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EN
The principle of the supremacy of the Constitution is universal adopted by most international constitutions, including the Jordanian constitution. The latter requires a certain legal mechanism to protect it which is conducted by overseeing the constitutionality of laws. Ordinary courts controlled the constitutionality of laws under Jordan’s 1952 Constitution, but they were only a no-action oversight. This was the case until the Constitutional Court was established on 6th October 2012 to oversee the constitutionality of the laws and regulations and to interpret the provisions of the Constitution. The relationship between ordinary courts and the control over the constitutionality of the laws has not been severed, as the Constitution and the Constitutional Court Law have maintained this relationship. The latter begins with the case court referring any plea of unconstitutionality to the Court of Cassation, which in turn refers it to the Constitutional Court if it deems that the plea is serious and fulfills its formal and objective conditions. Consequently, the ordinary judiciary (ordinary courts) remained the necessary link between the person who has an interest in the substantive case and the Constitutional Court, which does not accept any direct appeal except from official bodies exclusively specified by the constitution and the law, namely the Senate, Parliament and Council of Ministers. This calls for the adoption of a new mechanism that allows individuals to have direct access to the Constitutional Court in order to protect their constitutional rights.
EN
The aim of the article is to show that the concentrated system of constitutional protection in the republic of Austria – commonly referred to as the Kelsen sys- tem – was a legacy of the systemic practice and legal thought from the times of the Habsburg monarchy. The model of constitutional protection adopted in 1920 was based principally on the legal structures of old Austria, adapted to the new federal state system. The analysis of legal grounds of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal suggests that there occurred a transfer of legal solutions to the republican constitutional order rather than the emergence of a new type of constitutional judiciary that would protect the objective constitutional order by means of abstract control of the constitutionality of law. The control of the constitutionality of law in Austria at the time was, in principle, concrete. The article also provides justification for the idea that it is Georg Jellinek to whom we owe the idea of abstract control of the constitutionality of law. Even though it was revitalized by H. Kelsen, it did not become part of the constitutional protection model in the First Austrian Republic.
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Śmierć w starych dekoracjach

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EN
The text is a short commentary to Kamil Joński’s article entitled "Court of Peers – Political economy behind the triumph and crisis of Polish Constitutional Court", published in this issue of “The Voice of Law”. The author presents his views on the functioning of the Constitutional Court, referring to his own experiences as a Judge and the President of the Constitutional Court.
EN
This paper aims at clarifying the report between the President and the Constitutional Court. If we take as a starting point the constitutional mandate of these two institutions it follows that their final mission is the same, i.e., the protection and safeguarding of the constitutional system. This paper, thus, will clarify the key points in which this report is expressed. Further, this paper examines the theoretical aspects of the report between the President and the Constitutional Court, starting from the debate over this issue between Karl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen. An important part of the paper will examine the Constitution of Kosovo, i.e., the contents of the constitutional norm and its application. The analysis focuses on the role such report between the two institutions has on the functioning of the constitutional system. In analyzing the case of Kosovo, this paper examines Constitutional Court cases in which the report between the President and the Constitutional Court has been an issue of review. Such cases assist us in clarifying the main theme of this paper. Therefore, the reader will be able to understand the key elements of the report between the President as a representative of the unity of the people on the one hand and the Constitutional Court as a guarantor of constitutionality on the other hand.
EN
The paper aims to introduce the concept of constitutional liability of the President, and the institutions of the President’s constitutional liability. The author presents the liability and its relations with other types of head of state’s liabilities. The presented analysis includes all European countries.
