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1

Gestalt and Science. Kuhn’s Model of Scientific Change in the Light of Gestalt Theory

100%

Michalska A.

Dialogue and Universalism

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2015

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issue 4

131-144

EN

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas Kuhn propounded a controversial claim that the scientific change is a form of Gestalt switch. As I point out, he did it ap-parently without having a full understanding of what Gestalt theory was, and used the concept of Gestalt rather metaphorically, and not entirely consistently. Interestingly, however, Kuhn’s model of scientific change as sketched in The Copernican Revolution and advanced in his subsequent works, bears some obvious structural resemblance to Gestalt theory. In the paper, I confront Kuhn’s model with Gestalt theory, and attempt to show that the latter is able to clarify the basic assumption of the model. It unifies Kuhn’s views on scientific change, and provides a coherent conceptual frame in which scientific development can be analyzed. In particular, Gestalt theory helps to uncover the directionality of changes which Kuhn failed to acknowledge.

2

Paradigmatický prístup a jeho aplikácia v systéme náboženských presvedčení

100%

Karaba M.

Studia theologica

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2017

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vol. 3

45-60

EN

The article deals with the role of paradigms in the system of religious beliefs. Kuhn’s paradigmatic approach, which indicates that that scientific models are products of the creative analogical imagination, will be used as a starting point of my argument. The data are theory-laden as comprehensive theories are resistant to falsification, and a strict criteria for paradigm choice is difficult to find (if at all). These subjective features are undoubtedly more prominent in the field of religion, where there is a greater diversity of models, a greater influence of the interpretations to data, a greater persistence in fidelity to paradigm, and a greater unclearness in the process of paradigm choice. Although each of these subjective features is more evident in religious beliefs, there is a difference in degree between science and religion rather than an absolute contrast.

3

Ewolucja sposobów rozumienia pojęcia niepełnosprawności

89%

Wodecki P.

Niepełnosprawność - zagadnienia, problemy, rozwiązania

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2020

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issue 1(34)

108-109

PL

Artykuł jest próbą analizy historycznych sposobów ujmowania niepełnosprawności jako pewnego zjawiska społeczno-prawnego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem ich ewolucji oraz specyfiki przeważającego obecnie biopsychospołecznego modelu niepełnosprawności. Artykuł wykorzystuje terminologię opracowaną przez Thomasa Kuhna, by możliwie najprecyzyjniej ująć następujące po sobie paradygmaty niepełnosprawności. Przedstawione zostały kolejno: • model charytatywny niepełnosprawności; • model medyczny niepełnosprawności; • model społeczny niepełnosprawności; • model biopsychospołeczny niepełnosprawności. Wskazano przy tym na ich społeczne, filozoficzne oraz prawne uwarunkowania.

EN

The article is an attempt at a historical analysis of ways of disability recognition as a certain socio-legal phenomenon, with particular emphasis on their evolution and the specifics of the prevailing biopsychosocial model of disability. The article uses terminologies developed by Thomas Kuhn to conceive the paradigms of disability as precisely as possible. They were presented in turn: • charity model of disability; • medical model of disability; • social model of disability; • biopsychosocial model of disability. At the same time, social, philosophical and legal conditions of this models were shown.

4

Is normal science good science?

89%

Kępińska A.

Semina Scientiarum

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2015

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vol. 14

EN

“Normal science” is a concept introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). In Kuhn’s view, normal science means “puzzle solving”, solving problems within the paradigm-framework most successful in solving current major scientific problems-rather than producing major novelties. This paper examines Kuhnian and Popperian accounts of normal science and their criticisms to assess if normal science is good. The advantage of normal science according to Kuhn was “psychological”: subjective satisfaction from successful “puzzle solving”. Popper argues for an “intellectual” science, one that consistently refutes conjectures (hypotheses) and offers new ideas rather than focus on personal advantages. His account is criticized as too impersonal and idealistic. Feyerabend’s perspective seems more balanced; he argues for a community that would introduce new ideas, defend old ones, and enable scientists to develop in line with their subjective preferences. The paper concludes that normal science has no one clear-cut set of criteria encompassing its meaning and enabling clear assessment.

5

Aristotelova zmena paradigmy v ontológii

75%

Sýkora P.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2019

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vol. 67

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issue 6

861-876

EN

Aristotle‘s intellectual contribution to ontology has been interpreted in history as the culmination of the preceding evolution of philosophy. To a large extent he himself contributed to such a Hegelian notion of his place in the history of metaphysics, or more precisely ontology. In this paper, we will argue that Aristotle brought about a 180-degree change in ontological thinking, a conceptual revolution that can be described in terms of Kuhn’s “paradigm shift.” This means that what was previously described by philosophers as a false or illusory reality is, according to Aristotle, a true reality. Paradigmatic examples of such true reality are not elements or roots (of all the different things), atoms, or ideas, but ordinary medium-sized material objects, especially plants, animals, humans and their essences.

SK

Aristotelov myšlienkový prínos v ontológii sa v dejinách interpretuje ako určité zavŕšenie predchádzajúceho vývoja filozofie. On sám veľkou mierou prispel k takémuto heglovskému ponímaniu svojho miesta v dejinách metafyziky, resp. ontológie. V tomto príspevku budeme argumentovať v prospech tézy, že Aristoteles uskutočnil v ontológii myšlienkový obrat o 180°, konceptuálnu revolúciu, ktorú je možné označiť kuhnovským termínom – zmena paradigmy. To znamená, že to, čo bolo dovtedy filozofmi označované ako nepravá až iluzórna skutočnosť, je podľa Aristotela pravá skutočnosť. Paradigmatickými príkladmi takejto pravej reality nie sú prvky či korene (všetkých vecí), atómy, idey, ale bežné materiálne objekty strednej veľkosti, predovšetkým rastliny, zvieratá, ľudia a ich esencie.

6

The Philosopher Ahead of his Time. Ludwik Fleck and the Complexity of Science (Communication and Notes)

75%

Coco E.

Filozofia i Nauka

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2020

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vol. 8/2

177-183

EN

The new edition in Italian of the articles by the Polish microbiologist and philosopher Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) edited by Francesco Coniglione offers the opportunity for some considerations around this significant scholar. Fleck anticipates Kuhn's ideas as well as those of the sociology of science. For him, any epistemology that does not take psychological and sociological methods into account, or that does not concern itself with economics, technology, art, and even politics, is an epistemology imaginabilis. Here we discuss some key points of the essays collected in the book, some observations taken from the rich introduction of the editor, and an inevitable question: Why has Fleck been neglected for so long?

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1 Dialogue and Universalism

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