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DOKTRYNA WOJENNA FEDERACJI ROSYJSKIEJ W XX I XXI WIEKU. CELE – ZADANIA – KIERUNKI DZIAŁANIA

100%

Malendowski W.

Przegląd Strategiczny

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2017

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issue 10

55-94

EN

The collapse of the USSR as a subject of international law and a significant geopolitical entity ultimately put an end to the Cold War and the bipolar system of international relations. The Russian Federation, as international successor and continuator of the Soviet Union, was downgraded to the position of a second-rate empire and faced the objective necessity of developing new principles for its security policy and war doctrine. The hitherto coalition-based Soviet war doctrine became invalid. In the concepts of foreign policy and other official documents developed from the early 1990s to 2010 the role of Russia was presented as that of a global power with global interests. The significance of the Russian military potential was emphasized, including nuclear weapons, as a significant element in the international balance of power. At the same time, Russia asserted its right to use weapons of mass destruction in case of danger to the security of the state. Further war doctrines expanded the catalogue of possible threats, including territorial claims made against Russia, local conflicts in the vicinity of its borders and the external borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Particular attention was given to military blocs and alliances. The content of the war doctrines confirms the grand aspirations of Russia as a state taking an active part in the construction of a new international order. In practice, however, Russia has abandoned a reactive policy in favor of concrete actions, applying means that infringe the fundamental principles and norms of international law.

PL

Upadek ZSRR, jako podmiotu prawa międzynarodowego i ważnego bytu geopolitycznego, doprowadził do ostatecznego zakończenia zimnej wojny i demontażu dwubiegunowego systemu stosunków międzynarodowych. Federacja Rosyjska jako prawno-międzynarodowy sukcesor i kontynuator Związku Radzieckiego, zdegradowana do rangi mocarstwa drugiej kategorii, znalazła się w obliczu obiektywnej konieczności opracowania nowych zasad polityki bezpieczeństwa i doktryny wojennej. Straciła aktualność dotychczasowa, koalicyjna radziecka doktryna wojenna. W rezultacie, już w nowej sytuacji geopolitycznej i geostrategicznej, przygotowano koncepcje bezpieczeństwa narodowego oraz kolejne doktryny wojenne (1993 r., 2000 r., 2010 r., 2014 r., 2015 r.). Zarówno w koncepcjach polityki zagranicznej, jak i w innych oficjalnych dokumentach opracowanych od początku ostatniej dekady XX wieku, do 2010 r., wskazywano na rolę Rosji jako mocarstwa światowego, posiadającego globalne interesy. Podkreślano także znaczenie rosyjskiego potencjału wojskowego, w tym broni jądrowej, jako istotnego elementu międzynarodowego układu sił. Jednocześnie zawarowano sobie prawo do użycia broni masowego rażenia w razie zagrożenia bezpieczeństwa państwa. W kolejnych doktrynach wojennych poszerzano katalog zagrożeń, o roszczenia terytorialne wobec Rosji, konflikty lokalne w pobliżu jej granic i zewnętrznych granic Wspólnoty Niepodległych Państw. Szczególną uwagę zwracano na bloki i sojusze wojskowe. Ich powiększanie i przybliżanie do granic Rosji traktowano, jako nadzwyczajne niebezpieczeństwo. Czynnikiem, który mógłby je umocnić, był system tworzony przez Organizację Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie. Początkowo zakładano, że w dającej się przewidzieć przyszłości nie ma groźby agresji na szerszą skalę. Podkreślano również, że Rosja nie traktuje a priori żadnego państwa jako przeciwnika. Dlatego też deklarując gotowość do odparcia siłą napaści zewnętrznej, nie wskazywano na potencjalnego agresora. Dopiero w doktrynie wojennej z 2010 r., jednoznacznie wskazano na najważniejsze zagrożenie zewnętrzne bezpieczeństwa Rosji. Odniesiono je do NATO podkreślając, że dąży ono do przyznania sobie globalnych funkcji, z naruszeniem prawa międzynarodowego oraz przybliżenia swojej infrastruktury wojskowej do granic Federacji Rosyjskiej. W związku z tym, w kategoriach zagrożenia potraktowano poszerzenia NATO o państwa Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz amerykańskie plany budowy tarczy antyrakietowej w tym regionie. Rosja zastrzegła sobie prawo do użycia broni jądrowej w odpowiedzi na agresję z zastosowaniem broni jądrowej i innych rodzajów broni masowego rażenia oraz w przypadku agresji konwencjonalnej, gdy zagrożone będzie istnienie państwa. Z drugiej strony, eksponując nadrzędne znaczenie prawa międzynarodowego, deklarowała wolę zapewniania bezpieczeństwa całej społeczności międzynarodowej, z poszanowaniem postanowień Karty NZ. Treść doktryn wojennych stanowi potwierdzenie mocarstwowych aspiracji Rosji, jako państwa biorącego aktywny udział w budowie nowego ładu międzynarodowego. Natomiast w praktyce Rosja odchodząc od polityki reaktywnej do konkretnych działań, stosuje środki naruszające podstawowe zasady i normy prawa międzynarodowego.

