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EN
Postmodern humanists often refer to the study of particular sciences to confirm their theses. However, the general question arises: do they need these particular sciences to validate their research, or do they think that all natural research results from humanistic or cultural issues? Postmodern philosophers accept the latter option. It also seems that the postmodern humanists are not able to completely get rid of rational deadlines and methods, because it better describes reality. The problem of referring to the exact sciences and the lack of one's own clear methods is taken up in the presented text by the example of the works of selected non-rational thinkers.
PL
Postmodernistyczni humaniści często odwołują się do badań nauk szczegółowych w celu potwierdzenia swoich tez. Powstaje jednak zasadnicze pytanie: czy potrzebują oni szczegółowych nauk, aby potwierdzić swoje badania, czy też jest odwrotnie: uważają, że wszystkie badania nauk szczegółowych wypływają z tez humanistycznych lub kulturowych? Myśliciele postmodernistyczni zakładają tę drugą opcję. Wydaje się również, że owi humaniści nie są w stanie całkowicie pozbyć się racjonalnych terminów i metod, ponieważ one lepiej opisują rzeczywistość. Problem odwoływania się do nauk ścisłych i braku własnych klarownych metod podejmowany jest w prezentowanym tekście na przykładzie prac wybranych myślicieli postracjonalnych.
PL
Przedmiotem moich rozważań jest pytanie, czy wielokrotnie ogłaszana śmierć człowieka (podmiotu) przypieczętowała jego rzeczywisty kres, czy wręcz przeciwnie, zmusiła do gruntownego przemyślenia i zreorganizowania strategii obronnych w obrębie trwającego sporu. W tym celu analizie poddaję dwa główne paradygmaty pojmowania podmiotowości: monadyczny oraz relacyjny (dialogiczny). Następnie staram się wyjaśnić, na przykładzie koncepcji podmiotu dialektycznego Paula Ricoeura oraz filozofii Innego Emmanuela Lévinasa, powody, dla których należy zrezygnować z części prerogatyw, jakie przypisała podmiotowi nowożytność, jeśli chcemy, by dyskusja o subiektywności mogła w przyszłości się rozwijać. W artykule bronię tezy, że powrót do idei podmiotu nie oznacza powrotu podmiotu, lecz odejście od starych form myślenia na rzecz nowych ujęć. Waga konsekwencji usunięcia idei podmiotu znacznie przewyższa doniosłość satysfakcji płynącej z ostatecznego zamknięcia sporu.
EN
In the paper, the author asks whether what we have all heard over and over again of the “end of man” means the real end of man or, on the contrary, it has given rise to profound and necessary reevaluation of self-transparent subjectivity. The debate on the notion of selfhood has not been closed yet. The author analyzes two different approaches to the problem. One pertains to the “self ” that is taken as a monad. The other refers to dialogical theory of selfhood which, as she tries to explain, one may regard as a way of overcoming the essential problem with the constitution of ourselves. According to this, the author claims that it is necessary to reconsider the claims of modern philosophy. She suggests that many of the objections that have been made against subjectivity derive from the narrow view of philosophy in the 17th century.
EN
1. For many people, the contemporary culture seems to be something different from modernity, it is something resembling a special period of “post-”. At the same time, different trends are present in current culture. Some reach the genesis of nearly two and a half thousand years back, others have about half a century. Perhaps also breaks some modern belief that in every culture, “newer” means “better”. 2. Representatives of the philosophical and theological trend of “Radical Orthodoxy” noticed in this the approach of postmodernism to the pre-modern tradition. Therefore, we can say that we live and operate in a “post-world”, without leading currents of thought. On the other hand, is the current culture very different from the others when you look at it from the perspective of centuries? 3. For many philosophers, it is still important to reach to the great traditional approaches to the problem of truth. These are above all three concepts related to three great philosophical syntheses created by Plato, Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. This is also evident among the basic contemporary trends critical of the classics and philosophical tradition. 4. M. Heidegger created a certain idea of being reduced to the time determinant. For the supporters of his views, it became the overcoming of Aquinas’s theory. The German thinker also formulated a specific interpretation of Plato's views on truth. He contrasted it with Thomas's concept, especially with the definition of truth as the adequacy of thing to intellect. 