Search results

1

Rortyian Hope

100%

Sanders M.

Human Affairs

|

2009

|

vol. 19

|

issue 1

52-59

EN

This is a paper about Richard Rorty's notion of hope, and the role that it plays in breaking down Rorty's public/private distinction, and connecting philosophy to politics. The argument that philosophy can be engaged in and with the social-political world is one that is coherent with Rorty's position if philosophy is understood as striving towards its goals with a sense of contextualism and fallibilism. Placing Rorty within the tradition of the classic pragmatists, James and Dewey, I will argue that pluralism can and should serve as a contextual foundation for liberalism. Through an examination and analysis of Rorty's liberal ironist and anti-foundationalism, I will explore how Rortyian hope can be understood as socially and politically transformative, transforming our conception of knowledge from one based on certainty to one based on fallibility.

2

Teoria interesariuszy a neopragmatyzm

89%

Soin M.

Prakseologia

|

2017

|

vol. 159

83-106

PL

Celem artykułu jest uporządkowanie zarzutów, jakie – zdaniem autora – należy postawić próbom powiązania teorii interesariuszy z neopragmatyzmem w wersji Rorty’ego. Przedmiotem krytyki jest zwłaszcza stanowisko R. Edwarda Freemana, jednego z głównych autorów i popularyzatorów teorii interesariuszy, który – skądinąd zgodnie z filozoficzną modą – w końcu lat dziewięćdziesiątych porzucił dość szeroko rozpowszechnioną kantowską wersję uzasadnienia teorii interesariuszy na rzecz jej wykładni neopragmatycznej. Dyskutowane zarzuty wynikają wprost ze specyfiki neopragmatycznego ujęcia kwestii prawdy, a także relacji między faktami i wartościami, w szczególności z odrzucenia korespondencyjnej koncepcji prawdy oraz zatarcia różnicy między opisem i normą. Przesadne uogólnienia i fałszywe alternatywy, na jakich opierają się tego rodzaju rozstrzygnięcia, podważają opisowy sens teorii interesariuszy. W rezultacie powiązania z neopragmatyzmem teoria interesariuszy traci jednak również swoje praktyczne zalety, stając się arbitralną narracją niezdolną do uporania się z problemami jej normatywnego zastosowania i dlatego z reguły maskującą rzeczywiste stosunki władzy.

EN

The goal of this article was to sort out the accusations that must be made against attempts to connect stakeholder theory with neopragmatism in Rorty’s version. The main subject of criticism is the stand of R. Edward Freeman, one of the main authors and popularizers of stakeholder theory who – in accordance with philosophical fashion – at the end of the 90s, rejected popular Kantian version of substantiation of stakeholder theory, choosing its neopragmatic interpretation. Discussed accusations result directly from specificity of neopragmatic perspective of the issue of truth, as well as of relations between facts and values, especially from rejection of correspondence concept of the truth and blurring the difference between description and norm. Exaggerated generalizations and false alternatives that such settlements are based on undermine descriptive meaning of stakeholder theory. As a result of connection with neopragmatism, stakeholder theory is also losing its practical values, becoming narration unable to deal with the problems of its normative application and hiding real relations of power.

3

Rorty na temat świata i prawdy. Polemika z Hanną Buczyńską-Garewicz

89%

Markiewka T. S.

Diametros

|

2014

|

issue 41

152-167

PL

Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz twierdzi, że Richard Rorty chce pozbyć się pojęcia prawdy. Co więcej, sądzi ona, że podejście Rorty’ego do problemu prawdy jest powiązane z jego twierdze-niem, iż nie istnieje żaden świat pozajęzykowy. Autor artykułu stara się dowieść, że Buczyńska-Garewicz opisuje stanowisko Rorty’ego w nieprecyzyjny sposób. Rorty pragnie jedynie przekonać nas, że (1) filozofia nie ma nic ciekawego do powiedzenia na temat prawdy i świata oraz (2) że powinniśmy przestać używać słów „prawda” i „prawdziwy” w niektórych kontekstach. Nie twierdził on nigdy, że nie istnieje świat pozajęzykowy ani że powinniśmy zupełnie porzucić poję-cie prawdy.

