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1

The Functional Model of Analysis as Middle Ground Meta-Ethics

100%

Saja K.

Diametros

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2020

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vol. 17

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issue 63

21

EN

The main purpose of the paper is to present a new framework of meta-ethics which I call the Functional Model of Analysis. It presupposes that the most important meta-ethical question is not “What is the meaning of normative words, sentences and what is the ontological fabric of the moral world?” but “What should morality and ethics be for?”. It is a form of meta-ethics that focuses on finding theoretical resources that can be helpful in understanding ongoing ethical debates between disciples of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, Augustine, Hobbes, utilitarians and Kant, and in building normative ethical theories that can help us to answer normative questions. As an example of such output I will present a formal sketch of Hybrid Function Consequentialism – a normative ethical theory based upon the meta-ethical framework proposed here.

2

Strategie obrony człowieka przed nieograniczonymi żądaniami

88%

Kwarciński T.

Prakseologia

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2007

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issue 147

65-76

EN

According to the utilitarian reasoning, people should always choose the least bad option of action. For example, they should sacrifice one person to save more people. The act of demanding from anybody such a decision is named „an unrestricted demand”. The justification of the belief that we should not address unrestricted demands to anybody usually takes form of deontological argumentation (deontological strategy), which points to deontological principles (e. g. „do not kill”) or rights (e. g. the right to live), leaving apart the consequences of the actions. In the following article we defend the thesis that the equally successful justification of the interdiction of addressing unrestricted demands can be formulated on the basis of the modified calculus of consequences (consequential strategy). Of course, modifying consequentialism by taking into account rights or egoistic motives is not sufficient. We can obtain the successful defence from unrestricted demands within the consequentialist frame by resigning from the impartiality condition on behalf of the evaluator relativity concept.

3

The Evil of Refraining to Save: Liu on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing

88%

Blair J.

Diametros

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2017

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issue 52

127-137

EN

In a recent article, Xiaofei Liu seeks to defend, from the standpoint of consequentialism, the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: DDA. While there are various conceptions of DDA, Liu understands it as the view that it is more difficult to justify doing harm than allowing harm. Liu argues that a typical harm doing involves the production of one more evil and one less good than a typical harm allowing. Thus, prima facie, it takes a greater amount of good to justify doing a certain harm than it does to justify allowing that same harm. In this reply, I argue that Liu fails to show, from within a consequentialist framework, that there is an asymmetry between the evils produced by doing and allowing harm. I conclude with some brief remarks on what may establish such an asymmetry.

4

J. S. Mill and the Art of Compromise

88%

Cejudo R.

Human Affairs

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2010

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vol. 20

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issue 4

300-307

EN

The word compromise means a kind of agreement and a concession to something harmful or wrong. I argue that particularly this second sense is quite relevant in the ethics of political action. John Stuart Mill focused upon this issue in his Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform 1859. I outline Mill's doctrine on compromise looking at the external and internal features of an acceptable measure of compromise. These features provide a set of conditions necessary in order for compromise to take place, but they do not guarantee sufficient conditions. In order to assess Mill's political coherence and to draw a general distinction between strategic and ethical compromises the paper concludes by considering two compromise measures that Mill adopted while he was a Member of Parliament.

5

O znaczeniu fundamentalnych zasad karania w polityce karnej — uwagi na tle przyczyn i skutków „masowego uwięzienia” w Stanach Zjednoczonych

88%

Stańdo-Kawecka B.

Nowa kodyfikacja prawa karnego

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2017

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vol. 43

509-522

EN

In the last century, in the United States, there was a significant change in the paradigms of punishment. In the 1970s the ideology of rehabilitation collapsed and reforms, which aimed at restoring justice in punishment and reduction of the prison population, were initiated. In the next decade, the movement aiming at liberal reforms lost the social and political support and was replaced with the repressive criminal policy. At the same time, a rapid increase in the prison population started which has been referred to in the criminological literature as the phenomenon of mass incarceration. After four decades of continuous growth in the number of persons deprived of their liberty there is no doubt that the social and financial consequences of a repressive system of punishment proved to be dramatic. For this reason, issues concerning the restoration of justice and rationality in punishment have again been discussed in the United States. Many European countries also experienced the “punitive turn” in the criminal policy at the end of the 20th century, although its scale was incomparable with what happened in the United States. It does not mean, however, that American discussions on the philosophy of punishment and criminal policy are irrelevant for Europe. Multidimensional negative effects of the American policy of mass incarceration indicate the dangers resulting from ignoring the basic principles of punishment that protect against abuses of the state’s power to punish. Additionally, they encourage a serious discussion about the integration of punishment theories with the empirical knowledge on the results of sentencing and sentence enforcement.

