Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 34

first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  SUBJECTIVITY
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 3
269-283
EN
Kant's view of subjectivity implies a twofold consideration of the idea of subject. On one hand, there is the empirical self, and on the other hand, there stands the transcendental subject as the principle of the unity of experience, and therefore, as the principle of the existence of the empirical self. Kant's transcendental subject is an effort to suggest a theory of subjectivity, which is impersonal and non-atomistic, that is to say a model that intends to exclude individualism. Yet, this model fails to constitute the factually existing person as subject. Kant's theory of transcendental subject is rooted in his subjectivist idealist philosophy; the transcendental subject appears to be another type of the idea of absolute.
EN
In this paper some considerations are presented on the subjectivity as one of the core philosophical conceptions construing the disciplinary field of 'general education'. The particular focus is on the changeover that we witness nowadays within the philosophical ideas on subject and subjectivity. Herein, the vivid debate between defining subjectivity in essential terms, as it is presented within 'classical' philosophy of Enlightenment, and poststructuralist views that deconstruct the Enlightenment idea of autonomous and absolute 'Self' takes place. The question of subjectivity and its contemporary transformations touches the very educational problem of cultivating humanity throughout the process of education.
EN
The autoress' book 'Nomadic Studies: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory' touches upon the most important issues of our contemporary feminist debate, including, inter alia: western epistemology vs. femininity; feminism vs. bioethics; individual issues of European feminism and how the American feminism may affect the theories conceived in Europe. She defends a trans-disciplinary and multidisciplinary methodology of building a female, but also a male, subjectivity in the context of the present time which less and less frequently enables one to refer to the roots whilst more and more frequently requiring from its nomadic dwellers to seek for new methods of constructing their own 'self'. A 'nomadic subject' forms subjectivity being free of any nostalgia for durability, the idea of constancy or permanency being quit. The authoress approaches the option to build feminine subjectivity in political terms, dialogue being deemed its key element. Dialoguing requires a redefinition of what is man in a circumstance where the old definitions prove non-useful, for what is human is re-constructed in the context of global economy, technological revolution, emergence of multicultural societies, or a new social/cultural reality. Her suggestion is that the sexual difference be treated as a positive element of asymmetry between males and females - so that whatever a woman can offer might transform our contemporary policy and the world. Providing that femininity can be defined in a variety of ways.
4
Content available remote

