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EN
The subject of the study was interlocking directorates in Polish joint stock companies. In order to explore this area a monitoring system has been developed which consists of a database and query system. Data is automatically introduced from printed announcements into the MySQL database using PHP scripts.The phenomenon of interlocking directorates in Polish joint stock companies is comparable with other countries. Board members in Poland are significantly younger than, for example, in the USA. Women constitute an important group of board members. Insurance companies and investment funds are closely connected with other companies, but banks are not.The monitoring system developed enables us to identify who is, and who was, a board member of every joint stock company. It also enables us to identify, for every person, which board he or she now serves on, and has served on, in the past. The system also enables us to produce different reports concerning, for example, changes in certain indexes in subsequent years. The system is also accessible via the Internet.
EN
The article deals with responsibility of a member of a board in Stock Corporation, which is inseparably linked with his funkcion and the member of the board cannot divest of that. The article comparatively refers to the valid legislation in the Slovak republic, the Czech Republic and Poland. The author not only mentions the valid legislation, but also points out the decisions of the Courts of the mentioned countries. The article refers to terminology issues and compares term „proffesional diligence “which is used in the Slovak republic with term” diligence of due manager“which is used in the Czech republic.
EN
The aim of this paper is to bring together some of the foundational and recent literature interlinking corporate governance and the leadership role of the board of directors. Strategic leadership is widely assumed to be a responsibility that defaults to the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). However, in practice, what most CEOs do is strategic management rather than strategic leadership. While strategic management does share key aspects of strategic leadership CEOs are expected to prioritize the managerial side over the leadership side. This is just one of the situations in which the boardroom assumes the leadership role. This paper discusses how boards of directors conduct the process of strategic leadership in their organizations. In recent years there has been an increasing interest among scholars to understand how boards strategize from a behavioral point of view. This growing interest has resulted in the development of various typologies regarding boards’ involvement in the strategic leadership processes.
PL
W spółkach kapitałowych (ksh) obowiązek nadzorowania i monitorowania procesu sporządzania i badania sprawozdań finansowych realizowany jest przez rady nadzorcze. W przypadku gdy spółka ma status jednostki zainteresowania publicznego (JZP), tworzone jest dodatkowe ciało, jakim jest komitet audytu. Porównanie kompetencji obu organów pozwala na stwierdzenie, że ich zadania i obowiązki się powielają. Jednak zgodnie z polskim prawem jedynie rada nadzorcza jako całość ma wyłączne, ustawowe kompetencje decyzyjne. Komitet nie może zatem zastępować rady, zaś jego funkcja ogranicza się do działalności doradczej i wspierającej działalność rady. Jednak dzięki niezależności i określeniu kwalifikacji członków komitetu, przewidywanym karom administracyjnym oraz enumeratywnie wymienionym kompetencjom i obowiązkom możliwy jest pełniejszy nadzór nad adekwatnością i skutecznością wszelkich systemów spółki w kontekście prawidłowości i rzetelności generowanych informacji, a tym samym wspomaganie bezpiecznego funkcjonowania JZP.
EN
In capital companies (CC) the obligation to supervise and monitor the process of preparing and auditing financial statements is carried out by the supervisory boards. If a company has the status of a public interest entity (PIE), an additional body is established, i.e. the audit committee. Comparing the competences of both bodies allows stating that their tasks and obligations are duplicated. However, in accordance with Polish law only the supervisory board, as a whole, has the exclusive, statutory decision-making powers. Therefore, the committee cannot replace the council, whereas its function is limited to advisory and supportive activities provided for the council. Independence and qualifications of the committee members, anticipated administrative fines and enumerated competences allow for the supervision over both adequacy and effectiveness of all systems in the context of the correctness and reliability of the generated information, and thus support the safe functioning.
EN
The paper is devoted to the problems of the financial statements changes aimed at improving the efficiency of corporate governance. It presents key modifications – both already introduced and proposed – with regard to the form and content of financial statements. In addition, the directions of non-financial (narrative) reports, starting with the Management Commentary and ending with an integrated reporting are presented.
PL
Istnieje kilka teorii opisujących działanie rady nadzorczej. Są to w szczególności: teoria hegemonii zarządu, teoria pośrednictwa, teoria uzależnienia od zasobów, teoria instytucjonalna, teoria interesariuszy, teoria włodarza, teoria hegemonii klasowej. W artykule opisano miejsce rady nadzorczej w szeroko rozumianym systemie nadzoru korporacyjnego i przedstawiono teorie opisujące jej funkcjonowanie. Sformułowano też wnioski dotyczące zakresu obowiązywania teorii w obecnym systemie nadzoru korporacyjnego w Polsce.
EN
There are several theories describing board of directors roles. This are in particular: managerial hegemony theory, agency theory, resource dependence theory, institutional theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, class hegemony theory. In the paper the position of board of directors in corporate governance system has been shown and the theories have been presented describing its roles. Some conclusions were also formulated concerning validity of presented theories in the current Polish corporate governance system.
PL
Popularne w polskiej praktyce gospodarczej jest tworzenie spółki komandytowej, której komplementariuszem jest spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością. Wspólnicy de facto w ten sposób ograniczają swoją osobistą odpowiedzialność jaką ponosiliby, gdyby występowali w roli wspólnika aktywnego jako osoby fizyczne. Zarządzającymi spółką komandytową są członkowie spółko z o.o., których de facto nie łączy ze spółką komandytową ani komandytariuszami żaden stosunek obligacyjny. W przypadku wyrządzenia przez członków zarządu szkody spółce komandytowej bądź jej komandytariuszom pojawia się problem podstaw do odpowiedzialności. Obecny stan prawny skłania ku refleksji nad regulacją de lege ferenda nie tylko samej spółki komandytowej, ale także całego systemu prawa spółek..
EN
Popular in Polish business practice is the creation of a limited partnership, the general partner of which is a limited liability company. The de facto partners thus limit their personal responsibility if they acted as an active partner as natural persons. The management of a limited partnership company are members of the company with o.o., which de facto does not link with the limited partnership or limited partners any bond relationship. In the case of damage caused by members of the management board to a limited partnership or its limited partners, there is a problem of grounds for liability. The current legal situation prompts us to reflect on de lege ferenda regulation not only of the limited partnership itself, but also of the entire company law system.
EN
The act on the management of the state property adopted in 2016 significantly transformed the entire system of management of state property, including its functional and structural-organisational aspects. As part of this reform, some provisions of the municipal economy act were also amended, which is understandable given affiliation of both types of property (state and municipal) to one category of public property. This article answers the question — what are the consequences for the self-government sector and economic agents operating within it (entrepreneurs acting on the basis of municipal property) of the changes made relating to the status, composition, appointment and operation of the supervisory board and board of directors of municipal company.
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