EN
The right to privacy is one of the fundamental rights of the modern constitution. Right to privacy includes the sphere associated with deprivation of liberty. The author says that there is no need to separate personal interest in the form of a right to a dignified imprisonment, because it contains the personal well-being, which is human dignity. The author on the background of the constitutional catalog of personal property shall render the Constitutional Court of 26 May 2008, which recognized the constitutional complaint of Jack G. concerning the lack of time limits placed prisoners in conditions where the cell area per person is less than 3 square meters. The Constitutional Court ruled that in exceptional situations (eg, building disaster in prison) is possible to embed prisoners for less than the standard 3m in short periods. The rules place the offender temporarily in a smaller cell but clearly defined. The author also emphasizes that the result of judgment of the Tribunal in May 2008. was the resolution of seven judges of the Supreme Court of 18 October 2011 at the request of the President of the Supreme Court in the application dated 30 March 2011 (BSA V-4110-2/11), which asked „Does placing a prisoner in a cell with an area for one person less than 3 square meters it is a violation of personal rights, whether the premise of compensation referred to in art. 448 of the Civil Code in this case is only unlawful or the guilt?” Now the Supreme Court arising from the article 77 paragraph 1 of the Constitution and article 417 of the Civil Code found that the make good damage caused by unlawful action of public authority also includes non-pecuniary damage (harm) in terms of article 448 of the Civil Code, and the fault is not a condition of the State Treasury pursuant to article 448 of the Civil Code. In the text we find the comments indicating a need for sanctions and measures of freedom and the idea that any circumstances, even the emergency can’t be an obstacle to respect the human dignity.
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EN
The article presents models of extra-parliamentary constitutional review of law. The starting point is the methodological discussion of various concepts of the division and types of review, i.a. political vs judicial, strong vs weak, centralized vs decentralized. Most often the constitutional review of law is classified into American-type review (judicial review) and European-type review (review performed by constitutional courts). This dichotomous classification is often replaced with the categories of “dispersed review” and “concentrated review”, which is the most often classification, at the same time clearly expressing the features distinguishing the two review mechanisms. While the American model does not raise serious discussions, the European model — also referred to as Kelsenian or Austrian model — is controversial. It can be subclassified into original (pure) model and its various mutations, referred to as the mixed European model of the constitutional review of law, most often applied in practice. Moreover, other types of review are also applied in Europe, hence the French and the Scandinavian models are also sometimes distinguished. Regardless of the classification, all review models are now being homogenized. This means that the review is performed by the courts (concrete review is introduced), the protection of rights and freedoms of an individual is emphasized, and poli­tical consequences of constitutional review are becoming more significant, as a result of which the organ performing the constitutional review becomes a political, active authority within the state.
EN
The ruling relates to the problem of selection judges of the Constitutional Court on the positions vacated between end of the current parliamentary term and start of new tenure. The author criticizes the judgment of the Constitutional Court.
PL
Glosowane orzeczenie dotyczy głośnego problemu wyboru sędziów Trybunału Konstytucyjnego na stanowiska opróżniane w okresie przypadającym na zakończenie dotychczasowej kadencji parlamentu i rozpoczęcia nowej jego kadencji. Autor dokonuje krytycznej oceny wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego.
EN
The article deals with the model of presidency adopted in the basic laws of eight West African francophone states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. In many aspects, those acts were based on the systemic solutions applied in the Constitution (1985) of the Fifth French Republic. According to them, the President is the most important element of the constitutional system of government and the basic holder of the executive power. The following aspects were considered in the analysis of the existing model of presidency: the procedure for election of the head of state, incompatibility of the office of President with other posts, performance of the duties of President in the event of vacancy in the office, the status within the executive power and in relation to Parliament, presidential extraordinary powers, requirements of political and legal accountability. The solutions used in the above-mentioned states provide for establishing a presidency more powerful than that existing not only in the parliamentary cabinet system, but also in the French current legal framework. However, the extent of this enhancement in particular states varies, thereby influencing the nature of the existing system of government. In some states included in the article, the constitutions directly draw on the presidential model in which the executive is not responsible to Parliament politically. Others have implemented the basic principle of the semi-presidential system, namely the responsibility of the government to both the head of state and the representative body (Parliament). Notwithstanding the specific nature of the detailed solutions, the said states have implemented a model of presidency adapted to particular political, social and cultural circumstances.
