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EN
In the process of democratic transformation, the creation of political parties and development of a party system are essential aspects of building a new political order. Therefore, the shaping of a party system which enables free competition between political parties affects the functioning of the political system as a whole. In the case of post-soviet Ukraine, stabilization of democratic rivalry, which is the core of an institutionalized party system, is hampered by permanent changes in the constitution and electoral system. The progress of Ukraine’s democratization from 2004 to 2013 is very often referred to as both revolutionary and evolutionary. And violent political changes exert an impact on the triad: transformation of political regime, electoral systems and institutionalization of political parties. All three ultimately determine the institutionalization of the entire party system on the path to democratic consolidation. It can be observed that the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has impeded this process. Despite a dynamic development of the present political situation, previous experience helps us to predict the implications of the currently implemented systemic solutions
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Śmierć w starych dekoracjach

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EN
The text is a short commentary to Kamil Joński’s article entitled "Court of Peers – Political economy behind the triumph and crisis of Polish Constitutional Court", published in this issue of “The Voice of Law”. The author presents his views on the functioning of the Constitutional Court, referring to his own experiences as a Judge and the President of the Constitutional Court.
EN
For most of the former European colonies of South and Southeast Asia, the end of the Second World War was also the beginning of the end of colonial rule. With independence came the challenge of unifying disparate ethnic, religious and linguistic communities into cohesive nations– a challenge that some countries met more successfully than others. The price of failure could be high – hundreds of thousands were killed, and many millions displaced in 1947, as inter-communal conflicts tore British India apart. Indonesia declared independence in 1945 (a declaration not recognised by the country’s Dutch colonial rulers until 1949), while Burma (as Myanmar was then known) was granted independence by Britain in 1948. Both countries were able to avoid tragedies on the scale of the Indian Partition. Nevertheless, nation-building has been a difficult and as yet uncompleted process, the source of continuing challenges tonational security. This article looks at the situation in the two countries, traces the origins of some of the current problems, and attempts to explain why Indonesia has generally been more successful in this respect than Myanmar, despite the similarities in the initial situations of the two countries.
EN
In the recent 40 years, around 90 countries have tried – with more or less success – to move away from their autocratic past and to follow the path to democracy. In 201, quite unexpectedly, such a chance arose for West African countries, including Egypt and Tunisia. The author presents the democratic constitutional drafting which is most desirable for those countries, Muslim and Arabic at the same time. For this purpose he also examines the structural factors, including the Sunni Islam, the level of respect for the rule of law, economic situation and the state of political elites. Nevertheless, the author focuses his attention on the model of democratic transition in both countries, including the starting point and the course of transition.
EN
The article discusses the current position of Hungarian historiography towards the role of recent history in the Hungarian identity and its relationship to domestic policy. The democratic transition after 1989 contributed to a substantial change in historical scholarship through the dismissal of censorship, the opening of archives and the lifting of the ideological pressure on research. However, the change of the historical self-portrayal of Hungary after the fall of the communist regime was an element of the democratic transition. The author describes the process of the use of historical arguments in forming national attitudes and self-identity by several political circles in Hungary over the last three decades, with special attention paid to the activities and ideas of József Antall and Victor Orbán. The experiences of the 1956 revolution were initially focused on as an anchoring point for national identity after the fall of communism. In the course of these years, the centre of political attention shifted to the proposed anti-communist and anti-left wing interpretation of Hungarian history from March 1944 to May 1990, and, as author points out, it is aligned with the attitude of the ruling circles. The author notes the substantial state’s initiatives in the field of the politics of memory in recent years, especially in the early formation of the 1956 Institute (est. 1991), then the Institute of the 20th Century (XX. Század Intézet, est. 1999), the House of Terror Museum (Terror Háza Múzeum, est. 2002), the Institute for the Research on Communism (Kommunizmuskutató Intézet, est. 2011), the Research Institute and Archives for the History of Regime Change (Rendszerváltás Történetét Kutató Intézet és Archívum, RETÖRKI, est. 2013), the VERITAS Research Institute for History (VERITAS Történetkutató Intézet, est. 2013), the Committee of National Remembrance (Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága, NEB, est. 2013), and the Institute of National Heritage (Nemzeti Örökség Intézete, NÖRI, est. 2013).
