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1

Philosophical reflections on death

100%

Bobko A.

Analecta Archaeologica Ressoviensia

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2013

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vol. 8

13-24

EN

This article briefly discusses the relationship between life and death. Understanding of this relationship has changed over the centuries, but this article focuses primarily on contemporary issues. The analysis makes reference to the texts of Max Scheler and Arthur Schopenhauer, as well as to the poetry of Rilke. This indicates that a human being should accept the necessity of death. Avoiding the truth, or attempting to take control over death – which is sometimes suggested by contemporary culture and technology – can be devastating for life

2

Karol Wojtyła reads and interprets Max Scheler

89%

Radziechowski D.

Logos i Ethos

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2023

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vol. 61

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issue 1

41-56

PL

Niniejszy artykuł porusza temat „spotkania” Karola Wojtyły z myślą Maksa Schelera, wyrażoną głównie w jego pracy „Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik” (Formalizm w etyce i niematerialna etyka wartości). Można wyraźnie wyróżnić trzy etapy: (1) pierwsze inspiracje, które pojawiły się przede wszystkim dzięki spotkaniu z ks. Ignacym Różyckim, Jackiem Woronieckim OP i Romanem Ingardenem; (2) okres pracy nad rozprawą habilitacyjną, opartą na powyższej pracy Schelera; i (3) dalszą aplikację wypracowanych wniosków filozoficznych. Wojtyła doszedł do wniosku, że etyczny system Schelera nie nadaje się do naukowej interpretacji etyki chrześcijańskiej. Powodem było to, że niemiecki filozof skupiał się niemal wyłącznie na sferze emocjonalnej i nie dostrzegał sfery sprawczej osoby. W takim przypadku osoba nie jest zdolna do realizacji wartości, a jedynie może je odczuwać jako bierny podmiot. Gdyż w kontekście etyki chrześcijańskiej opierającej się na tezie, według której człowiek jest sprawcą dobra i zła etycznego swoich własnych czynów, doskonaląc się poprzez wartości etycznie pozytywne i deprecjonując się poprzez negatywne, koncepcja Schelera jest absolutnie nieakceptowalna dla Wojtyły. Niemniej jednak, Wojtyła dostrzegł wyjątkowo pozytywny aspekt w podejściu Schelera, mianowicie samą metodę fenomenologicznej analizy faktów etycznych na płaszczyźnie zjawiskowej i doświadczalnej. Ponadto, poprzez próbę pewnej integracji klasycznej metafizyki z analizą fenomenologiczną, Wojtyła - w swoisty i twórczy sposób - rozwijał swoje własne stanowisko filozoficzne.

EN

The present article addresses Karol Wojtyła’s “encounter” with Max Scheler’s thought, expressed mainly in his work Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik (Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values). Three stages can be clearly distinguished: (1) first inspirations, which came about in particular as a result of contact with Rev. Ignacy Różycki, Jacek Woroniecki OP, and Roman Ingarden; (2) the duration of work on the habilitation thesis, which was based on Scheler’s above-mentioned work; and (3) further application of the philosophical findings. Wojtyła concluded that Scheler’s ethical system was unfit for scientific interpretation of Christian ethics. The reason was that the German philosopher focused almost exclusively on the emotional sphere and did not discern the person’s causal sphere. In a case like this a person is incapable of realizing values, and can only feel them, as a passive subject. However, inasmuch as Christian ethics is based on the thesis whereby man is the agent of the ethical good and evil of his own acts, perfecting himself through ethically positive values, and devaluing himself through negative ones, Scheler’s concept is absolutely unacceptable to Wojtyła. Still, Wojtyła discerned an eminently positive aspect in Scheler’s approach, namely, the very method of the phenomenological analysis of ethical facts on the phenomenal and experiential levels. Moreover, by attempting a certain integration of classical metaphysics with phenomenological analysis, Wojtyła – in a peculiar and creative way – developed his own philosophical position.

