Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 12

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  absolute
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The main concern of my work is the issue of the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity on the ground of Frege’s works. It is assumed in this article that in Frege’s concept of objectivity is a special kind of absolute. In order to justify that claim, I use Frege’s ontological ideas, e.g. distinction between object and concept, three kingdoms, Truth, False, distinction between thought and thinking.
EN
One of the distinguishing characteristics of Marguerite Duras’ works is her focus on contradictions, especially in the realm of physicality, which is part of the “dialectic of desire”, a nonverbal pleasure. In the analysed novels: The Sea Wall and The Lover this passion manifests itself through the “rite of passage”. It is a double discovery of one’s own and someone else’s physicality. Duras perceives love as an un-controllable, violent “experiment”, a rebellion against one’s mother and restrictions.Narrating one of the most important (and secret) episodes of her life – crossing the Mekong – the author depicts the sexual initiation of a young heroine (Duras’ alter ego), who seduces a mature man with her behaviour and dress. This experience al-lows her to experience the absolute and become initiated and free. For the narrator it is an opportunity for in-depth analysis of the secular and the sacred aspects of desire. To fully understand the sacred and the profane in Duras’ works, it seems necessary to approach the phenomenon from an interdisciplinary perspective.
EN
At the foundation of systematic thinking lie decisive assumptions that cannot be articulated and treated in a theoretical manner. Nonetheless, they are settled practically and metaphorically to orient and provoke the systematic attempts of philosophy. This field of non-theoretical assumptions is the theme of this paper. In the following, I articulate one specific metaphorical and practical answer that defies theoretical and systematic treatment. While it is among the most fundamental and fatal answers that can ever be ventured in the entire field of systematic thinking, they cannot occupy center-stage in theoretical thinking. The problematic concerns the pragmatic or absolute establishment of the edifice of philosophy. In the following, I try to portray a fundamental but irresolvable conflict in a back-and-forth movement between rival answers given to this problematic. This investigation concludes by emphasizing the irremediable failure to settle, once and for all, the conflict portrayed between the two opposed designations of philosophy in principle.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Osobnienie

71%
EN
The article aims to outline the presence of a metaphysical perspective in Stanisław Barańczak’s poems which is already present in the poet’s earliest works. Barańczak outlines this process in his debut collection. His translation achievements support the presence of a metaphysical perspective in his original poems, and the mutual dependence of his poetry writing and translation can already be clearly felt in his initial works. The article compares the views of poets from generations younger than Barańczak’s and their reactions to the work of the author of A Postcard from the Other World (Widokówka z tego świata).
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2017
|
vol. 65
|
issue 4
271-292
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest krytyczna prezentacja głównych tez pewnej wersji współ­czesnego deizmu, zaproponowanej przez Roberta Corfe’a, autora książki Deism and Social Ethics: The Role of Religion in the Third Millennium. Nie jest to prosta kontynuacja osiem­nastowiecznego angielskiego deizmu Jana Tolanda i Mateusza Tindala. Deizm Corfe’a jest refleksją filozoficzną, biorącą pod uwagę osiągnięcia współczesnych nauk przyrodniczych. Autor podejmuje taką refleksję w przekonaniu, że główne zagrożenie światowego pokoju wypływa z konfliktów między przedstawicielami religii monoteistycznych: chrześcijaństwa i islamu. Jego zdaniem głównym zadaniem współczesnego deizmu jest budowanie porozumienia ponad reli­giami poprzez odwołanie się do racjonalnej perswazji, możliwej do przyjęcia przynajmniej przez niektórych przedstawicieli tych religii. Proponowana wersja deizmu miałaby być globalną etyką, odniesioną do nieosobowego kosmicznego Bóstwa (Dobra), zrywającą ze wszystkimi nadnatural­nymi religiami, które Corfe oskarża o kultywowanie irracjonalizmu, szkodliwego samego w sobie. Mimo że deizm Corfe’a nie przeradza się w ateizm, wbrew zapewnieniom autora Deism and Social Ethics nie stanowi skutecznej zapory przeciw temu ostatniemu. Autor niniejszego artykułu pokazuje, że koncepcja Corfe’a nie jest wewnętrznie spójna, jest niedopracowana teoretycznie i w znacznie mniejszym stopniu racjonalna, niż się Robertowi Corfe’owi wydaje. W istocie nie stanowi ona przekonującej alternatywy dla religii monoteistycznych takich jak chrześcijaństwo.
