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XX
This article investigates levels and predictors of support for democracy and two democratic principles (free speech and minority rights) among Czech 14- to 17-year-olds. An analysis of survey data collected in primary and secondary schools in four regions in 2014 (N = 1,959) reveals that among young Czechs general support for a democratic regime is relatively independent from more specific pro-democratic attitudes (although there is an association between general support for democracy and the abstract principle of freedom of speech). On a general level, democracy was supported by about two-thirds of adolescents in the sample. Similar or even higher levels of support were found for the two principles of democracy when presented in abstract terms. However, when these principles were presented to them in specific, less clear-cut contexts, support for them was much lower. Specifically, despite their strong support for free speech, about half of respondents supported restricting unconventional political activism. Moreover, a similar proportion of participants seemed to downplay minority rights when the majority rule was emphasised. Results of the analysis also revealed that support for different aspects of democracy was predicted by various psychological and socioeconomic factors.
EN
In the definition of civic competences which is situated in the Annex to Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 on key competences for lifelong learning – Key Competences for Life-long Learning – a European Reference Framework it is written: “Full respect for human rights including equality as a basis for democracy, appreciation and understanding of differences between value systems of different religious or ethnic groups lay the foundations for a positive attitude”. Therefore, the question is: Does school education in general premise developing attitudes based on values essential to democracy? The answers to this question can be searched conducting various studies. The paper presents the results of analysis of the core curricula conducted by a team of researchers from the Department of School Education, Faculty of Educational Sciences, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun (Poland). Why core curricula have become the object of our research? Basically, for two reasons. Firstly, the school has obligated to implement them, and all school programs and textbooks have to be consistent with them. Secondly, they are also a kind of articulation and a declaration of competence required from people in the given place and time.
EN
In Ukraine, having arrived at a critical stage of its history, three areas can be highlighted at the level of legislation during the struggle for the way forward since the end of 2013: the language issue, the constitutional process, and the efforts to eliminate the Soviet legacy. The subject of our analysis is the four laws belonging to the 2015 legislative package on decommunization, with an outlook to the broader context, as well. The four laws in question decide about who are heroes and who are enemies in history; what Ukraine’s relationship is with World War II, as well as with the Communist and Nazi regimes. The laws point out firmly and excluding any further debate the primacy of the country’s independence over all else, and the protection of the ideal of independence by any means concerning both the past and the present. The laws prescribe impeachment as a sanction for denying their contents. This story – hot memory influenced by politics – will be summarized for the period of 2015–2016.
EN
While it is well-known that education is positively connected to support democracy (competitive elections, a multi-party system, and the belief that political leaders must obey the law) in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, we have few empirical tests of how attitudinal, structural, and cognitive mechanisms mediate that connection. I use the Polish Panel Survey (POLPAN) for 2008–2013, a crucial period that captures the Polish political experience after acceding to the European Union and before the massive political change of the 2015 elections, to empirically test how these different mechanisms impact the link between education and democratic values. I find empirical support for the hypotheses that (a) in terms of attitudes, higher levels of education are associated with lower authoritarian attitudes, which in turn correlate with stronger pro-democratic values; (b) in terms of structure, individuals with higher levels of education, who are more likely to belong to privileged social classes, are more pro-democratic; (c) in terms of cognitive mechanisms, higher educational attainment is associated with higher cognitive abilities, which in turn correlate with stronger support for democracy.
