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1

Wyjaśnienie świadomości a problem scalania

100%

Wójcik B.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2012

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issue nr 20

123-142

EN

Consciousness, which failed to explain the earlier philosophers, is now one of thelast scientific mysteries. On the one hand there is no exaggeration to say, that weactually learned to just put the right questions about the mind. On the other hand,innovative research programs and interdisciplinary methodology, enabled a wholenew perspective on brain function and processes, that underlie the phenomena ofconsciousness. Contemporary solutions of the Binding Problem, allow to identify,inter alia, the specificity of the progress achieved in the study of consciousness.They reinforce the belief, that our cognitive limitations preclude full explanationof consciousness.

2

What More is Folk Psychology?

100%

Grzegorek T., Grzegorek T.

Psychological Studies

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2011

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vol. 49

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issue 1

49-60

EN

Oridinary describing and explaining of everyday behavior became an object of systematic psychological study in the late-40s. The results create a picture of folk psychology as a primitive version of scientific psychology, kind of "naive" theory which is rather false. The picture represents folk psychology only as a speculative artefact, but there is also another notion of folk psychology as a basic conceptual schema which organizes experience. The specific scientific approach to folk psychology is described, some arguments against the view of folk psychology as a theory are pointed and the alternative notion of folk psychology is demonstrated in this article.

3

Folk Psychology and Law: the Case of Eliminativism

89%

Jakubiec M., Janik B.

Semina Scientiarum

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2017

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vol. 16

EN

The aim of this paper is very modest. First, we want to assess how differentstrategies of naturalization might deal with the need of using folk psychologyin legal domain. Second, we want to check whether folk psychology is indeedindispensable in the legal domain. Third, we want to describe possible problemswith one strategy of naturalization, i.e. radical naturalization with classicalelimination. Our conclusion will be that despite various attempts, every projectof naturalization of law will have to resolve the tension between law and folkpsychology and such resolution would not be achieved by simple reduction orelimination of folk psychology. A variety of non-standard solutions might be inplace to resolve this tension. We will only outline those strategies here.

4

A Socio-Linguistic Approach to the Development of Folk Psychology

88%

Ohreen D.

Human Affairs

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2008

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vol. 18

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issue 2

214-224

EN

One of the most interesting issues central to folk psychology is how it develops in humans. Over the past few decades, two distinct theories have emerged known as the Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory. Theory-theory supporters argue that children construct theories to explain behavior, while simulation theorists extol the virtues of empathy-putting yourself in another person's shoes. I argue that each position falls short of an adequate account of how folk psychology develops. Instead, explaining behavior is a matter of acquiring folk psychological concepts within a culture and then learning how to deploy such terms with competence.

5

Who Is a Creative Person? Conceptualisation of creativity by people with autism spectrum disorder.

76%

Gut A., Moszyńska M., Reszuta N.

Interdyscyplinarne Konteksty Pedagogiki Specjalnej

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2019

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issue 27

PL

Arkadiusz Gut, Małgorzata Moszyńska, Natalia Reszuta, Who Is a Creative Person? Conceptualisation of creativity by people with autism spectrum disorder. Interdisciplinary Contexts of Special Pedagogy, no. 27, Poznań 2019. Pp. 373–387. Adam Mickiewicz University Press. ISSN 2300-391X. e-ISSN 2658-283X. DOI:https://doi.org/10.14746/ikps.2019.27.17 A growing body of literature has focused on individuals with autism spectrum disorder who are entering adulthood. Thus, one of the main topics is social interactions and the issue of their functioning in professional contexts. Researchers focus their attention on those individuals’ folk theories that are also crucial in the lives of the normative sample. One of the key folk theories that guide our professional lives is a folk image of the creative person. The folk theory is nothing more than tacit knowledge held by a group of people. It is a system of beliefs and an inner standard of assessment that serves us to explain, for example, why we believe that someone is creative or when we assess the effects of their work. The aim of this paper is to present chosen findings from our study of the folk theory of creativity and creative person using a sample of persons with an autism spectrum disorder. We used a reversed version of Klaus Urban’s and Hans Jellen’s Test for Creative Thinking – Drawing Production (TCT-DP) where respondents selected previously prepared drawings, instead of making them. Their task was to select the most and least creative drawings and rank all the drawings according totheir level of creativity. We also measured respondents’ levels of creative efficiency and creative identity.

6

Is Having Contradictory Beliefs Possible? Discussion and Critique of Arguments for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction

75%

Studia Semiotyczne

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2019

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vol. 33

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issue 2

EN

The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction which states that one cannot have, or cannot be described as having, contradictory beliefs. By differentiating two possible interpretations of PNC, descriptive and normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.

7

Eliminativní materialismus, lidová psychologie a jazyk myšlení:

63%

Dražil M.

Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)

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2020

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vol. 42

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issue 2

253-284

EN

The article provides an analysis of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I will distinguish two lines of argument in their eliminativism: one seeking to eliminate folk psychology and the second criticising Jerry Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis. Then I will closely examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program.

