quine's philosophical attitude is sketched and the role that the criticism of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy played in the development of modern empiricism is shown. These and other issues are seen in the context of the doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation, which is the main topic of the paper. The most important consequences of the radical translation experiment are discussed, especially ontological relativity, the indeterminacy of translation and Quine's criticism of traditional semantical concepts. In the context of the empirical underdetermination thesis, the ontological character of the indeterminacy of translation is displayed. In the last part of the paper, physicalism and the assumption of the universal translatability of languages are also briefly discussed. The assumption made implicitly by Quine exemplifies his anti-relativistic standpoint.
2

EXPLODING A MYTH: C. I. LEWIS, PRAGMATISM, AND THE GIVEN

100%
Misak C.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 4
332 – 341
EN
Clarence Irving Lewis is one of the mostly unjustly neglected philosophers of the last century. This paper shows how he is the inheritor of Peirce’s view; and did not succumb to the myth of the given, but rather, put forward a view that was picked up, almost in whole, by his student Quine.
3

FOUR QUINE’S INCONSISTENCIES

100%
Picazo G.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2015
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vol. 22
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issue 2
163 - 177
EN
In this paper the author argues that the idiosyncrasy of linguistic competence fosters semantic conceptions in which meanings are taken for granted, such as the one that Quine calls ‘uncritical semantics’ or ‘the myth of the museum’. This is due to the degree of automaticity in the use of language which is needed for fluent conversation. Indeed, fluent conversation requires that speakers instinctively associate each word or sentence with its meaning (or linguistic use), and instinctively resort to the conceptual repertoire of our language, without calling into question that the meaning of a particular word, or the conceptual repertoire of our language, could have been different than they are. This habit of taking meanings for granted, inherent to our linguistic ability, sometimes interferes with our semantic research, hampering it. In order to illustrate this problem, the author pinpoints four places in Quine’s work where, despite his acknowledged analytical rigour, and despite his congenital aversion to the habit of taking meanings for granted, he himself appears to slip into this habit, inadvertently.
4

QUINE AND QUANTIFIED MODAL LOGIC: AGAINST THE RECEIVED VIEW

100%
Tuboly Á. T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2015
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vol. 22
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issue 4
545 – 518
EN
The textbook - like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, received views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of analytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified modal logic and thus it became a respectful tool for philosophers. If we accept the historical interpretation of the network between Quine, Kripke and modal logic, which is to be presented here, we have to conclude that Quine’s real philosophical animadversions against the modalities are still on the table: though Kripke has provided some important (formal-logical) answers, Quine’s animadversions are still viable and worthy of further consideration.
5
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Zagadnienie zakresu języka

100%
Godlewski R.
Filo-Sofija
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2006
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vol. 6
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issue 6
119-134
EN
The article analyses questions concerning the measure of the relation between language and the world. The author distinguishes questions related to the domains of reality that can be described in a given language (these are based on the dualism of content and conceptual scheme so they are dualistic ones) and questions related to the types of objects that you can talk about in a given language (particular ones). Besides, questions about the measure are divided into two categories: 1. ontological (concerning the objects or domains that you can talk about in a given language); 2. transcendental (concerning the experience data that can be considered in a given language). Some problems that arise in the context of presented questions are discussed. Dualistic and transcendental particular questions are recognized as incorrect. Ontological particular questions are limited only to comparisons between object languages, whereas our language (metalanguage) can never be compared to any other. All theses in the article are supported with the author’s own argumentation.
6

QUINE A NATURALISTICKÝ OMYL

100%
Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2023
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vol. 78
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issue 8
664 – 674
EN
The article focuses on the problem of normativity in Quine’s naturalized epistemology. Quine characterizes his epistemological project mainly in descriptive terms, which seemingly problematizes the normative side of epistemology. Although Quine offers a certain explanation of normativity within his conception, known as “cognitive engineering,” there is a suspicion that he commits a serious logical error, the so-called naturalistic fallacy. Two attitudes can be taken to this suspicion. First, the naturalistic fallacy is indeed present in Quine’s thinking, but it cannot be attributed a negative meaning because it is an inevitable consequence of the naturalization of epistemology. Second, Quine does not commit the naturalistic fallacy because he derives the normativity of epistemology from the “terminal parameter,” i.e. an external goal against which cognitive strategies are assessed. The latter interpretation seems to be in better agreement with Quine’s statements. In this understanding, naturalized normativity has an instrumental character, which ranks it among the tools of instrumental rationality, linked to practical aspects of human activities.
7

