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Fenomenologicko-existenciálna analýza krásy

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EN
The article presents a phenomenological-existential analysis of the experience of beauty (the aesthetic experience) through Heidegger’s approach to the examination of mood. It thematizes a subject that Heidegger undoubtedly had an immense interest in, but which he himself didn’t address with the methods that he developed in his work Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). The text therefore attempts to present what Heidegger’s answer to the question, “What is beauty?” might have looked like in this period of his work. The analysis that is presented respects the original structure of the question about mood and investigates beauty from three points of view concurrently: 1) what do beautiful objects have in common and what is it that characterizes them, 2) what characterizes the experience of living through an aesthetic experience and, for that matter, 3) what happens to us when we have an aesthetic experience. Thus, it attempts to interpret beauty in the spirit of Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein and being before the turn. The study points to the cognitive aspects of the aesthetic experience in the sense of the understanding of beauty as an uncovering of being and the worldliness of the world.
SK
Predkladaný text sa pokúša predstaviť fenomenologicko-existenciálnu analýzu prežívania krásy (estetickej skúsenosti) prostredníctvom Heideggerovho prístupu k skúmaniu rozpoloženia. Tematizuje tému, ktorá Heideggera nepochybne nesmierne zaujímala, ku ktorej však sám nepristúpil metódou, ktorú ponúkol vo svojom diele Bytie a čas. Text sa tak pokúša predostrieť, ako by mohla vyzerať Heideggerova odpoveď na otázku „Čo je to krása?“ v tomto období jeho tvorby. Predkladaná analýza pritom rešpektuje pôvodnú štruktúru otázky o rozpoložení a krásu skúma z troch hľadísk: 1) čo majú krásne objekty spoločné a čo ich charakterizuje, 2) čím je charakteristické prežívanie estetickej skúsenosti, a napokon 3) o čo nám v estetickej skúsenosti ide. Krásu sa tak pokúša interpretovať v intenciách Heideggerovho chápania pobytu a bytia pred obratom. Štúdia poukazuje na kognitívne aspekty estetickej skúsenosti v zmysle porozumenia kráse ako odkrývaniu bytia a svetskosti sveta.
DE
Der vorliegende Text stellt einen Versuch dar, eine phänomenologisch-existenzielle Analyse der Erfahrung von Schönheit vermittels Heideggers Denkansatz zur Befindlichkeit vorzustellen. Die Schönheit ist ein Thema, das Heidegger zweifellos sehr interessierte, dem er sich jedoch nicht mit derselben Methode näherte, die er in seinem Werk Sein und Zeit verwendete. Im vorliegenden Text wird daher versucht zu zeigen, wie Heideggers Antwort auf die Frage: „Was ist Schönheit?“ in seiner damaligen Schaffensperiode hätte aussehen können. In der Analyse wird dabei die ursprüngliche Struktur der Frage nach der Befindlichkeit respektiert und der Schönheitsbegriff aus drei Perspektiven untersucht: 1) Was ist schönen Objekten gemeinsam und wodurch zeichnen sie sich aus? 2) Wodurch zeichnet sich die ästhetische Erfahrung aus? 3) Worum geht es uns in der ästhetischen Erfahrung? Schönheit soll hier in den Intentionen von Heideggers Auffassung zu Dasein und Sein vor der Wende interpretiert werden. In der Studie wird auf die kognitiven Aspekte der ästhetischen Erfahrung im Sinne des Verstehens der Schönheit als Aufdeckung des Seins und der Weltlichkeit der Welt hingewiesen.
EN
Raising, reduced to the formula of up-bringing does not (Polish: wy-chowan-nie), allows us to reveal what is hidden, and by denying it (-not), it enables a person to experience the sense of his essence and see the tragedy of his upbringing and the sense of his life. Featured upbringing and up-bringing-does not (written separately) results from the difference in the approach to truth. Today, upbringing in its objectifying children truth refers to the concept of veritas, and because it lost its original meaning or aletheia, in search of the truth of upbringing, it was reduced to the formula of up-bringing-does not. With the help of this formula, an attempt was made to reveal the real sense of upbringing and the conditions that should be met in order for human up-bringing-does not to have a human (aletheia) dimension.
EN
René Girard’s Mimetic Theory has put forward a very compelling toolbox whose hermeneutical valour we are willing to test by reading Heidegger’s ontological wandering in the semantic constellation of Being. Finding a lead in Heidegger’s reading of Œdipus’ peripeties as presented in Sophocles’ Œdipus Rex, we will try to translate the fundamental notions of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics into Girard’s jargon to see if any clarity is gained. It is time to go after Heidegger, both as in following him in his own wandering but also as in chasing him, out of his Holzwege, and eventually go further. Hopefully, some of the obscurities of Heidegger’s text will find in this perspective a new light, without losing any of its fascination.
EN
Truth is a central concept in human thought. The philosophical reflection on the relationship to the human world and to reality was therefore always, directly or indirectly, a reflection on the meaning of the concept of truth. The question of the meaning of truth and of the conditions for human relation to truth has long been a fundamental question for philosophy because philosophy stands for the idea that human life as a whole is oriented towards truth, that is, for the idea of the life in critical responsibility. For Heidegger the question of truth is neither the question of the logical conditions of the statement about truth nor the question of beings, but the question of the truth of beings and the truth of being itself.
EN
This paper follows Iris Murdoch in an ongoing critique of existentialism that saw the beginnings of her philosophical work with Sartre and its conclusion with her manuscript on Heidegger. The continuity of her critique focuses upon her concern with the magnetism of the ego over and against attention toward the other. Heidegger, as a metaphysician working to close the post-Enlightenment subject/object separation, engages her thought regarding new possibilities for a future metaphysics. For Murdoch, seeking an ontology that rejects a transcendent God requires a notion of goodness that provokes a point of contention with Heidegger’s ontology of Being, where a new dualism of authenticity and inauthenticity toward Being undermines any ethos of the other.
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