EN
In his essay entitled Deism and Social Ethics: The Role of Religion in the Third Millennium, Robert Corfe presents a contemporary version of deism. His concept is not a simple continuation of eighteenth-century English deism, but is a considerably modified theory, taking into account mo­dern achievements of the natural sciences. The author believes that the main threat to world peace comes from conflicts between followers of the largest monotheistic religions like Islam and Christianity. A main task of contemporary deism would be the construction of agreement among the large religious communities in the world by means of continuous rational persuasion. Above all, the proposed deism would be a global ethics, related to an impersonal cosmic Deity (the Good). Simultaneously, it would break with all supernatural religions (theologies) based on different reve­lations. These latter are the source of irrationalism according to Corfe. It would be much better to replace them with a suprahuman rationalism discovered in Nature and deriving from Divine Reason immanently existing in the Universe. Corfe’s deism would be an alternative to atheism, popularized among educated men in Western countries. Also his deism is addressed to all people, who are making now political and economic decisions in a globalized world. As such, his deism can be a great worldwide ideology, especially useful for those who have an influence on the fate of the contemporary world. In this article are presented the main features of the above-mentioned version of deism, as well as a critical assessment of this type of deism, including a discussion of hidden and controversial presuppositions. It is found that this version of deism is not as persuasive and rational as its author thinks.
EN
The idea of the article is to search for the roots of the so-called existential thinking, using the peculiar comparison: of the religiously oriented ideas of Kierkegaard ( especially his notions of subjective and objective thinker and the idea of subjective truth) and contemporary ideas of Odo Marquard’s hermeneutical skepticism. Surprisingly, Marquard’s anthropologically and sociologically oriented reflection, while dealing with the problem of human search for absolute knowledge and its depreciation of particular existence, comes to much the same reflections as Kierkegaard: stating rational inability to reach The Objective. Both philosophers analyze the dynamics of the thinking subject and come to more similar statements: Kierkegaard’s notion of objective uncertainty can be, to the certain extent, used to describe attitude of modern thinker described by Marquard. “To the certain extent” – because it is hard and not legitimized to avoid in interpretation the ultimate religious goal that ties up the whole Kierkegaard’s authorship and makes his thought so specific. But the similarities are not meant just to be shown here: they aim to point out certain, very substantial reflection that lies at the root of the existential thinking and makes it still necessary. It is the reflection that sees human mortality, individuality and the dynamic character of the self as the basis for giving primacy in philosophy to the “here and now” questions of how to live and die and how to share those questions with others.
EN
The idea of the article is to search for the roots of the so-called existential thinking, using the peculiar comparison: of the religiously oriented ideas of Kierkegaard ( especially his notions of subjective and objective thinker and the idea of subjective truth) and contemporary ideas of Odo Marquard’s hermeneutical skepticism. Surprisingly, Marquard’s anthropologically and sociologically oriented reflection, while dealing with the problem of human search for absolute knowledge and its depreciation of particular existence, comes to much the same reflections as Kierkegaard: stating rational inability to reach The Objective. Both philosophers analyze the dynamics of the thinking subject and come to more similar statements: Kierkegaard’s notion of objective uncertainty can be, to the certain extent, used to describe attitude of modern thinker described by Marquard. “To the certain extent” – because it is hard and not legitimized to avoid in interpretation the ultimate religious goal that ties up the whole Kierkegaard’s authorship and makes his thought so specific. But the similarities are not meant just to be shown here: they aim to point out certain, very substantial reflection that lies at the root of the existential thinking and makes it still necessary. It is the reflection that sees human mortality, individuality and the dynamic character of the self as the basis for giving primacy in philosophy to the “here and now” questions of how to live and die and how to share those questions with others.
