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EN
Political will acts as a key component of the political process, the understanding of the essence of political events and the development of mechanisms for the modernization of socio-political life. The systematization of the motivational factors for implementing political will in decisions of the ruling elite and consolidation of the social outlook within the framework of the national identification process will allow establishing the essence of the determination of the political process, as well as identifying the key problems of balancing the socio-political environment and rationalizing the methodology of public policy development. Of particular importance is the above-mentioned problem within the Ukrainian socio-political space. The complexity of modernizing management institutes, regulating channels of power-public interaction and leveling up the confrontation of social initiatives requires the urgent development of algorithms for the transformation of a political system based on the materialization of social political will and the reconciliation of public expectations with the functional guides of key political actors. A prerequisite for these progressive advances is the theoretical understanding of the processes of practical implementation of the political interests of civil society in political decisions of the ruling elite, which is possible on the basis of studying the motivation of political will as the basis for reforming the socio-political sphere and the driving force of the gradual improvement of the political arrangement of the state system. Understanding the will as a regulator of human behavior and activity is expressed in the ability to overcome internal and external difficulties in the process of the implementation of purposeful actions and actions. It is the will to control the incentive to act and act in accordance with the purpose. Will and her motivation are the most important components of the deliberate behavior of a statesman. If the motivation is primarily responsible for initiating behavior (the formation of intentions), the will is responsible for their implementation. Considering the essence of the concept of «political will» through the prism of the practical measurement of the political process, the extraordinary value in the context of the search for the root causes and the development of mechanisms for modernizing public administration is to prevent the negative phenomena of politics - the centralization of political power and authoritarianization of the political system. After all, the greatest potential and opportunities for the implementation of motivated political will are fixed by the political actors endowed either by democratic procedures or through the form of organization of the political regime of power preferences. As with the functioning of representative democracy of the Western model with the prevalence of the legislative institution and the presidential form of the organization of political power inherent in certain countries of the post-Soviet political space, the implementation of a functional program for modeling state policy is de facto consolidated by representatives of the authorities. In any case, the political will of a separate political actor in the implementation of national policies should not prevail over the collective initiatives of civil society. Only then, representative democracy, based on the articulation of public interests by democratically oriented politicians, will not turn into a state system of an authoritarian type, where the definition of the course of foreign and domestic policy of the country will be in the plane of individual beliefs of one or more political actors. Expansion of the motivational paradigm of political will becomes especially relevant for defining the content of democratization processes in the post-Soviet political space, including in Ukraine. The long process of formation of Ukrainian statehood was accompanied by the arrival of a number of political forces, which were marked by different political views and a change in the constitutional matrix of the organization of political space. However, not always the political will of the country’s elite to form the course of state policy was in the field of national benchmarks of the Ukrainian public. As a result, the dissonance of the political will of the authorities and public institutions has led to political activation of the public and reformatting political power on the basis of popular will. The coincidence of various factors of a subjective and objective nature put the Ukrainian state in front of the choice of a vector for further political development. Challenges are not only in the field of consolidation of public landmarks, but also in rationalizing the administrative and management system and improving the program of political actions of the ruling elite. So, as a general conclusion, we note the following. Whatever the active role played by the will in the activity of a statesman, one can not completely deny that it is determined by a set of objective conditions and subjective factors, the material relations in which a person is. Will, as a driving force, is the concentration of energy that the subject receives from society, a form of manifestation of political activity, which includes the political consciousness and behavior of the subject of politics, and is directed, first of all, to the realization of interests and needs, related to the achievement of power, its maintenance, strengthening and use. An essential characteristic of political will is the ability of a political entity, through the appropriate volitional effort, to consistently pursue its goals and objectives in the field of political life, which involves the development, clear and clear articulation of political requirements and programs, the ability to adjust its goals and actions in relation to certain circumstances. The main motivational factors and at the same time the semantic core of the realization of political will are political values and the installation of social and individual consciousness, the political and legal culture of the subject of political activity. Volitional efforts can be related to biologically determined predispositions of the individual. Along with this, the motivation of political leaders in resolving political problems by volitional efforts is often caused by external factors, which indicates a significant reduction in their role of internal moral control. External motives can drive a policy maker in favor of a solution that will bring immediate benefits, but its long-term consequences will be negative. Therefore, when making decisions, one must always take into account the voice of conscience and think about how one or another solution will affect other people. Ideally, volitional activity of subjects of political activity should be limited not only to moral values, but also to the corresponding rules and norms. Only in this case, it will meet the idea of achieving the public good.
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Teizm a twardy inkompatybilizm

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PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie stanowiska zwanego twardym inkompatybilzimem i po­rów­nanie go z teistyczną, a w szczególności współczesną chrześcijańską koncepcją wolności woli ludzkiej. Twardy inkompatybilizm głosi, że wolność woli ludzkiej, rozumiana zarówno w sposób libertariański, jak i kompatbilistyczny, nie istnieje. W artykule zwraca się uwagę na pewną zbież­ność między tezą twardego inkompatybilizmu a opartą na Biblii mądrością chrześcijańską, gło­szącą zależność ontyczną i aksjologiczną człowieka od Boga. Zarazem jednak argumentuje się, że jednym z najważniejszych składników teologii i filozofii chrześcijańskiej jest doktryna o wol­ności woli ludzkiej i ludzkiej odpowiedzialności za zło. Doktryna ta jest niespójna z twar­dym inkompatybilizmem. W części końcowej artykułu przedstawiona jest syntetycznie propo­zy­cja, jak można uzgodnić ze sobą tezę indeterminizmu metafizycznego, która jest spójna z twar­dym in­komatybilizmem, z tezą libertarianizmu, która jest niespójna z twardym inkompaty­bi­lizmem.
