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In the last three decades, mainstream economics has been influenced by authors associated with new institutional economics and new behavioral economics. The dispute over rationality as an assumption of economic theories is becoming particularly evident and is taking new forms. The aim of this article is to examine the connections between the institutional and behavioral approaches as well as between researchers’ ideas as to what rationality is and their beliefs regarding an optimal economic system. It will demonstrate that so-called behavioral and institutional economists have more in common than not. Institutions play a key role in the arguments of behavioural economists, whereas the argument of institutional economists is almost always based on the issue of human cognitive abilities and emotions. What directly links the two trends is the attention given to the rationality of actions that an individual takes as a premise of economic choices and as an assumption of economic theories. Differences in views relate to the understanding of rationality and exist within the framework of behavioral economics itself. At the core of the dispute is the distinction between two concepts of rationality: constructivist and ecological. This distinction serves as a starting point for the second matter discussed in the article. The author argues that the concept of constructivist rationality is related to the vision of the top-down creation of social order, while the proponents of the ecological approach to rationality stress the importance of market institutions. Interestingly, from the perspective of cognitive psychology and the heuristics of Daniel Kahneman, it can be presumed that the convictions of a scholar about the “ideal system” can influence his or her arguments on the essence of human rationality.
EN
The paper outlines various concepts of rationality, their characteristics and consequences. In the first, most general part, the metaphysical, instrumental and discursive rationality is distinguished. The following part focuses on instrumental rationality and the rational choice theory and ordinal and cardinal utility, expected utility and game theory, respectively. All those concepts are summarised as being the most mathematically elegant and mostly decidable and helpful in the decision-making process. Giving primacy to individual preferences and withholding the judgment on their “objective” value, they are also devoid of double standards. They are, however, strongly normative and weakly coincide with actual agents’ behaviour. Empirical findings on agents’ decision making seem to demonstrate their irrationality, unless we introduce into the analysis different concepts of rationality, namely based on costs efficient heuristics, inclusive fitness and ecological rationality. They are discussed respectively, and although they seem better to explain the set of humans’ seemingly irrational behaviour, they are likely week in predicting that behaviour. They are also losing their normative dimension and thus cease to be helpful in decision making. Applying the particular theory of rationality, either descriptively or normatively, seems to depend strongly on the environment, which can be characterised by its extension from a small to a large world. The more the small world’s features an environment reveals, the more effective is the application of the particular model of rationality. Beyond the small worlds, rule stochasticity, underspecification and misspecification and the only reasonable method are consecutive trials and errors, which eventually may reduce the large world to the small one.
EN
Issues of ecological rationality are concerned with psychological criteria of rationality in cognitive processes. Ecological rationality is a key term suggested for an alternative view of relationship between rationality and the phenomena of psychological reality being investigated (Gigerenzer). The study is focused on sociolinguistic conceptions, which define rationality of common talk due to functions of linguistic means and strategies in fulfilling psychological intentions and goals. The analyzed models of common talk (Grice) and common politeness (Brown Levinson) represent shifts from an initial emphasis on logical principles of rational communication to current analyses of psychological environment where language communication takes place. Psychological environment is defined in relationship to the meanings intended and negotiated, to their exchange between social actors in situational contexts of mutuality. Relevance of considerations about cological rationality for interpretation of common talk phenomena is documented by the studies of an irony as a politeness strategy.
EN
Heuristics used in financial decision process in polish and international papers are commonly linked to intuitive, automatic, habitual and consequently to irrational decisions. As presented in the paper, heuristics may become a very optimal decision strategy, especially from the decision’s environmental perspective. It is postulated to normalize this approach as ecological rationality in decision making theory. The aim of the paper is to present theoretical and practical arguments which support the following thesis: In the context of financialisation and financial development, heuristic approach to decision making may become the leading and optimal decision strategy. It is essential due to fact that heuristics have a high predictive and explanatory effectiveness as well as the number of practical applications.
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