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Convergence Problems in the Eurozone

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This paper analyses the issue of convergence in the Eurozone. The overarching objective was to evaluate the monetary and fiscal convergence of the countries in the Eurozone during the recent period. A further goal was to establish recommendations boosting the economic efficiency of the analysed currency integration of the Eurozone. The paper pinpoints crucial theoretical underpinnings and the current analysis of the Eurozone. Empirical data pertinent to macroeconomic indicators, which were collated and statistically analysed, were also used to delineate crucial issues of convergence in the Eurozone.
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The article focuses on the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact in the context of the experience of the latest financial crisis. The starting point for the discussion is a look at the basic assumptions of the Stability and Growth Pact. Subsequently the author evaluates the agreement in the form in which it was adopted before the latest crisis. The article closes with conclusions resulting from the financial crisis for the future of the Stability and Growth Pact. The latest crisis has upset the balance in the public finance sector and renewed debate about the Stability and Growth Pact, Lubiński says. According to critics, the Stability and Growth Pact, which was expected to guarantee stability in the eurozone, has largely failed to live up to expectations. The international debate has featured many arguments for and against the Stability and Growth Pact. At the same time, some earlier proposals for changes have been revived and new proposals have been made. The latter are not always realistic for political reasons, according to Lubiński. The global financial crisis has exposed the weaknesses of the existing system and highlighted the need to strengthen implementation and coordination efforts and take additional preventive and remedial measures, the author says. The crisis has shown that a comprehensive system for resolving crises needs to be developed, according to Lubiński.The proposed measures call for far-reaching modifications that would in practice mean a departure from the Stability and Growth Pact. Some argue that the Stability and Growth Pact is only a slogan and an unrealistic scenario for the European Union-one that could lead to completely different results than those originally assumed.
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This paper presents the principles of budgetary surveillance in the euro area and assesses the effectiveness of supervision in relation to the requirement to maintain budgetary discipline in the fiscal policy. The research covers the period 1999-2012. Applied research methods involve the analysis of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and the economic analysis of financial indicators. Source materials were derived from the EUR-Lex database of EU law and economic publications of the European Commission. Introduced in 1998, the Stability and Growth Pact aimed at preventing excessive public deficit and the obligation of Member States to achieve the medium-term objective for the budgetary position close to balance or in surplus, and in case of occurrence of an excessive public deficit to eliminate it by taking the necessary measures. Compliance with budgetary discipline was supposed to be ensured by the system of sanctions provided by the treaty. The study shows that in most euro area countries budget surplus or deficit close to balance have not been achieved and maintained in the medium term, and they failed to avoid excessive public deficit. The main reason for non-compliance with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact was an ineffective system of sanctions imposed on the country conducting fiscal policy not in accordance with the requirements for financial stability. The treaty did not establish a mechanism for the automatic imposition of sanctions, the Council was authorized only to impose coercive measures against the country, leaving the Council complete freedom in this area. Economic and financial crisis fully exposed the consequences of violations of fiscal discipline in the euro area. Strong economic recession was accompanied by rapid and intensive increase in the public deficit and debt, threatening not only the sustainability of public finance in the long run, but also the proper functioning of economic and monetary union. Established in 2011, the EU’s framework for economic governance significantly changed the rules of budgetary surveillance in the euro area. Firstly, numerical fiscal rules on budgetary expenditure growth in conjunction with the rise of potential GDP was established. Secondly, the criterion of public debt was given the same importance as the public deficit criterion in the excessive deficit procedure. Thirdly, the new law established a more effective enforcement of the preventive and corrective arms of the Stability and Growth Pact. Procedure for the imposition of sanctions under the budgetary surveillance was changed. The role of the European Commission in enforcing compliance with the rules of Stability and Growth Pact was strengthened. Fourthly, Member States were obliged to respect the common requirements for national budgetary framework. The fiscal pact adopted in 2012, gives the most important rules of the Stability and Growth Pact higher legal rank. It also imposes on the Member States to introduce these rules into national law, by giving them, if possible, constitutional status.
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The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact were one of the first solutions which strengthened the public finance discipline in the European Union and the euro area. This article presents one of the tools for reducing the excessive deficit, included in the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact − the Excessive Deficit Procedure. The goal of this article is a critical analysis of regulation which is aimed at ensuring public finance discipline. The article identifies changes that were aimed at strengthening the procedure. This paper includes examples of countries which were exposed to the procedure. As a result of the last recession in 2010, the procedure was implemented in 24 of 27 Member States.