EN
The primary purpose of the presented paper is to conduct comparative analysis of the institution of constitutional complaint within the legal systems of Poland and Germany. Within such analysis the author aims at establishment of an adequate relationship between two main goals of the constitutional complaint, such as: 1. the elimination of unconstitutional provisions and 2. the ensurance of human rights protection within two aforesaid legal systems. The secondary purpose of the article is to make attempt of the resolution of the issue which of the presented purposes shall gain a primacy while constituting an adequate model of the constitutional complaint. For the genuinity of the conducted analysis, the author will take into consideration such determinants as: the adapted model of the constitutional complaint (narrow limited only to legal provisions or wide), conditions of the admissibility of the constitutional complaint as well as competences of the Constitutional Court while hearing a certain constitutional complaint case. Such factors will subsequently be juxtaposed with the objective dataset, such as: yearly number of complaints submitted, yearly number of complaints accepted to the meritorical recognition, percentage of the complaints among all cases heard by the Constitutional Court and the average period of recognition of such complaint. The author will also refer to the level of satisfaction with the constitutional complaints efficiency in particular societies. Moreover the paper will rely upon the dogmatic analysis of the appropriate regulations regarding constitutional complaints in two abovementioned legal systems. The justification of the choice of presented subject comes down to necessity of the revision of the current Polish solutions regarding the constitutional complaint in order to ensure the icreasement of the efficiency of the human rights protection. Subsidiarily, the paper will also refer to the judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights.
EN
The article is in response to polemic comments from Piotr Radziewicz on the author’s article about the review of constitutionality of the entire statute (published in "Przegląd Sejmowy” 2012, No. 2). Replying to the objections of Radziewicz, the author clarifies that her original article was based on the assumption of an active role of the constitutional court in the process of hierarchical review of conformity of the normative acts of lower rank to the normative acts of higher rank. The aim of the cited article was not to examine the limits of judicial activism, but, under a tacit assumption of its admissibility (or, sometimes, even necessity), to show real issues facing constitutional court judges when considering applications to review the constitutionality of the statute as a whole. In the author’s view, the Constitutional Tribunal – carrying out the review of the entire statute – may make a decision which is fully affirmative or declaring inconsistency with the constitution of only several elements of the statute, or give a fully negative (denying) judgment. The latter will be admissible only in the event that the Tribunal declares unconstitutionality of all the provisions of fundamental nature and indicates the resultant unconstitutionality of all other provisions of the statute. Judgments declaring unconstitutionality of the entire statute will be made very occasionally. The author claims that carrying out of the review of constitutionality of the statute as a whole is based on Article 122 (3) for an a priori review and Article 188 (1) for an a posteriori review. In her view, even if a given statute has been challenged by the President of the Republic under the a priori review procedure and (consequently) unconstitutionality of the provisions integrally associated to the entire statute has been declared, the Constitutional Tribunal will be allowed to make use of its competence provided for in Article 122 (4), the second sentence. This, however, cannot be confused with a review of the entire statute per se.
RU
Достижение концептуальной определенности в отношении понимания представительной демократии приобретает особую значимость в условиях формирования на постсоветском пространстве реального конституционализма. В статье на основе анализа обширной практики российского конституционного правосудия раскрываются важнейшие содержательные характеристики представительной демократии. Представительная демократия рассматривается как конституционная ценность, цель, принцип, организационная форма народовластия, характеристика конституционного режима, а также сфера реализации правового статуса личности.
EN
The conceptual certainty regarding the meaning of representative democracy has special importance in conditions of formation on the post-Soviet space of a real constitutionalism. The most important substantive aspects of the representative democracy are analyzed in the article on the basis of the extensive practice of the Russian constitutional justice review. The representative democracy is considered as the constitutional value, goal, principle, organized form of the grass-roots democracy, characteristic of the constitutional regime, as well as sphere of the individual’s constitutional status realization.
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Výběr soudců Ústavního soudu ČR

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EN
The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic has been in existence for 22 years. During that time, the three Presidents of the Czech Republic have nominated 61 candidates for the position of Judge of the Constitutional Court. However, ensuing debates and arguments held during different terms of the Senate (during 1993 and 1994 of the Chamber of Deputies), only 41 of those 61 went on to be appointed to the post of Judge of the Constitutional Court. The aim of this article is to summarise the reasons that turned out to be decisive for the approval of the individual candidates. This enables us to test the extent to which the result of the appointment process of the constitutional judges reflects the vector sum of the political forces influencing the approval of candidates, as well as the emphasis put on the expertise and professional demeanour of the prospective constitutional judge.