6

Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Risk of Punishing the Innocent: The Troublesome Case of Proxy Crimes

88%

Bystranowski P.

Diametros

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2017

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issue 53

26-49

EN

This paper discusses differences between two major schools in philosophy of criminal law, retributivism and consequentialism, with regard to the risk of (unintentionally) punishing the innocent. As it is argued, the main point of departure between these two camps in this respect lies in their attitude towards the high evidentiary threshold in a criminal trial: while retributivism seems to strongly support setting this standard high, consequentialists may find it desirable to relax it in some cases. This discussion is set in the context of proxy criminalization, i.e. a situation, in which some suspicious behaviour (i.e. behaviour that is only in some correlation with wrongful conduct, while not being substantially wrongful in itself) is criminalized. Since proxy criminalization may be understood as an effective lowering of the evidentiary threshold, its employment is justifiable from the consequentialist perspective, while being highly problematic for the retributivists.

7

Never–Ending Story of the Use of Vaccines Derived from Aborted Infants. Part I: Critique of Teleological Proportionalism and Consequentialism from the Perspective of Moral Theology

88%

Balák R.

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2017

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vol. 64

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issue 3: Teologia moralna - English Online Version

75-92

EN

The standard obligatory use of unethical vaccines derived from aborted human foetuses is currently a significant moral theological problem. It forms a serious dilemma of conscience especially when people become aware of the connection between their own actions and the morally wrong act committed by another person. However, a few years after the release of the declaration of Pontifical Academy for Life Moral Reflections on Vaccines Prepared from Cells Derived from Aborted Human Foetuses (5th May 2005), this serious problem was pushed into oblivion. Moral assessment is still dominated by consequentionalism and proportionalism which reject papal Magisterium ordinarium.

8

Proporcjonalizm: pokusa utylitaryzmu z teologii moralnej

75%

Plich R.

Forum Teologiczne

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2011

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vol. 12

73-86

EN

During the post-Conciliar renewal of Catholic moral theology, some theologians worked out a method of moral reasoning called ‘proportionalism’. According to this method, an acting person is obliged to choose the option likely to yield the best proportion between pre-moral good and evil. Proportionalism seems attractive, but it contains some serious flaws. Although its adherents insist that proportionalism is distinct from utilitarianism because of its theory of the good, the two methods share a consequentialist approach from which proportionalists were never able to separate their system. In other words, proportionalists borrowed from utilitarians the principle of utility and tried to combine it with a certain understanding of the objective good. This effort proved fruitless because there is no single universal standard against which one can measure basic human goods in their specific existential realizations. Although proportionalists reject traditional Catholic teaching on intrinsically evil acts, they claim that their understanding of so-called ‘proportionate reason’ is rooted in tradition. Yet a traditional condition of proportionate reason, which is one of the elements of the principle of double effect, requires not that the good effect outweigh the evil one, but that a person aiming for an intended good end should choose a good means that causes as little non-intended evil as possible. Proportionalism was rejected by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical letter Veritatis splendor, 74-75.

9

What Is Dignity?

75%

Herrman C.

Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture

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2019

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vol. 3

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issue 3(9)

103-126

EN

It stands to reason that a criterion is needed that can serve as a common denominator for weighing or assessing different values or ideals. Dignity is offered as a possible candidate, to be presented from religio-legal and cross-cultural vantages. A definition will be offered for dignity and its parts defended throughout the paper. The approach is not only not rigorously analytic – there are no case studies – but is instead a presentation of topic areas where we should expect to find the concept of dignity to be relevant. Utilizing a rights-moral and duties-ethical framework, it is in essence an argument for further elevating the prestige of dignity so that it might provide a widely-accepted groundwork for ethics and morality. .

10

Utilitaristická justifikace lidských práv: čtyři argumenty

63%

Abel M.

Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)

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2023

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vol. 162

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issue 11

1062-1066

EN

According to Martin Hapla, human rights should be conceived as justified moral rights. We have human rights in this sense because there are compelling reasons for them, namely, that in the long-term and universal perspective, their observance leads to the maximization of utility, even though there may occasionally be stronger reasons in the long-term and universal perspective for their violation. Docent Hapla calls this the utilitarian justification of human rights. Hapla’s argument must face at least four objections. The justification of moral rules leading to the maximization of utility in the long-term and universal perspective does not necessarily establish the justification of moral rights, and if it does, not automatically universal human rights. Furthermore, utilitarian justification, whether of rules or human rights, would likely have to rely on paternalistic foundations, which utilitarians would probably reject. Finally, in my opinion, we must ask Professor Hapla a provocative question: whether his consequentialism does not parasitize on deontological thinking.

CS

Podle Martina Haply je třeba lidská práva koncipovat jako justifikovaná morální práva. Lidská práva v tomto smyslu máme proto, že pro ně svědčí pádné důvody, a sice že v dlouhodobé a univerzální perspektivě jejich dodržování vede k maximalizaci užitku, i když tu a tam mohou pro jejich porušení svědčit důvody v dlouhodobé a univerzální perspektivě pádnější. Docent Hapla to nazývá utilitaristickou justifikací lidských práv. Haplova argumentace musí čelit nejméně čtyřem námitkám. Justifikace morálních pravidel vedoucích v dlouhodobé a univerzální perspektivě k maximalizaci užitku ještě nezakládá justifikaci morálních práv, a pokud ano, nikoliv automaticky univerzálních lidských práv. Nadto, utilitaristická justifikace, ať už jen pravidel, nebo i lidských práv, by patrně musela stát na paternalistických východiscích, která by utilitaristé zřejmě rozporovali. Nakonec podle mě musíme docentu Haplovi položit provokativní otázku, jestli jeho konsekvencionalismus neparazituje na deontologickém myšlení.

11

Problem trafu moralnego i winy według Thomasa Nagela i Norvina Richardsa. Próba uzupełnienia krytyki Richardsa

63%

Strzyżyński P.

Filozofia Chrześcijańska

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2012

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vol. 9

71-89

EN

The article discusses the problem of moral luck described by T. Nagel and B. Williams. It also presents the critique of N. Richards. In terms of Nagel moral luck causes a paradox: we judge morally random acts and break the principle of estimating only those acts which are under the con- trol of the perpetrator. Richards criticizes the sole use of the criterion of effects of the act, without intentions. This criticism is extended and includes the objection of too far-reaching generalization of the role of luck made by Nagel.

12

Buying and selling price for risky lotteries and expected utility theory without consequentialism

63%

Lewandowski M.

Metody Ilościowe w Badaniach Ekonomicznych

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2010

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vol. 11

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issue 1

223-253

EN

"In this paper I show that within expected utility large buying and selling price gap is possible and [R] paradox may be resolved if only initial wealth is allowed to be small. It implies giving up the doctrine of consequentialism which may be reduced to requiring initial wealth to be total lifetime wealth of the decision maker. Still, even when initial wealth is allowed to be small and interpreted narrowly as gambling wealth, classic preference reversal is not possible within expected utility. I show that only another kind of reversal which I call preference reversal B is possible within expected utility. Preference reversal B occurs when buying price for one lottery is higher than for another, but the latter lottery is chosen in a direct choice. I demonstrate that classic preference reversal is susceptible to arbitrage whereas preference reversal B is not which suggests that the latter reversal is more rational."

13

Neverending History of the Use of Vaccines Derived from Aborted Infants. Part I: Critique of Teleological Proportionalism and Consequentialism from the Perspective of Moral Theology

63%

Balák R.

|

2017

|

vol. 64

|

issue 3: Teologia moralna

93-110

EN

The standard and obligatory use of unethical vaccines derived from aborted human foetuses, is currently a significant moral theological problem. It is a serious dilemma of conscience the situation when people become aware of the connection between their own actions and the morally wrong act committed by other person form a serious conscience dilemma. However, a few years after the release of declaration Pontifical Academy for Life Moral Reflections on Vaccines Prepared from Cells Derived from Aborted Human Foetuses (05.06.2005), this serious problem was pushed into oblivion. The moral assessment is still dominated by the consequentionalism and the proportionalism which reject papal Magisterium ordinarium.