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In the course of the economic crisis a number of austerity measures have been implemented in Italy in order to comply with requirements under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and Fiscal Compact. These austerity measures are in line with the currently dominating perception in EU politics that fiscal consolidation is decisive in order to restore confidence in the markets and to help affected countries overcome the economic crisis. It was taken a close look at the costs and benefits of austerity measures in Italy and investigates their impact on the Italian economy. Using quantitative data from Eurostat it is also analysed whether a balanced budget and low levels of government debt are the keys to long-term economic stability and growth. The analysis finds that this perception is biased and neglects factors like foreign debt and current account deficits. Since the austerity measures had to be implemented in order to comply with SGP and Fiscal Compact, these two legal fiscal agreements have been described to. Moreover, it was examined whether the implemented austerity measures are effective and the least harmful way to stimulate economic growth in the long run. One the one hand, this paper shows that SGP and Fiscal Compact are vital tools to the survival of the eurozone. However, it has also emphasised that timing and severity of austerity measures is not based on a rational decision making process and that current austerity measures in Italy are therefore likely to impede economic growth rather than boosting it.
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The author analyzes the experience of fiscal reforms carried out in the European Union after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The treaty provides for what are called convergence criteria for countries aspiring to join the eurozone. After the treaty was signed a period of fiscal adjustments began in Europe. In the following years, individual countries pursued different strategies and attained different results in the process. The article aspires to be a source of information for those seeking to develop an optimal reform strategy for Poland-now that the Polish government has clearly stated that Poland should become part of the euro zone in the future. Using statistical data, Gajewski discusses how the convergence criteria adopted in the Maastricht Treaty (reference values for the deficit and public debt) influence fiscal policy in terms of the effectiveness of the strategy for adjusting government revenue and expenditure. It turns out that the fiscal convergence criterion could increase the pro-cyclical aspect of fiscal policy in the period directly preceding the launch of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union and in the first few years of the system’s functioning, Gajewski says. His research confirms earlier findings that effectively bringing down the deficit below the reference level requires focusing one’s efforts on the expenditure rather than revenue side of the budget. This may be because limiting expenditure calls for more comprehensive reforms covering structural changes and increased effectiveness of available resources. According to Gajewski, countries that have met the fiscal criterion by limiting expenditure generally took longer to meet this criterion and had a higher budget balance on average, during the period of the eurozone’s functioning, than countries that focused their strategies on the revenue side of the budget and stopgap measures. The author concludesthat the adopted strategy for public finance consolidation had far-reaching consequences for the competitiveness of individual countries and may have been one of the main causes behind the crisis, which hit the eurozone in 2008.
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By joining the European Monetary Union (the “EMU”), member countries lost the ability to use monetary policy as a tool for macroeconomic regulation. The attention was then focused on regulation of fiscal policy and Stability and Growth Pact (the “SGP”) was the instrument agreed upon. The states of the EMU have agreed to meet the 3% of GDP requirement for the maximum annual public budget deficit. Based on evolution of public debt in member countries, we can say that the SGP has failed as a tool for fiscal discipline. In this paper, we answer the question of whether the failure was due to the incorrect concept of the SGP or whether the development of the debt was affected more by arbitrary disrespect of the agreed rules. The two reasons mentioned above are interdependent. To separate them, we construct a dynamic model of EU countries’ public debt. By using real data, we simulate the potential values of public debt in a situation where the SGP rules have been respected in recent years. Comparing the results for the potential debt given by simulation of the model with the current real values, we are able to quantify the impact of non-compliance for each country. The initial results indicate that there are both EU states where non-compliance led to a negligible increase in public debt - up to 7% of GDP - and other states where this factor caused the growth of public debt by more than 30% of GDP.
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Kryzys zadłużeniowy wymusił na Unii Europejskiej podjęcie reformy Paktu Stabilności i Wzrostu. Celem artykułu jest ocena wpływu tej reformy na dynamikę długu publicznego oraz jej wpływu na wielkość SFA w państwach Unii Europejskiej. Przeprowadzona analiza wykazała, że dług publiczny w większości krajów spadał w analizowanym okresie. Jednocześnie uzyskano wyraźny związek pomiędzy dynamiką długu a SFA w krajach o najlepszej sytuacji w zakresie dynamiki długu publicznego. JEL: H62, H63 null The creation of the English-language version of these publications is fi nanced in the framework of contract No. 607/P-DUN/2018 by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education committed to activities aimed at the promotion of education.
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The debt crisis forced the European Union to reform the Stability and Growth Pact. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the influence of the reform on the dynamics of public debt and its correlation with stock-flow adjustment in the European Union. The undertaken analysis was based on the TOPSIS method. The synthetic measure was based on chosen variables which reflect the public debt dynamics. An analysis of correlations was also performed to find relations between the debt dynamics and stock-flow adjustment. The undertaken analysis has shown that the majority of EU countries reduced public debt in the analyzed period. We can also observe that there is a strong correlation between public debt and stock-flow adjustment in the group of the most successful countries in the area of public debt dynamics. The article introduces a synthetic measure of public debt dynamics which is wider that a change of public debt. Moreover, the relation between public debt dynamics and stock-flow adjustment was analyzed. JEL: H62, H63 null The creation of the English-language version of these publications is fi nanced in the framework of contract No. 607/P-DUN/2018 by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education committed to activities aimed at the promotion of education.
