Results found: 2

Search results

Search:
in the keywords: composition as identity

Sort By:

Limit search:

Composition, identity, and emergence

100%

Calosi C.

Logic and Logical Philosophy

2016

vol. 25

issue 3 Mereology and Beyond (II)

429-443

Composition as Identity (CAI) is the thesis that a whole is, strictly and literally, identical to its parts, considered collectively. McDaniel [2008] argues against CAI in that it prohibits emergent properties. Recently Sider [2014] exploited the resources of plural logic and extensional mereology to undermine McDaniel’s argument. He shows that CAI identifies extensionally equivalent pluralities – he calls it the Collapse Principle (CP) – and then shows how this identification rescues CAI from the emergentist argument. In this paper I first give a new generalized version of both the arguments. It is more general in that it does not presuppose an atomistic mereology. I then go on to argue that the consequences of CP are rather radical. It entails mereological nihilism, the view that there are only mereological atoms. I finally show that, given a mild assumption about property instantiation, namely that there are no un-instantiated properties, this argument entails that CAI and emergent properties are incompatible after all.

Composition as identity and plural Cantor's theorem

88%

Bohn E. D.

Logic and Logical Philosophy

2016

vol. 25

issue 3 Mereology and Beyond (II)

411-428

In this paper, I argue that the thesis of Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor’s Theorem, and that this in turn has implications for our use of Cantor’s theorem in metaphysics. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano, and might be turned around to become an abductive argument for Composition as Identity

Refine search results

2 Logic and Logical Philosophy

1 Bohn E. D.

1 Calosi C.

2 2016

Search results

Composition, identity, and emergence

Composition as identity and plural Cantor's theorem