NEURČITOSŤ REFERENCIE A PRETRVÁVANIE V ČASE

88%
Schmidt M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 8
656 – 668
EN
According to the inscrutability of reference principle, there are source language sentences that have exact counterparts in the target language, yet some of their sentence-parts may refer to different things. One word sentence “Gavagai“ means “There is a rabbit“ though ‘rabbit’ may have different referents, among them the temporal stage of four-dimensional rabbit, or three-dimensional rabbit as a whole. It follows that ‘rabbit’ reference may be bound to either three- or four-dimensional ontologies yet the sentence where it occurs doesn’t shift its stimulus meaning. However, there are recent proposals in meta-ontology that consider the dispute between three- and four-dimensional views of particulars verbal. If that is the case, then one of the Quine’s principal examples of inscrutability of reference (and ontological relativity as well) fails. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the difference between the rival theories of particulars is not verbal and becomes evident mainly in the context of possible worlds.
8

INŠTRUMENTÁLNA NORMATIVITA NATURALIZOVANEJ EPISTEMOLÓGIE

88%
Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 9
680 – 693
EN
The paper concerns the fundamental debate whether naturalized epistemology is or can be normative. Following the example of W. V. Quine, if we replace the philosophical theory of knowledge with a psychological description of cognitive processes, we may not be able to identify “correct” processes of cognition and thus determine epistemic norms. A group of authors (L. Laudan, H. Kornblith and others) consider epistemic norms as hypothetical imperatives connecting cognitive means with cognitive ends. Such instrumental understanding of normativity is compatible with the naturalistic picture of epistemology. However, the key question concerns cognitive ends: are there any universal ends, or do we have to be satisfied with relativism of norms? In the paper, we defend the thesis that the ultimate end of knowing is “truth”. If we understand epistemic norms as hypothetical imperatives that prescribe how we should acquire beliefs in order to achieve our needs and interests, then we can define “truth” as that factor that makes certain processes successful with respect to these ends. It is a neutral understanding of truth as a criterion for the “correct” (functional) performance of the cognitive system. Orientation to truth thus forms the common value of the successful pursuit of any particular goals, thereby avoiding relativism of norms. At the same time, this understanding provides a more definite content to Quine’s concept of normativity as “truth-seeking technology” aimed at making accurate predictions.
9

NATURALIZMUS A SKEPTICIZMUS

88%
Szapuová M., Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 9
760 – 775
EN
The problem of scepticism is one of the central problems in traditional epistemology which has its place also in contemporary analytically oriented epistemology. However, from the point of view of naturalized epistemology, scepticism is shifting to the periphery of interest. The subject of the paper is the relationship between scepticism and naturalism, which in contemporary epistemology are understood as opposing positions. Attention is focused on the critique of philosophical scepticism from the naturalistic perspective, as well as on the critique of the naturalistic reaction to scepticism from anti naturalist positions. The aim of the study is to clarify the main points of the dispute between the traditional approach and the naturalistic approach to knowledge inspired by Quine, with special regard to the problem of scepticism. The intention is to demonstrate that the dispute between traditional and naturalistic epistemology is not primarily concerned with scepticism, but it is a meta-epistemological dispute concerning the nature or the very possibility and legitimacy of epistemology as a philosophical study in which the issue of epistemic normativity plays a central role.
10
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Główne typy metafizyki analitycznej

