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1

INSTANTIATION AS A PARTIAL IDENTITY

100%
Marambio J. T. A.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2012
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vol. 19
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issue 4
459 – 487
EN
This work presents and discusses the conception of instantiation as a ‘partial identity’. The theory has been previously proposed in two different guises by Baxter (2001) and Armstrong (2004a). Attention will be paid mostly to Baxter’s presentation, which seems the best developed, and where instantiation is understood as identity of ‘aspects’ of a universal and a particular. The theory seems to offer a solution to the vexed question of Bradley’s Regress, because instantiation is no longer conceived as a relation between numerically different entities. The proposed solution requires ontology of ‘aspects’ in order to work. The aspects are presented in the form [x insofar as ] where x is filled by the entity to which the aspect pertains and  is filled by the respect in which the entity in question is considered. The aspects are numerically identical with the entity to which they pertain and with the other aspects of the same entity. Nonetheless, they are not mere ways in which one can conceive an entity. The aspects are objective. The attributions of one aspect are not also attributions to the other aspects of the same entity. Hence, the aspects offer ways to deal with seemingly incoherent attributions to the same entity. Baxter uses them to solve the problem of the multi-location of universals, temporary intrinsic and trans-world identity, besides the nature of instantiation. Several difficulties are presented, both to the general metaphysics of aspects, and to the conception of instantiation as identity of aspects. In general: (i) it is not clear how to distinguish objective aspects from the mere forms in which we conceive an entity; (ii) it is not clear what are the conditions of identity of an aspect; and (iii) although the necessity of identity is rejected in general, it reappears as necessity of ‘aspectual’ identity. The necessity of aspectual identity raises concerns about the stability of the view. In respect to the specific conception of instantiation as identity of aspects, it will be pointed out that the theory implies the complete identity of universals and particulars that instantiate them and, further, that it implies the identity of everything with everything.
2

THREE CONCEPTS OF UNIVERSALS

100%
Rojek P.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2008
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vol. 36
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issue 3
45-61
EN
There are three main concepts of universals. They can be defined on the basis of two fundamental ontological relations: inherence and determination. Inherence holds between the abstract and the concrete, e.g. between a property and a thing; determination holds between the determinate and the determinable, e.g. between particular redness and colourness. (1) Abstract universals are defined as common properties, which inhere in many different things: (A). The contemporary debate on universals involves mainly this concept of universals. (2) Determination-universals are determinable aspects, which are determined by particulars or by particular properties (tropes): (B). It seems that Aquinas, Husserl, and Ingarden were determination-realists. (3) Concrete universals are wholes in which many different things inhere: (C). This is a concept of universals which can be found in Hegel, the neohegelians, and some Russian philosophers. Note that (A), (B) and (C) stand for specific mathematical symbols & equations presented in the full text
3
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IDIOMS AND THEIR CONCEPTUAL MOTIVATION - INSIGHTS FROM CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS

100%
Strugielska A.
Biuletyn Polskiego Towarzystwa Językoznawczego
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2008
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vol. 64
97-108
EN
The aim of this article is to present the role of conceptual metaphors in motivating meaning(s) of selected idiomatic expressions. According to the cognitive paradigm, meaning equals conceptualization and the function of metaphors is to facilitate cognitive processes. Thus, the semantic pole of, at least some, metaphorical expressions and idioms can be derived from the scope of metaphor, which, by the same token, constitutes the general meaning of idiomatic expressions. However, contrastive studies seem to substantially delimit the range of metaphorical motivation. Namely, it appears that experiential primacy should be given to image-schematic and ontological metaphors, which emerge as most universal in cross-linguistic studies.
4

Schemat predykacji Fregego i problem uniwersaliów

75%
Wojciechowski E.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2018
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vol. 46
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issue 1
131-151
EN
Stanisław Leśniewski is the author of the famous verbal argumentation claiming that the universals do not exist. Bolesław Sobociński expressed this argumentation, in accordance with its author`s intentions, in elementary ontology, enriched with an additional assumption (TL1), which is of key importance for it. In the framework of the theory of universals sketched in this way, the above-mentioned conclusion occurs (TL7). The paper shows that this argumentative assumption (TL1) is unacceptable. It is artificial and incompatibile with the assumptions adopted implicitly by the supporters of the existence of universals. Based on elementary ontology enriched with Frege`s predication scheme (OEsub), we shall introduce the functor universal by definition (DP). In the framework of OEsub system one can talk of universals in a coherent way and it is impossibile to reconstruct the above argumentation (TL7 is not these here)
5
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O związkach między wielością dyskursów metafizycznych a pojęciem bytu

63%
Tomasz Kołodziejczyk S.
Filo-Sofija
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2011
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vol. 11
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issue 4(15)
865-880
EN
The aim of the paper is to argue that there is a mutual relationship between the concept of being as it is conceived of in the classical Aristotelian metaphysics and the plurality of possible metaphysical discourses. That thesis is rooted in the inherent ambiguity of the concept of being and some consequences connected therewith. Three forms of metaphysical thinking are taken into account: the metaphysics of formal interpretation of the concept of being, metaphysics of existential determination of being, and metaphysics of the material content of every conceptual representation of being.
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