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EN
In this paper, I argue that philosophers, while developing ontologies, can be classed as misers or profligates. I develop the categories of ontological miserliness and ontological profligacy and supply explanatory examples. I explore the theoretical motivation of both misers and profligates in terms of thought-time and inquiry scope. In brief, misers prioritize thought-time over inquiry scope; vice-versa for profligates. I examine the extent to which conservation of thought-time is an active concern for misers and provide a miserly taxonomy for ontologies; ontologies may be cheap, expensive or impossible. I argue that profligates countenance the generative character of the ontological enterprise at the expense of exclusion and limitation. The works of Willard Van Orman Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein provide canonic examples of miserly and profligate ontologies. I argue that Quine is an ontological miser par excellence, and that Wittgenstein is profligate in his later period and evinces an intermediate position in his early period. Finally, I discuss the theoretical stakes involved in this entire discussion, provide brief contemporary examples, and explore the extent to which the distinction between miserliness and profligacy is illusory.
Human Affairs
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2011
|
vol. 21
|
issue 3
280-293
EN
Did the pragmatic turn encompass the linguistic turn in the history of philosophy? Or was the linguistic turn a turn away from pragmatism? Some commentators identify the so-called “eclipse” of pragmatism by analytic philosophy, especially during the Cold War era, as a turn away from pragmatist thinking. However, the historical evidence suggests that this narrative is little more than a myth. Pragmatism persisted, transforming into a more analytic variety under the influence of Quine and Putnam and, more recently, a continental version in the hands of Richard Rorty and Cornel West. In this paper, I argue that proof of the linguistic turn’s presence as a moment in a broader pragmatic turn in philosophy can be garnered from close examination of a single article, W. V. O. Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” and a single issue: whether the analytic-synthetic distinction is philosophically defensible.
EN
Quine’s project of “naturalized epistemology” is usually interpreted as a rejection of classical epistemology, which becomes merely a “chapter of psychology”. It does not imply, however, a different understanding of the character of naturalization is inadequate or wrong. Susan Haack’s interpretations are briefly analyzed in the paper. Thereafter, they are harnessed as models of interpretation of the “naturalization of law”. The main aim is to point the radical reading of Quine’s project (the replacement model) is not the only acceptable one. Consequently, there are at least three models of the “naturalization of law” that are analogical to the “naturalization of epistemology”. The author details their character.
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Absolutyzm logiczny a ontologia

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EN
The text considers the link between logic and ontology in the context of the problem of future truth. The main issue examined in this paper is the following one: the classical logic is strongly insensitive to the ontological determinism-indeterminism problem.
PL
Tekst jest poświęcony związkowi między logiką a ontologią w kontekście problemu prawdziwości zdań o przyszłości. Jednym z rozważanych problemów jest „niewrażliwość” logiki klasycznej na ontologiczny problem determinizm-indeterminizm.
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