45%
Szubka T.
Filo-Sofija
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2011
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vol. 11
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issue 4(15)
849-864
EN
In a widespread general view about analytic philosophy it is often emphasized the supposed animosity or mistrust of that movement towards metaphysics. That opinion is in many respects one-sided and incorrect. First, one cannot find that animosity towards metaphysics in the works of G.E. Moore and B. Russell, the founders of modern analytic philosophy. Of course, they criticized the speculative, Hegelian metaphysics of their idealistic predecessors, but they did it in order to defend metaphysics of a different kind, more careful, empirical, and realist one. Moreover, even if it is to some extent true that over a few decades analytic philosophy was dominated by the attitude of mistrust towards more theoretical and comprehensive metaphysical investigations, it should be stressed that that attitude has almost completely disappeared in the last fifty years. Metaphysics has again regained the status of central and vigorously pursued philosophical discipline. One of the main originators of that metaphysical turn in contemporary analytic philosophy was Sir P.F. Strawson, the Oxford philosopher, who in 1959 forcefully articulated the idea of descriptive metaphysics. A somewhat similar way of doing metaphysics was later developed in the writings of D. Davidson, M. Dummett, and – in certain respects – H. Putnam. One may say that all those thinkers have attempted to identify the basic structure of reality by describing and elucidating the basic structural features of our thought and talk. Since in such a method of doing metaphysics one can discern some characteristic marks of Kantian transcendental arguments, there is a point to call it analytic-transcendental metaphysics. In a completely different way metaphysics has been pursued by those analytic thinkers who are under heavy influence of the conception of philosophy put forward by W.V. Quine. For Quine philosophy, including metaphysics, is continuous with science, and, to be more precise, constitutes the theoretical end of science. Among many followers of that kind of metaphysics, that may be called analytic-naturalistic one, there are D.M. Armstrong and D. Lewis. The paper presents those two varieties of analytic metaphysics, and succinctly discusses their main difficulties. Subsequently, it mentions those examples of contemporary analytic metaphysics that, for one reason or another, do not belong to either of those two varieties. The paper ends with a brief appendix discussing the most recent revival of metaphysics within the analytic movement and a critical response toit from the deflationary point of view.
11
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Współczesne postaci ontologii. Od Hegla do Quine’a

38%
Paź B.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 1(16)
9-38
PL
The article presents some prominent figures of modern ontology from Hegel to nowadays. It takes into account the diverse forms of ontology in three distinct trends of philosophy: Hegelianism, phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Each of these trends has its own subject, aim and method of ontology. The subject of Hegel’s ontology is understood as something originally undefined, being on the border of nonentity. When presented this way, the subject presupposes a dialectic method of ontology, which the German philosopher defines as “the consciousness of the form of the inner self-movement of the content of logic.” It is based on reflection, which, according to Hegel, is both a tool and medium to knowledge, though in his Phenomenology of spirit he identifies it as being by itself. Thus understood ontology is to be found both in the works of Hegel’s students and his critics (S. Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, J.-P. Sartre). In Husserl’s phenomenology it is not reflection but eidetic intuition (Wesensschau) that is the main method of ontology, and its subject is not just being, but the essence – a correlate to the eidetic intuition. To Husserl’s phenomenological presumptions referred, among others, N. Hartman and R. Ingarden, who understood ontology as eidetic analysis of ideas. Though Heidegger saw the problem differently: the goal of ontology is defining the meaning of Being (Sinn vom Sein), its method is phenomenological. In none of the approaches was the subject of ontology understood in a classic way as Being, but rather as a certain form of its representation, as the content of consciousness (ideas), or as a certain sense for a definite subject. A different approach to ontology is observable within analytic philosophy, which involved lots of different personalities and different traditions, such as the new positivism, scholastics (J.M. Bocheński, E. Nieznański), Leibnizian rationalism (A. Plantinga), empiricism and pragmatism (W.O. Quine, P. Strawson). Remarkable achievements in ontology belong to some Polish logicians, representatives of the Polish school of analytic philosophy, such as S. Leśniewski and T. Kotarbiński. Leśniewski was the founder of formal ontology – logical calculus of names, while Kotarbiński discovered nominalistic and materialistic ontology – reism (from Latin: res ‘thing’) based on Leśniewski’s ontology. The main thesis of reism was the claim that “every object is a body.”
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