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1

TRACTARIAN OBJECTS IN THE STRUCTURAL SETTING

100%
Schmidt M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2009
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vol. 16
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issue 3
328-343
EN
The aim of the paper is to argue that the ontological setting of objects in Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' is a version of structural realism. According to our plan, one of the opening statements of the Tractatus - The world is the totality of facts, not of things - introduces structuralist perspective: structures are superior to their constituents. However, structuralists use the notion 'superior' in various senses, but this paper argues that the Tractatus places its objects within the framework of ontic structural realism in its moderate form. That form puts structures and individuals on the same ontological footing. Such thesis contradicts traditional object-ontology that dominates Tractarian literature.
2

STRUCTURAL REALISM: ONTOLOGICAL STRUCTURES, COHESIONS AND MODALITIES 'DE RE' (Strukturnyi realizm: ontolohichni struktury, zv'yazki ta modalnosti de re)

100%
Nef F.
Філософська Думка
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2010
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issue 1
57-75
EN
The paper deals with the nature of ontological structures. The metaphysical assumption of the existence of ontological structures allows explaining both the singularity of things and cohesion between them. The author adheres to the standpoint of structural realism, according to which ontological structures exist independently of our representation ability. He suggests that things are made up from tropes, and that these tropes are connected with each other by a strong cohesion, which goes beyond the relations of compresence. It is confirmed that the cohesion is grounded in ontological necessity, and that adequate understanding of ontological structures thus requires an appeal to the modality 'de re' which cannot be reduced to the modality 'de dicto'. In this way modal ontology plays a central role in the investigation and description of ontological structures.
3

CAUSATION AND STRUCTURAL REALISM

100%
Schmidt M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2010
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vol. 17
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issue 4
508-521
EN
M. Esfeld has recently argued that ontic structural realism may succeed only if it is based on causal structures. In order to meet this requirement, he offers a combination of dispositional/causal relations with moderate form ontic structural realism. This paper, however, demonstrates that moderate position, in relation to causation, faces a dilemma whose resolution leads to a monistic ontology that creates a rather hostile environment for structural metaphysics.
4

STRUCTURAL REALISM WITHOUT METAPHYSICS: NOTES ON CARNAP’S MEASURED PRAGMATIC STRUCTURAL REALISM

63%
Beni M. D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2015
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vol. 22
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issue 3
302 – 324
EN
Carnap’s re-invention of the Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theories has been at the centre of a new debate in recent years. Following Grover Maxwell, Psillos (2000a) argued that Carnap’s re-invention of the Ramsey-sentence had failed to lead to the desired neutral stance in the realism-instrumentalism debate, and ended, instead, to a form of structural realism which happened to be liable to Newman’s objection to Russell’s version of structural realism. The objection held that without putting suitable restrictions on the range of the variables of the Ramsey-sentence, a Ramsey-sentence approach to theories renders trivial and a priori true all ontological commitments to unobservable entities issued by scientific theories. By arguing that Carnap achieved the neutral stance, Friedman (2011) counter Psillos claim. He denied that any form of realism could be attributed to Carnap. In this paper, the author provides a middle ground, where an unorthodox form of structural realism could be attributed to Carnap. He highlights parts of Carnap’s work which deal with the problem of designation of abstract terms and the relation of the language to the facts of the matter (in Carnap 1934; 1950; 1966), to argue that it was Carnap’s view about the practical methodological considerations, being at work in the construction (or choice) of the linguistic systems, which led him to the unorthodox form of structural realism. The author claims also that the same practical considerations constitute the nub of a viable Carnapian answer to Newman’s objection.
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