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EN
In this paper I aim to compare and evaluate two theoretic approaches to pragmatic presuppositions: the Common Ground account and Propositional Context account. According to the Common Ground account proposed by Stalnaker (2002), it is appropriate to assert a sentence p that requires a presupposition q only if q is mutually believed as accepted as true and taken for granted by the interlocutors. Otherwise, Gauker (2002, 2008) claims that the ground of propositions taken for granted coincides with what he calls the objective propositional context, that is the set of objectively relevant propositional elements that speakers ought to share in order to evaluate the appropriateness of utterances so as to reach the goal of a conversation.The main purpose of my paper is to show that, according to the Propositional Context account, a theory of presupposition has to take into account a normative-objective notion of context. Secondly, I aim to develop a criticism of Gauker's point of view claiming that the Propositional Context account does not account for the number of ways in which a proposition can be taken for granted by the speakers depending on the context. Finally, I propose to integrate Gauker's account with a further condition for appropriateness of assertion which states that: in order to appropriately assert a sentence p that requires a presupposition q, speakers ought to recognize how they should justify q in a specific communicative context.
EN
According to Kaplan’s bidimensional theory of demonstratives, the descriptive content of any indexical term (and the sentences they appear in) is only employed to determine its reference in any possible world rigidly but cannot be expressed by the sentence’s truth conditions. Kaplan then argues that an indexical sentence’s informativeness depends on what he calls its character, a property of the context that relates a particular context to a concrete content, but it cannot be a part of the proposition the sentence entertains (its content), primarily given the logical inconsistencies the opposite would show in the theory of conditionals and counterfactuals. I agree with Kaplan that indexicals should not be considered disguised descriptions. Nevertheless, I believe that their content is informative and, therefore, part of the proposition these sentences express, even though that implies accepting the existence of content shifting operators within the same context --what Kaplan dubbed monsters. This paper, therefore, presents an alternative account to indexical terms and sentences employing the Interactive Theory introduced in Colomina-Alminana (2022). This approach considers that the meaning of any sentence, the proposition it expresses, depends upon three interrelated factors: the speaker’s intentions when uttering, the audience’s potential uptakes of such statement, and the conventions established by the speech community both speaker and audience belong, or the linguistic interaction takes place. The critical element is the so-called speaker's point of view, an objective perspectival networking background that allows lexical and syntactic mechanisms to trigger and update potential conceptual presuppositional content shared by both speaker and audience and whose existence is prior to any context and circumstances.
EN
In the paper the author is describing two perspectives of conceiving context. The first is represented by the objective state of affairs and the second by interlocutors’ mental states. The notion of common ground is discussed with focus on its subjective character. On the basis of that term a model of context is being constructed. According to observations made in the article, the common ground, as it is widely perceived in the literature, is a purely theoretical notion which corresponds to neither speaker’s nor audience’s point of view. Moreover, the author is arguing that both objectively and subjectively understood contexts are indispensable and both should be taken into consideration in the analysis of speech acts.
EN
People make reference to places in the variable formulations afforded by their languages and to multiple ends that in addition to picking out a referent, simultaneously build conceptual common ground about seen and unseen landscapes, including moral stances about the social geography. This paper examines the different ways that Lachixío Zapotec speakers of Oaxaca, Mexico, formulate and interpret place references in the dialogic narratives of their conversations. I examine sequences of interaction within stories that emerged in conversations as joint social actions. These sequences include both speakers’ place formulations and addressees’ responses that publically display their uptake and stances toward the references. I describe resources of the Lachixío Zapotec language for referencing place and show how place references are entangled with person references, references to historical events, and participants’ moral stances toward such references. Through examining references to locations within sequences of conversational story telling we gather some evidence for how conceptual common ground and moral value is developed through the step-wise progression of turn-taking and how stances about places come to be culturally shared or contested between interlocutors dialogically.
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