3

Od metafizyki do empirii. Antropologiczno-filozoficzne wizje człowieka

88%

Chrobak K.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2014

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issue 26

135 - 156

EN

This essay focuses on three conceptions of man formulated within the German school of philosophical anthropology. I discuss, one by one, theories by Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and Arnold Gehlen. First, I emphasize the common to these theoreticians methodological assumptions consisting primarily in an opposition against the Cartesian dualism and in founding a ground for philosophical analysis in the results of scientific research. Second, I present their conceptions of man stressing at the same time dissimilarities that differ them from each other. These differences concern first and foremost their general orientation: while Scheler’s understanding of man is clearly determined by a metaphysical idea of a permanent essence of man, Plessner’s conception focuses rather on a dynamic, historical way of manifesting of their existence. Philosophy by Gehlen in turn presents a picture of man as a biological being who by their own effort, by emerging institutional reality, stabilizes their existence.

4

VALOR Y EDUCACIÓN DEL AMOR SEGÚN MAX SCHELER Y SAN AGUSTÍN DE HIPONA

75%

Román Ortiz Á. D.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2012

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vol. 1

75-89

EN

The theory of values by Max Scheler became one of the most influential theories in XX century. However, the term ‘value’ is insufficient to build a particular moral behavior. Under the Scheler’s concept of ‘value’ there is the concept of ‘love’ by Saint Augustine of Hippo. Thus, if the Augustinian influence is followed, one may go beyond the lacks of the Scheler’s theory. Through these lines one can trace the way leading from the concept of Christian love to the concepts of value, love and person by Scheler. There is, however, a question whether it is possible to teach values. According to the author if values are to be taught, the education of values is to be preceded by teaching love as a virtue.

5

The Link between Intersubjectivity and Self-Shaping in the Light of Phenomenological Philosophy

75%

Bellini B.

Avant

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2018

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vol. 9

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issue 2

203-229

EN

The paper aims to investigate the link between self-shaping and intersubjectivity from a phenomenological perspective. This means that two main topics are here at stake. On the one hand, the paper purports to argue that tackling the link between self-shaping and intersubjectivity from a phenomenological perspective is a meaningful (§1) and sound approach (§2). On the other hand, the paper purports to argue that such an analysis enables us to bring to light an inherent linkage that tethers the topic of intersubjectivity to the sway that other persons hold over one’s process of self-shaping. This influence will be gradually investigated. Firstly, Husserl’s stance on other persons as “variations of my self” (“Abwandlungen meiner Selbst”) will allow us to understand why other persons might hold sway over one’s process of self-shaping and self-knowledge (§3). Secondly, exemplariness will turn out to be the way through which other persons might hold sway over one’s process of self-shaping and self-knowledge: Scheler’s stance on exemplariness will be examined since he makes us treat the question of exemplariness from the standpoint of the process of the formation of individuality: exemplars hold sway over such a process (§4). So, we will rely upon the Husserlian thesis (“the other person is an intentional variation of my self”-“der Andere [ist] eine intentionale Abwandlung meiner selbst”) and the Schelerian thesis (others could become exemplars for me) to argue for a thesis that goes beyond Husserl’s and Scheler’s perspectives: others as exemplars shed light on the eidetic possibilities of myself and others could become exemplars for me since they are variations of myself; that is, they exemplify untaken possibilities of myself.1 We will argue that exemplariness is the key to the link between the issue of intersubjectivity and the process of self-shaping.

6

Scheler and the Very Existence of the Impersonal

75%

Auxier R. E.

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture

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2018

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vol. 2

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issue 1(3)

74–86

EN

Usually philosophers worry about the existence of mind, or consciousness, or persons, or other difficult-to-explain phenomena. Having posited matter or nature, or fields, they wonder where can person or consciousness originate? This kind of thinking is backward. Only persons ask such questions. Persons exist. I turn the tables on the traditional problem of person by asking whether anything impersonal really exists. I argue that the impersonal almost exists, using the theory of feeling of Max Scheler and supplementing it with insights from Alfred North Whitehead and Josiah Royce. Even though feeling almost succeeds in divesting itself of the pre-supposed act of the person, but its concrete actuality blocks such complete self-abstraction.

7

Moral Dilemmas, the Tragic and God’s Hiddenness. Notes on Shusaku Endo’s Silence

75%

Głąb A.

Diametros

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2018

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issue 58

18-33

EN

The essay discusses the religious and ethical message of Shusaku Endo’s Silence. Briefly focusing first on the plot of the novel, the article proceeds to discuss the moral dilemma that is the core of the novel and asks whether the dilemma is symmetrical or incommensurable. Next, the essay analyzes the dilemma from the point of view of Max Scheler’s theory of the tragic. Finally, to highlight Rodrigues’s tragic situation, it discusses the notion of the hiddenness of God.

