This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the supreme Good is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity (scil. non-unity) and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence (and in accord with the suggestions given by Simplicius), the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness.
IT
This article intends to characterize the constructive function that the Indeterminate Duality may have played in Plato’s oral teaching. Far from being in itself – as some testimonia seem to suggest – the primary origin of evil, as origin of multiplicity the Indeterminate Duality can be perceived as intrinsically presupposed by Plato’s identification of the source of being with the supreme Good. The notion of good implicates for Plato namely an unconditioned impulse to relationality, which indicates that the supreme Good is to be considered as supreme origin not only of unity, but also of multiplicity (scil. non-unity) and alterity. In the absence of multiplicity and alterity, no real relation, and, therefore, no real manifestation of the Good could in fact take place. As a consequence (and in accord with the suggestions given by Simplicius), the Indeterminate Duality may be considered as source of that original differentiation as well as of that generativity without which the supreme Good would be discordant with its goodness.
In this article, we consider the problem of the equivalence of transcendentals: beauty, truth and good, in the perspective of two great thinkers of the twentieth century: H. U. von Balthasar and J. Tischner. Based on the confrontation of their reflections, we introduce the concept of the paradox of the “strugle of transcendentals” and we analyze the philosophical positions they occupy in this matter. The obtained research results, concerning all transcendentals, are then concretized on the agathological ground, where the similarities and differences in views of both authors are apparent. A common ground for Balthasar and Tischner consists in the recognition of good as a fundamental transcendentale in the development of (theo)dramatic reflection. The basic difference is revealed in their perception of the relation of good to other transcendentals. Tischner is in favor of the absolute primacy of good among all transcendentals, while Balthasar admits only a relative primacy in this case. In the final section of the work we indicate some shortcomings of both approaches and we propose a soteriological-anthropological example illustrating the validity of tischnerian approach.
PL
W niniejszym artykule rozpatrujemy problem równoważności transcendentaliów: piękna, prawdy i dobra, w ujęciu dwóch znakomitych myślicieli XX wieku: H. U. von Balthasara i J. Tischnera. Opierając się na konfrontacji ich refleksji, wprowadzamy pojęcie paradoksu „walki transcendentaliów” i analizujemy stanowiska filozoficzne, jakie zajmują oni wobec tego zagadnienia. Uzyskane wyniki badań, dotyczące ogółu transcendentaliów, konkretyzujemy następnie na gruncie agatologicznym, na którym najwyraźniej zarysowują się podobieństwa i różnice w poglądach obu autorów. Wspólną płaszczyzną dla Balthasara i Tischnera okazuje się być uznanie dobra jako transcendentale fundamentalnego dla rozwijania refleksji (teo)dramatycznej. Podstawowa różnica ujawnia się w ich postrzeganiu relacji dobra do pozostałych transcendentaliów. Tischner opowiada się za absolutnym prymatem dobra wśród transcendentaliów, Balthasar dopuszcza w tym przypadku jedynie prymat relatywny. W końcowej sekcji pracy zwracamy uwagę na pewne mankamenty obu podejść i proponujemy soteriologiczno-antropologiczny przykład ilustrujący zasadność podejścia Tischnerowskiego.
The German researcher of the philosophy of religion, Bernhard Welte (1906–1983), looking for an answer to the question about the substantive relationship between philosophical thinking and religious thinking, does not provide a final answer, but allows some discussion and polemics. This way of practicing the philosophy of religion is interesting because this problem is juxtaposed with the problem of man and his experience of existence. Thanks to this narrative, it is possible to pose more demanding ethical questions. In the further deliberations of this author, there are, inter alia, reflection on what a person’s life could look like without the “presence” of religion in his life (also in the aspect of relating to being a non-believer), also in the ethical aspect. It can be said that in a similar key - anthropological and ethical - he presents his position on the problem of “philosophical thinking versus religious thinking”, the Krakow philosopher Józef Tischner (1931–2000). This thinking is based both on his concept of the philosophy of drama, as well as on the experience (direct and indirect) of the believer. This reflection is “torn” between a specific topos (temple) and the people who come to a particular temple and create a specific community. The aim of the article is an attempt to answer the question of what religious thinking is as perceived by Tischner, as well as to specify his position in the aspect of the contemporary crisis of understanding the community in terms of the philosophy of values.
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