EN
The author of the article notes that modern Ukraine is in a state of systemic transformation, the essence of which is to choose between conservative and modernization projects of the formation of Ukrainian statehood. This choice is compounded by the state of the socio-political crisis, military aggression and the weakness of its own geopolitical strategy. The leading factor in overcoming the modern challenges and the formation of a sovereign democratic state is the identification of citizens in public life, their consolidation around a common system of values. The processes of consolidation of Ukrainian society are clearly reflected in the dynamics of geopolitical priorities, as they serve as a unique marker of the citizens’ position in all the most important issues of political development. Together with their cultural and civilization choice, Ukrainians choose between democracy and authoritarianism, legal protection and corruption, equal cooperation in the international arena and the status of «younger brother». It is Ukraine’s role in the geopolitical environment that is crucial for its foreign policy aimed at forming strategic partnerships and effective protection of sovereignty in the international arena. At the same time, the main function of foreign policy is to compensate for internal problems and create favorable conditions for the realization and protection of national interests. The study of empirical indexes on the geopolitical orientation of Ukrainians made it possible to determine the main tendencies and peculiarities of the processes of foreign policy identification in modern Ukraine. It is noted that there is a rather active formation of a civil consensus around the Euro-Atlantic civilization’s choice. This is evidenced by an increase in the support of this choice in the national dimension and a marked convergence of regional positions on this issue. The conclusion is drawn about the formation of a stable tendency to strengthen the European integration orientations of Ukrainians. The continuation of military, political and cultural-information aggression of Russia makes the greatest influence on this tendency. The main motives of the European choice of Ukrainians are the desire for material well-being, legal protection and adherence to democratic values. In most cases, rapprochement with NATO is justified by the aspirations of the country’s security, reliable protection against aggressive actions, first of all, of Russia. In addition, the objective is to modernize the army in accordance with international standards and to increase the international prestige of Ukraine. The idea of Eurasian integration is noticeably losing its popularity, especially in the regions directly confronted with the military aggression of Russia (East and West). The idea of a kind of neutrality, that is, non-alignment with any unions, preserves the considerable support, mainly due to the passage of votes from the camp of opponents of rapprochement with the EU and NATO. The identified trends in the dynamics of the geopolitical priorities of Ukrainians are largely due to external factors and are still hardly supported by the domestic reforms of the country, as negative things such as corruption, low level of trust in power, slow pace of modernization of socio-economic sphere and low welfare of citizens persist. Under such conditions, the Ukrainian political elite should focus on the creation and implementation of effective strategies for integration and identification of citizens at the expense of real modernization of the economy and raising the standard of living.
XX
Speaking about democratic choice we are mainly interested in the common features in the motivation of post-colonial, post-totalitarian and post-authoritarian societies, their leaders, elites and people, which determine attractiveness of democracy in the contemporary world. The intention to be democratic today is often connected with the intention to be free, modern, safe, developed state, which is accepted in the circle of developed countries on the conditions of friendly and equal partnership. Based on the experience in building democracy in the “third wave” countries (S. Huntington) and on the other conceptual assumptions of institutionalists, we can come to the conclusion of necessity to review the traditional approaches to the problem of democratic transit. These approaches considered democratic transit, firstly, as the issue of the ideological (or value, in a wider sense) choice, and, secondly, as the issue of destruction of non-democratic social institutions with the aim to build institutions of liberal democracy in their place. Therefore, they referred to the following as to the major directions of building democracy: a) understanding by the active part of the society of the liberal paradigm of public consciousness; b) maximal denationalisation of the public sphere; c) harmonisation of the national institutions and standards with the Western samples. The Western expert community arrived at the conclusion that the so called civil society should become a driving force for democratic changes in the former USSR countries. These approaches considered democratic transit, firstly, as the issue of the ideological (or value, in a wider sense) choice, and, secondly, as the issue of destruction of non-democratic social institutions with the aim to build institutions of liberal democracy in their place. Therefore, they referred to the following as to the major directions of building democracy: a) understanding by the active part of the society of the liberal paradigm of public consciousness; b) maximal denationalisation of the public sphere; c) harmonisation of the national institutions and standards with the Western samples. However, the modern views enable not to define democracy as just an ideological choice or an institutional model, but as social innovation. This definition opens to us a somewhat different outlook of the study on the problems of building democracy and the problems of practical democratic reforms. As we speak about innovation, the most important aspects of its study and design in a specific social organism are as follows: a) motivation; b) preconditions; and c) algorithm of its launch. The issue of a subject of democratic transformations has not lost its topicality, either, though in case of innovation, it would rather mean an initiative core, as well as perceptiveness to novelties and interest towards them by various social groups and political actors. Returning to the issue of motivation, we should detail the interrelation between democratisation and modernisation. The matter is that intention to modernisation, which is quite understandable to world-system periphery countries, is often understood as readiness for democracy. As a matter of fact, motivation with regard to these two strategies for national development only coincides partially. Modernisation is the shortest way to development and, in certain sense, safety. But often modernisation does not account for motivation of freedom and in certain cases, is conducted much more efficiently and quickly when freedom is restricted. To Ukraine, motivation of freedom is traditionally one of the leading public values. As for two other aspects of a democratic choice, safety and development motivations, these characteristics of a democratic order were learned and assessed by the Ukrainian society much later. The democratic social innovation in Ukraine is accompanied by processes of national development and the struggle to redistribute the social product. The main trends of Ukraine democracy building include the targeting on state, nation and civil society development. We can distinguish several key collisions in understanding democracy, which imposed a serious obstacle to building an efficient democracy in Ukraine. The major problem of Ukrainians’ democratic self-determination is related to the correlation between freedom and law. Other issues are the correlation between rights and obligations and the correlation between the will of the majority and the right of the minority. Having defined the democratic development objective in Ukraine as a transition from imitation to essence, we have highlighted the key markers of this transformation. These include negotiation of such widespread phenomena as the sword-law, citizens’ passivity, corruption, uncertainty about powers and areas of responsibility of state bodies, political appropriateness, failure to comply with procedures, informational closeness and politicians’ lies, as well as other features of immature public organization, which continue existing under the lee of democratic institutions.