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Non-military determinants of the Russian Federation policy

94%

Grenda B.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2019

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vol. 23

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issue 1

23-47

EN

This study analyses various non-military factors in shaping the security policy of the Russian Federation. This work undertakes to establish their substance, content and scope, and to draw the conditions and trends in the political, economic and social security of modern Russia in the context of its international ambitions, role and state security. In the work theoretical method analysis, synthesis, abstracting and generalization were used. Based on the results of the research, it was determined that the specificity of its location definitely exerts an adverse effect on Russian state security. The reconstruction of imperial Russia is among the key goals set forth by Vladimir Putin in Russia’s foreign and military policy. In fact, the entire economic, political and military activity of Russia is subordinated to this goal. With regard to the economic and social state, the dependence of the Russian Federation on the extraction and export of crude oil and natural gas is an obvious indication of the constraints of its economy. Moscow’s particular interests are formulated in official state documents, such as the Military Doctrine and the National Security Strategy. These documents identify not only external and internal threats to state security but above all indicate the means and methods of possible deterrence.

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Derring Russia in the Baltics to Allow US Power Projection in the Pacific

94%

Middents M. G.

Security Forum

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2017

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vol. 1

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issue Volume 1 No. 2/2017

47-58

EN

The balance of power in the world is fluctuating as the US is facing new competitors as the People’s Republic of China being as rising power. So, if tensions between the US and China or another near-peer will grow, the US would need to dedicate significant resources to the face new threat. Such a shift of power could affect the balance of power in other regions of the world and it could even trigger Russian opportunism in its former Soviet satellites. There could be a risk that NATO’s current military structure in the Baltic States leaves its Eastern flank exposed to potential risks. The paper argues that additional initiatives such as easing the flow of Allied forces across borders, the establishment of NATO anti-access/ area denial (A2AD) measures and efforts towards political cohesion need to be added and done so in a manner to gain maximum benefits from their combined effects.

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Ewolucja i perspektywy procesu integracji pomiędzy Białorusią i Rosją

94%

Tworek P.

Polonia Journal

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2021

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issue 14

81-97

EN

The article examines the specificity of the integration process between Belarus and Russia from 1991 to 2021. Due to historical and socio-cultural determinants Russia considers the Republic of Belarus as a part of its natural sphere of influence. Created in 1999, a “union state” become the main instrument of economic integration with efforts in the defense and intelligence. This arrangement was not fully implemented, but the Kremlin is committed to reestablish regional hegemony and increase Belarus dependance and commitment to Russia’s strategic goals.

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Eurazjatycka Unia Gospodarcza – plany i perspektywy rozwoju organizacji

94%

Waśkiel T.

Wschodnioznawstwo

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2017

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issue 11

427-439

EN

The Eurasian Economic Union is an organization that consists of five member states – Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. Declaratively, this initiative is purely economic, but it’s hard not to notice also its political nature. Compared to previous attempts to integrate the post-Soviet area, this current (Eurasian) is quite efficient, although many of the objectives still remain unfulfilled. Politicians (especially Russian) are looking for ways to strengthen the organization and, in addition to deepening cooperation, are also planning to expand the ECU and attract some other states. Politicians ideas often do not coincide with reality and in this article they have been critically analyzed. The most likely future member of the ECU seems to be Tajikistan, a country still heavily dependent on Russia. Other ideas for widening the organization are very questionable (Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova), some of them are unreal (Turkey, Syria) and some even surprising (Greece, Cyprus).