8

U źródeł odpowiedzialności: Max Scheler - Dietrich Bonhoeffer: próba porównania

75%

Brejdak J.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2022

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vol. 50

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issue 1-4

21-43

EN

Responsibility is a pillar of Max Scheler's ethical personalism, visible in all dimensions of his rich thought: anthropological, sociological, ethical, and philosophico-religious. It was also an important inspiration for Dietrich Bonhoeffer, as the author of Sanctorum Communio confessed. Responsibility and co-responsibility become the pathos of the process of reality’s becoming, with human participation, in the face of the absent Christ or the powerless god. In this essay, I try to compare the concepts of Scheler's “collective person” (Gesamtperson) and Bonhoeffer's “congregation”. For the author of Formalism in the Ethis and material Value Ethics, the collective person becomes a kind of proof of the existence of God; for the author of Sanctorum Communio, in turn, the congregation becomes Christ. The ethics of the model person, analyzed thoroughly by Scheler as the process of self-identification on the three levels of ens amans, volens and cogitans, seem to be correlated with the very process of being in the stead of Christ, i.e. substitution. But even with the many fundamental points of contact between these concepts, we need to note the criticism that Bonhoeffer directed at Scheler and the core of Scheler's emotional analysis, i.e., the act of love itself.

9

Związek filozofii Karla Jaspersa z klasyczną antropologią filozoficzną XX wieku

71%

Urbanek M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2015

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vol. 32

93-112

EN

The main objective of this paper is to reconstruct Jaspers’ views on philosophical anthropology of the early twentieth century. The text can be divided into three parts. First part tries to reconstruct direct and indirect references which Jaspers makes toward: a) term “anthropology”, b) the representatives of philosophical anthropology. Second part shows Jaspers’ attitude toward Scheler’s anthropology. Third and final part raises a question: Why do we often regard Jaspers’ philosophy as anthropology, can he be considered as philosophical anthropologist? We will show that the main point of his critic is that anthropology sets biological point of view as a starting point for its inquiry on human being. Therefore, human being can not be seen adequately from anthropological perspective. Its specificity is reduced by anthropologists to the specific characteristics of species, a collection of biological, psychological and social conditions that describe the phenomenon of man but do not reach the depths of the human being.

10

Co jest ważne dla młodzieży? O preferencjach i roli wartości w życiu uczniów szkół ponadpodstawowych

71%

Wędzińska M.

Rocznik Towarzystwa Naukowego Płockiego

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2020

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vol. 12

347-374

EN

The objective of this article is to present the issues of values in the philosophical thought of Max Scheler and priest Józef Tischner. The first part of the article is a reconstruction of Scheler’s and Tischner’s views on the role of values in human life. In the second part of the article is presentation of the results of own research on preferences of values among high school students were presented. The studied youth values the moral values in the highest degree, and the aesthetic values in the least. Youth value preferences differ from the model hierarchy of values according to Max Scheler. What is more, the preferences of the value of young people are diverse due to their gender, place of residence and type of school. The third part of the text is devoted to the analysis of theresults of research in relation to axiological education at school.

PL

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przybliżenie problematyki wartości w myśli filozoficznej Maxa Schelera oraz księdza Józefa Tischnera. Pierwsza część artykułu stanowi rekonstrukcję poglądów Schelera i Tischnera na temat roli wartości w życiu człowieka. W drugiej części artykułu zostały zaprezentowane rezultaty badań własnych dotyczących preferencji wartości wśród uczniów szkół ponadgimnazjalnych. Badana młodzież w najwyższym stopniu ceni sobie wartości moralne, w najmniejszym zaś wartości estetyczne. Preferencje wartości młodzieży różnią się od wzorcowej hierarchii wartości według Maxa Schelera. Co więcej, preferencje wartości młodzieży są zróżnicowane ze względu na jej płeć, miejsce zamieszkania oraz typ szkoły. Trzecia część tekstu poświęcona jest analizie rezultatów badań w odniesieniu do kształcenia aksjologicznego w szkole.

11

Józefa Tischnera myślenie według czy przeciw wartościom?

63%

Stachewicz K.