PL

Standardowe i obowiązkowe stosowanie szczepionek pochodzących z abortowanych płodów ludzkich stanowi obecnie istotny problem teologicznomoralny. Rodzi ono poważne dylematy sumienia, gdy osoby uświadamiają sobie istnienie związku pomiędzy jej własnym działaniem i czynem moralnie złym popełnionym przez inną osobę. Warto do tej kwestii powracać tym bardziej, że ma się wrażenie, iż bardzo szybko zapomniano o wskazaniach na ten temat zawartych w dokumencie Papieskiej Akademii Życia pt. Rozważania moralne o szczepionkach przygotowanych z komórek pochodzących z abortowanych płodów ludzkich (05.06.2005). W ocenie moralnej nadal można obserwować przewagę konsekwencjonalizmu i proporcjonalizmu, który odrzuca papieskie Magisterium ordinarium.

14

Proč nejsem utilitaristou? Vyznání přirozenoprávníka

51%

Baroš J.

Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)

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2023

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vol. 162

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issue 11

1047-1061

EN

Although the quality of Martin Hapla’s monograph Utilitarianism and the Philosophy of Human Rights is really extraordinary by Czech standards, his version of pragmatic utilitarianism presents some fundamental difficulties. These stem from the consequentialist or utilitarian framework of his argumentation. In this paper, I will discuss some of these difficulties, from the perspective of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. The objections will thus not be directed primarily at the conclusions, which utilitarianism tends to lead to in particular cases, but mainly at its intuitively accepted assumptions, especially its understanding of (the maximization of) utility. In the first part of the text, I start my exposition with an understanding of utilitarianism as a specific tradition of moral inquiry. In this, I draw inspiration from the work of moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. The utilitarian tradition absolutizes fragments from a more compact whole, which is better captured by the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition associated with the natural law theory. This rival tradition is also closer to our ordinary moral experience and can capture it in more precise terms. I bolster these conclusions in the second part of the text by thematizing the critique of consequentialism by the famous British philosopher G.E.M Anscombe. Expounding on her ideas, I argue that utilitarianism should be abandoned because it entails a peculiar and oversimplistic characterization of the immorality of human acts. I conclude the paper by arguing that Hapla’s pragmatic utilitarianism is far more revisionist and revolutionary than it first appears.

CS

Přestože je třeba ocenit na české poměry opravdu nadstandardní kvality monografie Martina Haply Utilitarismus a filozofie lidských práv, jeho verze pragmatického utilitarismu s sebou přináší zásadní potíže. Ty vyplývají z konsekvencialistického, respektive utilitaristického rámce jeho argumentace. V předloženém článku na tyto problémy poukážu, a to z perspektivy aristotelsko-tomistické tradice. Námitky tak nebudou směřovat v prvé řadě vůči závěrům, k nimž utilitarismus v konkrétních případech vede, ale hlavně vůči jeho intuitivně přijímaným předpokladům, zvláště pak vůči jeho chápání (maximalizace) užitku. V první části textu vycházím z chápání utilitarismu jako specifické tradice morálního zkoumání. V tom se inspiruji dílem morálního filosofa Alasdaira MacIntyra. Utilitaristická tradice absolutizuje dílčí prvky kompaktnějšího celku, které však lépe zachycuje aristotelsko-tomistická tradice, spojovaná s teorií přirozeného práva. Tato soupeřící tradice má též blíže k naší běžné morální zkušenosti a dovede ji zachytit v adekvátnějších termínech. Tyto závěry v druhé části textu podporuji tematizací kritiky konsekvencialismu od slavné britské filosofky G. E. M. Anscombové. V návaznosti na její teze argumentuji, že je třeba utilitarismus opustit, neboť s sebou nese zvláštní a příliš zjednodušující charakterizaci nemorálnosti našeho jednání. Článek uzavírám konstatováním, že Haplův pragmatický utilitarismus je daleko více revizionistický a revoluční, než se na první pohled zdá.

15

Morální dilema v profesní etice advokátů: jak řešit rozpor mezi obecnou a profesní morálkou?

51%

Hapla M.

Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)

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2023

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vol. 162

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issue 7

610-627

EN

The question of how we should resolve conflicts between the demands that arise from general morality and those derived from a particular professional role (for example, that of a lawyer) is one of the traditional problems of professional ethics. The aim of this article is to provide an answer to this question on the basis of consequentialist ethics, or a specific variant of it, which is based on utilitarianism and whose operation in practice is closer to pragmatic reasoning. In the text, the author first discusses the very nature of the above conflict, then critically analyses some of the existing approaches to its resolution, and finally presents the starting point offered by the pragmatic utilitarianism he proposes here. It has plausible normative foundations, as well as a good ability to resolve moral conflicts and various kinds of trade-offs. Above all, it allows us to maintain rationality in our decision-making processes and it can also organically take into account the plurality of moral attitudes that is often seen as a key characteristic of contemporary Western societies. The text concludes with an analysis of the case of Alton Logan as an illustration of how this approach can be practically applied.

CS

Otázka, jakým způsobem máme řešit konflikty mezi požadavky, které vyplývají z obecné morálky, a těmi odvozenými od určité profesní role (například advokáta), patří k tradičním problémům profesní etiky. Cílem tohoto článku je poskytnout na ni odpověď na bázi konsekvencialistické etiky, respektive její specifické varianty, která vychází z utilitarismu a její fungování v praxi se přibližuje pragmatickému uvažování. Autor v textu nejprve rozebírá samotnou povahu výše uvedeného střetu, následně kriticky analyzuje některé stávající přístupy k jeho řešení, aby nakonec představil východisko, které nám zde nabízí jím proponovaný pragmatický utilitarismus. Právě on má totiž ve srovnání s konkurenčními teoriemi několik významných výhod. Má věrohodná normativní východiska, jakož i dobrou schopnost řešit morální konflikty a různé druhy trade-offs. Především nám však umožňuje udržet racionalitu v našich rozhodovacích procesech a dovede také organicky zohledňovat pluralitu morálních postojů, jež bývá často vnímána jako klíčová charakteristika současných západních společností. Text uzavírá rozbor případu Altona Logana coby ilustrace toho, jak může být tento přístup prakticky aplikován.

16

Institutional Function Consequentialism

51%

Saja K.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2019

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vol. 48

5-25

EN

In this paper, I present a new account of normative ethics that I call Institutional Function Consequentialism. It is a form of indirect consequentialism that focuses on the optimal harmony of institutions rather than on rules, motives or acts. It proposes one normative foundation for all social order that is composed of different institutions. This account can also be seen as method of consequentializing different rival theories such as Aristotelianism, stoicism, utilitarianism, contractarianism and contractualism.

17

Omezení svobody projevu soudců a jeho morální zdůvodnění v judikatuře ESLP a NSS

45%

Stehlíková J.

Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)

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2021

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vol. 160

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issue 8

350-663

EN

Freedom of speech enjoys protection and judicial freedom of speech is not an exception. However, judges are limited in their speeches by legal and ethical requirements of judicial office, by contrast to other people in society. It is not always clear what those requirements really mean, how the ethical requirements differ from the legal ones and what consequences are connected with certain types of speeches. Judges thus often face a difficult task not to breach limits of their freedom of speech, unless they know what guideline to follow in controversial situations. This article therefore analyses three judicial decisions (of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Supreme Administrative Court) in which courts dealt with judicial speech that were not in compliance with legal or ethical norms. In the first case, the judge, due to his speech failed the requirement of impartiality. In the second case, the judge became a target of justified public criticism, and in the third case, the judge committed a disciplinary offence. Courts used moral arguments (deontological and consequentialist) in their decisions to justify their statements concerning faults of these three judges. By revealing these moral arguments in each judicial decision, the article points out how the courts reflect upon requirements posed on judiciary. It also shows a guideline which can be followed be judges when they try not to breach any norm.

CS

Svoboda projevu je chráněna a svoboda projevu soudců není výjimkou. Na rozdíl od ostatních lidí ve společnosti jsou však soudci ve svých projevech limitováni zákonnými i etickými požadavky na výkon funkce soudce. Není ale vždy zřejmé, jaký je skutečný obsah těchto požadavků, v čem se od sebe profesně etické a zákonné požadavky liší a jaké následky se s konkrétními projevy pojí. Soudci tak mnohdy čelí nesnadnému úkolu nepřekročit meze své svobody projevu, aniž vědí, podle čeho se mají ve sporných situacích orientovat. Tento článek proto rozebírá tři soudní rozhodnutí (Evropského soudu pro lidská práva a kárného senátu Nejvyššího správního soudu), v nichž soudy řešily případy, kdy se soudci provinili svými projevy proti zákonným či etickým normám. V jednom případě soudce svým projevem narušil zdání své nestrannosti, ve druhém se stal terčem oprávněné kritiky ze strany veřejnosti a ve třetím spáchal kárné provinění. Soudy v těchto třech rozhodnutích odůvodnily pochybení soudců různými morálními argumenty (deontologickými a konsekvencialistickými). Odhalením těchto morálních argumentů v jednotlivých rozhodnutích článek poukazuje na to, jak soudy uvažují o požadavcích na výkon soudcovské funkce a podle čeho se tedy mohou soudci samotní orientovat, když přemýšlejí, zda se svým projevem neprovinili proti nějaké normě.