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Transition toward democracy – Georgian problems

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PL
Proces demokratyzacji w Gruzji ma swoje trudności, głównie związane z aspektem kulturowym i społeczno-ekonomicznym. Wyzwania polityczne są powiązane z postawą społeczną i odwrotnie. Historyczna rola kościoła prawosławnego w zachowaniu gruzińskiej tożsamości narodowej przez wieki jest nadmiernie kompensowana z częstymi pisarskimi uwikłaniami w życiu publicznym. Niedemokratyczne rządy dokonały wszelkich starań, aby sfinalizować proces transformacji i przez dwie dekady stan pozostawał w szarej strefie między konsolidacją i autokracją. Rok 2012 został oznaczony rokiem dla nowych nadziei demokracji Gruzji. Nowy rząd został wybrany przez wolnych i uczciwych wyborców, ale demokracja wymaga warunków aby przetrwać i ten artykuł je bada.
EN
Abstract: The process of democratisation in Georgia has its obstacles, mostly connected with cultural and socio-economic aspects. Political challenges are interlinked with societal attitudes and vice versa. The historical role of the Orthodox Church in preserving Georgian national identity throughout the centuries is over-compensated for, with frequent clerical involvements in public life. Non-democratic governments have made no effort to finalise the process of transition and for two decades the state has remained in the grey zone between consolidation and autocracy. 2012 was marked as a year for the new hopes of Georgian democracy, a new government was elected via free and fair elections, but democracy needs conditions to endure and this paper examines those conditions.
EN
The discussion of the role of self-government in Poland’s political structure has been closely linked to the Polish people’s aspirations and desire for freedom, democracy and a state in which sovereignty is indeed in the hands of its people. These aspirations, so strongly expressed during the general election of June 1989, have since the very beginning included demands for self-government. What it meant for the state and its political system, was the implementation of the idea embodied in the name Solidarity which, as a trade union, was also to be independent and self-governing. It was also the realisation of the demand for a ‘Samorządna Rzeczpospolita’ (a Self-governing Republic), one of the fundamental principles of the Solidarity movement put forward at its First National Congress, which I had the honour of chairing in 1981. In March 1990, only a few months after its election on 4 June 1989, the Polish parliament adopted a law that restored the institution of local self-government at the level of communes and municipalities (gmina). Thus, 25 years ago, the road to political transformation in Poland was opened, allowing the building of a Polish state understood as the political community of all its citizens – a real Res Publica. The predominating belief which accompanied us in this process was that the indispensable prerequisite to shaping democracy was to give back the state to its citizens, thus releasing dormant social energy and the entrepreneurial spirit of the people. After all democracy means not only the possibility of the democratically electing the political representatives (the authorities) but equally the chance for citizens to feel involved and take the responsibility for public affairs. Therefore the first democratic government, headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, began the process of restoring the state to its citizens from the most important starting point. It started with the rebuilding of communal and municipal self-governing structures and the recreating of the intellectual foundations for the formation of the new constitution of a citizens-centred state. This was possible mainly because a vision of reform had already been conceived and had been long developing in the minds of a number of distinguished persons. This project of self-government reform constituted an original example of engagement of Polish intellectuals in state affairs and their taking responsibility for the common good. The reform also turned out to be one of the most effective methods of de-communisation of Polish public life. This could be best seen in the results of the first election to self-governing structures in 1990, and the role which the Solidarity citizens’ committees played in it. It was indeed the same people, the co-founders and members of the Solidarity movement, who have successfully carried out the restoration of self-government in Poland. ‘We marched for power to return it to the people’ was the motto of the Polish government in 1997, a government which I had the honour of heading for the subsequent four years, and which articulated the goals and the sense of political and social transformation of those times. We called it a Four Reform Programme, and its objective was a fundamental transformation of public life in Poland. On the one hand we intended to create favourable conditions for the development of the public civic space, while on the other we strove to activate and make more dynamic the processes of economic, political and cultural development in the country. We believed that acceleration of this development and modernisation was contingent upon active participation of self-government structures. Hence the creation of strong self-government had gradually become our conscious choice and an urgent ‘civilising task.’ This task was grounded equally in the need to manage properly our recently regained independence, and in the need to make efficient use of the pre-accession period preceding Poland’s membership of the European Union, which was then imminent. Thus the administrative reform undertaken by my government in 1999 introduced districts (powiat) as self-governing level of administration, allowing it, in conjunction with communes and municipalities (gmina), to take effective control of matters directly affecting local communities and their citizens. The self-governing structures formed at the level of strong voivodships, or regions, allowed at the same time to decentralise responsibility for regional economic development, competitiveness and modernisation strategies. Today, after over 10 years of EU membership, it is worth reflecting on the impact the political reforms which we carried through then have had on Poland’s functioning in the system of European integration. We were proven right in our conviction that decentralisation and differentiation of various state functions would allow for a better and more effective use and management of EU funds. The three-tier self-government structure created solid foundations helping to satisfy better the aspirations of citizens, local communities and regions with regard to their modernisation and development. Today it is those local self-governing units, those closest to citizens, those most familiar with and with the best understanding of their needs, which are responsible for the drafting of regional development projects and the management of funds available for those projects. Self-government structures have become the real centres for formulating and implementing development strategies. This is the context in which the key challenge facing self-government is set, namely the fostering of entrepreneurship, ensuring proper conditions for innovation and mobilising citizens to engage in economic and social initiatives. The role of self-government in shaping of the state’s development policy is not limited to dividing available means and resources. Much more important is its ability to effectively multiply the available means, to support partnership ventures, including public-private projects, to form strong business to business relationships as well as partner relations between research centres and local administrative bodies, or promote and support innovations and civic initiatives serving the common good. After all, all these are key factors for the long-term stability and development of our communities and our country, which is today the key measure of the responsibility for public matters, so deeply rooted in the idea of self-government. The self-government reform originated from the ideas developed in the 1980s of the twentieth century as part of the Solidarity movement, but was implemented in an already independent Poland, when laying the foundations for a transformation of the state and the democratisation of the citizen-state relationship. It also had, however, and maybe predominantly, a deep idealistic dimension, so easy to forget when we focus on the current and most urgent challenges of the present. In my opinion, it is in self-governance, as well as in the political and administrative culture, that opportunities for building our freedom lie: freedom, the sense of which we feel best if given a chance to share in the responsibility for it. In times of independence this means the possibility of personal engagement public issues based on the pro publico bono principle: issues pertaining to our family life, our local community, or the whole country. Today, in the context of our shared responsibility for the European Union, such an understanding of self-governance should also inspire us to seek new directions of development, and to participate in the shaping of Europe-wide standards of public life. In the same way as 25 years ago in Poland we founded a political community on the basis of self-governance, we should today look at self-governance as a chance to create a true political community of all European citizens.
PL
Od początku istnienia republiki, armia odgrywała kluczową rolę w kształtowaniu państwa tureckiego. Z punktu widzenia relacji pomiędzy rządzącą Partią Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju (AKP) i Tureckimi Siłami Zbrojnymi (TSK), proces europeizacji i reform konstytucyjnych, będących rezultatem starania się Turcji o członkostwo w UE, okazał się kluczowym w demokratyzacji państwa, bowiem obie strony, ze względu na przyspieszenie procesów integracyjnych, były zmuszone do nawiązania dialogu. Niestety, po roku 2006, kiedy doszło do pogorszenia relacji pomiędzy UE a Turcją, widoczna stała się radykalizacja poglądów po obu stronach. Głównym celem niniejszej pracy jest ukazanie dynamiki procesów zachodzących w Turcji w ciągu ostatnich lat, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem relacji cywilno-wojskowych oraz reform konstytucyjnych będących rezultatem harmonizacji prawa tureckiego z prawem UE.
EN
The Turkish Armed Forces played a key role in politics since the establishment of the republic in 1923. Despite the thorny relations between the civilian and military elites, the process of European integration played an extremely important role in bringing the country on a path of democratic reforms. Both opposing sides, namely the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Turkish Military (TSK), in the context of the ongoing process of European integration and a relatively high societal support for Turkey’s EU accession, seemed to accept more conciliatory approaches to each other (2001–2006). Unfortunately, starting from 2006, along with the rise of euro-scepticism among Turks and the loosening of ties with the EU, the AKP and TSK adopted more antagonistic stances towards each other. The European Union and its institutions, which also influence constitutional changes in Turkey, therefore create an extremely important international context for democratisation.