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Multikulturalita Ruské federace a její reflexe ve školním vzdělávání

94%

Ježková V.

Pedagogická orientace (Journal of the Czech Pedagogical Society)

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2012

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vol. 22

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issue 4

565-480

EN

The Russian Federation is a considerably multicultural country, which also influences the school. The subjects of the study are two main areas: dealing with he nationalities issue and the language policy of the Russian Federation, namely at the level of the whole society and at the level of school education. In the summary the situation in the Russian Federation is compared to the situation in the Czech Republic and and other countries: Germany, Great Britain and Sweden.

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Zakres procesów integracyjnych w ramach Unii Celnej Rosji, Białorusi i Kazachstanu

94%

Czerewacz-Filipowicz K.

International Business and Global Economy

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2014

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vol. Volume 33

227–237

EN

Processes of international regional integration in the post-Soviet area raise many doubts and controversies. Since the collapse of the USSR and formation of new countries in its place in 1991, numerous initiatives have occurred, that often to a greater extent attempt to maintain the previously-functioning political and economic ties between these countries, instead of creating a new quality of mutual relations between them. An additional difficulty in this respect lies in large disparities in terms of economic and political potential and natural resources owned. Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), since its inception in 2001, has assumed ambitious economic goals. The Eurasian Customs Union, founded in 2010 on the territory of the EurAsEC, integrates three of the five members of the group: the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The purpose of this article is to attempt to answer the question about the actual extent of economic integration between the countries which formed this customs union and the prospects of transforming the area into a common market.

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An energy promise of democratic peace for the arctic: Russia’s case

94%

Stekić N., Kopcewicz G., Olszanecka N., Urbański D., Piechowiak-Lamparska J., Bryc A., Bojarczyk B., Jorgensen F. A. E., Niedziołka D., Pacześniak A., Potorski R., Wincławska M., Włodkowska-Bagan A., Jeran A., Mol A., Solsbery A., Dąbrowska I., Głodkowski M., Kopcewicz G., Olszanecka N., Piechowiak-Lamparska J.

The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies

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2018

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issue 1

EN

It has been widely discussed whether the existing theoretical approaches within the international relations could efficiently explain the newly established phenomena within the international system. As a vast space of emerging importance, the Arctic presents a unique area which is an immanent strategic object of the world’s major powers such as Russia, China, Canada, and the EU. This article uses the democratic peace theory to determine whether the major intervening variables – energy policy and transit potential in the Arctic – could inhibit the theoretically predicted behaviour of such states. Theoretical implication stemming from the literature review points to an inherently more peaceful nature of Russia in this space, unlike the rest of the world. This was an incentive to fill in an epistemological gap of the democratic peace puzzle. Following the logic of the democratic peace theory, this research has demonstrated that the two intervening variables have been omitted and thus they should be incorporated in further empirical research.

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Maritime Safety of NATO Borders in the Baltic Sea Region

94%

Gac M.

Historia i Polityka

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2019

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issue 30 (37)

77-87

EN

The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) is a specific area lying between the areas of conflicting political interests of the East and West, making it an object of particular interest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Russian Federation. The current situation is characterized by the high militarization of the region, mainly related to the use of the Russian power sector, with the anti-access capabilities in the Kaliningrad District in particular. Changes in the security environment in this area have resulted in the increased capabilities to deter and the collective defence capabilities of all NATO members, as part of strengthening the Alliance’s eastern flank.

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Zahraniční a bezpečnostní politika Ruska a jeho zájmy v regionu Blízkého východu a severní Afriky v kontextu událostí arabského jara

94%

Tichý L.

Slovanský přehled: historická revue pro dějiny střední, východní a jihovýchodní Evropy (Slavonic Review: Review for Central, Eastern and Southeastern European history)

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2015

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vol. 101

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issue 1

125-156

EN

After the end of the Cold War, the relations between the Russian Federation and the states of the Near East and North Africa underwent many different developmental stages during the course of the next two decades. Whereas in the period of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin’s presidency in the 1990s this region remained rather in the background of Russia’s interests, in the first decade of the 21st century Russia renewed its influence in this region during the presidencies of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and then Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev. The events of the Arab Spring became a new challenge for Russia in 2011. In the context of these actualities, there are two main goals for this article. The first is to compare the position of the Russian Federation’s foreign and security policies in the region of the Near East and North Africa in the periods before and during the Arab Spring against the background of Russian interests. The second goal of the article is to define the influence of post-revolutionary developments on Russian foreign and security policy in the region of the Near East and North Africa.

