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1

DESCARTES' 'MEDITATIONS' IN THE HISTORY OF SCEPTICISM

100%
Zieminska R.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2009
|
issue 15(28)
47-62
EN
Descartes started his philosophy when scepticism was very popular in France (M. de Montaigne's followers). Meditations are under influence of sceptical tradition even if Descartes does not mention it. His methodical scepticism was very serious in fact (the threat of sceptical conclusion was real). Descartes made the traditional sceptical reasons deeper by constructing two hypotheses: of dream and evil demon. He stopped sceptical doubting by discovering his own existence and tried to rescue the rest of human knowledge. There are many critical remarks about his answer to his own sceptical hypotheses. Descartes' role in the history of scepticism is the role of the author of evil demon hypothesis (recently modified as the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis).
2

ON THE ORIGINS OF THE BERKELEIAN DEFINITION OF 'EXISTENCE'

100%
Szalek P. K.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2009
|
issue 15(28)
145-159
EN
The paper seeks an interpretation of Berkeley's metaphysics, which is characterised in terms of an attempt to formulate a kind of ontology of the existence. Although essential, this existential aspect of Berkeleian thought is surprisingly neglected by commentators, presumably due to the dominant epistemological tendency in the interpretation of his philosophy. The aim of the paper is an attempt to fill the above lack in the scholarship on Berkeley's philosophy.
3

UNDER-DETERMINATION, SCEPTICISM, AND REALISM

100%
Koreň L.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2014
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vol. 21
|
issue 2
145 – 167
EN
This study aims to articulate and compare the structure, presuppositions and implications of two paradigmatic sceptical arguments, i.e. arguments from under-determination of scientific theories by observational data (UA) and Cartesian-style arguments (CA) invoking sceptical scenarios of severe cognitive dislocation. Although salient analogies between them may prompt one to think that a unified diagnosis of what is amiss with them is called for, it will be argued that this may be a false hope, if those analogies do not underwrite a complete homology. That said, possible parallels of one promising anti-sceptical exposure of CA are pointed out for the case of UA, which conspire together to render the problem of under-determination less threatening than it could at first appear.
4

JE SKEPTICIZMUS STÁLE ZAUJÍMAVÝ?

100%
Greif A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
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vol. 70
|
issue 7
531 – 545
EN
The article aims at answering two questions: 1) Is scepticism still a problem worth the attention of philosophers? 2) Is sceptical attitude true? It also sheds light on current local discussion of scepticism and offers some critical commentaries on it. Ad 1): The difference between scepticism and sceptic argument is underlined as well as the necessity to focus on explicitly articulated sceptic arguments. Ad 2): There are several scepticisms that are to be differentiated if we want to judge their truth values. In general, the interesting forms of scepticism are not true (this judgment depends on conceiving interesting sceptical arguments as paradoxes). Finally, some of the short-comings of otherwise valuable writings on sceptical arguments in current discussion are indicated, due to which the solutions they offer cannot be satisfactory.
5

MIESTO ANTICKÉHO SKEPTICIZMU VO FILOZOFII 16. STOROČIA

100%
Kaliský J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
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vol. 66
|
issue 2
174-185
EN
The paper deals with the rediscovery of ancient scepticism by the Renaissance philosophy, especially that of the 16th century. It examines the conditions of its revitalization as well as the reasons, why the sceptical argument has been so widely applied by the Renaissance philosophers. The most of them used it in defence of their religion against non-believers. Some of he Renaissance fideists were sceptics: they did not want to know, because they did want to believe.
6

SEXTOS EMPEIRIKOS: PROTI LOGIKOM ALEBO POZVANIE DO ANTICKÉHO SKEPTICIZMU

100%
Kalaš A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2008
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vol. 63
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issue 3
252-269
EN
The paper gives an outline of the history of the ancient scepticism, underlining the position of Sextus Empiricus in the ancient philosophical thought. The author argues that in antiquity there was a continuous sceptical reflection on reality and human being. He presents the ancient scepticism as a continuous struggle towards eudaemonia, the ethical aim rarely present in scepticism's modern variations. The first Slovak translation of the several introductory chapters from Sextus Empiricus' 'Against the Logicians', which follows the paper, should serve as a textual evidence of the inferences made in the paper.
7
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SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM (Semantyczne zalozenia sceptycyzmu kartezjanskiego)

