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  1. 1 Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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  1. 1 Schetz A.

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  1. 1 2012

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Luka eksplanacyjna a pojęcia własności fenomenalnych stanowisko Josepha Levine’a

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Schetz A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2012
|
issue nr 17
125-148
EN
The explanatory gap problem arises in the context of the mind-body relation, and especially the phenomenal concepts-physical concepts relation. It is posed as a question about the method which is appropriate for the reduction of consciousness to physical or neural states of the brain. Therefore it concerns – as the paper suggests – theoretical incapability of naturalistic attempts to explain what phenomenal concepts are about in terms of what physical or natural concepts are about. The paper discusses the argument of Joseph Levine, one of the best-known critics of the reductive attempts to close the explanatory gap. The bottom line of the argument is that since phenomenal concepts are theoretically thick, and physical concepts are theoretically thin, there is no way to reduce the former to the latter.
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