In her paper “Argumentation theory and the conception of epistemic justification”, Lilian Bermejo-Luque presents a critique of deductivism in argumentation theory, as well as her own concept of epistemic justification inspired by the views of Stephen Toulmin. Reading this paper induced me to reflect on the mutual relation between the notions of justification and argumentation. In this work I would like to first draw the reader’s attention to a few issues which seem debatable to me, or which I find worth presenting from a slightly different point of view than that of Lilian Bermejo-Luque. I agree that deductivism is not suitable for a general theory of evaluation of arguments although the critique of deductivism presented by the Author appears as not fully adequate to me. Then I proceed to presenting my doubts about the “conception of justification as a proper outcome of good argumentation” presented in the work. I need to emphasise that due to a broad range of topics addressed by me in this short paper, the description of some of them will be neither fully precise nor exhaustive.
In this paper I will argue that most objections to deductive analyses of a priori analogies are incorrect, often involve basic misinterpretations of what the deductive reconstruction of those arguments are saying, and sometimes also betray a confusion about what part of the reasoning corresponds to the analogical inference. In particular, I will be focusing on a raft of objections made by Juthe in [2015] and subject his alternative views to criticism. I will then argue that Juthe does implicitly have a good argument against deductivism: adding further analogues seems to have a cumulative force that they would not have on a deductivist analysis. This is so not only in ordinary analogical arguments but, perhaps surprisingly, with a priori analogical arguments. I will then argue that this does not favor a sui generis view of the analogical argument over inductivist views, and attempt to show that a confirmation-theoretic approach to analogical inference makes the best sense of our intuitions about the strength of analogical arguments.
Osoba dokonująca tzw. standaryzacji argumentu musi często zdecydować, czy argument ten należy uzupełnić o brakujące elementy – z jakichś względów pominięte przez jego nadawcę przesłanki lub konkluzję. Zgodnie z często spotykanym stanowiskiem – deduktywizmem, argumenty należy uzupełniać w taki sposób, aby ich konkluzja wynikała logicznie z przesłanek. Rozwiązanie takie, choć proste i eleganckie, rodzi jednak inne poważne problemy. Pewną pomoc w rekonstrukcji argumentu stanowić może tzw. „zasada życzliwości”. Najbardziej pomocna w uzupełnianiu argumentu o brakujące elementy wydaje się jednak teoria schematów argumentacyjnych rozwijana przez D.N. Waltona. Rekonstruowanie argumentu w taki sposób, aby odpowiadał on określonemu schematowi, pozwala w wielu przypadkach adekwatnie oddać sens argumentu, ułatwia jego zrozumienie, a następnie ocenę i ewentualną krytykę podczas dyskusji.
EN
While performing so-called standardization of the argument, we often need to decide whether the argument should be supplemented with its missing parts – “hidden” premises or an omitted conclusion. According to deductivism, the very popular view, we should supplement the argument in such a way that its premises entail the conclusion. Such a solution of the problem of missing parts of the argument, though simple and elegant, is a source of other serious diffi culties. The principle of charity could help in the reconstruction of arguments. However, the Walton’s argumentation schemes theory appears to be the most helpful device one can use during the process of standardization of the argument. Reconstructing the argument in such a way that it corresponds to the particular scheme, allows to understand what has really been said in the argument, and also helps to evaluate the argument and refute it during the discussion.
The paper puts forth an interpretation of Popper’s early theory of knowledge that is found in the work Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. It mainly, however, focuses on his original and surprisingly detailed interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Popper is inspired by Kant in many things: he, for example, makes use of Kant’s transcendental method of inquiry and also the discovery that all knowledge of reality lies in the existence of laws. At the same time, however, he criticizes Kant because of the circular reasoning of transcendental idealism by means of transcendental deduction, which additionally leads Popper to exchange the epistemological and psychological aspects of knowledge. Although Popper distinguishes between the theory of knowledge and the psychology of knowledge, he does not recognize formal apriorism in the epistemological sense but only genetic apriorism in the cognitive psychological sense. Popper’s interpretation of Kant is not however free from certain misunderstandings as it ignores the difference between “pure natural science” and “empirical physics.”.
CS
Stať se zaměřuje na výklad Popperovy rané teorie poznání v díle Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie. Soustředí se přitom především na jeho originální a překvapivě podrobné interpretace Kantova transcendentálního idealismu. Popper se nechává Kantem v mnohém inspirovat: využívá například jeho transcendentální způsob tázání a také myšlenku, že každé poznání skutečnosti spočívá v existenci zákonitostí. Zároveň Kanta na druhé straně kritizuje kvůli kruhovému zdůvodnění transcendentálního idealismu prostřednictvím transcendentální dedukce, jež navíc Poppera dovádí až ke kritice zaměňování epistemologických a psychologických aspektů poznání u Kanta. Popper totiž rozlišuje teorii poznání a psychologii poznání, přičemž neuznává formální apriorismus v epistemologickém smyslu, nýbrž pouze genetický apriorismus ve smyslu kognitivně psychologickém. Popperova interpretace Kanta nicméně není prosta určitých nedorozumění, především opomíjí rozdíl mezi „čistou přírodní vědou“ a „empirickou fyzikou“.
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