Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  SCIENTIFIC LAWS
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

Why was Roentgen's Discovery of X-Rays scientific?

100%
Sady W.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2004
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3(51)
7-20
EN
It is research procedure that is scientific or not rather than its product, i.e. a theory. To be the scientific one, both experimental research and theoretical investigations must be systematic. There are three necessary conditions of the scientific character of research procedure. (1) The same set of laws should be applied in the theoretical analysis of different phenomens. (2) In different applications of the set of laws there should appear the same groups of additional conditions in recurring configurations . (3) While choosing additional conditions the whole knowledge about supposed elements of the system under study should be taken into account. The general principle is that if nothing is known that a theoretical property of a given element can change, it should be ascribed to the same element present in subsequent experiment. The author tries to show that all those conditions were satisfied in case of Roentgen's 1895 research.
2

COMMENTS ON GIACOMO BORBONE’S BOOK THE RELEVANCE OF MODELS. IDEALIZATION AND CONCRETIZATION IN LESZEK NOWAK

88%
Hanzel I.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2023
|
vol. 30
|
issue 2
163 – 164
EN
Chapter II of Borbone’s book addresses Nowak’s innovative views and reconstruction of the methods used in Marx’s economic works, namely, Marx’s delineation of the law of value, as well as Marx’s explanation based on this law as performed by the method of gradual concretization. In Chapter III, Borbone provides a comparison of Nowak’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation with that of Hempel. From that comparison Nowak’s approach comes out as superior to that of Hempel due to the former’s ability to reconstruct laws containing equations, the possibility to address the issue of the explanation of a scientific law from other scientific laws, as well as a more fine-grained view on the very nature scientific explanation.
3

VEDECKÝ ZÁKON: K HISTÓRII JEDNÉHO POJMU

88%
Hanzel I.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2007
|
vol. 62
|
issue 9
801-812
EN
The aim of this paper is to show the incompleteness of the exclusively logico-syntactical and logico-semantical approaches to one of the core issues of philosophy of science, namely, scientific laws and scientific explanation in C. G. Hempel works. The author starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel approach (labeled 'the D-N model') to the deductive explanations based on the universal scientific laws and then analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. Next, he traces these characteristics back to the Hempel and Carnap attempts to ground the concepts of scientific law and explanation exclusively on logic (i.e. logical syntax and/or logical semantics), which led to a highly normative approach alienated from the practice of real science.
4

SCIENTIFIC LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATIONS: A DIFFERENTIATED TYPOLOGY

75%
Hanzel I.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2008
|
vol. 15
|
issue 3
323-344
EN
The paper tries to provide an alternative to C. G. Hempel's approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation as given in his D-N model. It starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel's approach to deductive explanations based on universal scientific laws and analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. By way of solution, it analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. The paper makes an attempt to provide a new approach to the scientific laws and scientific explanations. The author gives a brief overview of Hempel's approach to the scientific laws and scientific explanation, as well as of its failures and paradoxes. As a way out, the author analyzes the scientific laws and explanations in classical mechanics and then reconstructs the corresponding models of explanation, as well as the types of scientific laws appearing in it. Finally, he provides a differentiated typology of the scientific laws and scientific explanations.
5

Is Chance An 'Element' Of Miracle? In Search For Common Aspect Of Miraculous And Chance Events

75%
Swiezynski A.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2010
|
vol. 46
|
issue 2
25-47
EN
Philosophical attempts to answer the question as to what chance is and the question as to the possibility of the existence of the miracle, are ineluctably bound up with the problem of the concept and structure of the laws of nature. It thus appears that the most competent area of philosophical deliberation, within the framework of which one might seek the answer to the foregoing questions, is the philosophy of nature, rooted within contemporary natural sciences. An extraordinary event, one which we are unable to incorporate into the regularities of nature as we know them, may be such either on account of its ontic structure, or on account of the observer's limited cognitive capabilities. What emerges here is a convergence between the empirical element of a miraculous event and an event which we describe as a chance event, in the sense of there being an absence of cause/a lack of knowledge regarding the cause.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.