18

P.F. Strawson’s optimism: On responsibility and punishment in "Freedom and Resentment"

45%

Jędrczak S., Jędrczak S.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2019

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issue 4

19

Eutanazie a klasický hedonismus

45%

Černý D.

Časopis zdravotnického práva a bioetiky (Journal of Medical Law and Bioethics)

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2017

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vol. 7

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issue 2

29-43

EN

The overall aim of the article “Hedonism and Euthanasia” is to illustrate the complex interplay between hedonism as a theory of welfare and the problem of the rationality of suicide, assisted suicide and euthanasia. The article is divided into three parts. In the first part, it provides a succinct description of hedonism culminating in the definition of standard hedonism. The second part deals with the problem of whether death can in some (exceptional) circumstances represent a rationally justifiable choice. The third and final part combines consequentialism with standard hedonism, obtaining standard utilitarianism, and sets forth a straightforward argument for the conclusion that assisted death might be an ethically acceptable (even obligatory) choice. However, hedonism is shown to be an inadequate theory of good life and, consequently, the ethical argument for assisted death is rejected.

CS

Hlavním cílem článku Hedonismus a eutanazie je ilustrovat komplexní vztahy mezi hédonismem jako teorií welfare a problémem racionality sebeusmrcení, asistovaného sebeusmrcení a eutanazie. Článek je rozdělený na tři části. První část přináší stručný popis hédonismu a vrcholí definicí standardního hédonismu. Druhá část se věnuje problému, zda smrt může v některých (výjimečných) situacích představovat racionálně ospravedlnitelnou volbu. Třetí a konečná část spojuje konsekvencialismus s tradičním hédonismem do standardního utilitarismu a předkládá přímý argument ve prospěch závěru, že asistovaná smrt může být eticky přijatelnou (dokonce povinnou) volbou. Ukazuje však, že hédonismus není adekvátní teorií dobrého života, a proto nakonec etický argument ve prospěch asistované smrti odmítá.

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The Functional Model of Analysis as Middle Ground Meta-Ethics

Strategie obrony człowieka przed nieograniczonymi żądaniami

The Evil of Refraining to Save: Liu on the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing

J. S. Mill and the Art of Compromise

O znaczeniu fundamentalnych zasad karania w polityce karnej — uwagi na tle przyczyn i skutków „masowego uwięzienia” w Stanach Zjednoczonych

Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Risk of Punishing the Innocent: The Troublesome Case of Proxy Crimes

Never–Ending Story of the Use of Vaccines Derived from Aborted Infants. Part I: Critique of Teleological Proportionalism and Consequentialism from the Perspective of Moral Theology

Proporcjonalizm: pokusa utylitaryzmu z teologii moralnej

What Is Dignity?

Utilitaristická justifikace lidských práv: čtyři argumenty

Problem trafu moralnego i winy według Thomasa Nagela i Norvina Richardsa. Próba uzupełnienia krytyki Richardsa

Buying and selling price for risky lotteries and expected utility theory without consequentialism

Neverending History of the Use of Vaccines Derived from Aborted Infants. Part I: Critique of Teleological Proportionalism and Consequentialism from the Perspective of Moral Theology

Proč nejsem utilitaristou? Vyznání přirozenoprávníka

Morální dilema v profesní etice advokátů: jak řešit rozpor mezi obecnou a profesní morálkou?

Institutional Function Consequentialism

Omezení svobody projevu soudců a jeho morální zdůvodnění v judikatuře ESLP a NSS

P.F. Strawson’s optimism: On responsibility and punishment in "Freedom and Resentment"

Eutanazie a klasický hedonismus