11

94%

Minkina M.

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2019

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vol. 26

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issue 4

34-50

EN

Objectives The elite of Russian power and Russian society have never come to terms with the collapse of the Soviet Union. They also did not accept the world order with the primary role of the United States. The purpose of this article is to characterize the policy of the Russian Federation, which is aimed at rebuilding the superpower position of this state, and to identify the reasons that clearly define Russia’s determination in this respect. Methods Achieving the formulated goal will be possible by answering the question: Why does Russia strive to rebuild the status of the global superpower and what actions it undertakes in its policy? This question is the main research problem, which the authors of the article have taken up. In order to solve the indicated problem, theoretical methods will be used in the form of: source and literature criticiam, analysis, synthesis and inference. Results Nobody negates the fact that Russia is still one of the largest countries in the world. Nonetheless, it is much smaller and weaker than the USSR. By means of assertive, not to say aggressive, and anti-western politics it demands to be recognized as a superpower eligible to decide on the international order. However, in the contemporary world, the territory decides about the superpower status to a much smaller extent. Conclusions The foundations of the Russian superpower status are weak, and the popular anti-western narrative is not conducive to strengthening the Kremlin's position internationally.

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Russian Active Measures in Psychological Warfare

94%

Doroszczyk J.

Polish Political Science Yearbook

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2018

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vol. 3 (47)

521-534

EN

The aim of the article is to analyse Russian active measures in the context of psychological warfare. Active measures are defined as the actions of political warfare conducted by Russian secret service. In case of Russian Federation they are the core of psychological operations that are tools of realising international and domestic policy priorities. Active measures include disinformation campaigns and supporting insurgency in opponent states. Regarding the context of psychological operations active measures are designed to model the mental sphere of opponent society. Active measures are aimed at weakening the unity of the European Union as well as common trust in NATO. Creating favourable atmosphere for Russian activity is the main goal of implementing active measures. Therefore active measures are considered as a great part of Russian interpretation of psychological warfare. Although active measures can support the military activity they are designed to influence the mental sphere of opponent society and are used to create opinions and interpretations that match Russian interests. Those measures are difficult to identify and therefore are threats that are not easy to counteract.

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Деякі аспекти стандартизації підготовки соціальних працівників в РФ

94%

Robak W.

Prosopon. Europejskie Studia Społeczno-Humanistyczne

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2014

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issue 1(7)

181-189

EN

The article analyzes the state standards of two generations for the preparation of social workers according to the qualifying levels “bachelor” and “master” in the Russian Federation. The author concludes that a new generation of standards contain a number of progressive changes (formation on the basis of competence approach, expansion of academic freedom of universities, strengthening of natural science component, specification of the field of professional activity), which will help to improve the process of preparing above mentioned professionals.

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Examples of hybrid activities in Baltic countries

94%

Oleksiak K.

Obronność – Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania i Dowodzenia Akademii Sztuki Wojennej

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2018

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issue 2(26)

11

PL

W niniejszym artykule, autorka precyzuje podejście do działań o charakterze hybrydowym, prezentując ich istotę oraz analizując ich elementy składowe. Artykuł oparty jest na jawnej części raportów dotyczących kontrwywiadu krajów bałtyckich i prezentuje rosyjskie działania przeprowadzone w krajach bałtyckich w pierwszej oraz drugiej fazie działań hybrydowych.

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Rosyjska polityka pretekstów, a art. 5 Traktatu waszyngtońskiego – zagrożenia i możliwości obronne

94%

Securitologia

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2014

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issue 1(19)

47-65

EN

The Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated that the Russian Federation is now more likely to use a strategy of inspired pretexts than ever before in order to influence international relations and the internal situation of former communist republics and other Countries of Eastern Europe. This article describes the possible areas of hotspots that may be used by Russia to create an atmosphere of tension in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region. It also points out the differences in attitude to Russia's activities, revealed by various NATO members during the Ukrainian conflict and the current role of the 5th Article of The North Atlantic Treaty in a system of collective defence.

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