K FILOZOFICKÉMU DISKURZU LITERÁRNEJ MODERN

100%
World Literature Studies
|
2021
|
vol. 13
|
issue 4
142 - 149
EN
In this study, we define philosophical discourse as one of the dominant discourses of literary modernism, whose specific authorial expressions depend primarily on the concentration on man and his inner world. This subjective world was strongly marked by the disintegration of universalism, which resulted in value relativism and the search for new “truths” capable of establishing a lost order (on a transcendental or rational basis).
EN
This article deals with the problem of subjectivity and social participation of rural inhabitants. Its main objective, however, is to find an answer to the question about the level of subjectivity and activity of adult residents of rural communes of the Lodz region, and to determine the correlates of these variables.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2007
|
vol. 62
|
issue 8
668-674
EN
There are more forms of intersubjectivity or more ways of how we experience the overlaps of our subjectivity to the other, to the alter in his different forms. The paper focuses on some selected aspects of this problem, which are related to the phenomenological reduction and situated at the intersection point of two theses: Subjectivity is intersubjectivity; Intersubjectivity is subjectivity. The discussion is based on selected texts of Edmund Husserl and Natalie Depraz.
EN
The paper deals with what could be seen as 'a new origin' (rather as a comeback) of the subjectivity in contemporary French philosophy. The author believes, that a piece of this 'different' subjectivity appears already with Husserl; it is something irreducible to the idealistic subject matter in transcendental egology, something similar to feeling, which endures giving. In his view in contemporary French phenomenology there are two different 'families': the first one is led by its radicalism to the original anonymity (Merleau-Ponty and to some extent also J. Garelli and M. Richir); the other is led by the same radicalism to Self-feeling. This second family is discussed in more details: it is the extreme phenomenology, which endures the excesses of destruction and hurting; it becomes sensible to subjectivity as an irremovable feeling, to which a man is bound: a man is this feeling. It is the Self induced by and delayed in relation to that, of which it is a feeling; it is the Self deprived of this feeling, the Self, which can not constitute this feeling as its own experience actively. Nevertheless this Self is entirely this feeling. We can find this in the works of M. Henry and E. Levinas as well as in those of Derrida (what is embarrassing only at first sight and does not undermine at all the radicalism of Derridaian deconstruction of the subject).
EN
This text is yet another attempt at taking up the immortal question reappearing seasonally in university or college seminars in humanities: Can interpretation be scientific? Can an act of interpreting, understood as responding to the call and meeting the challenge posed by a text (or, by 'texts', in a broad semiotic meaning), aspire to be termed 'scientific', as per the customary explanation of the term? If, namely, there is always someone's subjectivity behind an interpretative gesture, whereas striving for objectivity - or, inter-subjective communicability - is part of the essence of science, then, is it not so that the notion of 'scientific interpretation' proves to be a classical example for quadrature of the circle? The author also attempts at responding the question of why science - understood for the purpose as codified rules of a methodological game - is so much afraid of interpretative subjectivity, and, at the end of the day, why it strives so insistently for taming any interpretative passion.
EN
This article determines not only the scope of issues to be discussed in it, but above all a pretext to discuss a different view of the man whose space is sketched by his being, which is complementary. The mental sensations are a subject for ideological concretisation also dimensioned by scientific knowledge and above all educational knowledge referred to here as “educatiology”. As a result of human experience there is carnality normalized by education, a tool shaped by the nature of politics, ethics, history and aesthetics, contributes to the formation of personality.
EN
The article attempts to show the relationship between the 'visible' surface of the world and the Divine according to Cyprian-Kamil Norwid's interpretation of Christian belief. This relationship is represented against the background of imperial Rome in the second century AD. When one looks at the colourful bustle of the Pagan capital from a Christian point of view, it becomes clear that its bright surface contains an added dimension that reveals itself in the dark (nightscapes) and depth (the catacombs). Thanks to this insight we understand that being is sacred in itself - the Divine is apparent 'here and now' on the pavement of Rome. We (the author and the reader) discover (establish) certain tangible and bodily 'configurations': the 'rock'-motive, 'three' Christians who are persecuted for their refusal to participate in a 'feast of the Emperor', the young anonymous hero who unconsciously becomes a martyr for his belief in an essential humanity of the Divine (and vice-versa - the idea of God-man). Reality appears to us as the realm in which the holy and the profane, immanence and transcendence, time and eternity are intertwined. However, it should not be overlooked that 'Quidam' is a highly ironical poem. From an existential point of view, the author identifies himself with the anonymous 'Son of Alexander' ('Quidam', 'Everyman'), whose title character, in his quest for ultimate truth, arrives at acting like a Christian without being aware of his 'imitating Christ'. His 'sacrificial' identity with the example of God-man is suggested by the 'second' Quidam, the 'Gardener', to whom the truth of Christianity had been previously revealed. The gardener is the 'ideological' mouth-piece of the author - he lacks a psychological 'depth'. The tension between the existential authenticity of a man in search of a not-yet consciously achievable fulfilment (the sacrificial death of Alexander's son is, as a matter of fact, a form of fulfilment) and the truth as a result of simply accepting the dogma constitutes the essential features of the world of Norwid's poetry - its meaning is not self-evident, but must be brought into the open by intellectual effort. God's revelation is put into perspective by individual man.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2017
|
vol. 45
|
issue 4
169-185
EN
In this article the author focuses on some important elements in the philosophy of the French contemporary thinker Renaud Barbaras. It is a matter of fact that Barbaras developed his concept of subjectivity in the context of his general philosophical position. Here the author presents and discusses the key aspects of this anthropology. Although rooted in the great tradition of French phenomenology, Barbaras is able to develop his own, original position in which he puts together philosophy of life, dynamic phenomenology, and above all, a new concept of anthropology rooted in negative metaphysics.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 9
724 – 735
EN
The paper addresses the tension between Badiou’s claim that his theory of the subject must be considered first of all as a ‘formal’ theory, and a certain genealogical history of his notion of the subject. In the latter case, it seems that a very specific political experience has played a crucial role (at least) for Badiou in his early conception of the subject. More particularly, the paper addresses this tension from an ethical perspective. As for the claim repeatedly made in his work, one can identify an implicitly ethical disposition in the formalization itself. At the same time, there are several formulations in his writings that seem to exceed the formal level. The paper examines four concepts or formulations appearing in his three main books (Theory of the Subject, Being and Event, Logics of Worlds) that seem to express a more or less explicit ethical dimension, namely his theory of affects, the principle ‘to decide the undecidable’, the contrast between ‘fidelity’ and ‘confidence’ and Badiou’s answer to the question What is it to live? The paper’s aim is to pinpoint the difference between the ethical stance implied in the formal description of Badiou’s theory of the subject and an explicit ‘ethics of the subject’. The author’s hypothesis is that the latter embodies a dimension that remains tacit in the formal expression of the subject’s ‘household’ alone: Badiou’s ubjectivity itself.
