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The Normative Significance of Empirical Moral Psychology

100%
Żuradzki T.
Diametros
|
2020
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vol. 17
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issue 64
1-5
EN
Many psychologists have tried to reveal the formation and processing of moral judgments by using a variety of empirical methods: behavioral data, tests of statistical significance, and brain imaging. Meanwhile, some scholars maintain that the new empirical findings of the ways we make moral judgments question the trustworthiness and authority of many intuitive ethical responses. The aim of this special issue is to encourage scholars to rethink how, if at all, it is possible to draw any normative conclusions by discovering the psychological processes underlying moral judgments.
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Morální intuice z pohledu současné deskriptivní etiky

100%
Chudárková P.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
|
2019
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vol. 41
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issue 2
259-282
EN
In the last twenty years, there has been an enormous growth of scientifi c research concerning the process of human moral reasoning and moral intuitions. In contemporary descriptive ethics, three dominant approaches can be found – heuristic approach, dual-process theory, and universal moral grammar. Each of these accounts is based on similar empirical evidence combining fi ndings from evolutionary biology, moral psychology, and neuroethics. Nevertheless, they come to diff erent conclusions about the reliability of moral intuitions. Th e aim of this paper is to critically investigate each of these approaches and compare them with recent scientifi c fi ndings. Last chapter addresses implications of these fi ndings for moral epistemology and normative ethics. Th e aim is to show that despite diff erent interpretations of available data, we can reach a satisfying pragmatical conclusion which would be in compliance with the empirical evidence, yet it would not necessarily depend on it.
CS
V posledních přibližně dvaceti letech byla pozornost v oblasti deskriptivní etiky soustředěna především na výzkum morálního usuzování a morálních intuic. V současnosti lze nalézt tři rozdílné přístupy týkající se této problematiky. Jedná se o heuristický přístup, teorii duálních procesů a teorii univerzální morální gramatiky. Všechny vycházejí z podobné empirické evidence kombinující poznatky evoluční biologie, morální psychologie a neuroetiky, ale ohledně povahy a spolehlivosti morálních intuic docházejí k odlišným závěrům. Cílem článku bude jednotlivé přístupy vzájemně porovnat a zhodnotit, nakolik jsou v souladu s dostupnou vědeckou evidencí. Závěr článku se bude věnovat důsledkům, které mají tato zjištění pro oblast morální epistemologie a normativní etiky. Cílem bude ukázat, že i přes rozdílné interpretace je možné dojít v otázce spolehlivosti morálních intuic k uspokojivému pragmatickému řešení, které bude v souladu s touto empirickou evidencí, nebude na ní však nutně závislé.
3

THE INFLUENCE OF IMPROBABLE OPTIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE OF CHOICE

80%
Móra L. X.
Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle (Hungarian Psychological Review)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 2
295-320
EN
We need to make a choice between alternatives on numerous occasions in our everyday life. However, we are not always confident that we have made the right decision. The subjective sense of certainty that accompanies our decisions made in uncertain situations is usually expressed in labels or in percentages: “dead sure”, “it may be right”, 90%, etc. Calibration research focuses on what these verbal labels and percentages express and how they are related to the final outcome. For example, whether out of a 100 situations where we make decisions with 90% confidence, the number of decisions that afterwards can be considered correct decisions/judgments is truly around 90. The current research examines how the options that are ruled out easily by decision makers influence the confidence of choice for the remaining options. The general decision making process appears to start with ruling out unrealistic options and then contemplating the choice between the remaining realistic ones. On the basis of the study, it can be stated that unrealistic options do not make the decision more difficult and do not add to the uncertainty of decision making, on the contrary, they make the decision maker more confident. These results contradict the normative decision theory, the support theory of probability calibration, the theory of ecological validity and probabilistic mental models and are in accordance with the theory of optimistic overconfidence.
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