CS

Článek se věnuje rozboru eliminativního materialismu Paula a Patricie Churchlandových. V jejich eliminativismu rozliším dvě argumentační linie: jednu usilující o eliminaci lidové psychologie a druhou kritizující hypotézu jazyka myšlení Jerryho Fodora. Následně se blíže zaměřím na tuto druhou linii a ukáži, že představuje hlavní motiv práce Churchlandových od konce 80. let 20. století, a dále předvedu, proč úspěch argumentace proti hypotéze jazyka myšlení nezakládá důvod k eliminaci lidové psychologie. V závěru text přezkoumám důsledky tohoto přístupu pro roli lidové psychologie ve zkoumání mysli a ukazuje, že tato oslabená eliminativistická pozice stále naplňuje původní záměr programu Churchlandových.

8

Two arguments supporting the thesis of the predictive nature of reasons for action

51%

Piekarski M.

Studia Philosophiae Christianae

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2018

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vol. 54

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issue 1

93-119

EN

The dominant view in contemporary philosophy of action is that, to explain an action we need to provide a reason for it. A reason is what rationalises an action. According to Donald Davidson, before we can describe a reason we must identify the need that accompanies the performance of a given action, as well as the specific attitude of the agent to the action. The author of “Action, Reason and Cause” believes that the proattitude/ belief pair helps determine the reason for action, which is at the same time the action’s cause. Davidson’s view has a lot of supporters today and is strictly related to the so-called post-Humean theories of action. The objective of the present analysis is to demonstrate that the primary reason for action is not provided by the pro-attitude/belief pair, but by predictions due to which agents act in such and such a way. This expands on Elizabeth Anscombe’s intuition according to which each intention is predictive in nature. I will support the thesis about the predictive nature of reasons for action by means of two arguments. The first argument relies on the analysis of the Knobe effect concerning the asymmetry between attributing intentionality and attributing responsibility for actions; the other draws upon the theory of predictive processing. The remainder of this paper has the following structure: in §1, I will discuss Donald Davidson’s theory. §2 will focus on Elizabeth Anscombe’s conception. In §3, I will examine an argument drawn from the analysis of the Knobe effect, according to which an agent will intentionally perform a given action when he can predict the effects of performing it. §4 will introduce the problem of providing reasons for action in the context of folkpsychological explanations. §5 will examine the theory of predictive processing. §6 will demonstrate that predictions serve a specific, normative role in the decision-making processes, whereas §7 will advance the argument from predictive processing whereby to explain an action is to identify specific predictive reasoning which caused the action to be performed . In the Conclusions, I will show the consequences of my main thesis for the problem of the nature of actions and explanations, as well as the rationale for using folk-psychological categories.

9

William Ramsey o psychologii potocznej, racjonalności i pojęciu reprezentacji w naukach kognitywnych

51%

Gładziejewski P.

Diametros

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2012

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issue 31

33-55

PL

W książce Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey argumentuje przeciwko tezie, że naukowe (tj. kognitywistyczne) pojęcie reprezentacji mentalnych powinno zostać oparte na pojęciu reprezentacji zaczerpniętym z psychologii potocznej (tj. pojęciu reprezentacji mentalnych jako postaw propozycjonalnych, takich jak przekonania i pragnienia). Przedstawiony wywód ma za zadanie wykazać, że – wbrew temu, co twierdzi sam Ramsey – nawet jeśli potoczne pojęcie reprezentacji najprawdopodobniej nie stanie się częścią repozytorium pojęciowego kognitywistyki, to nie implikuje to, że przekonania, pragnienia czy racjonalność ludzkiego myślenia mogą zostać wyeliminowane z naturalistycznego rozumienia umysłu (systemu poznawczego) i procesów poznawczych. Kluczem do zrozumienia tego faktu jest ujęcie systemów poznawczych jako hierarchicznych, wielopoziomowych mechanizmów.

EN

In his book Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey argues against the view that the concept of mental representation employed by cognitive scientists should be based on the folk-psychological concept of mental representation as propositional attitudes. The author of the present article will attempt to show that, contrary to what Ramsey himself claims, the fact that the folk concept of mental representation will most likely not be a part of the conceptual repository of cognitive science does not imply that beliefs, desires or the rationality of human cognition should be eliminated from the naturalistic outlook on the nature of mind (construed as a cognitive system) and cognitive processes. The key to see that this is the case lies in understanding cognitive systems as multi-level, hierarchically organized mechanisms.

10

Antropodoksa polityczna jako kategoria teoretyczna i przedmiot badań

51%

Bachryj-Krzywaźnia M.

Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne

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2017

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vol. 23

21-40

EN

The article presents a meaning of the notion “political anthropodoxis” and justifies its analytical separation. The title category, inspired by the structure of philosophical anthropology thought and findings in folk psychology, is first placed into the system of political theory concepts. Its subsequent detailed characteristics is followed by outlined methodological perspective appropriate for its analysis.

11

Поиски бога в ранних дневниках Михаила Пришвина

51%

Krivolapova E.