EN

Hanna Buczyńska-Garwicz claims that Richard Rorty wants to get rid of the notion of truth. Moreover, she thinks that Rorty’s attitude to the problem of truth is connected with his claim that there is no world beyond language. The author of the article tries to prove that Buczyńska-Garewicz's description of Rorty’s philosophy is very inaccurate. All Rorty wants is just to convince us that (1) philosophy has nothing interesting to say about truth and world and that (2) we should try to stop using words “truth” and “true” in some contexts. He has never said that there is no world beyond language and that the notion of truth should be completely abandoned in our everyday life.

4

Społeczne uzasadnienia dla ochrony praw jednostki

89%

Srokosz J.

Roczniki Nauk Społecznych

|

2015

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vol. 7(43)

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issue 4

59-72

EN

This paper presents the notion of the protection of the rights of the Individuals on the basis of certain social processes and cultural conditions. Solidaristic, Communitarian, and Rorty’s pragmatic visions of individual rights rejected the notion of its protection on the basis of philosophical legitimation (on the Enlightment's universalistic approach towards rights of the individuals) or positivistic (on the notion that the legal acts in themselves are the sole source of individual's rights). Solidaristic approach hinges heavily on inter-personal relations and ever increasing complexity of social interactions resulting in increase in person’s individualization within the society. Communitarian approach relies on the assumption of balance between individual's rights and obligation within the society. According to this view the origins of rights of the individuals lay in the moral progress of the society. According to the Rorty's pragmatic approach protection of the rights of individuals in the Western culture has been achieved due to sense security and sympathy developed in the social life. This in turns allow for every individual to be treated on the equal footing.

PL

W artykule przedstawione zostały koncepcje ochrony praw jednostki oparte na odwołaniu do pewnych procesów społecznych lub konkretnych uwarunkowań kulturowych. Przedstawione wizje ochrony jednostki (solidarystyczna, kommunitariańska oraz pragmatyczna Rorty’ego) odrzucały uzasadnienie ochrony praw człowieka oparte na legitymacji filozoficznej (oświeceniowy uniwersalizm praw jednostki) lub pozytywistycznej (treści aktów prawnych zawierające przepisy chroniące prawa człowieka). Wizja solidarystyczna podstawy dla ochrony praw jednostki widziała w rozwoju solidarności międzyludzkiej i komplikowania się więzów społecznych, skutkujących coraz większą indywidualizacją w ramach społeczeństwa. Komunitarystyczna koncepcja ochrony praw człowieka zakładała z kolei równowagę praw i obowiązków każdej jednostki w ramach wspólnoty, genezę ochrony praw jednostek widząc w postępującym rozwoju moralnym społeczeństwa. Natomiast pragmatyczna koncepcja Rorty’ego za podstawę ochrony praw jednostki w kulturze Zachodu uznawała osiągnięty stan bezpieczeństwa oraz współczucia w ramach życia społecznego, pozwalający na traktowanie Innego w taki sam sposób, jak członków własnej społeczności.

5

Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory

88%

Soin M.

Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym

|

2018

|

vol. 21

|

issue 7

75-84

EN

Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory-which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics-are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.

6

Is Rorty a linguistic idealist?

88%

Marvan T.

Human Affairs

|

2011

|

vol. 21

|

issue 3

272-279

EN

The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a “linguistic idealist”. I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty’s works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam’s well-known conception of “internal realism” and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this causal independence of things and the sense of our discourse being guided by them with our autonomy with regard to the construction of various “vocabularies” with which we describe, or cope with, reality. In the final part, I address in some detail Rorty’s animadversions concerning the idea of the intrinsic nature of reality. I show them to be only partly successful.

