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EN
The Uppsala School in philosophy and the Vienna Circle are prima facie similar currents in contemporary philosophy. Both reject metaphysics, claim that reality is a spatio­‑temporal realm and adhere to noncognitivism in terms of values. However, justifications of these assumptions are quite different. In the following article we reconstruct main theses of both mentioned currents and then we indicate their impact on one of the major jurisprudential movements, namely Scandinavian Legal Realism. We focus on Alf Ross’ legal philosophy, as it was an attempt to accommodate both: the philosophy of the Uppsala School and of the Vienna Circle (while other Scandinavian realists referred exclusively to Uppsala philosophy). We trace those two sources of inspiration in Ross’ theory of legal validity and of legal concepts.
EN
The purpose of this article is the analyses of discussion between Albert Einstein and Werner Heisenberg in the period 1925-1927. Their disputes, relating to the sources of scientific knowledge, its methods and the value of knowledge acquired in this way, are part of the characteristic for the European science discourse between rationalism and empirism. On the basis of some sources and literature on the subject, the epistemological positions of both scholars in the period were reconstructed. This episode, yet poorly known, is a unique example of scientific disputes, whose range covers a broad spectrum of methodological problems associated with the historical development of science. The conducted analysis sheds some light on the source of popularity of logical empirism in the first half of the 20th century. A particular emphasis is placed on the impact of the neopositivist ideas which reflect Heisenberg's research program, being the starting point for the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. The main assumption of logical empirism, concerning acquisition of scientific knowledge only by means of empirical procedures and logical analysis of the language of science, in view of the voiced by Einstein arguments, bears little relationship with actual testing practices in the historical aspect of the development of science. The criticism of Heisenberg's program, carried out by Einstein, provided arguments for the main critics of the neopositivist ideal and contributed to the bankruptcy of the idea of logical empirism, thereby starting a period of critical rationalism prosperity, arising from criticism of neopositivism and alluding to Einstein's ideas.
EN
The article is diverse on two parts. In the first part, the author refers assumptions of Bohdan Chwedeńczuk book, “Przekonania religijne” [Religious Beliefs] that was devoted to justify the thesis according to which religious statements are meaningless. He emphasizes a role of so called Hume Requirement that was postulated as a demarcation line between meaningful and meaningless words in Chwedeńczuk argumentation chain. Next he indicates main objections against the Requirement which were considered by Chweden czuk. The second part of the article is a discussion with critiques that were emerging after publishing of “Przekonania”. Such philosophers as J. J. Jadacki, M. Przełęcki, K. Kondrat, M. Pawliszyn, W. Wolan czyk and I. Ziemin ski formulated a number of arguments against the thesis about meaninglessness of religious statements. Author shows that Jadacki, Przełęcki and Ziemin ski presented compelling arguments which cannot be undermine basing on the “Przekonania” text, thus these objections must be included if the Chweden czuk’s theory could be considered as justified. Arguments formulated by Kondrat and Wolan czyk are possible to refute and Pawliszyn’s critique is pointless.
Kultura i Wychowanie
|
2023
|
vol. 24
|
issue 2
125-145
EN
The works of the Vienna Circle introduced a new era. Radical thoughts that were supposed to consolidate the existing empirical science and remove all metaphysics in order to build a real, scientific philosophy proved to be a mistake. The radical assumptions led to absurd conclusions. The Vienna Circle was guided by the principle of verification which sought to establish whether a sentence was meaningful or not. Yet this principle was not free of the assumptions that it was supposed to indirectly remove – metaphysical assumptions. In this article, I present the views of the Vienna Circle that are often overlooked in various publications. The central point of the text will be an attempt to discuss the criticism of the Vienna Circle’s assumptions.
PL
Działalność Koła Wiedeńskiego rozpoczęła nową erę. Radykalne przemyślenia, które miały z jednej strony ugruntować istniejącą naukę empiryczną, a z drugiej usunąć wszelką metafizykę i w konsekwencji zbudować prawdziwą, naukową filozofię, okazały się błędem. Radykalne założenia, które miały na celu uporządkowanie wiedzy, wbrew intencji doprowadziły do absurdalnych wniosków. Koło Wiedeńskie kierowało się zasadą weryfikacji, która miała rozstrzygnąć, czy dane zdanie jest zdaniem sensownym, czy bezsensownym. Niemniej jednak sama zasada, choć prosta w swoim wysłowieniu, nie była wolna od założeń, które miała pośrednio usunąć – założeń metafizycznych. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest prezentacja poglądów Koła Wiedeńskiego wraz z istotnymi, często w różnych publikacjach pomijanymi zagadnieniami. Natomiast centralnym punktem tekstu będzie próba przedstawienia krytyki podnoszonej w założeniach Koła Wiedeńskiego.
EN
The chief aim of this paper is to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt how, through an essential misunderstanding of the nature of philosophy, and science, over the past several centuries, the prevailing Western tendency to reduce the whole of science to mathematical physics unwittingly generated utopian socialism as a political substitute for metaphysics. In short, being unable speculatively, philosophically, and metaphysically to justify this reduction, some Western intellectuals re-conceived the natures of philosophy, science, and metaphysics as increasingly enlightened, historical and political forms of the evolution of human consciousness toward creation of systematic science, a science of clear and distinct ideas. In the process they unwittingly wound up reducing contemporary philosophy and Western higher education largely into tools of utopian socialist political propaganda.
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