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The aim of this article is to analyse the fulfilment of the Stability and Growth Pact rules by the EU 15 member states in the period 1999–2015. The article also presents the evolution of the EU fiscal rules since their formulation, including, in particular, the influence of the crisis on both meeting the rules by the member states and their substance. The conclusion of the article is that the construction of the rules is the main cause of the ineffectiveness of the pact in eliminating the deficit bias in the EU. In the analysed period, there were years when the member states did not follow the limits defined by the rules (the whole period, but in particular the years before the crisis), years without anticyclical influence of the rules (in fact, the whole period 1999–2015), and years when the rules turned out not to be elastic enough (the years after the crisis). It leads to the overall conclusion that the EU fiscal rules are not the best tool to counteract the deficit bias in the EU.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przeanalizowanie stopnia przestrzegania przez 15 krajów UE reguł fiskalnych zawartych w pakcie stabilności i wzrostu w latach 1999–2015 i ewolucji tych reguł od początku ich sformułowania. Analiza stopnia wypełniania poszczególnych reguł prowadzi do wniosku, że na nieskuteczność reguł w eliminowaniu zjawiska deficit bias rzutują w dużej mierze ich błędy konstrukcyjne. W trakcie całego analizowanego okresu, a zwłaszcza okresu przedkryzysowego, można było stwierdzić, że limity określone przez reguły nie były przestrzegane, właściwie przez cały analizowany okres nie prowadziły do antycyklicznej polityki fiskalnej, a po kryzysie nie były wystarczająco elastyczne. Prowadzi to do konkluzji, że reguły fiskalne nie są najlepszym środkiem do walki ze zjawiskiem deficit bias w Unii Europejskiej.
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This paper argues that the loose monetary policy of two of the world’s most important financial institutions—the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and the European Central Bank—were ultimately responsible for the outburst of global financial crisis of 2008-09. Unusually low interest rates in 2001- 05 compelled investors to engage in high risk endeavors. It also encouraged some governments to finance excessive domestic consumption with foreign loans. Emerging financial bubbles burst first in mortgage markets in the U.S. and subsequently spread to other countries. The paper also reviews other causes of the crisis as discussed in literature. Some of them relate directly to weaknesses inherent in the institutional design of the European Monetary Union (EMU) while others are unique to members of the EMU. It is rather striking that recommended remedies tend not to take into account the policies of the European Central Bank.
PL
Celem artykułu jest ocena roli paktu stabilności i wzrostu w stabilizowaniu gospodarki w strefie euro przez zbadanie współzależności między przestrzeganiem jego reguł przez państwa członkowskie a antycyklicznym nastawieniem ich polityki fiskalnej w latach 1999–2015. W badaniach zastosowano statystykę opisową oraz analizę korelacji. Z przeprowadzonych badań wynikają następujące wnioski: stopień poszanowania reguł paktu stabilności i wzrostu przez państwa członkowskie jest niski, zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do wymogu dotyczącego osiągnięcia i utrzymania średniookresowego celu budżetowego; polityka fiskalna miała raczej charakter procykliczny aniżeli antycykliczny; istnieje dodatnia korelacja między przestrzeganiem numerycznych reguł paktu stabilności i wzrostu a antycyklicznym nastawieniem polityki fiskalnej.
EN
The article assesses the role the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) plays in stabilising the euro area economy. It examines the relationship between member states’ compliance with the rules of the Pact and their attitude to countercyclical fiscal policy in the years 1999–2015. The study used descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, and arrives at the following conclusions: the level of member state compliance with the rules of the SGP is low, particularly in relation to the requirement to achieve and maintain the medium-term budgetary objective; the fiscal stance was pro-cyclical more often than countercyclical; there is a positive correlation between the perception of the Pact’s numerical rules and the attitude of countercyclical fiscal policy.
EN
The aim of this article is to assess the public finance imbalance in selected CEE countries. The study examines public debt and deficit in six European Union Member States: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Hungary. The study revealed the growing imbalance in public finance in these countries, resulting mainly from the increased public debt. Moreover, the examined countries have problems with the implementation of supranational fiscal rule for budget balance, which resulted in the imposition of the Excessive Deficit Procedures.
PL
Przedmiotem podjętych analiz jest ocena nierównowagi finansów publicznych w wybranych krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. W opracowaniu zbadano kształtowanie się długu publicznego oraz deficytu w sześciu państwach Unii Europejskiej: Bułgarii, Chorwacji, Czechach, Polsce, Rumunii oraz na Węgrzech. Przeprowadzone analizy wykazały, że w państwach tych narasta nierównowaga, wynikająca m.in. ze wzrostu zadłużenia publicznego. Ponadto poddane ocenie państwa wykazują problemy z realizacją reguły przewidzianej dla deficytu, co wpłynęło na nakładanie na nie procedur nadmiernego deficytu.
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