Search results

1

UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONCEPT OF REASON IN HERMANN COHEN'S PHILOSOPHY

100%

Swiecicka K.

Przegląd Filozoficzno-Literacki

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2008

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vol. 6

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issue 2-3(20)

473-487

EN

The article is devoted to a summarization of philosophy of Hermann Cohen, a Neo-Kantian and the Marburg school founder. It discusses the concept of consciousness and its relation to the unity of culture and its rational character as developed by this eminent and yet less known philosopher. He attempted to unify different levels of rationality: in science, ethics, art and religion; this way, he inspired the later philosophy of symbolical forms in Ernst Cassirer.

2

Siateczkowy model rozwoju nauki a struktura racjonalnego działania

100%

Michalska A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2011

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vol. 47

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issue 1(187)

41-58

EN

In the paper I put to analysis the reticulated model of scientific change, introduced by Larry Laudan in his Science and Values, aiming at reconstruction of the concept of rationality it presupposes. In elaborating on the model's structure I draw on Jurgen Habermas' s theory of speech acts and discuss the concept of instrumental rationality. I argue that in the area of philosophy of science, the model heralds the demise of a classical ideal of rationality, based solely on the notion of justification of judgments. My claim is that reticulated model demands that the analytical paradigm, the scope of which remains confined to a semantic dimension of science, should be replaced with a properly understood instrumental model of rationality, displaying both semantic and pragmatic facet of cognition.

3

RATIONALITIES OF EMOTION - DEFENDING, DISTINGUISHING, CONNECTING

80%

Rietti S.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2009

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vol. 16

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issue 1

38-61

EN

Claims that emotions are or can be rational, and crucially enabling of rationality, are now fairly common, also outside of philosophy, but with considerable diversity both in their assumptions about emotions and their conceptions of rationality. Three main trends are worth picking out, both in themselves and for the potential tensions between them: accounts that defend a case for the rationality of emotions A) by assimilating emotions closely to beliefs or judgements; B) in terms of the very features that traditional views of emotions as irrational/a-rational emphasized; C) by arguing that emotions exhibit a more sui generis kind of rationality, often one based on a narrative or dramaturgic 'inner logic'.

4

DEFENDING THE GOOD DOG PICTURE OF VIRTUES

80%

Mărăşoiu A. I.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2020

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vol. 27

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issue 4

539 - 555

EN

I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.

5

NEED FOR COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN DECISION-MAKING

80%

Curseu P. L.

Studia Psychologica

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2006

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vol. 48

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issue 2

141-156

EN

This paper addresses the relation between the need for cognition and rationality in decision-making and also reconsiders the relation between need for cognition and the framing effect using modified versions of the Asian disease task. In the first study (N = 205), a significant and positive relationship was obtained between need for cognition and the rationality of decision-makers. Also a negative and significant relationship was obtained between need for cognition and indecisiveness. These findings are consistent with the theoretical propositions hypothesized in the need for cognition theory (Cacioppo et al., 1996). The second study (N = 462) is an in-depth analysis of the relation between the need for cognition and the framing effect, revealing a positive and significant relation between need for cognition and the respondents' preference for the probabilistic framed alternatives in two risky choice framing effect tasks.

6

COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCED VS. NOVICE TEACHERS IN COGNITIVE REFLECTION AND RATIONALITY

80%

Čavojová V., Jurkovič M.

Studia Psychologica

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2017

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vol. 59

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issue 2

100 – 112

EN

Relatively little is known about actual cognitive skills and thinking dispositions of teachers, despite their possible importance. In the current paper we examined two predictions related to rational performance of teachers. First, we expected that more experienced teachers have more rational thinking dispositions, are more cognitively reflective and discount the future less in comparison to novice teachers. Second, we expected that cognitive reflection is related to options involving more patience. 109 novice teachers (undergraduate students) and 55 experienced teachers participated in the study. Thinking dispositions were measured by Rational-Experiential Inventory, cognitive reflection was measured by CRT, to measure future discounting we used intertemporal choice tasks and Consideration for Future Consequences questionnaire. We found that teachers differed significantly from undergraduate students in CRT and all subscales of these measures in the expected direction, with the exception of CFC-Immediate and REI-Experiential Engagement, but we found no significant differences between teachers and students (with one exception) on intertemporal choice tasks. The results also confirmed the expected relationships between CRT, CFC and REI. These results pose some important implications for educating future teachers.