100%
Poslajko K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2010
|
issue 12
167-182
EN
The paper purports to show that in order to formulate the hypothesis that all our beliefs are collectively false - which is taken to be the core of Cartesian skepticism - one must accept the presumption that semantic properties of subject's beliefs locally supervene on 'internal' properties of said subject. In order to show that the responses to skepticism from semantic externalism, i.e. those formulated by Putnam and Davidson, are analyzed. It is argued that even though these arguments are controversial they indicate that Cartesian skeptic must assume that subject beliefs' semantic properties can remain the same in different surroundings, which is exactly what the supervenience thesis amounts to. Finally, it is pointed out that the skepticism introduced by Kripke in his discussion of rule-following is indeed more radical than traditional, Cartesian one, as the former denies the very thesis that the latter must assume.
8

WHAT DOES THE PREMISE “A DECEIVER DECEIVES ME” CONCLUDE? －DESCARTES’ DECEIVER ARGUMENT RECONSIDERED

100%
Tamura A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
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vol. 74
|
issue 4
308 – 317
EN
Descartes insists, “[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me [...]” (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 17). In what way can we draw evidence that our existence can be drawn from our being deceived? The interpretations that the earlier studies have shown are not a monolith. Then I will search for some inherent characteristics of deception, and analyse the construction of the reasoning, “if a deceiver deceives me, I exist.” To be concrete, I show: 1) that it is not “I exist” but “I think” that is concluded from the supposition “a deceiver deceives me/I am deceived by a deceiver”; 2) that the attributions of the self as a thinking thing, i.e. understanding, affirming, and denying (AT-VII, 28; CSM-II, 19), are discovered in the very supposition of a deceiver.
9

SKEPTICIZMUS A NEGATÍVNY DOGMATIZMUS V MYSLENÍ HOMÉRA A XENOFANA

88%
Kubok D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
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vol. 69
|
issue 3
223 – 235
EN
The article presents selected aspects of Xenophanes’ philosophy (especially B 34 and B 18 Diels-Kranz) in the light of Homer’s thought. First of all, scepticism should be distinguished from negative dogmatism. Therefor the author will use the term “scepticism” (from Greek skeptomai – explore, examine, consider, think) in accordance with Sextus Empiricus’ typology. In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (I, 1-2) he distinguishes three forms of philosophy: (1) dogmatic (dogmatike), characteristic of those, who claim to have found the truth; (2) academic (akademaike), defined as negative dogmatism denying the possibility of finding the truth; (3) sceptic (skeptike), which involve a persistent search for truth. The main aim of the paper is to compare Homer’s attitudes with those of Xenophanes as far as the distinction between scepticism and negative dogmatism is concerned.
10

ZDRAVÝ ROZUM VO FILOZOFII THOMASA REIDA

88%
Nuhliček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
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vol. 65
|
issue 5
449-460
EN
The paper offers a discussion of the concept of common sense in T. Reid's philosophy. Reid criticizes Hume's scepticism, which is in conflict with common sense, as a 'deadlock of philosophy'. Reid's criticism thus might be seen as naive and 'un-philosophical', and therefore missing the point. The author argues, however, that common sense, as used by Reid, is a metaphysical concept. In his view common sense and its principles delimit all plausible philosophizing. He also sees a remarkable affinity between Reid's philosophy and later Wittgenstein's considerations of 'the image of the world'. Reid's philosophy of common sense is an original philosophical resolution of the problem, which the philosophy 'in a deadlock' is facing, as well as an effective criticism of scepticism.
11

TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND PHENOMENOLOGY (Argumenty transcendentalne i fenomenologia)

88%
Leszczynski D.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2009
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vol. 37
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issue 3
181-197
EN
The paper discusses some problems concerning transcendental arguments. The author reconstructs the main aspects of transcendental arguments, their functions (as anti-skeptical strategies) and their structure. What is crucial in this respect is that transcendental arguments are not modus ponens reasoning but synthetic a priori statements and forms of 'situated thought'. In this sense there is a connection between the idea of 'situated thought' and some of Husserl's conceptions from the 'Logical Investigations'. The author discusses also this problem in reference to Searle's transcendental defense of external realism.
12