PL
Pozycja ustrojowa TK była najwyższa (w kategoriach aktywizmu i legitymizacji) w pierwszych latach transformacji, kiedy wydawał się najbardziej zagrożony. Z kolei istotny kryzys sądownictwa konstytucyjnego nastąpił ćwierć wieku od przemian ustrojowych, gdy demokracja konstytucyjna wydawała się silna i dobrze zakorzeniona. Aby wyjaśnić tę sprzeczność, w tekście zaproponowano trzy modele pozycji ustrojowej sądu konstytucyjnego, uwzględniające perspektywę ekonomii politycznej. Pierwszy, „sądu rozjemczego”, zakłada polityczną selekcję sędziów w celu zapewnienia reprezentacji różnych wrażliwości ideologicznych oraz konsensualny styl orzekania. Drugi, „Izby Konstytucyjnej SN”, zakłada odpolityczniony system nominacji, neguje znaczenie wrażliwości ideologicznych i zachęca do zgłaszania zdań odrębnych. Trzeci, „Trzeciej Izby Parlamentu”, oznacza rozmontowanie sądownictwa konstytucyjnego, gdyż polityczna selekcja sędziów przekształca sąd w kolejną instytucję większościową realizującą cele partyjne. Negocjowana natura polskiej transformacji ustrojowej stworzyła zapotrzebowanie na instytucje pełniącą funkcje „sądu rozjemczego”, tym samym wzmacniając legitymizację TK wśród polityków i zniechęcając ich od ataków na jego niezależność. Fundamentalne zmiany na scenie politycznej obserwowane po 2005 r. – osłabienie formacji postkomunistycznej i podział sceny między dwa ugrupowania postsolidarnościowe, kierowane przez nową generację liderów – zburzyły ten konsensus i zaowocowały erozją pozycji ustrojowej do „Trzeciej Izby Parlamentu”.
EN
The Constitutional Court was at its strongest (in terms of activism and legitimacy) at the early stages of democratic transition, at the very moment when it was expected to be the most vulnerable. An effective end of the constitutional adjudication came quarter a century after the regime change, when constitutional democracy appeared strong and well-entrenched. To explain this puzzle, this paper proposes three political-economy models of the Constitutional Court’s position. First – ‘the court of peers’ – assumes political selection of constitutional judges to provide representation of ideological sensitivities, and largely consensual decision-making inside the Court. Second – ‘the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court’ – assumes de-politicized selection procedures, downplays ideological sensitivities and encourages dissent. Third – called the ‘Third Chamber of the Parliament’ – amounts to the dismantling of the constitutional adjudication, as political selection of constitutional judges transforms the Court in yet another majoritarian institution pursuing party goals. It is argued, that the negotiated nature of the Polish transition created demand for ‘the court of peers’ type of an institution, thereby fostering Constitutional Court legitimacy among politicians and restraining them from assaults on its independence. However, a fundamental shift in the political landscape observed in 2005 – diminishing of the post-communist formation and the ascent of two post-Solidarity parties led by the new generation of leaders – shattered this consensus and resulted in the Constitutional Court’s erosion towards the ‘Third Chamber of the Parliament’.
EN
This article discusses the institutional attempts to deal with the archival legacy of the Romanian communist security police, Securitate (1945–1989), during the democratic transition in post-communist Romania. The first part draws a short outline of Securitate’s history and activities as one of the main power instruments of the communist dictatorship. The second part of the article shows the development of political attitudes towards institutional attempts to deal with the communist past in the post-communist Romania. This paper describes the reluctant attitude of the ruling circles in the 1990s towards the opening of the Securitate archives and the lustration attempts. The formation of the National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives (Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității, CNSAS, legally established 1999) hardly changed the general situation: the archives of the Securitate were transferred to CNSAS with significant delays, and the 2008 ruling of the constitutional court limited its lustration competences. The establishment of the Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes and the Memory of the Romanian Exile (Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului şi Memoria Exilului Românesc, IICCMER, established 2005) and formation in 2006 of the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania led by renowned political scientist Vladimir Tismăneanu together with the research and legal activities of CNSAS contributed to a broader evaluation of the communist regime (although its impact seems to be limited). The paper refers also to the public debate, sparked by the activity and the final report published by Tismăneanu’s commission.
PL
Głównym zadaniem niniejszego tekstu jest identyfikacja i prezentacja potencjału kategorii filozoficznych Margalita dla środkowoeuropejskich badań nad rolą społecznych pamięci zbiorowych, a także w celu określenia znaczenia tych pamięci w procesach konstytuowania wspólnot politycznych po 1989 roku. Zarówno „przyzwoite społeczeństwo”, jak i „etyka pamięci” mogą stanowić wartość dodaną dotychczasowych rozważań na ten temat. Dlatego też zostaną one zestawione ze stanem badań nad prawną petryfikacją społecznych pamięci zbiorowych przez poszczególne środkowoeuropejskie czynniki polityczne. Podjęcie tych zagadnień pozwoli zidentyfikować obszary, które mogłyby zostać wzbogacone przez filozofię Margalita.