EN
This study analyses Patočka’s conception of the relation between the finite human bein­g and the infinite, or rather, various conceptions of this relation which also imply different understandings of what the finite human being and the infinite consist in. The key theme becomes the different possibilities of interpreting Patočka’s early thesis stating that “the absolute is not outside us but in us”. The late Patočka explicitly dismisses the idea that the finite human being can discover the infinite in itself and that this “discovery” requires turning away from the world. The infinite can be reali­sed only by a loving relating to others irreducible to a collective “service to being”. The present interpretation aims to reinterpret true love as a movement which turns to others in their concrete (affective) situation of (present) praxis. It is through this movement that the finite human being lives in the infinite.
EN
In the absolute silence of the anechoic chamber John Cage supposedly heard the sounds of his body, and although this interpretation of what happened is questioned, one can draw from this experiment a not necessarily empirical lesson that for the subject the field of the hearable is constituted by a surplus which materialises in a hallucinatory sound. In Arnold Schoenberg’s Erwartung we encounter the opposite kind of surplus: a second of the scream so full that to exhaust it half an hour (the duration of the compositon) and all the intuitive resources of the composer are necessary. This scream is a formless permanent presence tearing the narration apart and materializing as its tears, which places it on the side of (non-empirical) silence. Therefore, because the field of the hearable is split for the subject, “on the side of silence” silence does not exist – it manifests itself as all kinds of sounds, even hallucinatory ones. We can reach the “absolute” silence only if we take the position of the paradoxical object which splits us – only through the surplus of constantly changing and at the same time formless sound, which paradoxically reaches a complex state of stasis. In the pure presence of the split, in which the difference between the subject (consciousness) and the object (sound) is overcome, the external rules of organisation (instinct, reason) are no longer biding, and the subject, who is a dissonance, becomes its own cause.
PL
John Cage w absolutnej ciszy komory bezechowej usłyszał ponoć dźwięki swego ciała i choć interpretacja ta poddawana jest w wątpliwość, można z jego doświadczenia wyciągnąć niekoniecznie empiryczną lekcję, że pole słyszalnego dla podmiotu ustanawiane jest przez nadmiar, który materializuje się w halucynacyjnym dźwięku. W Erwartung Arnolda Schönberga mamy do czynienia z odwrotnego rodzaju nadmiarem: z sekundą krzyku tak pełną, że na jej podtrzymanie przez pół godziny (czas trwania utworu) kompozytor  potrzebuje całej swej inwencji. Krzyk ten jest formalnie bezkształtną permanentną teraźniejszością, rozrywającą narrację i materializującą się jako jej zerwania, a zatem lokującą się po stronie (nieempirycznej) ciszy. Zatem ponieważ pole słyszalnego jest dla podmiotu rozszczepione, „po stronie ciszy” cisza nie istnieje – to tylko rożnego rodzaju dźwięki, nawet halucynacyjne. Do „absolutnej” ciszy możemy dotrzeć jedynie próbując zająć miejsce paradoksalnego obiektu, który nas rozszczepia – poprzez taki rodzaj nadmiaru zmieniającego się jak w kalejdoskopie, a zarazem formalnie bezkształtnego dźwięku, który paradoksalnie osiągnie złożony stan bezruchu. W czystej teraźniejszości obiektu, gdzie zostaje zniesiona różnica między podmiotem (świadomością) a przedmiotem (dźwiękiem), zewnętrzne reguły organizacyjne (instynkt, rozum) przestają obowiązywać i podmiot, który jest rozdźwiękiem, staje się swą własną przyczyną.
EN
We are now more often than ever contemplating existential problems. In this text I present some reflections related to the issue in the title. I do it in two steps. First, I consider from which perspective one can reasonably and effectively adjudicate about the meaning of an individual's life. Next, I illustrate this problem by presenting several concepts that refer to the mythological fate of Sisyphus. I precede the text with an introduction and close with an ending.
