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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 9
647 – 660
EN
The paper deals with the cooperative model of epistemological naturalism, which, while promoting strong influence of empirical information on epistemological considerations, rejects Quinean radical reduction of epistemic relations to non-epistemic ones, e.g., causal-nomological relations. The character of this kind of naturalism is illustrated by the example of A. Goldman’s epistemics. This conception consists of two intertwined elements: a priori performed conceptual analysis of epistemic concepts, supplemented by empirical studies of human cognition. First, the dynamics between the a priori and the empirical respective parts of this conception is explained, and, second, three important epistemological issues are discussed from its point of view: the problem of starting points of inquiry, the problem of intuitions, and the problem of normativity.
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