EN
The main goal of the paper is an identification and presentation of Margalit’s philosophical categories’ potential for their application in CEE socio-legal studies on collective memories and the constitutionalization of the political communities after 1989. Both “decent society” and the “ethics of memory” are an added value for the recent discussion on that problem. That is the reason why their comparison with the actual state of knowledge and the reality of societal collective memories’ petrification by several political factors is crucial. Looking for an answer to the question formulated in the article’s title will help in the identification of the fields which could be enriched by Margalit’s philosophy.
PL
Artykuł jest rezultatem szerszych badań nad stosunkiem do symboli upadłej dyktatury, pozostających w przestrzeni publicznej po wprowadzeniu demokracji. Na podstawie szerokiej kwerendy przypadków rozmaitego traktowania takich pamiątek przeszłości w postkomunistycznej Polsce, wyselekcjonowane zostały te najlepiej oddające rozmaite aspekty tego zjawiska. Posłużyły one wskazaniu typów działań zachodzących wokół pomników oraz rodzajów aktorów politycznych angażujących się w ten proces. Tekst stanowi element badań empirycznych prowadzonych w ujęciu międzynarodowym, których ostatecznym celem jest usystematyzowanie tego tematu i jego syntetyczne, komparatystyczne opracowanie
EN
The following paper is the result of broader investigation regarding the attitude towards past dictatorship symbols which remain in the public sphere even after the democratic transition. Based on a wide query of a variety of case studies regarding different postures towards particular relics of the past in post-communist Poland, I selected those best reflecting various aspects of the subject. They have been used to indicate the types of actions that refer to the topic, as well as political actors involved in the process. The article constitutes a part of empirical research conducted in an international context whose eventual goal is to systematize the subject and to elaborate on its comparative synthesis
EN
The study examines the role of the Czech National Council and the Slovak National Council in the political development of the Czechoslovak federation. It presents the two republic parliaments as hitherto overlooked institutions, where significant processes toward their transformation into parliaments of independent states – the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic – were taking place. It emphasizes that the formally identical status of both National Councils was hiding different realities, practices and evolutionary dynamisms of the two bodies, which were a result of a not very fortunately chosen institutional architecture of the federation. Prague’s twin role as both federal and Czech capital made the Czech National Council act as a regional authority, while its Slovak counterpart in Bratislava was playing a key role in Slovakia’s political life. The two authors illustrate the situation using two documentary probes. The first of them concerns the Slovak struggle for their own constitution promised to both republics in the new constitutional order in 1968. It shows that a majority of the Slovak National Council adopted a requirement for an autonomous constitution as early as in the first weeks after the fall of the last Communist government and kept insisting on it until the end of the federation. The second probe into documentary sources indicates a different dynamism; it presents the formation of nuclei of the Czech foreign policy through the Foreign Committee of the Czech National Council, the body established only in the spring of 1991, which subsequently became one of the institutional pillars of Czech separatism in the next year and a half.
EN
The author examines the attitude of Slovenians to the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia since the late 1960s until the declaration of the independent Republic of Slovenia in 1991. He asks himself a question whether socialist Yugoslavia was indeed a state which Slovenians perceived as theirs, just like they had done in the case of the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and he observes how their identification with that state was changing over time, the reasons of the changes, and whether the loss of their loyalty caused the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. He is looking for answers in public opinion polls which had been continually taking place in Slovenia since 1968 and conducted in a relatively fair manner, without political interventions, which is indeed a rarity in the context of socialist countries. Using their results, the author concludes that Slovenians viewed themselves as a natural part of the Yugoslav community until the late 1980s. This opinion was shared by a majority of Slovenia’s population, although many of them were not satisfied with Slovenia’s position in Yugoslavia, or their living standard at times of economic crises. It was only in 1989 that the opinion that Yugoslavia as a “country of many advantages” had run out of its potential and no longer offered good prospects for future prevailed among Slovenians. However, their attitudes reacting to accelerating changes both at home and abroad did not cause the disintegration of the common state. After 1991, Slovenians completely (and sometimes uncritically) identified themselves with independent Slovenia, and mostly (although rather declaratively) also with values of parliamentary democracy. The author’s exposition is preceded by an analysis of published sources on the disintegration of Yugoslavia and based on an extensive set of empirical data from public opinion polls in the form of tables.
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