5. T. Bartoś – Polish author of the new attempt to read the essence of the concept – believes, in turn, that the statements of the Angelic Doctor can be found close to the characteristics of post-modernity. He points to a certain incoherence and fragmentary nature of the problem, anthropocentrism and pragmatism of the approach, and a rejection of the unity of truth. It seems, however, that there is a lot of exaggeration in this interpretation. De facto, we are dealing here with radical criticism of Thomism as a trend that develops the views of Saint Thomas Aquinas, because none of the known Thomists do not even come close in their deliberations to the view that T. Bartoś formulated. 6. Finally, a group of philosophers using in the method of reflection the achievements of contemporary logic, representatives of analytic philosophy, generally seems to be aimed at getting rid of the term “truth” from his vocabulary. The idea of reaching their assumptions of logical positivism is difficult to discuss with his followers because of the difference in approach to the practice of philosophy itself between the “analysts” and “non-analysts”. The classic concept of philosophy, under which situates itself Platonism, Aristotelianism and Thomism, is different from the concept of linguistic or neo-positivist, which locates to analytic philosophy. 7. The classical approach to truth, especially the definition developed in the final shape in the Middle Ages, indicating the adequacy of things and the intellect as the essence of truth, therefore meets with criticism from various directions. This does not mean that they should go into oblivion, that they have been replaced by newer and better concepts, or simply refuted. The proclamation of the slogans such as “The End of the Era ...”, “The End of Truth ...” sounds propaganda. 8. The classical approach to the problem of truth has lost nothing in its argumentation. In fact, the current forms of criticism do not rely on any discussion, but on the rejection of the principles on which it is based. Heidegger proclaimed his vision of being and truth, supporting it with a hermeneutic analysis of ancient works. He claimed that this vision is contained in the properly read outlooks of ancient Greek thinkers. The current of philosophy practiced with the use of modern logic tools considers reality only in so far as it can be translated into a “language fact”. This is the analysis of language and not reality. The proposal to read the theory of truth contained in the works of Aquinas, submitted by T. Bartoś to be a projection of some interpretative grid on the expression Thomas's interpretation, wherein the radically differs from the recognized positions. 9. It seems that in the whirlwind of ideologies present in philosophy, science and culture in general, it remains to preserve the classical approach to the problem of truth and develop them according to their essential elements. Compilation with principles that are not appropriate to them will not result in the presentation of their authentic content. They are permanent achievements of culture, philosophically justified. Recourse to reality, confrontation with it, makes the classic approaches open in terms of development. None of them provides a closed system also adopted a priori or received by the conversion performed according to a specified number of regulations. The development of the classical approaches to the problem of truth is theoretically interesting for the whole field of philosophy and as such should be supported.
PL
Sama etyka to normy rozumiane jako kryteria doboru działań chroniących osoby. Gogacz przekonuje, że etyka realistyczna poszukuje tych kryteriów - za Arystotelesem i św. Tomaszem - w człowieku. Rezultatem tych poszukiwań jest wskazanie trzech najważniejszych kryteriów postępowania moralnego: mądrości, sumienia i kontemplacji. Po pierwsze, ludzka mądrość jako podstawowe kryterium dobrego postępowania. Mądrość pomaga rozpoznać najwyższe dobro i umożliwia ludziom wybór właściwego kierunku działania. Po drugie, prawidłowo ukształtowane sumienie jest kolejnym kryterium moralnego postępowania. Gogacz zwraca uwagę, że moralne postępowanie wymaga regularnej ludzkiej refleksji, przemyślenia tego, co należy zrobić. A zatem, po trzecie, kontemplacja jest ostatnim kryterium moralnego postępowania. Rozważania te otwierają najważniejszą książkę Mieczysława Gogacza, w której przedstawił on swoją oryginalną propozycję teorii etycznej, tj. Wprowadzenie do etyki chronienia osób. W niniejszym artykule spróbuję zrekonstruować tę propozycję i wskazać jej najważniejsze tezy, koncepcje i postulaty. Przebieg wywodu będzie zgodny z kolejnością omawiania problemów etycznych w tej książce. Część pierwsza tego artykułu rozpoczyna się krótkim omówieniem zagadnień metodologicznym: wyjaśnimy czym jest etyka, jakie racje stoją za uzależnieniem etyki od antropologii, by następnie przywołać tezę Gogacza, że badania etyczne muszą być poprzedzone badaniami z zakresu metafizyki człowieka. Następnie w części pierwszej przedstawimy najważniejsze tezy etyki chronienia osób. Skupimy się na relacjach osobowych. Zostaną również sformułowane trzy zasady etyki. Druga część (Anthropological problems) dotyczy uszczegółowienia zagadnień z filozofii człowieka, aby móc w kolejnej ostatniej części (Ethical problems) przyjrzeć się bliżej szczegółowym propozycjom problemów etycznych.