EN
This article is devoted to the study of socio-historical factors in the development of global constitutionalism in the modern world. The author considers different options (models) the development of global constitutionalism.
EN
The civil competences may have a great influence on the level of the democracy consolidation. They are a mark of knowledge about the democracy, understanding the democracy mechanisms and also the trust to its institutions. This way of understanding the civil competences (especially for the participating kind of political culture) seem to be not enough developed in Poland, what is proved by the results of carried out and shown research. Also vthe idea of the necessity of the occurrence of civil competences, understood as the compulsion for the participating kind of political culture to work, might be exaggerated, because not always the knowledge about the democracy and its mechanisms and its institutions, must be connected with the civil activity.
EN
Privacy has been one of the major democratic values since the origin of liberal democracy. The information revolution and rapid increase of accessible information resulted in the necessity of redefinition of the privacy concept. Privacy has lost its status of the guarantee of personal liberty and turned out to be the secondary value, often regarded as commodity. Various forms of privacy intrusion (watching, intercepting, reading, interpreting) are highly accepted as the cost of being the part the digital world. It implied also the emergence of the new model of personal security. We no longer need privacy to feel secure. Consumption-oriented identity within which everything is public and common seems to overshadow perception of self as autonomous – self-dependent and sometimes solitary – citizen.
EN
This article describes the research project Democratic Values and Protest Behavior: Data Harmonization, Measurement Comparability, and Multi-Level Modeling. This survey data harmonization project engages with the relationship between democracy and protest behavior in comparative, cross-national perspective by proposing a theoretical model that explains variation in political protest in light of individual-level characteristics, country-level determinants, and interactions between the two types of factors. Methodologically, the project requires data with information at both the individual- and the country-level that varies over time and across space. While the social sciences have a growing wealth of survey projects, the data are often not comparable. This project selects variables from existing international surveys for ex post harmonization to create an integrated dataset consisting of large number of variables with individuals nested in countries and time periods. Throughout this process, focus is on three important and well-defined fields of methodology, namely data harmonization, measurement comparability, and multi-level modeling.
EN
The article deals with the causes of Russia’s war on Ukraine, which is based on political and geopolitical interests, economic and military strategies, ambitions of individual political leaders, and mentality factors. The ontological basis of the war is the historically formed fundamental difference between the spiritual world, mentality traits of Ukrainians and Russians, which formed under the influence of a particular culture, with its ethnic, value and worldview coordinates, and under the influence of ideologies that determined the features of social and political life at different historical times. A strong spiritual system is created in the social and cultural space of the state, which preserves its values from generation to generation in the culture, forming a stable mentality and enduring attitudes. Their conceptual comprehension expands the context of cause-and-effect connections, helps to understand the situation more deeply and to choose optimal effective mechanisms for gradually successfully resolving the complex geopolitical situation that threatens the whole world.