Filozofia Chrześcijańska

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2011

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vol. 8

47-59

EN

The article reconstructs a certain element of the evolution in Józef Tischner’s thinking. Initially representing orthodox phenomenology, Tischner situated his philosophy in exiological paradigm seeing in values the most fundamental reality and the main object of philosophical research. Later, thanks to agathological dimensions he put aside the language of values and sometimes doubted adequacy of values as philosophical category. Tischner revealed courage when he was able to radically revise his former views according to the principle: amicus Plato, magis tamen amica veritas.

12

Bezdroża smutku. Zdrada źródeł radości.

63%

Kozłowski R.

Filozofia Chrześcijańska

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2013

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vol. 10

113-129

EN

Man is a being created for joy. Joy has many sources – small and large. Thus, he experiences great and small, long and short joys, just as great and small love, great and small hopes, great and small faith. Man, by betraying joy, enters a world of grief and despair, he lives as if he did not live, he loses a sense of meaning and value of life. Sometimes man has the courage to ask: “Why am I like this?” Oblomov in Goncharov’s novel never answered the question why I “died miserably,” while E. Stein never betrayed her little joy, little hope and little love – her only joy and truth turned out to be God, whom she sought and found.

13

Sfera niczyja jako źródło życia psychicznego: Nietzsche, Scheler, Wittgenstein, Goffman

54%

Gurczyńska-Sady K.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2016

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vol. 35

45-67

EN

Traditionally mental life of the person goes into "seclusion" called his/her interior. It is believed that because of its secret nature of the it and because it is not immediately given to other subject who may – at best – guess of what "goes in". Free access one has got only to his/her own experiences (feelings, emotions, thoughts etc.). In the twentieth century (and a bit earlier) this traditional view is criticizedand changed. As a fruit of this criticism emerged the opposite trend: the knowledge of both my and his/her inner experience is explain by introducing an element that allows this knowledge and is placed outside any of them. I call it the impersonal sphere of nobody – supra-individual matrix of the knowledge of my and his/her mental life. In this article I try to indicate the origin of the idea of this sphere giving its main characteristics. A description is based on the views of known philosophers: Nietzsche, Scheler and Wittgenstein and one sociologist – Goffman.

14

«Рай незабывчивой души» и «христианская истина о человеке»: Eden Вячеслава Иванова

51%

Slavia Orientalis

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2018

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vol. LXVII

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issue 2

15

Wojtyła’s Normative Ethic vs. Scheler’s Emotionalization of the A Priori

51%

García Casas P.

Studia Gilsoniana

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2019

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vol. 8

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issue 3

569-592

EN

The article discusses Wojtyła’s position regarding the Schelerian a priori. Both Woj-tyla and Scheler recognize the notion of a priori. But Wojtyła seeks an equilibrium between the a priori of duty (i.e., regardless of experience), on the one hand, and the exclusivity of the a priori values (aside from all normativity), on the other hand. The author concludes that Wojtyła points to the truth of man, which includes a concrete duty to realize the good by the acts of voluntary choice.

Refine search results

Philosophical reflections on death

Karol Wojtyła reads and interprets Max Scheler

Od metafizyki do empirii. Antropologiczno-filozoficzne wizje człowieka

VALOR Y EDUCACIÓN DEL AMOR SEGÚN MAX SCHELER Y SAN AGUSTÍN DE HIPONA

The Link between Intersubjectivity and Self-Shaping in the Light of Phenomenological Philosophy

Scheler and the Very Existence of the Impersonal

Moral Dilemmas, the Tragic and God’s Hiddenness. Notes on Shusaku Endo’s Silence

U źródeł odpowiedzialności: Max Scheler - Dietrich Bonhoeffer: próba porównania

Związek filozofii Karla Jaspersa z klasyczną antropologią filozoficzną XX wieku

Co jest ważne dla młodzieży? O preferencjach i roli wartości w życiu uczniów szkół ponadpodstawowych

Józefa Tischnera myślenie według czy przeciw wartościom?

Bezdroża smutku. Zdrada źródeł radości.

Sfera niczyja jako źródło życia psychicznego: Nietzsche, Scheler, Wittgenstein, Goffman

«Рай незабывчивой души» и «христианская истина о человеке»: Eden Вячеслава Иванова

Wojtyła’s Normative Ethic vs. Scheler’s Emotionalization of the A Priori