EN
The key postulate of Mieczysław Gogacz’s ethics of protecting persons is to develop an attitude that always stands on the side of persons and defends the persons. In order to be able to implement this postulate, Gogacz points out that it is necessary to recognize in advance who a person (i.e. the subject of ethics) is. In his account, ethics of protecting persons is an ethical proposition built on metaphysics, on certain metaphysical assumptions. The ethics itself is constituted by norms understood as criteria for selecting actions that protect persons. He indicated three the most important criteria for moral conduct: wisdom, conscience and contemplation. Firstly, human wisdom as the basic criterion of good conduct. Wisdom helps to recognize the ultimate good and enables people to choose the right courses of actions. Secondly, a righteous conscience is another criterion for moral conduct. Gogacz point out that moral conduct requires a regular human reflection, consideration of what is to be done. Thus, thirdly, a contemplation is the last criterion for moral conduct. In this paper, I will attempt to reconstruct this proposal and point its most important theses, concepts and postulates. The course of the argument will correspond to the order of discussing ethical problems in Gogacz's book. The first part of this article begins with a brief discussion on methodological issues: we will explain what ethics is, what are the reasons for the dependence of ethics on anthropology, and then we will recall Gogacz's thesis that ethical research must be preceded by research in metaphysics of a human being. Then, we will present the most important theses of the ethics of protecting persons. Precisely, we will focus on personal relationships. Three rules of ethics will also be formulated. The second part (Anthropological problems) deals with some detailed problems on metaphysics of a human being (i.e. body, soul, conception, birth, death, suffering, etc.) in order to be able to take a closer look at the detailed propositions of ethical problems in the next last part (Ethical problems).
EN
We live in a time of civilization breakthrough. Human activity aimed at the submission of the natural environment resulted in its devastation with disastrous consequences. Scientific predictions published since October 2018 show the threat of a global climate catastrophe in the coming years as an inevitable scenario unless we counteract it effectively. Preventing the catastrophe is becoming one of the most pressing problems facing the world today. This article examines the ways contemporary philosophy is addressing this issue, arguing that in fact there is no specific philosophical reaction to the climate catastrophe and advancing an explanation of such a striking negligence.
PL
Żyjemy w czasach cywilizacyjnego przełomu. Ludzka aktywność skierowana na podporządkowanie sobie środowiska naturalnego doprowadziła do jego dewastacji, niosącej katastrofalne skutki dla dalszego trwania ludzkości. Naukowe prognozy, publikowane od października 2018 roku, ukazują realne zagrożenie globalną katastrofą klimatyczną w najbliższych latach jako oczywisty scenariusz w przypadku niepodjęcia skutecznej próby przeciwdziałania zagrożeniu. Powstrzymanie katastrofy staje się coraz trudniejszym zadaniem dla społeczności ludzi obecnie żyjących. Artykuł koncentruje się na zagadnieniu reakcji na wspomniany kryzys w dyskursie filozoficznym. W świetle przeprowadzonej analizy wiele wskazuje na to, że w filozofii współczesnej zagrożenie globalną katastrofą nie wywołuje wyraźnej reakcji jej przedstawicieli. Przeprowadzona analiza zmierza do ukazania przyczyn tego stanu rzeczy.
PL
Filozofia subiektywności dotarła w XX wieku do granic swoich możliwości. Jako odpowiedź na jej ograniczenia rozmaici filozofowie podjęli próby nowego rodzaju myślenia. Takie próby to m.in. myśl dialogiczna, która pierwszy wyraz znalazła w pismach takich filozofów, jak Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber czy Eberhard Grisebach. Innym przykładem jest postulat powrotu do pytania o bycie Martina Heideggera. W niniejszym artykule staram się pokazać, że obie próby mają ze sobą wiele wspólnego, choć ich przedstawiciele odnosili się do siebie nawzajem raczej krytycznie, o ile w ogóle to czynili. Okazuje się jednak, że myśl Martina Bubera oraz Martina Heideggera ujmują człowieka jako byt dynamiczny, który staje w obliczu nachodzącego go wezwana. Dlatego też analizuję najpierw koncepcję Martina Heideggera z okresu Bycia i czasu, następnie przedstawiam myślenie Martina Bubera, głównie w oparciu o jego traktat Ja i Ty. Na koniec dokonuję zestawienia i porównania wątków wspólnych obu filozofom, jak również zaznaczam różnice, które dzielą obie próby przekroczenia filozofii podmiotowości.
