Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  agency problem
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
Research background: The rapid development of digital economy has set off a new wave of enterprise reform. Developing the digital economy is not only an urgent requirement of the current situation, but also an important way to meet the people's better life. Purpose of the article: This paper attempts to reveal the important role of the development of digital technology on the debt financing cost of micro enterprises, and provide micro evidence for the integration of digital economy and real economy. At the same time, this paper wants to provide relevant guidance for formulating digital related policies and reducing the financing cost of the real economy. Methods: Taking China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as a sample, this paper empirically tests the impact of enterprise digital transformation on debt financing cost and its mechanism. In the robustness test, this paper uses the measures of changing independent variables and dependent variables, instrumental variable method and quantile regression method. In the mechanism test, this paper uses the intermediary effect model. In the further study, this paper uses the method of group regression. Findings & value added: The study finds that the digital transformation of enterprises significantly reduces the cost of debt financing. Mechanism tests show that the role of enterprise digital transformation in reducing debt financing costs is mainly realized by reducing information asymmetry and alleviating agency problems. Further tests show that the relationship between enterprise digital transformation and debt financing cost is affected by the degree of market competition, whether it is a high-tech enterprise and audit quality. When the degree of market competition is high, the enterprise is a high-tech one, or it is audited by the four major international accounting firms, the effect of enterprise digital transformation on the reduction of debt financing cost is more significant. The method used in this paper is also applicable to the study of other economic management problems. This paper proves a positive significance of digital transformation, which is conducive to promoting the digital transformation of enterprises. Especially for those enterprises in non-high-tech industries, they should speed up the pace. At the same time, this paper has a certain guiding role for the introduction and implementation of policies to encourage digital transformation.
PL
W artykule podjęto problem przedstawicielstwa w otwartych funduszach emerytalnych. Całość rozważań osadzono w założeniach pozytywistycznej teorii agencji. W tekście poddano analizie stosunki, w jakie wchodzą otwarte fundusze emerytalne (OFE) i powszechne towarzystwa emerytalne (PTE) – organ zarządzający OFE. Zwrócono uwagę na relacje zachodzące pomiędzy członkiem OFE a akcjonariuszem PTE. W opracowaniu jako cel przyjęto ocenę mechanizmów ukierunkowanych na łagodzenie konfliktu interesów pomiędzy członkami OFE a PTE. Analizie poddano dwa rodzaje mechanizmów, a mianowicie: bodźce i monitoring. Zdaniem autora w zakresie bodźców przyjęte przez ustawodawcę rozwiązania nie do końca odpowiadają potrzebom członków OFE. Autor proponuje powiązanie większej części wynagrodzenia PTE z wynikami inwestycyjnymi OFE. Towarzyszyć temu jednak powinno zniesienie ustawowych ograniczeń inwestycyjnych dla środków zgromadzonych w OFE i stworzenie możliwości wyodrębnienia z OFE kilku subfunduszy o różnym poziomie ryzyka inwestycyjnego. Autor zaznacza przy tym, iż o profilu ryzyka planu emerytalnego decydować powinien członek OFE. Przyjęte natomiast przez ustawodawcę rozwiązania z punktu widzenia mechanizmu monitoringu nie budzą większych zastrzeżeń. Pewnej poprawy wymagałyby jednak relacje wewnątrz PTE, a dokładniej kwestie dotyczące rad nadzorczych.
EN
The article discusses the agency problem in open pension funds. All these considerations embedded in the assumptions of the positivist agency theory. The text analyzed the relationship between the open pension funds (OFE) and general pension societies (PTE) – OFE governing body. Attention was paid to the relationship between members of the open pension funds and PTE shareholders. The study adopted as a goal: to assess the mechanisms that solve the conflicts of interest between members of OFE and PTE. Author analyzed two types of mechanisms, namely: incentives and monitoring. According to the author, adopted solutions by the legislator in the area of incentives do not fully meet the needs of OFE members. The author proposes to link the greater part of the PTE remuneration with the results of OFE investment. The author also proposes the abolition of statutory investment limits on OFE and separation within the OFE several sub-funds with different levels of investment risk. OFE member should decide about the risk profile of a pension plan. Adopted solutions by the legislature in the field of monitoring do not raise major objections. One improvement would require, however, relations within the PTE, and more specifically issues concerning supervisory boards.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.