SKEPTICKÉ INTUÍCIE

88%
Greif A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
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vol. 71
|
issue 9
733 – 745
EN
The goal of this paper is to provide answers for two key questions concerning epistemic intuitions in the context of sceptical arguments: (1) What is the nature of these intuitions? (2) Do they provide evidence or justification for the premises of these arguments? In contemporary literature on scepticism, the precise propositional contents of our „sceptical“ intuitions are rarely identified. The author considers several possible ways of identifying them and concludes that our intuitive answers to various sceptical thought experiments are the best means of capturing the propositional content of our intuitions. This conclusion is based on the argument from philosophical usage of the terms „intuition“, „intuitive“ and the like. Moreover, the author proposes a theory of the origin of sceptical intuitions. He argues that these intuitions are products of our language competence. Further, he shows that if this theory was true, it would not lend support to the idea that sceptical intuitions provide evidence or justification for the premises of sceptical arguments.
13

PREČO EXTERIALISTICKÉ KRITÉRIÁ ZDÔVODNENIA PRINCIPIÁLNE ZLYHÁVAJÚ?

88%
Nuhlíček M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
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vol. 20
|
issue 1
37 – 49
EN
The article concerns two basic approaches to the problem of epistemic belief-justification: internalism and externalism. The article aims to showing that internalism as well as externalism, when confronted with the problem of philosophical scepticism, face various kinds of problems, which lead to implausibility of their respective accounts of justification. The author provides a special focus on the externalist approach which was invented as a direct response to the threat of scepticism. The central part of the article contains a brief analysis of main attributes of externalism, and subsequently its criticism which aims to showing that the criteria of justification proposed by externalists do not accomplish the basic function of distinguishing between justified and unjustified beliefs. The author argues that the discussed deficiencies of externalism result from its elementary rationale, which implies that they are incurable, and therefore the externalist criteria of justification inevitably fail.
14

'GRAMMAR RULE' IN LATER WITTGENSTEIN

88%
Cana T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2006
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3
349-360
EN
The paper deals with Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to the 'rule following activities'. Wittgenstein made many profound remarks, especially on the nature of the rules determining our communication in an everyday language. Some of these remarks are in the center of a current philosophical controversy known as 'rule following considerations'. Among many contributors the most important one is probably Saul Kripke. The aim of this paper is to refute Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach to these activities, which Kripke developes in his book 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'. According to Kripke, the central argument of 'Philosophische Untersuchungen' - the private language argument - leads us to so-called sceptical conclusion. From this conclusion it follows that in the everyday language there is no clear meaning of the term 'following a rule'. The paper is an attempt to reconsider this approach and to demonstrate that this sceptical interpretation of the private language argument is misleading.
15

NATURALISTICKÉ TENDENCIE VO FILOZOFII DAVIDA HUMA

88%
Szapuová M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2022
|
vol. 77
|
issue 9
665 – 679
EN
Naturalism as a general philosophical strategy became a popular topic of philosophical debates during the last half of century, however, its roots go deeper into the history of philosophical thought. One of the authors in whose works some elements of philosophical naturalism are undoubtedly identifiable is David Hume. The aim of the paper is to shed light on some naturalistic tendencies in Humeʼs philosophy, which, as I will argue, can be considered as inspiring even today. Such is his approach to his “new science of man”, within which his inclination towards methodological naturalism can be found. Naturalistic tendencies can be identified in Humeʼs views regarding knowledge and understanding, especially with regard to the problem of scepticism. The study outlines also a possible naturalistic interpretation of Humeʼs moral philosophy.
16

AKVINSKÉHO TEÓRIA INTENCIONALITY V KONTEXTE EPISTEMOLOGICKÝCH DISKUSIÍ

88%
Mlčúchová A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
|
vol. 67
|
issue 6
491 – 497
EN
The paper deals with Aquinas’ theory of intentional forms, so-called species, insofar as it gives an account of the validity of human cognitive acts. Its focus is on the objectivity of knowledge and the basis of radical (Cartesian) scepticism, therefore the comparisons to the modern theory of ideas are employed. However, the author’s aim is not a defence against scepticism; her aim is rather to provide certain insights into its origins.
17