CS
Za dvacet dva let existence Ústavního soudu ČR zastávalo funkci ústavního soudce 41 osob, které uspěly z celkem 61 nominací pocházejících od tří prezidentů a projednávaných v různých funkčních obdobích Senátu (v letech 1993 a 1994 Poslanecké sněmovny). Cílem tohoto článku je shrnout důvody, které se ukázaly být rozhodujícími při udělování souhlasu s jednotlivými kandidáty, a ověřit, nakolik výsledek nominačního procesu soudců Ústavního soudu ČR odráží jak vektorový součet politických sil působících při schvalování kandidátů, tak důraz, který v něm byl kladen na odbornost a profesionalitu budoucího ústavního soudce.
EN
Court packing greatly threatens democracy. This paper examines, compares and draws conclusions from two attempts: The PiS government is near to packing Polish courts; President Roosevelt tried but failed to pack the U.S. Supreme Court in 1937. In most democracies a head of government with a legislative majority and strong party control can pack courts, giving complete control. The United States escaped; Roosevelt lacked complete party control. Poland is unlucky; PiS is strongly controlled. Peaceful domestic protest is necessary, but Poland’s hope is from EU-level institutional pressure, supported by major democracies, to reverse packing and prevent further seizure of power.
PL
Artykuł krytycznie analizuje modele kontroli konstytucyjności przyjęte w Portugalii i w Polsce. W tym celu zastosowano metodę komparatystyczną, porównującą rozwiązania portugalskie z polskimi. Przedstawiono kwestie teoretyczne związane z pojęciem kontroli konstytucyjności oraz przedstawiono pojęcia kontroli skoncentrowanej i rozproszonej. Następnie w publikacji przeanalizowano faktyczne modele kontroli w obu państwach z osobnym rozważeniem kontroli rozproszonej i skoncentrowanej. Rozważono przy tym zasady konstytucyjne dotyczące bezpośredniego stosowania konstytucji, konstytucyjnej jurysdykcji sędziów i działania sądów konstytucyjnych. Artykuł kończy się konkluzją, że w obu krajach funkcjonują odrębne modele kontroli konstytucyjności. W Portugalii funkcjonuje model mieszany, podczas gdy w Polsce, pomimo poglądów o dopuszczalności kontroli rozproszonej, funkcjonuje model scentralizowany.
EN
The article critically analyses the models of the constitutionality inspection adopted in Portugal and in Poland. For this purpose the comparative method has been applied, comparing Portuguese and Polish approaches. Theoretical aspects of the constitutionality inspection are discussed and the notions of the centralised and the diffuse inspection model are introduced. Then the paper analysis the actual inspection practices in both countries discussing the diffuse and concentrated inspection separately. Constitutional rules pertaining to the direct effect of the constitutions, constitutional jurisdiction of judges and operation of the constitutional courts are considered. The article concludes that in both countries different models of constitutionality inspection operate. In Portugal operates the mixed constitutionality inspection model while in Poland, despite views advocating for permissibility of the diffuse control, the centralised model functions.
PL
Pozycja ustrojowa TK była najwyższa (w kategoriach aktywizmu i legitymizacji) w pierwszych latach transformacji, kiedy wydawał się najbardziej zagrożony. Z kolei istotny kryzys sądownictwa konstytucyjnego nastąpił ćwierć wieku od przemian ustrojowych, gdy demokracja konstytucyjna wydawała się silna i dobrze zakorzeniona. Aby wyjaśnić tę sprzeczność, w tekście zaproponowano trzy modele pozycji ustrojowej sądu konstytucyjnego, uwzględniające perspektywę ekonomii politycznej. Pierwszy, „sądu rozjemczego”, zakłada polityczną selekcję sędziów w celu zapewnienia reprezentacji różnych wrażliwości ideologicznych oraz konsensualny styl orzekania. Drugi, „Izby Konstytucyjnej SN”, zakłada odpolityczniony system nominacji, neguje znaczenie wrażliwości ideologicznych i zachęca do zgłaszania zdań odrębnych. Trzeci, „Trzeciej Izby Parlamentu”, oznacza rozmontowanie sądownictwa konstytucyjnego, gdyż polityczna selekcja sędziów przekształca sąd w kolejną instytucję większościową realizującą cele partyjne. Negocjowana natura polskiej transformacji ustrojowej stworzyła zapotrzebowanie na instytucje pełniącą funkcje „sądu rozjemczego”, tym samym wzmacniając legitymizację TK wśród polityków i zniechęcając ich od ataków na jego niezależność. Fundamentalne zmiany na scenie politycznej obserwowane po 2005 r. – osłabienie formacji postkomunistycznej i podział sceny między dwa ugrupowania postsolidarnościowe, kierowane przez nową generację liderów – zburzyły ten konsensus i zaowocowały erozją pozycji ustrojowej do „Trzeciej Izby Parlamentu”.