7

Rationality--Human Individual--Action

80%

Aleksandrowicz D.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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vol. 13

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issue 1(49)

257-270

EN

The rational choice theory pretends to explain human behaviour. It is not clear, however, that the theory can accomplish this task without first justifying a broader conception of rationality. Is it rational to maximise profits or to minimise risks? It seems that the theory must adopt some such limiting assumptions, by replacing, for instance, 'expected payoffs' by 'subjectively perceived advantages', before it can begin to make any recommendations. The subjective approach involves individual preferences based on memory of past events. If someone wants to beat the record of the latter day Simon Stylite, he must first consult the Guinness Book of Records to learn who recently remained longest on the top of a pillar. Then, in one sense, it is rational for the challenger to stay on the pillar for a longer time than the most recent record breaker did, but at the same time it is not entirely rational for him to undertake this task at all. It seems that all individuals are capable of seeing both sides of the coin. If so, the dichotomy of objective versus subjective characterisation of rationality can be replaced by a holistic versus aspect approach.

8

PROLEGOMENA TO THE RÓZEWICZ'S BODY AND THE END OF EKPHRASIS

80%

Mrugalski M.

Przegląd Humanistyczny

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2005

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vol. 49

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issue 4(391)

25-43

EN

Classical ekphrasis, represented here by Philostratos' 'Imagines' works thanks to an unusual combination of rationality and highly developed sensuality: method combines with charm to seduce the reader. Rózewicz puts the components together differently, obtaining another genre. One can come closer to it thanks to Freud's school of dream explanation and Walter Benjamin's concept of dialectic image. Rózewicz's images are controlled by negative dialectics. It does not attempt to get back presence, but it tries to regain a thing without losing its loss.

9

Ends and Means in the Perspective of Categorical Imperative

80%

Gokieli M.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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vol. 13

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issue 4(52)

183-190

EN

The author undertakes to reconstruct Kantian analysis of instrumental rationality in the 'Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals'. He argues that Kant's arguments are crucial for the understanding of wanting, and especially for identification of epistemic conditions of wanting. He also points out that Kant's writings contain two different concepts of the subject. Each presupposes a different conception of rationality.

10

MALÁ ŠTÚDIA O FANATIZME (NA MOTÍVY VEĽKEJ ŠTÚDIE MARIANA VÁROSSA O FANATIZME)

80%

Buraj I.

Filozofia (Philosophy)

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2014

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vol. 69

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issue 2

143 – 153

EN

The aim of the first part of the paper is to make the reader acquainted with the selected parts of Váross’s large study of fanaticism (Le Fanatisme. Une analyse psychologique et axiologuiqe; Paris: Sorbonne 1947, 541 pp.). The second part deals with two contemporary most expanded kinds of fanaticism: political and ideological ones as two distinctive kinds of rationality. Attention is paid also to several parallels between political fanaticism and ideological fanaticism, as they are defined by M. Váross, and as conceived by H. Arendt.

11

NARROWNESS OF WIDE-SCOPE PRINCIPLES

80%

Botting D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2016

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vol. 23

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issue 2

177 – 203

EN

In this paper the author will propose that the unpalatable consequences of narrow-scope principles are not avoided by altering the scope of the principle but by changing the kind of conditional. He argues that a counterfactual conditional should do the trick and that the rational requirement of modus ponens can be understood as something like a “Ramsey test” on this conditional.

12

CONDITIONAL UNIQUENESS

80%

Demircioğlu E.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2022

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vol. 29

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issue 2

268 – 274

EN

In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other.

13

DISTINCTIVE RATIONALITY OF INTENTIONS

80%

Botting D.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2013

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vol. 20

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issue 4

507 – 526

EN

In this paper the author intend to defend Broome’s cognitivist view that reduces practical normativity to theoretical normativity, but argue that this leaves unaccounted for distinctively practical norms that the author seeks to capture as a system of local obligations to have particular intentions. The krasia requirement dictates what obligations we have relative to the normative beliefs that we have but does not tell us what intentions it is rational to have all-things-considered.

14

Świadomość mityczna jako problem filozoficzny

80%

Ples M.

IDEA. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych

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2012

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vol. 24

5-18

EN

The article Mythical consciousness as a philosophical problem is an at- tempt to analyze the subjective reflection of a myth that is concentrated on such notions as: “mythical consciousness”, “mythical imagination”, “mythical thought” or “logic of myth”. The analysis shows the main theses and pro- blems of subjective reflection of the myth, based on philosophical theories (E. Cassirer, L. Kołakowski) and also on the concepts which developed in the area of the cultural anthropology (B. Malinowski, L. L´evy-Bruhl, J.G. Frazer, C. L´evi-Strauss).

15

RADICAL RATIONALIZATION ACCOMMODATES RAMPANT IRRATIONALITY

80%

Lipski J.

Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu

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2018

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vol. 25

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issue 1

53 – 73

EN

According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper the author will offer one such criterion. More specifically, he argues that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.