EN
This paper is a critical appraisal of the most recent attempt from cognitive science in general, developmental and evolutionary biology in particular, to understand the nature and mechanisms underlying consciousness as proposed by Anton J.M. Dijker. The proposal, briefly stated, is to view consciousness as a neural capacity for objectivity. What makes the problem of consciousness philosophically and scientifically challenging may be stated as follows: If consciousness has the first-person ontology and our best scientific theories have the third-person ontology, how can we come up with a satisfactory theory? Moreover, if the reduction of one to the other is impossible, what are we supposed to do? By neglecting what Chalmers calls the “hard problem” of consciousness, Dijker’s proposal seems unable to respond to the foregoing questions, and these questions, I maintain, are the very motivations that most of us have when we inquire about consciousness.
EN
In the article the character of relationship between brain processes and subjective experience is considered. Based on the concept of consciousness as a emergent property of complex brain processes (Sperry, 1969), the authors postulate that mood, as a psychophysiological phenomenon, can be studied using laboratory methods. The experiment is an attempt to establish the relationship between reported mood, described by Thayer's Activation-Deactivation Adjective Check List - ADACL (Thayer 1989) and spectral power density of the brain waves in spontaneous EEG. The results show, that estimation of mood on the Energy-Sleep dimension is correlated negatively with alpha activity and the Tension-Placidity dimension is correlated negatively with theta band power. This may lead to conclusion, that specific variability of brain activation states is differentiated in verbal reports.
EN
This article examines the concept of republican political freedom in connection with three aspects of the relationship between subject and state: the subject as distinct from, or opposed to, the state; the subject as established by its constitutional definition; and the subject as a historical praxis of identification and de identification with its legal, recognised form. For this, firstly, I discuss the republican concept of freedom. This is followed by a reflection on the relationship between the individual and the modern state in terms of an analysis of the subjective legitimacy of power based on consent. Finally, I set out to examine republican political freedom from a historicist perspective, venturing some reflections on the relationship between the republican state as a promoter of freedom and historical liberating practices.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2019
|
vol. 74
|
issue 6
456 – 471
EN
Globalization and mass migration have raised anew the question of the nature and origin of human rights. There have been a number of works that seek inspiration on this issue from the philosophy of Hegel. Usually, the primary focus of these works has, naturally enough, been the main statement of Hegel’s political philosophy, the Philosophy of Right. Scholars go to this work in search of a principle that can ground human rights in such a way that can be meaningfully used in a political and legal context. This body of literature is important in that it draws attention to this aspect of Hegel’s thought and shows how it is relevant for a problem of some topicality today. However, this approach, I wish to argue, takes up the issue at a fairly advanced stage in Hegel’s thinking and fails to see some much more fundamental elements in his way of understanding the concept of human rights, specifically, that the very idea of human rights presupposes a philosophical anthropology and a theory of history since human rights as a concept did not always exist. These aspects of Hegel’s theory have been generally neglected in the secondary literature on the issue of human rights.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2023
|
vol. 78
|
issue 2
115 – 127
EN
There have been a considerable number of reactions against scholars who put radical subjectivity at the centre of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. These reactions emphasize the importance of social existence in Kierkegaard’s works. The present paper agrees with these reactions, but it goes one step further by arguing that: once individuality has been established, the individual should, in certain circumstances, cut back on their individuality to become open to others. In this paper, the phrase “forgoing the self” is used as an umbrella term to discuss various forms of this process, e.g., forgetting the self, denying the self.
EN
It is not possible to make a clear definition of the Romanticism in terms of values or aesthetic canon, and also in terms of opposition toward other canons: e.g. Classicism. There are a lot of romantic authors whose works shows classicistic features (e.g. Chateaubriand, Byron, Delacroix, Kleist). It is necessary to understand Romanticism in its variants of 'Romanticisms - and see mainly variety of different 'ideological unites' and artistic forms, who could co-exist within one culture. The article contains three parts. The first one deals with the features of Romantic pluralism, the second one with philosophy of nature (F. Schelling) and the third one concern questions and problems about nature in the early Romantic poetry. There are problems concerning the Romantic understanding of the nature as it is not possible to make a direct and concrete picture of the nature in full authenticity of feelings and experiences. The solution of the problems is to understand the Romantic poetry in terms of communication, as a new type of human communication. That kind of communication based on the power of metaphorical language brings genuine pleasure and knowledge that brings people of different historical periods and different cultures together. That way it produces new values; they replace natural and inevitable truths of human emotions and that way they form a new person, a kind of 'second (parallel) nature'. That is why the virtual character of arts as a technique of communication and knowing of emotions is more important than the reality of nature itself.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 3
195-206
EN
The paper offers an outline of M. Merleau-Ponty's thought as represented in his earlier works 'The Structure of Behavior' and 'Phenomenology of Perception'. In them Merleau-Ponty, contrary to the conception of the subject as an 'apprehending no-thingness', tries to establish a mutual relationship between person and meaning, person and the other person, a sort of a merging embracement.
20
Content available remote

DOES EPISTEMIC SUBJECTIVITY HAVE MORAL IMPORT?

88%
EN
We start from the basics: there is a meaning of the notion of epistemic subject under which it is not an object at all. This statement does not lead to dualism of substance; it fits with any sort of non-reductionism. What follows is that we assume certain subjects that are not objects, hence entities that we can't build direct predicative statements about. Whatever we can say about them comes indirectly, from the influence subjects have on certain objects. Hence, loosely speaking, subjectivity can be viewed as a feature of certain ontological entities (objects), such as persons. But an ontology of pure subjects is possible, based on the indirect influences they have. Such ontology of subjects that are not objects allows us to have subjects consistently as a part, though a very specific one, of the ontological furniture of the world. The author also claims that subjectivity is what, prima facie, deserves a moral standing though only certain additional capacities make a being a moral patient.
first rewind previous Page / 2 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.