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EN
The present article is the first part of a paper that was delivered, in an abbreviated form, as keynote address, December 16, at the Conference “Ethics of Moral Absolutes Twenty years after 'Veritatis Splendor', Warsaw 16th–17th December 2013. Containing the word truth in its name, the Encyclical insists that human freedom is based on the foundation of truth. Therefore, even though the judgment of conscience represents the highest subjective norm for moral actions, our first obligation is that our conscience itself conform to the truth and base itself on its knowledge. Even in the case in which an erring conscience obliges or frees us to commit what we deem to be good or permitted, this is only true in virtue of the sincerity and authenticity of a person searching the truth as foundation of the voice of conscience. In other words, conscience receives its extraordinary ultimate subjective moral authority only – even if it is based on error – from the truth which it always must intend as ground of its verdict. In the following, I will try to show by purely philosophical reflections that these fundamental tenets of "Veritatis Splendor" are not merely based on the Holy Scripture and Church teaching, but can also be shown to be true by philosophical reason.
EN
The basic message of "Veritatis Splendor" is neither a legalism nor a mere set of ethical absolutes, not even a specifically and exclusively Christian ethic. Rather, the “absoluteness” of the moral calls and the obligatory unconditional rejection of acts that are in themselves evil, lives in the heart of morality as such and especially of Christian morality. How can one understand otherwise the words, where the absolute God reveals himself as the final addressee of any inner-worldly action when he says: “you have done unto me what you have done to the least of my brothers,” and: “what you not have done to the least of my brothers, that you have not done unto me”? What words might reveal more deeply the inner unity between the fundamental option and the specific interpersonal action, as well as the absolute character of the moral Act that is directed to fellow human beings? What words could insist more on the glory of human dignity, but also on the splendour of truth, and the holiness of God that radiate from these words? Perhaps this is the deepest sense of the word of Saint Gregory of Nyssa: "gloria Dei vivens homo est" – "The glory of God is the living human person."
EN
The author of this article discusses the relationship between the subject matter (contents) of an action and the circumstances in which it is performed. The related problems were one of the motives behind John Paul II’s encyclical "Veritatis Splendor". He attempts to show the essence of this problem with reference to Thomas Nagel’s book "The View From Nowhere". Contemporary thinkers, however, those referred to as consequentialists or proportionalists, believe that circumstances are in fact part of the physical act itself and materially affect its understanding. Referring to that principle in "Veritatis Splendor", John Paul II says that he is aware one must often choose between actions that are inherently evil, but he believes that this is permissible only when there are no alternatives to choose instead. One should never choose an evil action to achieve a positive effect, or do that because the proportion of positive effects is greater than that of negative ones. The author shows also a striking similarity between what John Paul II wrote about the absolute character of moral norms and the external nature of circumstances with respect to the essence of the act, its internal purpose, and what we read in "The View from Nowhere", a book by Thomas Nagel, who considers himself an atheist. The search for objectivity in moral judgment is difficult, but not impossible, at least as far as its essence is concerned. Failure to consider the relevance of reasons to persons, and failure to make that reference, but first of all the treatment of circumstances as part of a moral action turns ethics into praxeology, or a theory of efficient action.
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