FREEDOM, POWER AND CAUSATION

75%
Pink T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2019
|
vol. 26
|
issue 1
141 – 168
EN
Freedom or control of how we act is often and very naturally under-stood as a kind of power—a power to determine for ourselves how we act. Is freedom conceived as such a power possible, and what kind of power must it be? The paper argues that power takes many forms, of which ordinary causation is only one; and that if freedom is indeed a kind of power, it cannot be ordinary causation. Scepticism about the reality of freedom as a power can take two forms. One, found in Hume, now often referred to as the Mind argument, assumes incompatibilism, and concludes from incompatibilism that freedom cannot exist, as indistinguishable from chance. But another scepticism, founds in Hobbes, does not assume incompatibilism, but assumes rather that the only possible form of power in nature is ordinary causation, concluding that freedom cannot for this reason exist as a form of power. This scepticism is more profound—it is in fact presupposed by Hume’s scepticism—and far more interesting, just because freedom cannot plausibly be modelled as ordinary causation.
18

Sceptycyzm i dyskusja z nim w filozofii George'a Berkeleya i Thomasa Reida

75%
Kucharski D.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2010
|
vol. 46
|
issue 2
25-47
EN
The main aim of the paper is an attempt to characterize two different approaches to refute skepticism, namely, that of George Berkeley and Thomas Reid. The reason to choose these thinkers is twofold. First, the Berkeley's system (among other systems labeled by Reid as 'theory of ideas') was an object of a very serious and even fierce critique by T. Reid. That critique was meant as a first step for creating his own system known as the Scottish School of Common Sense. Second, despite of that critique, in many respects the philosophical views of Reid strikingly resemble these of Berkeley. And among the resemblances, the opinions of the two about the nature of perception of external objects play a very important role. Both philosophers take presentationalism as their own position. Both of them maintain that the other possible view, representationalism, leads inevitably to skepticism. And, last but not least, one should remember that for G. Berkeley and equally T. Reid the refutation of skepticism was one of the most important reasons for building their own systems. However, the similarities mentioned above prove to be rather superficial. It is common knowledge how much differ the outcomes of the attempts taken by Berkeley and Reid to refute skepticism. So similar assumptions and goals do not bring similar answers at all. The paper attempts to show how Berkeley and Reid dealt with the problem of skepticism. Namely, what they meant by skepticism, how they understood an object of perception, and how they defined the reality of an object. And what solution against skepticism they offered. As we know Berkeley came to the conclusion that immaterialism is the best remedy against skeptical doubts about perceiving the real world. The concept of material substance and the mediate perception of things were the main sources of skepticism. Reid, however, defended the material nature of objects of perception - that belief was an intrinsic part of common sense. He maintained that any discussion with that sort of beliefs is impossible, they lay the foundations of any other knowledge. Consequently Reid builds such a philosophical system that would justify and prove right the beliefs of common sense.
19

KNOWING OUR OWN CONCEPTS: THE ROLE OF INTUITIUONS IN PHILOSOPHY

75%
Hartl P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2011
|
vol. 18
|
issue 4
488 – 498
EN
Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticizing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is an intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? The author presents and examines the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claims that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. His argument will utilize Goldman’s view, according to which intuitions give reliable (though not infallible) evidence about a person’s Concepts, and this knowledge is valuable for further philosophical research as well. The author will argue that the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are harmless against this conception of philosophy, because even from a naturalist perspective certain kind of intuitive judgments about our concepts can be warranted, and this grants the specific epistemic status of intuitions. Of course, the reliability of introspection can be challenged. However, denying self-knowledge about his internal mental states is disputable – as he will show – both from a philosophical and a scientific point of view.
20

BOGHOSSIAN O NEZDÔVODNITEĽNOSTI EPISTEMOLOGICKÝCH NÁROKOV LOGIKY

75%
Čana T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 8
620 – 632
EN
This paper deals with the epistemological claims of logic. Scepticism is a position in the philosophy of logic, according to which the „fundamental logical truths“ such as „Modus ponens is a valid rule of inference“, are unjustifiable. In his quest for a „plausible epistemology for logic“, Paul Boghossian subjected this position to an original criticism. He argues that the unique status of fundamental logical truths should also be justified. Otherwise, nothing can be really justified. He tries to demonstrate that, under such circumstances, the sceptical position does not represent „the stable platform to stand on“, either. The aim of this paper is to critically reconsider Boghossian’s attack on this position.
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