11
Content available remote

Wykładnia absolutu w systemie Hegla

51%
Diametros
|
2013
|
issue 35
49-64
PL
Artykuł przedstawia pierwszy schemat Heglowskiego rozumienia absolutu. Schemat ten, zgodny z systemem Spinozy, ma zdaniem Hegla pokazać, jak nie należy pojmować rzeczywistości. Jednocześnie schemat ten jest koniecznym etapem w rozumieniu idei absolutnej, będącej ostateczną treścią całej Nauki Logiki.
EN
The article presents the Hegelian notion of a substantial absolute, which is included in the “Exposition of the Absolute” in the Doctrine of Essence, in the “Science of Logic”. It shows its ambiguity and lack of meaningful content, which is, however, the way it was intended by the philosopher himself. By doing so Hegel points out how the concept of the absolute should not be construed by those who want to attain the absolute truth.
Studia Mazowieckie
|
2022
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2
87-100
EN
The article presents the issue of the psychology of creativity. In the 19th century, psychological issues, along with philosophical ones, were at the very center of thought, penetrating all areas of life. The basic key word for this field in Romanticism was the concept of a “soul”–  a very ambiguous term, encompassing many different meanings and semantic properties. The psychological “soul” - similarly to the key words in philosophy: “God,” “absolute,” “eternity,” “infinity”– refers to the idea (quality) that is elusive, inaccessible in a human way, introducing the “inexpressible” element to romantic poetry. This is the attempt to express the “inexpressible” – according to the author of the article – in Zygmunt Krasiński’s "Utwory francuskie" [Eng. French Works]. Images of the soul, deeply embedded in these texts, are a bold poetic attempt to explore the sphere of elusive, essentially “inexpressible”qualities. They take us into the “supernatural universe, where the spirit incarnates sublime shapes or is terribly born in the unconscious, allowing us to penetrate the most irrational and imaginary world [translation].” However, Krasiński’s “soul,” asthe author states, remains unknown in these texts; moreover –  it should remain unrecognized. Enchanted in its non-recognition, it testifies not only to the novelty and artistry of "Utwory francuskie", but also determines the essence of romantic poetry and poetry in general.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono problem dotyczący psychologii twórczości. Problematyka psychologiczna, obok filozoficznej, w wieku XIX znajdowała się w samym centrum myśli, przenikała wszystkie dziedziny życia. Podstawowym słowem kluczem dla tej dziedziny stało się w romantyzmie pojęcie „dusza” – termin bardzo wieloznaczny, skupiający w sobie wiele różnych znaczeń i semantycznych odcieni. Psychologiczna „dusza” – podobnie jak w filozofii słowa klucze: Bóg, absolut, wieczność, nieskończoność – odnosi się do idei (jakości) nieuchwytnych, w sposób ludzki niedostępnych, wprowadzających na grunt romantycznej poezji pierwiastek „niewyrażalnego”. Z taką właśnie próbą wyrażenia „niewyrażalnego” – zdaniem Autora artykułu – mamy do czynienia w Utworach francuskich Zygmunta Krasińskiego. Obrazy duszy, tkwiące głęboko w tych tekstach, stanowią odważną poetycką próbę eksploracji sfery jakości nieuchwytnych, właśnie „niewyrażalnych”. Przenoszą nas w „uniwersum nadnaturalne, gdzie duch się wciela w kształty wzniosłe lub przeraźliwie zrodzone w nieświadomości, pozwalające nam wniknąć w świat najbardziej irracjonalny, urojony”. Jednakże „dusza” Krasińskiego, jak konstatuje Autor, pozostaje w tych tekstach nie-do-poznana; więcej – powinna pozostać nie-do-poznana. Zaklęta w swym nie-do-poznaniu zaświadcza nie tylko o nowatorstwie i artyzmie fragmentów francuskich, ale także stanowi o istocie poezji romantycznej i poezji w ogóle.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.