7

Rorty and Normativity

88%

Kremer A.

Human Affairs

|

2007

|

vol. 17

|

issue 1

71-77

EN

The paper summarizes some of the main ideas in Rorty's philosophy and indicates the views he holds on normativity. As a neopragmatic thinker, Rorty wants as little normativity as possible, but this does not mean that he rejects all types of normativity.

8

Toward an affective pedagogy of human rights education

75%

Hung R.

Journal of Pedagogy

|

2014

|

vol. 5

|

issue 1

48-64

EN

This paper explores the notion of Affective Pedagogy of Human Rights Education (APHRE) on a theoretical level and suggests a concept of curricular framework. APHRE highlights the significance of affectivity and body in the process of learning, factors usually neglected in the mainstream intellectualistic approach to learning, especially in areas under the Confucian tradition. The paper’s first section explores the thinking of three philosophers - Rorty, Merleau-Ponty, and Beardsley - who serve as sources for APHRE. The second section explains how their concepts contribute to APHRE’s development. In the third section, a practical curricular framework is presented. Finally, the paper discusses implementing the framework and concludes by recognizing APHRE as a pedagogic approach for crossing borders among nationalities, cultures, and languages

9

What Kind of Politics Do We Need? Toward Freedom as Responsibility in Habermas’s and Rorty’s Visions of Democracy

75%

Kilanowski M.

Kultura i Edukacja

|

2017

|

issue 2(116)

50-68

EN

Isaiah Berlin said that it is part of the human condition to make choices between absolute values. Obviously, this choice cannot be easy. To be well informed, it has to be made in full awareness of the contingency of our criteria. This ability to make choices between absolute values in the light of contingencies is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian, says Berlin, following Joseph Schumpeter. Similar ideas can be found in the philosophy of Richard Rorty, who believes that our liberal societies create more people who understand the contingencies of their vocabularies, but at the same time are still faithful to them. He calls this “freedom as acknowledgement of contingency.” This freedom is bound by the existence of a plurality of voices, which does not mean that it is bound by the existence of chaos. In such a spirit, Jürgen Habermas emphasizes the fact that in spite of the plurality of contingent views, we can find a unity of reason. In spite of plurality of views, we can still come to an agreement thanks to dialogue. The close analysis of Rorty’s and Habermas’s philosophy allows us to see that they share a common stance: thanks to disenchantment of the world, as Rorty says, or thanks to decentralization of the world, as Habermas says. Both are seeing such stance as a precondition to use our freedom in a way to be more tolerant, more open to dialogue and responsible for it. Further analysis allows us to see that there is a possibility to present a new understanding of the notion of freedom – freedom conceived as responsibility.

10

Two Dogmas of Rorty's Pragmatism

75%

Vuorio T.

Human Affairs

|

2009

|

vol. 19

|

issue 1

87-95

EN

Here I discuss two controversial distinctions that have an essential role in Rorty's pragmatism: the distinction between descriptive and normative discourses, and the distinction between the private and public dimensions of human life. Neither of them is Rorty's novelty, but the way he stresses them is unique. The first is a central presupposition of his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), while the other is the argumentative base of Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989). I will argue that the distinctions provide metaphilosophical tools for Rorty's pragmatism, and that our stance towards the latter depends on the plausibility of them.

11

Patočka and Rorty – The Problem of Freedom

75%

Mayerová K.

Folia Philosophica

|

2016

|

vol. 37

EN

Patočka´s and Rorty´s philosophy offer a foundation for the reconstruction of liberalism and a possibility of fulfilling individual´s freedom. Patočka intends to assess the value of transcendence and its relevance to life. He tries to save the metaphysics for it does not need to become necessarily dogmatic. Contemporary people may find Patočka´s reflections on freedom beneficial. Patočka invites people to connect their spirituality with skepticism and modesty, and according to Socratic knowing of unknowing, along with humility which makes man non-dogmatically open to transcendence. In the reflections on man, Rorty holds to moral responsibility and tries to bring man to self-awareness and taking responsibility for his acting, because it is only man who disposes of unique possibilities and abilities to shape his own authentic way of life. Rorty´s concept of freedom as an accidental phenomenon is based on the concept of history of Western philosophy and is closely linked with the problem of metaphysics and truth. Despite timeless reflections of both philosophers, any timeless ideal of human freedom is determined by the context in which we are thinking.