Roczniki Humanistyczne

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2022

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vol. 70

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issue 7

87-100

PL

W artykule zostają poddane badaniu cechy szczególne religijno-filozoficznych poszukiwań Michaiła Michajłowicza Priszwina. Na materiale wczesnych dzienników pisarza przenalizowne są etapy jego dążeń do «słusznej wiary». Zostaje scharekteryzowana kulturalno-historyczna sytuacja Rosji końca XIX i początku XX wieku. Przedstawione są także analizy specyficznych cech świadomości religijnej inteligencji rosyjskiej. Autor zwraca szczególną uwagę na fenomen «starczestwa» i jego znaczenie w literaturze rosyjskiej. Zestawienie egodokumentalnych i artystycznych źródeł pozwala na stworzenie wyobrażenia o cechach szczególnych religijno-filozoficznego myślenia Priszwina, o sposobach przyswojenia przez niego psychologii i wiedzy ludowej.

EN

This article examines the features of the religious and philosophical quests of Mikhail Mikhaylovich Prishvin. Based on material from the writer’s early diaries, the various stages of his search for the “correct faith” are traced. The cultural, historical and religious situation in Russia at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century is characterised. The specific features of the religious consciousness of the Russian intelligentsia are also analysed. Special attention is paid to the phenomenon of the “eldership” and its significance in Russian literature. This comparison of Prishvin’s egodocumentary and artistic sources allows us to present specific aspects of his religious and philosophical thinking, and how Prishvin assimilated folk psychology and folk faith.

RU

В статье рассматриваются особенности религиозно-философских исканий Михаила Михайловича Пришвина. На материале ранних дневников писателя прослеживаются этапы его поисков «правильной веры». Характеризуется культурно-историческая и религиозная обстановка в России конца XIX – начала XX вв. Анализируются специфические черты религиозного сознания русской интеллигенции. Особое внимание уделяется феномену старчества и его значению в русской литературе. Сопоставление автодокументальных и художественных источников Пришвина позволяет составить представление об особенностях его религиозно-философского мышления, о способах усвоения Пришвиным народной психологии и народной веры.

12

Czy posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań jest możliwe? Omówienie i krytyka argumentów za psychologiczną zasadą niesprzeczności

38%

Tarnowski M.

Studia Semiotyczne

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2019

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vol. 33

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issue 2

EN

The aim of this paper is to present and analyze arguments provided for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction which states that one cannot have, or cannot be described as having, contradictory beliefs. By differentiating two possible interpretations of PNC, descriptive and normative, and examining arguments (ontological and methodological) provided for each of them separately I point out the flaws in reasoning in these arguments and difficulties with aligning PNC with the empirical data provided by research done in cognitive and clinical psychology. I claim that PNC cannot be derived from any metaphysical stance regarding the mental phenomena and that having contradictory beliefs should be regarded as possible. Furthermore, I argue that interpreting a subject as having contradictory beliefs, and therefore abandoning PNC, can be more effective in explaining the phenomena of contradictory beliefs and irrational behaviour than solutions consistent with the PNC.

PL

Celem tego tekstu jest rekonstrukcja i analiza argumentów przedstawianych za Psychologiczną Zasadą Niesprzeczności (PZN), stwierdzającą, że żaden podmiot nie może mieć sprzecznych przekonań lub być opisany jako posiadający sprzeczne przekonania. Poprzez rozróżnienie dwóch możliwych interpretacji PZN, deskryptywnej i normatywnej, oraz dokładne zbadanie argumentacji przedstawionej dla każdej z nich z osobna, wskazuję zawarte w nich błędy oraz problemy związane z uzgodnieniem ich z wynikami badań prowadzonych w psychologii poznawczej i klinicznej. Uzasadniam, dlaczego PZN nie może być wyprowadzona z żadnego ze stanowisk metafizycznych dotyczących nastawień sądzeniowych i że posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań powinno być uznane za możliwe. Następnie piszę, dlaczego zinterpretowanie niektórych podmiotów jako posiadających sprzeczne przekonania może być bardziej efektywne w wyjaśnianiu przypadków nieracjonalnego zachowania niż rozwiązania zgodne z PZN.

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Wyjaśnienie świadomości a problem scalania

What More is Folk Psychology?

Folk Psychology and Law: the Case of Eliminativism

A Socio-Linguistic Approach to the Development of Folk Psychology

Who Is a Creative Person? Conceptualisation of creativity by people with autism spectrum disorder.

Is Having Contradictory Beliefs Possible? Discussion and Critique of Arguments for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction

Eliminativní materialismus, lidová psychologie a jazyk myšlení:

Two arguments supporting the thesis of the predictive nature of reasons for action

William Ramsey o psychologii potocznej, racjonalności i pojęciu reprezentacji w naukach kognitywnych

Antropodoksa polityczna jako kategoria teoretyczna i przedmiot badań

Поиски бога в ранних дневниках Михаила Пришвина

Czy posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań jest możliwe? Omówienie i krytyka argumentów za psychologiczną zasadą niesprzeczności