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EN
This paper offers a critical reconstruction of the motivations that led to the development of mereology as we know it today, along with a brief description of some questions that define current research in the field.
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EN
A significant part of neo-positivist philosophy was Carnap’s project of the elimination of metaphysics by the logical analysis of language, pronounced in the article with that title. This project was aimed, among other things, at the creation of a so-called logical syntax of language which would enable metaphysical sentences to be revealed as senseless and thus their elimination from scientific discourse. In this text we first of all focus on Carnap’s definition of logical syntax in its historical context. We then analyse Carnap’s unsuccessful attempts to construct the logical syntax of language, showing that his difficulties in seeking logical syntax are not accidental, but have a systemic character, for they are connected with the way in which Carnap defined the problem. In conclusion we formulate the consequences of Carnap’s failure for his philosophical project of the elimination of metaphysics and for neo-positivism in general.
DE
Ein bedeutender Bestandteil der neopositivistischen Philosophie war Carnaps Projekt der im gleichnamigen Artikel angekündigten Eliminierung der Metaphysik durch die logische Sprachanalyse. Dieses Projekt hatte u. a. die Schaffung einer sog. Sprachsyntax zum Inhalt, mit der metaphysische Sätze als sinnlos identifiziert werden und vom wissenschaftlichen Diskurs ausgeschlossen werden könnten. Im vorliegenden Text widmen wir uns zunächst Carnaps Definition der logischen Syntax im historischen Kontext. Anschließend analysieren wir Carnaps erfolglose Versuche der Konstruktion einer logischen Sprachsyntax, wobei wir aufzeigen, dass seine Schwierigkeiten bei der Suche nach einer logischen Syntax nicht zufällig, sondern systemimmanent sind und mit der Art und Weise zusammenhängen, in der Carnap das Problem definiert hatte. Abschließend formulieren wir die Folgen von Carnaps Versagen für sein philosophisches Projekt der Eliminierung der Metaphysik und für den Neopositivismus als solchem.
Studia Humana
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 4
3-12
EN
The concept a finite multi-carrier algebraic system (FMAS) as well as a language for handling systems such as YAFOLL (Yet Another First Order Logic Language) are introduced. The applicability of such systems to building a mathematical model of a part of reality, i.e. a mathematical structure that can be asked questions about the properties of subject domain objects and processes, is demonstrated.
EN
The article reconstructs the development of Ingarden’s viewpoint on the notions of content and form of a literary work of art. The author of the article thus calls up a specific methodological proposition formulated by the phenomenologist, emphasizing the fact that he presented an innovative and original understanding of both these notions. He built his own understanding of content and form on the basis of the layered structure of literary works of art. Assumptions of the latter became the source of concrete and precise formulations of the meaning of both categories, which – in accordance with the message of the article – seem commendable and worth of being employed by the contemporary researchers of literature.
EN
According to Aristotle, logic is a tool for philosophy. After nearly two and a half thousand years, we can say that not only logic, but also other formal tools and structures (algebra, topology, branched proof, induction) are tools for philosophical and also scientific consideration. Jan F. Drewnowski supported the use of formal tools in philosophy. In this article I describe Drewnowski’s position in relation to the formal study of philosophical problems (using logic and mathematical concepts). I also present contemporary formal solutions to certain philosophical problems, which can be understood as a justification for Drewnowski’s anticipation of the „power of formalism” and which in his time -were not always well received.
XX
Za Arystotelesem logika postrzegana jest jako narzędzie filozofii. Po blisko 2 i pół tysiąca lat dostrzegamy, że nie tylko logika, ale także różne formalne narzędzia i struktury są narzędziami namysłu filozoficznego – i również – naukowego. Zwolennikiem takiego postrzegania sprawy był Jan F. Drewnowski. Narzędzia, o których mówię w tytule, to różnego rodzaju techniki i reguły wypracowane w naukach formalnych. Zaliczyć do nich możemy np. regułę modus ponens czy technikę dowodu rozgałęzionego. Z kolei przez strukturę formalną rozumiem pewien obiekt formalny np. algebrę Boole’a albo przestrzeń topologiczną, które pozwalają modelować przedmioty różnych dziedzin naukowych, w tym filozofii. W niniejszym artykule zarysuję główne idee Drewnowskiego (i tzw. Koła Krakowskiego na temat konieczności stosowania współczesnych jemu dokonań logicznych i matematycznych oraz pokażę, w jaki sposób ontologię Wittgensteina można modelować w strukturach krat (por. Wolniewicz) i w jaki sposób przestrzeń topologiczna pozwala na analizę tak różnych pojęć filozoficznych jak możliwy świat czy monada. Przykłady te posłużą do argumentacji za prawdziwością metodologicznych tez Drewnowskiego, że (1) stosowanie logiki symbolicznej (oraz różnych struktur formalnych) służy uściślaniu dowolnych dziedzin wiedzy (w tym filozofii) i – jak sądzę – (2) nie narusza bogactwa treści właściwych danej dziedzinie.
EN
As it is indicated in the title, this paper is devoted to the problem of defining mereological (collective) sets. Starting from basic properties of sets in mathematics and differences between them and so called conglomerates in Section 1, we go on to explicate informally in Section 2 what it means to join many objects into a single entity from point of view of mereology, the theory of part of (parthood) relation. In Section 3 we present and motivate basic axioms for part of relation and we point to their most fundamental consequences. Next three sections are devoted to formal explication of the notion of mereological set (collective set) in terms of sums, fusions and aggregates. We do not give proofs of all theorems. Some of them are complicated and their presentation would divert the reader’s attention from the main topic of the paper. In such cases we indicate where the proofs can be found and analyzed by those who are interested.
EN
In the presented analyses we propose a formal complement to a certain version of the semantics of possible worlds inspired by Leibniz’s ideas and provide an adequate logic of it. As the starting point we take the approach of Benson Mates (Leibniz on possible worlds). Mates refers to Leibniz’ philosophy, but also uses tools of contemporary semantics of possible worlds and elaborates on an original conception of predication due to which possible worlds can be identified with collections of certain concepts, and not individuals. We complete a fragmentary description given by Mates in order to analyze if his conception allows for the establishment of this specific idea of a possible world. Our first step is to define a notion of the individual concept and describe possible world semantics in which possible worlds consist of individual concepts of compossible individuals (s-worlds). Our second step is to choose some version of modal free logic with the identity (S5MFLID), which is complete in our reformulation of Mates’ semantics. The connections between standard interpretation of S5MFLID and semantics inspired by Mates show that our logic does not distinguish s-worlds from i-worlds – counterparts of s-worlds that are collections of individuals.
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