PL
W artykule pokazujemy dwa czynniki kształtujące stosunek społeczeństwa do zmiany ustrojowej. Pierwszym czynnikiem jest przynależność jednostki do określonych klas i warstw społecznych. Drugim czynnikiem jest stosunek tych klas i warstw do wartości demokratycznych. W szczególności dotyczy to akceptacji pojęć rządów demokratycznych oraz rządów niedemokratycznych. Dane empiryczne, stanowiące podstawę analiz, zostały zaczerpnięte z badań CBOS . Ważnym aspektem poznawczym artykułu jest weryfikacja hipotezy: klasy i warstwy społeczne, które ukształtowały się w warunkach ustroju socjalistycznego, w mniejszym stopniu akceptują wartości demokratyczne niż klasy i warstwy, które ukształtowały się w trakcie procesu transformacji ustrojowej. Artykuł jest prezentacją teoretycznej koncepcji struktury społecznej, opartej na wyodrębnieniu dwóch kategorii zróżnicowania: klas społecznych i warstw społecznych. Podstawą tego rozróżnienia jest podział pomiędzy osobami, które zdobywają środki utrzymania w oparciu o prywatną własność środków pracy i renty oraz w oparciu o publiczną własność środków pracy i renty. Teoretycznymi punktami odniesienia tej koncepcji są teorie klas Marksa i Webera.
EN
There are two factors presented in the paper that have an impact on the general public attitude towards the change of the sociopolitical system. The first factor is the affiliation of individuals to a specific social class or stratum. The second factor is the attitude of these classes and strata towards democratic values. What is particularly significant in that respect is the acceptance of the notions of “democratic government” and “nondemocratic government”. The empirical data used in the analysis are based on research by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS ). The important cognitive aspect of the article is a verification of the following hypothesis: the social classes and strata that have existed since the times of socialism accept democratic values to a lesser degree than the classes and strata established during the transformation of the sociopolitical system. The paper is the presentation of the theoretical model of social structure, based on two separate categories of social differentiation: social classes and social strata. The criterion of this differentiation is the division into those whose means of existence are based on private property of means of labour and rent vs. those based on public property of means of labour and rent. The theoretical background of the conception is the class theories of Marx and Weber.
Zeszyty Naukowe KUL
|
2020
|
vol. 63
|
issue 3
53-70
EN
Due to the growing multiculturalism and socio-ideological changes in the Netherlands, there hasemerged a need to define common values for the whole society. In the article, these values are analysedfrom two perspectives: historical changes (since the time the Republic was founded, throughthe pillarisation, and the transformation of the 1960s to the present day) and the current status quo,analysed with empirical research data. The analyses conducted in the article allow the conclusionthat the Dutch society shares values related to civic and democratic culture, including freedom,equality and solidarity.
PL
Z uwagi na coraz większą wielokulturowość oraz przemiany społeczno-ideologiczne w Niderlandachpojawiła się potrzeba zdefiniowania wspólnych wartości dla całego społeczeństwa. W artykule wartościte są analizowane z dwóch perspektyw – przemian historycznych (ok. okresu powstania Republiki,poprzez filaryzację, przemiany lat sześćdziesiątych aż po czasy obecne) oraz stanu obecnego w oparciuo analizę danych zastanych, w tym z badań empirycznych. Na podstawie przeprowadzonej analizymożna uznać, że Holendrzy za swoje wartości wspólne uznają wartości związane z kulturą obywatelskąi demokratyczną, w tym m.in. wolność, równość i solidarność.
14
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The Strategic Culture of Chile

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ES
Este artículo describe un cambio importante en la auto-identidad de Chile después de la transición a la democracia tras la dictadura de Pinochet en 1989. El Chile democrático hizo una virtud de su estabilidad y autonomía en los asuntos in-ternacionales, en primer lugar, mediante la ejecución de una política comercial que minimiza su dependencia en el mercado mundial, y, en segundo lugar, mirando más allá de sus fronteras inmediatas para buscar la seguridad nacional como un defensor de los valores democráticos en una comunidad global más amplia.
EN
This article describes a major shift in Chile's self-identity after the transition to democracy after the Pinochet dictatorship in 1989. Democratic Chile made a virtue of its democratic stability and its autonomy in international affairs, first, by executing a trade policy that minimized its dependence in the world market; and, second, by looking beyond its immediate borders to seek national security as a de-fender of democratic values in a larger global community.
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