16

Twierdzenie Godla a wiara i rozum - czyli w poszukiwaniu nowych uzasadnień

80%

Jobczyk K.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2010

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vol. 46

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issue 1

191-195

EN

The aim of the paper is to show certain similarities between rationality of formal sciences and rationality of religious discourse. These similarities can be seen when analysing the ways in which the well-known Gödel's incompleteness theorem is justified. The main idea of the paper is that these two types of rationality are not dichotomous. This is so, because even in such formalised areas of rationality like mathematics and logics, mutual influences of rational and non-rational elements can be, unexpectedly, found.

17

(Racjonalnosc, zło i ewolucja

80%

Florek S.

Archeus. Studia z bioetyki i antropologii filozoficznej

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2011

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vol. 12

89-106

EN

In philosophical anthropology and ethics the phenomenon of rational agent doing evil to others or oneself has always been seen as a problem which demands solution. It is argued that adopting an evolutionary perspective and making distinction between instrumental and biological rationality enables to explain this enigma. It is maintained that in the reference to the evolutionary theories of altruism also egoistic and evil behavior can be explained. From this point of view many human actions, although evil, seem to be biologically rational. Furthermore, it is pointed out that also many irrational evil actions can be explained on the grounds of evolutionary biology and psychology (1) as byproducts of psychological mechanisms that evolved to promote altruistic behavior or (2) as results of nervous system dysfunction.

18

Rationality, Ignorance and Stupidity

80%

Aleksandrowicz D.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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vol. 13

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issue 2(50)

125-139

EN

Different types of action imply different types of knowledge. In natural sciences the link between actions and their effects is explicitly given. But in public sphere the knowledge that pretends to explain the connection between behaviour and its alleged purposes is semi-theoretical at best. This difference in competence and in causal concepts employed in the two different fields leads the author to claim that that mistakes in natural sciences can be considered honest acts of ignorance while in the humanities they are often manifestations of ungrounded projections, or--as the author calls them--act of stupidity. Then he points out that honest ignorance is not very dangerous, as it can be cured by supplying appropriate evidence to those who lack knowledge. Stupidity, on the other hand, is more pernicious and harmful, because it is something more complicated. It is ignorance of one's ignorance, a state that cannot be easily cured. As a consequence of the widespread inability to recognise stupidity for what it is, the public nurtures a 'culture of stupidity' that gains social legitimacy easily and without much protest.

19

Kant: Rationality as Practical Reason

80%

O'Neill O.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2004

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vol. 13

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issue 4(52)

125-145

EN

Practical reasoning must provide other persons with reasons for action. It must, consequently, refrain from all presuppositions that are not available to them. This observation offers an insight into what Kant meant by the concept of legislation that is made by moral subjects. In Kant's philosophy autonomy should not be interpreted as self-expression exercised by persons who make law. Instead it is a practice of adopting maxims or 'laws' that are in no way derivative or dependent on one's preferences. Practical reason imposes on practical maxims a certain modal demand which is to be found at the foundation of his criticism of heteronomy in ethics and which supports his arguments for various formulations of the categorical imperative to warrant its adequacy with respect to rationality, autonomy and obligation.

20

Hermeneutyka a kwestia rozumu

80%

Torzewski W.

Filo-Sofija

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2010

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vol. 10

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issue 2(11)

29-40

EN

This article is an expression and an attempt to justify the belief that hermeneutic philosophy is an interpretation of the rationality’s concept. Although hermeneutics itself is a critique of a certain form of rationalism, and therefore falls under charges “irrationality”, the concept of reason is an essential component of its identity as a philosophy.

Refine search results

UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONCEPT OF REASON IN HERMANN COHEN'S PHILOSOPHY

Siateczkowy model rozwoju nauki a struktura racjonalnego działania

RATIONALITIES OF EMOTION - DEFENDING, DISTINGUISHING, CONNECTING

DEFENDING THE GOOD DOG PICTURE OF VIRTUES

NEED FOR COGNITION AND RATIONALITY IN DECISION-MAKING

COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCED VS. NOVICE TEACHERS IN COGNITIVE REFLECTION AND RATIONALITY

Rationality--Human Individual--Action

PROLEGOMENA TO THE RÓZEWICZ'S BODY AND THE END OF EKPHRASIS

Ends and Means in the Perspective of Categorical Imperative

MALÁ ŠTÚDIA O FANATIZME (NA MOTÍVY VEĽKEJ ŠTÚDIE MARIANA VÁROSSA O FANATIZME)

NARROWNESS OF WIDE-SCOPE PRINCIPLES

CONDITIONAL UNIQUENESS

DISTINCTIVE RATIONALITY OF INTENTIONS

Świadomość mityczna jako problem filozoficzny

RADICAL RATIONALIZATION ACCOMMODATES RAMPANT IRRATIONALITY

Twierdzenie Godla a wiara i rozum - czyli w poszukiwaniu nowych uzasadnień

(Racjonalnosc, zło i ewolucja

Rationality, Ignorance and Stupidity

Kant: Rationality as Practical Reason

Hermeneutyka a kwestia rozumu