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1
100%
EN
Book review: Recenzja książki: Frans de Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 2016, ss. 473
PL
Recenzja książki: Frans de Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are?, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 2016, ss. 473; polskie wydanie: Bystre zwierzę: czy jesteśmy dość mądrzy, aby zrozumieć mądrość zwierząt?  tłum. Ł. Lamża, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków, 2016, ss. 438.
EN
We ask which ideas of cognitive science have their roots in traditional logic, grammar and rhetoric.We also emphasize the presence of cognitive science in the pages of Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric since its very beginning.
Studia Humana
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2016
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vol. 5
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issue 4
3-4
EN
First of all we pay attention to cognitive studies of religion and compare theology and philosophy of religion.
EN
The article 'Contemporary Dance Theatre in Neurocognitive Perspective – Granhøj Dans Case' concerns the description and interpretation of contemporary dance techniques using the example of the method created by Nancy Spanier (USA) and developed by Palle Granhøj (Denmark). The precise description of the performance's creation is presented from the perspective of a dancer taking part in a Granhøj Dans production. The neurocogitive context is then used to prove the director's statement, that the method 'allows the dancers to be more human, less dancers', thus creating a specific 'humanistic' effect in the aesthetics of the performance, which, as it is argued, exists in contemporary dance in general. Therefore, the obstruction technique serves as a valid example for applying cognitive sciences and neurosciences in the field of dance studies.
EN
Book review: Daniel C. Dennett, From Bacteria to Bach and Back. The evolution of mind, Penguin Random House, UK 2017, pp. 467.
EN
Cognition is meant as the process of acquiring knowledge from the world. This process is supposed to happen within agents, which build such knowledge with the purpose to use it to determine their actions on the world. Following Peircean ideas, we postulate that such knowledge is encoded by means of signs. According to Peirce, signs are anything that can be used to represent anything else. Also, for Peirce, to represent means to be able to generate another sign, called the interpretant of the original sign, which still holds the same power of interpretability, I.e, its power to be transformed into a new sign, holding this same power. This happens through a processcalled semiosis, the process by which a sign is transformed into an interpretant. This whole process is performed with the aim of subsidizing the agent in deciding its behavior. So, even though the semiosis process has the power to continue infinitely, it usually stops whenever the generated interpretant brings enough information in order for the agent to effectively act in the world. We take signals to be the substract of signs. Signals are any physical property, which can be measured and captured by the agent, by means of its sensors. This includes any kind of internal memory the agent is able to have access, in order to operate. In this sense, signs can be both in the world (if these signals come from sensors) and within the own agent’s mind (if signals come from an internal memory). We understandan agent’s mind as the agents’ control system. In either case, signals can be abstracted as numbers. Not simply numbers, but numbers coming from specific sensors or specific memories. Using ideas from Peircean philosophy, in this work we postulate a pathway, in which signals, collected by either sensors or memory, can be organized in such a way that they can be effectively used as knowledge, in order for an agent to be able to decide its actions on the world, on the pursuit of its internal motivations. We postulate that agents identify and create a model of the world based on possibilities, existents, and laws, and based on this model, they are able to decide an action that maximizes the chance for the world to gain a shape, which the agents intend for it to be. This theory is postulated particularly for the case of artificial autonomous agents, meant to be constructed by engineering artifacts.
EN
The aim of this article is to point to connections between intellectual and emotional aspects of learning. Cognitive science, especially research of neurobiologists (e.g. A. Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis) form theoretical basis of consideration of the issue and point to re-defining teaching-learning processes as necessity.
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84%
EN
Book review: Bernd Heinrich, Umysł kruka. Badania i przygody w świecie wilczych ptaków, tł. Michał Szczubiałka, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec, 2018, ss. 504.
PL
Recenzja książki: Bernd Heinrich, Umysł kruka. Badania i przygody w świecie wilczych ptaków, tł. Michał Szczubiałka, Wydawnictwo Czarne, Wołowiec, 2018, ss. 504.
Avant
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2016
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vol. 7
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issue 2
EN
The aim of the paper is to sketch an idea-seen from the point of view of a cognitive scientist-of cognitive semiotics as a discipline. Consequently, the article presents aspects of the relationship between the two disciplines: semi- otics and cognitive science. The main assumption of the argumentation is that at least some semiotic processes are also cognitive processes. At the methodo- logical level, this claim allows for application of cognitive models as explana- tions of selected semiotic processes. In particular, the processes of embedded interpretation (in contrast to interpretability in principle) are considered: belief revision, dynamic organization of meaning and metaknowledge. The explanations are formulated in terms of artificial cognitive agents of the GLAIR/SNePS cognitive architecture. Finally, it is suggested that even if some- one rejects the idea of artificial cognitive systems as simulations of semiotic processes, they may acknowledge the usefulness of cognitive modeling in analysis of semiotic processes in virtual, simulated worlds and in the area of “new media”.
EN
Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is im- mersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications.
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Content available remote

Fantom ciała jako cielesna samoświadomość

83%
Avant
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2010
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vol. 1
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issue 1
225-246
XX
In the article, I propose that the body phantom is a phenomenal and functional model of one’s own body. This model has two aspects. On the one hand, it functions as a tacit sensory representation of the body that is at the same time related to the motor aspects of body functioning. On the other hand, it also has a phenomenal aspect as it constitutes the content of conscious bodily experience. This sort of tacit, functional and sensory model is related to the spatial parameters of the physical body. In the article, I postulate that this functional model or map is of crucial importance to the felt ownership parameters of the body (de Vignemont 2007), which are themselves considered as constituting the phenomenal aspect of the aforementioned model.