EN
The Constitutional Court was at its strongest (in terms of activism and legitimacy) at the early stages of democratic transition, at the very moment when it was expected to be the most vulnerable. An effective end of the constitutional adjudication came quarter a century after the regime change, when constitutional democracy appeared strong and well-entrenched. To explain this puzzle, this paper proposes three political-economy models of the Constitutional Court’s position. First – ‘the court of peers’ – assumes political selection of constitutional judges to provide representation of ideological sensitivities, and largely consensual decision-making inside the Court. Second – ‘the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court’ – assumes de-politicized selection procedures, downplays ideological sensitivities and encourages dissent. Third – called the ‘Third Chamber of the Parliament’ – amounts to the dismantling of the constitutional adjudication, as political selection of constitutional judges transforms the Court in yet another majoritarian institution pursuing party goals. It is argued, that the negotiated nature of the Polish transition created demand for ‘the court of peers’ type of an institution, thereby fostering Constitutional Court legitimacy among politicians and restraining them from assaults on its independence. However, a fundamental shift in the political landscape observed in 2005 – diminishing of the post-communist formation and the ascent of two post-Solidarity parties led by the new generation of leaders – shattered this consensus and resulted in the Constitutional Court’s erosion towards the ‘Third Chamber of the Parliament’.
EN
The Italian Constitutional Court spoke on numerous occasions about the provisions of the Concordat concluded between the Italian Republic and the Roman Catholic Church. Up to the 1970s, the Constitutional Court had ruled for the most part on constitutionality of solutions regarding the Catholic religion. In this period of time the Constitutional Court issued rulings that were very important for the relation between the state and the Church. The article analyzes three significant sentences issued on March 1, 1971 regarding the institution of matrimony, as well as the sentence of July 8, 1971 in which the Constitutional Court resolved the constitutionality of the law allowing church marriages to be dissolved by the Italian civil courts. These rulings are very important due to the fact that the Italian Constitutional Court has referred to them on numerous occasions in the subsequent sentences, in which it considered the issue of the contradiction between the Concordat norms and the Constitution.
PL
Włoski Sąd konstytucyjny wypowiadał się wielokrotnie w sprawie przepisów konkordatu, zawartego między Republiką Włoską a Kościołem Rzymskokatolickim. Do lat 70. XX w. sąd konstytucyjny w przeważającej części orzekał o zgodności z konstytucją rozwiązań dotyczących w przeważające większości religii katolickiej. W tym okresie sąd konstytucyjny wydał orzeczenia, które były bardzo istotne dla relacji państwo kościół. Artykuł analizuje trzy istotne wyroki wydane w dniu 1 marca 1971 roku, dotyczące instytucji małżeństwa, a także wyrok z 8 lipca tego samego roku, w którym sąd konstytucyjny rozstrzygał konstytucyjność ustawy pozwalającej na rozwiązanie małżeństwa kościelnego przez włoski sąd cywilny. Orzeczenia te są bardzo istotne z uwagi na fakt, że włoski sąd konstytucyjny wielokrotnie się do nich odwoływał, w późniejszych orzeczeniach, w których rozważał problematykę sprzeczności norm konkordatowych z konstytucją.