EN
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the philosophy of subjectivity reached its limits. Various attempts at new thinking appeared as a reaction to these limits. Such attempts involve, among others, the philosophy of dialogue, which was represented in the works of Franz Rosen- zweig, Martin Buber and Eberhard Grisebach. Another approach includes Martin Heidegger’s demand for returning to the question of Being. In this article, I intend to present that both attempts are similar in many ways, although their representatives tended to be critical of one another. However, the approaches of Martin Buber as well as Martin Heidegger prove to understand a man as a dynamic being who faces the calling. Firstly, I would like to analyse the thought of Martin Heidegger as presented in Being and time , then I will describe the thought of Martin Buber mainly based on his treaty I and Thou . Finally, I compare the similarities and differences in the thinking of both philosophers
EN
The article concerns the Thomistic philosophy present in the mainstream of Polish Roman-Catolic integrism, i.e. among the supporters and adherents of the Priestly Society of the Saint Pius X (FSSPX). The main aspects of this environment's activities were presented in terms of philosophical issues. The article is based on the latest publications and effects of this environment, based on the author's own research. As a result of research, it was found that Catholic traditionalists often refer to Thomistic philosophy, as recommended by popes and Christian philosophers in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. According to the Catholic authors in Poland, advocating the pre-Vatican II tradition, Thomistic philosophy is not only a useful tool for expressing a realistic and religious vision of the world, but also an effective means of practicing apologetics for the traditionally understood Catholic vision of the world, man and society. The advantages of Thomism in this environment are: realism, objectivity, openness to divine revelation, respect for history, catholic holiness and supernaturalism. According to traditionalists, Thomism is the only perpetual philosophy and rescue against nihilism, subjectivism and individualism of our time, always recommended by popes.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
|
2020
|
vol. 1
|
issue 9
433-451
EN
The notion of history of philosophy is initiated by Bocheński by presentation of the notion of history itself which, according to him for the fact of treating the past („that what happened”), has two meanings: subject meaning (past events) and object meaning (historiosophy). Both of them can be further divided into two parts: history of facts and history of doctrines. History of philosophy is a typical history of doctrines. The second element of the name „history of philosophy”- which is philosophy-is etymologically linked to wisdom, present in numerous meanings: in antiquity its was simply a synonim of science. In the Middle Ages we observe division of human knowledge to revealed knowledge and natural knowledge, the latter one, in its aspect of exploring the ultimate principles and causes is called philosophy. In modern times philosophy was questioned at all or the entire science was included in its scope. For that reason Bocheński establishes the set of topics which are constantly present in the history of philosophy and which can be classified as strictly philosophical issues. They are: 1) the question of cognition (can we cognize truth?); 2) the question of science; 3) ontological issues (universalities, existence or non-existence of plurality); 4) questions of relation of science and psychic; 5) axiological issues (ethics, esthetics, philosophy of religion); 6) the question of absolute (God, eternal matter). Bocheński stresses that questions proper to philosophy can not be classified as one of the science and, what is more, contemporary methodology of science will rather not change this situation. Striking in that presentation is the lack of issues regarding philosophy of being (existence, essence, substance, accidental properties, relations, causes) with little exemption of philosophy of being inc-luded in the question of absolute. When it comes to division of history of philosophy, we may say that according to Bocheński it should follow analogically the traditional division of the European history such as classic, medieval, modern and contemporary times
EN
The death of God thesis is a siginificant one when it comes to the contemporary philosophy of religion. In this article we will try to present this thesis in the light of Gianni Vattimo’s philosophy in order to clarify the meaning of the death of God and also to critisize it. The article will be divided into three sections. The aim of the first one will be to show the ways in which the death od God thesis should not be understood. The aim of the second will be to present the actual meaning of the thesis. And the third one will be devoted to the critique of Gianni Vattimo’s philosophy of religion which constitutes itself as a result of accepting the death of God thesis.
PL
Teza o śmierci Boga jest niezwykle istotna we współczesnej filozofii religii. W niniejszym artykule postaramy się ukazać tę tezę w świetle filozofii Gianniego Vattima, aby wyjaśnić jej znaczenie oraz ją skrytykować. Artykuł zostanie podzielony na trzy sekcje. Celem pierwszej z nich będzie ukazanie niepoprawnych dróg rozumienia tezy o śmierci Boga. Celem drugiej zaprezentowanie właściwego jej znaczenia. Trzecia zaś poświęcona będzie krytyce filozofii religii Gianniego Vattima, która konstytuuje się jako wynik przyjęcia tezy o śmierci Boga.
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