12

Education as edification: Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatist philosophy of education

75%

Woźnica M.

Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny

|

2019

|

vol. 64(2 (252))

242-253

EN

Rorty draws from pragmatism, conversation, edification, and hermeneutics, but in spite of his reference to Dewey’s thesis on pragmatism, Rorty’s notion of ‘pragmatism’ is not offered as an idea of something that might fill the gaps left by slowly dying traditional philosophy. It is rather a more relaxed attitude of mind. He goes beyond the traditional notion of pragmatism and insists that the search should not focus on truth but on solidarity, in other words, what we as a group of people create and decide what is true. Truth, for Rorty, is a society’s exercise and agreement of what is true. It is achieved by discourse and not limited conversations. In order to educate a person as an individual who lives in a particular society with all the factors contributing to his/her growth, Rorty adopts a new word for education, namely edification, with its philosophical consequences. He draws on the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer to explore the idea of ‘edification,’ a word Rorty uses to gloss Gadamer’s Bildung (education, self-formation) (Rorty 1979).

13

Rorty, religia i demokracja

71%

Sieczkowski T.

Diametros

|

2013

|

issue 35

111-128

PL

Stanowisko Rorty’ego, nazwane przezeń ‘antyklerykalizmem’, jest jednym z trzech, obok postsekularyzmu i Nowego Ateizmu, ważnych głosów we współczesnej debacie filozoficznej dotyczącej miejsca religii w przestrzeni publicznej w zachodnich demokracjach. W niniejszym artykule przedstawiam Rortiańskie, neopragmatyczne rozumienie religii jako nawyku działania oraz jego krytyczne stanowisko wobec obecności instytucjonalnych form religijności w przestrzeni publicznej wyznaczanej przez nowoczesne konstytucyjne demokracje. W zakończeniu przedstawiam zarys krytyki stanowiska Rorty’ego, które naraża się na zarzuty o dezinterpretację pojęcia i doświadczenia religijności i jako postulat zmiany politycznej wikła się tym samym w poważne trudności.

EN

In addition to postsecularism and the New Atheism, Rorty’s idea of „anticlericalism” is one of the three important elements in the modern philosophical debate about the role religion should play in the public sphere in Western democracies. In the paper I discuss Rorty’s neopragmatic understanding of religion as a habit of action and his critical position on the presence of institutional forms of religion in the public sphere of modern constitutional democracies. In the end I sketch a critique of Rorty’s position, which misinterprets the concept and the experience of religiosity and thus involves serious difficulties as a proposal for political change.

14

Filozoficzne trudności teorii interesariuszy

63%

Soin M., Lodz University of Technology, msoin@poczta.onet.pl

Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym

|

2016

|

vol. 19

|

issue 3

EN

Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory – which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics – are connected first of all with questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism, which in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood at the same time as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. To the assumptions belongs a false dilemma taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, as a result of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a return to a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.

15

Providing orientation by philosophizing at school. Phenomenological and postmodern validity claims

63%

Thomas P.

Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny

|

2018

|

vol. 63(3 (249))

150-161

EN

In liberal societies it seems to be important to provide orientation by philosophizing at school. We are used to doing this by discussing classic ethics with our students. Here, skills like rational argumentation can be trained. It is the universal rationality that can be applied to different ethical issues and, thus, provide orientation. When it comes to this learning objective phenomenology and postmodernism are mostly not expected to provide assistance. Phenomenology might be seen as just dealing with perception whereas postmodernism is under suspicion for contributing to indecision, arbitrariness and relativism. In this article I will try to outline the potentials of phenomenology and postmodernism in the field of orientation. In the tradition of Husserl’s ‘epoché’ we can let students discover the perspective of a first person and what it means to be a ‘self’. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have not only described a certain closeness to the world which can be described as ‘dwelling’ of a lived body. They have also delineated elements of a new ‘postmetaphysical’ and at the same time ‘prehermeneutical’ metaphysics. All this can help to open the depth of self, life, and world. Postmodern thinkers claim a plurality of truths. By this means, these theories can encourage self-empowerment. At the same time, authors like Lévinas (responsibility for the other), Lyotard (the sublime), and Rorty (solidarity) describe new ways of openness towards the world which are not founded by any primal truth and thus provide orientation.

16

(Nie)obiektywna podmiotowość

63%

Piotrowski P.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

|

2016

|

vol. 36

113-131

EN

In this article, I analyze the issue of subjectivity in the form in which it appears in Charles Taylor’s and Richard Rorty’s writings. Positions of these philosophers aregenerally regarded as contradictory. I will, however, argued that the position on subjectivity represented by Rorty finds its complementation in Taylor’s concept. To do this, I will show firstly that both Rorty and Taylor use the category of contingency, presenting some common thesis about subjectivity. This way I will show that the location of the category of subjectivity and the scope of its use in each of them concept is closely related to the understanding of objectivity accepted by each of them. This will allow then to reconstruct the concept of subjectivity presented by Taylor and Rorty. Next, in the conclusion, I will present such a summary of those two standpoints, which will include justification of the thesis of their complementarity.

17

Spór o rozumienie pojęcia dziejów efektywnych w filozofii hermeneutycznej i postmodernizmie

62%

Sznajder P.

ΣΟΦΙΑ. Pismo Filozofów Krajów Słowiańskich

|

2018

|

vol. 18

75-89

RU

Статья является результатом исследования отношений между герменевтической философией Ханса-Георга Гадамера и постмодернизмом, представленным Джанним Ваттимо и Ричардом Рорти. В тексте анализируется понятие истории (Geschichte), особое внимание уделяется ее эффективному влиянию на автора, текст, интерпретатора и традицию, происходящее в гер-меневтическом диалоге (слияние горизонтов). Постмодернистской, конструктивистской интерпретации этого процесса, в которой опущена истина текста, противопоставляется универ-салистская концепция, в которой интерпретация понимается как процесс поиска логоса в диалоге.

EN

The article is a result of a research on the relations between the hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the postmodernism represented by Gianni Vattimo and Richard Rorty. The author analyses the notion of history (Geschichte) and its effective influence on an author, a text, an interpretator and a tradition in the hermeneutical dialogue (the fusion of horizons). The article opposes the postmodern, constructivistic approach, in which the truth of a text is made known to the universalistic conception in which an interpretation is understood as the process of searching for logos in a dialogue.

Refine search results

Rortyian Hope

Teoria interesariuszy a neopragmatyzm

Rorty na temat świata i prawdy. Polemika z Hanną Buczyńską-Garewicz

Społeczne uzasadnienia dla ochrony praw jednostki

Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory

Is Rorty a linguistic idealist?

Rorty and Normativity

Toward an affective pedagogy of human rights education

What Kind of Politics Do We Need? Toward Freedom as Responsibility in Habermas’s and Rorty’s Visions of Democracy

Two Dogmas of Rorty's Pragmatism

Patočka and Rorty – The Problem of Freedom

Education as edification: Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatist philosophy of education

Rorty, religia i demokracja

Filozoficzne trudności teorii interesariuszy

Providing orientation by philosophizing at school. Phenomenological and postmodern validity claims

(Nie)obiektywna podmiotowość

Spór o rozumienie pojęcia dziejów efektywnych w filozofii hermeneutycznej i postmodernizmie