PL
W artykule zaprezentowano rezultaty komparatystycznego studium konstytucji współczesnych państw pod kątem gwarantowanego w nich prawa do sprzeciwu sumienia. Prawo to najczęściej dotyczy służby wojskowej. W pojedynczych przypadkach sprowadza się do innej partykularnej klauzuli sumienia. W kilkunastu konstytucjach przyjmuje postać generalnego prawa do sprzeciwu sumienia. Unormowania konstytucyjne tytułowego prawa są zwykle ogólne. Z rzadka ustrojodawcy określają źródła sprzeciwu sumienia czy warunki skorzystania z prawa do sprzeciwu sumienia, w szczegółach odsyłając do ustaw. Kontrowersyjność tytułowej kategorii prawa tłumaczy jego eksplikatywne zakwestionowanie w kilkunastu ustawach zasadniczych. Praktyka orzecznicza, zwłaszcza sądów konstytucyjnych, pokazuje że normatywny byt i zakres treściowy prawa do sprzeciwu sumienia w danym porządku prawnym niekoniecznie jest prostą konsekwencją postanowień konstytucji. W judykaturze poszczególnych państw zdarza się uznawać konstytucyjny charakter prawa do sprzeciwu sumienia pomimo braku jego wyraźnego wyartykułowania w tekście ustawy zasadniczej, jak i czynić wykładnię zawężającą językowo jednoznacznych przepisów konstytucyjnych w tym względzie.
EN
The article presents the results of a comparative study focusing on the right to conscientious objection in constitutions of modern states. This right is primarily associated with military service. In approximately a dozen constitutions, it stands as an independent, general right to conscientious objection. The constitutional scope of the given right is typically broad, with lawmakers seldom specifying the sources or conditions for its exercise. The contentious nature of the analysed right causes its explicit challenge in several constitutions. Case law, especially that of constitutional courts, reveals that the normative presence and the specifics of the right to conscientious objection within a particular legal system may not necessarily originate directly from constitutional provisions. Court decisions rendered in various countries sometimes attribute a constitutional character to this right, even when the fundamental law does not explicitly articulate it. Conversely, there are occasional restrictive interpretations of unequivocal constitutional provisions regarding conscientious objection.
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O aktywizmie sędziowskim

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PL
W pierwszej części artykułu zaprezentowane zostały różne ujęcia pojęcia „aktywizm sędziowski” sformułowane w doktrynie, jak i jego rodzaje. Następnie ukazano tło sporu pomiędzy zwolennikami aktywizmu sędziowskiego a jego przeciwnikami. W zakończeniu natomiast przedstawione zostały argumenty uzasadniające zajmowanie postawy aktywistycznej przez sędziów.
EN
The first part of the article presents different approaches to judge activism formed in doctrine as well as its different forms. Then follows the presentation of the background for the conflict between the supporters of judge activism and its opponents. The article concludes with the presentation of arguments justifying taking the active attitude by the judges.
EN
The article describes accumulation of the conflict between the Russian Federation and the European Court of Human Rights. This process resulted in final implementation by the Russian Federation legal institutions, which legally allow not to implement ECHR’s judgements, alleging them in contradiction of the Russian Constitution. The main role in this process started to perform Russian Constitutional Court (CC). CC, requested by the executive body, may decide that ECHR’s judgment contradicts the Russian Constitution, which would result in lack of possibilities to execute such judgment. This kind of legal regulation is unprecedented among the legal systems of the Council of Europe member states, and poses a serious violation of international treaties, signed by the Russian Federation.
PL
W artykule zostało opisane narastanie konfliktów między Federacją Rosyjską a Europejskim Trybunałem Praw Człowieka. Proces ten skutkował ostatecznie wdrożeniem przez Rosję instrumentów prawnych, pozwalających na niewykonywanie wybranych orzeczeń ETPC pod zarzutem ich niezgodności z rosyjską konstytucją. Główna rola w tym względzie przypadła rosyjskiemu Sądowi Konstytucyjnemu (SK). SK, na wniosek organu władzy wykonawczej, na gruncie obowiązujących przepisów może orzec o niezgodności orzeczenia ETPC z konstytucją FR, co w praktyce uniemożliwia skuteczną egzekucję takiego orzeczenia. Przyjęcie takiego rozwiązania jest niespotykane na gruncie prawodawstwa innych państw członkowskich Rady Europy oraz stanowi istotne pogwałcenie umów międzynarodowych, których Rosja jest stroną.
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