Avant
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2016
|
vol. 7
|
issue 2
EN
The aim of the paper is to sketch an idea-seen from the point of view of a cognitive scientist-of cognitive semiotics as a discipline. Consequently, the article presents aspects of the relationship between the two disciplines: semi- otics and cognitive science. The main assumption of the argumentation is that at least some semiotic processes are also cognitive processes. At the methodo- logical level, this claim allows for application of cognitive models as explana- tions of selected semiotic processes. In particular, the processes of embedded interpretation (in contrast to interpretability in principle) are considered: belief revision, dynamic organization of meaning and metaknowledge. The explanations are formulated in terms of artificial cognitive agents of the GLAIR/SNePS cognitive architecture. Finally, it is suggested that even if some- one rejects the idea of artificial cognitive systems as simulations of semiotic processes, they may acknowledge the usefulness of cognitive modeling in analysis of semiotic processes in virtual, simulated worlds and in the area of “new media”.
EN
The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.
Human Affairs
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2007
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vol. 17
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issue 2
111-125
EN
"Practice theory" has a long history in philosophy, under various names, but current practice theory is a response to failures of projects of modernity or enlightenment which attempt to reduce science or politics to formulae. Heidegger, Oakeshott, and MacIntyre are each examples of philosophers who turned to practice conceptions. Foucault and Bourdieu made similar turns. Practice accounts come in different forms: some emphasize skill-like individual accomplishments, others emphasize the social character or presupposition-like character of the tacit conditions of activities. The Social Theory of Practices problematized the idea of sameness, the idea that participants in an activity had the same tacit possessions, which undermined the idea that practices were collective objects in which individuals participated. Later critics, such as Schatzki and Rouse, emphasized the normative coherence and character of practice, which has a collective aspect. Pickering and others suggested a notion of practices that was de-mentalized and focused on the objects that were part of the practical activity, which provided for the continuity and sociality of practice without collectivizing its mental content. The discovery of mirror neurons suggested a non-collective mode of transmission of practices. The implications of these developments can be seen in connection with ethics, where the conflict between the ethical and the practical can be understood in terms of the intrinsic conflict between the need to behave successfully and our learned ethical intuitions.
Studia Humana
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 2
16-25
EN
In this paper it has been argued that the theory of conceptual maps developed recently by Paul M. Churchland provides support for Wittgenstein’s claim that language is a tool for acting in the world. The role of language is to coordinate and shape the conceptual maps of the members of the given language community, reducing the cross-individual cognitive idiosyncrasies and paving the way for joint cognitive enterprises. Moreover, Churchland’s theory also explains our tendency to speak of language as consisting of concepts which correspond to things we encounter in the world. The puzzle of common sense reference is no longer a puzzle: while at the fundamental level language remains a tool for orchestrating conceptual maps, the fact that the maps encode some communally shared categorization of experience fuels our talk of concepts capturing the essences of things, natural kinds, prototypes, etc.
EN
This paper discusses the resources for deconstruction offered by cognitive science, drawing inspiration from David Gunkel’s work on the topic (Deconstruction, MIT Press 2021). The gesture of deconstruction is seen as having a positive impact on the development of this interdisciplinary field by challenging misleading dichotomies and examining its underlying assumptions, such as the symmetry of integration.
EN
Human musical aesthetic preferences differ significantly. People vary in this respect depending on culture in which they were brought up and on their individual experiences. The awareness of this differentiation was one of the reasons for which these aesthetic preferences were considered as conditioned only by culture. After cognitive science became interested in art, the aesthetic preferences have been explained by seeing the aesthetic assessment of stimuli as related to the evolutionary sources of human aesthetic tendencies. The contemporary knowledge of music processing by the nervous system and of musical skills development indicates that there are also some ubiquitous tendencies in the aesthetic assessment of music. The purpose of the current paper is to present preferences for tonal music and to explain their origin.
EN
Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is im- mersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications.
EN
The purpose of the article is to investigate the philosophical and theological validity and coherence of the classical concept of a miracle within the contemporary scientific world view. The main tool in this process will be the cognitive standard model of the formation of religious beliefs operative in the cognitive science of religion. The application of this model shows why an intentional agent is assigned as responsible for the occurrence of events with no visible cause such as a miracle: miracles are events that violate the intuitively expected behaviors observable in the physical reality. It will become evident that much of the conceptual content of the classical understanding of miracles can be retained despite of the ontological and epistemological challenges of the contemporary science. In particular, this concerns the semantic view of miracles in which a miracle does not occur as an objective Divine intervention but qualifies as religious interpretation of the natural course of events always in reference to a cultural and personal context that is unique to those who directly experience these events either as direct recipients or as observers.
EN
This article aims to indicate universal cognitive diagrams for the process of interpreting and creating works of art. This text deals primarily with issues such as visual perception, neural representations and mental maps. Each of these concepts has a direct connection with the reception of works of art (painting, sculptural and literary). A certain scope of cognitive processes may constitute a cognitive universe with respect to works of visual art. In every field of art, a set of similar, if not identical patterns with regard to a specific realization is noticed. We can therefore speak of generalizations, mutations and emanations in culture. This article is only a research proposal, which requires a wider study.
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