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The aim of the article is to present and to compare the view on human freedom called hard incompatibilism with the contemporary Christian doctrine on human free will. Hard incompati­bilism claims that human free will understood both in a libertarian and compatibilist way does not exist. One stresses in the paper that there is a similarity between hard incompatibilism and Chri­stian wisdom rooted in the Bible and this similarity consists in the fact that humans are deeply dependent in their existence on external conditions. Hard incompatiblism identifies that con­di­tions simply as the external or physical world and Christian wisdom points to God as an onto­logical and axiological foundation of human being and prospects. However, one argues in the paper that the doctrine of human freedom and responsibility for sin and moral evil is a crucial part of the Christian theology and philosophy. Thus, the Christian doctrine is incoherent with hard incompatibilism. There is a proposal, put forth in the last part of the article, how one can recon­cile metaphysical indeterminism—which is coherent with hard incompatibilism—with the liber­tarian doctrine on the human free will, which is coherent with the Christian view on the na­ture of human freedom.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu są rozważania o wolności człowieka. Nietzsche przede wszystkim neguje koncepcje wolnej woli, która jest tak zakorzeniona w powszechnej świadomości. Uważa jednak, że możliwe jest zdobycie wolności, a raczej jej nieustanne zdobywanie. Człowiek wolny jest wojownikiem. Do tego zdolny jest tylko nadczłowiek jako doskonały byt, charakteryzujący się dużym natężeniem woli mocy, dzięki której jest zdolny do indywidualnej twórczości. Większość ludzi, która żąda wolności, traktuje ją jako zabezpieczenie przed silnymi jednostkami. W rzeczywistości bowiem kwestią podstawową jest silna, bądź słaba wola, każdy chce zdobyć przewagę, a nie jedynie cieszyć się niezależnością wobec innych.
EN
The subject of the article is an analysis of the idea of human liberty. Nietzsche denies the idea of freedom of will. Although he believes that it is possible to become free, that freedom is a realizable ideal. Human beings are able to improve. Nietzsche is creating the concept of superman as a more excellent kind of being. Nietzsche’s elitism was devoted towards the self-creation of an individuality of great strength. People demand freedom only when they have no power. Freedom means that the manly instincts dominate over other instincts. The free man is a warrior. Freedom is the will to be responsible to ourselves. In real life it is only a question of strong and weak wills.
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PL
Artykuł podejmuje zagadnienie wolności w kontekście metafizyki i epistemologii Locke’a. W pierwszej części zostały wyróżnione trzy zasadnicze znaczenia, w jakich występuje termin wolność: dobrowolność, wolność działania oraz wolność woli. Przez dobrowolność Locke rozumie zdolność do działania zgodnego z tym, czego chce podmiot. Wolność działania wyraża się w zdolności zarówno do podjęcia jak i zaniechania określonego działania. Zaś wolność woli jest to zdolność do powstrzymania się od działania i dokonania jego oceny biorąc pod uwagę bardziej odległy cel, do którego podmiot dąży. W drugiej części podjęto próbę rozstrzygnięcia dwóch problematycznych kwestii w kontekście wyróżnionych odmian wolności: czy zasadne jest uznawanie poglądów Locke’a za zgodnych ze stanowiskiem kompatybilizmu a także jaki jest związek odmian wolności z moralną odpowiedzialnością podmiotu za swoje czyny. Analiza tych zagadnień wykazała, że tylko dobrowolność może współwystępować z koniecznością, dlatego aby móc określić zgodność poglądów Locke’a z kompatybilizmem należy wskazać, którą z odmian wolności się przyjmuje. Biorąc pod uwagę drugą kwestię uznano, że moralna odpowiedzialność jest związana z wszystkimi odmianami wolności.
XX
The article presents the problem of freedom in Locke’s metaphysics and epistemology. The analysis of the source text shows, that he uses the concept of freedom in the three different meanings. The first one is voluntary that can be described as the power to do what the agent wants. Next is freedom of action which is the ability to do what the agent wants to do and also to stop doing this whenever he wants to. The last one is freedom of will that means the power to refrain from performing an action. After that the agent can think about his decision and make it more thoughtful and accurate. In order to characterize these kinds of freedom it is necessary to answer to following questions: Which kind of these three types of freedom presented by John Locke is compatible with determinism? And the second question is: what kind of freedom relates to moral responsibility? The final analysis shows that only voluntary can coexist with determinism. Therefore Locke should not be interpreted as compatibilist for all of three kinds of freedom in his theory. Answering to the second question, moral responsibility is connected with every kind of freedom. In each case an agent has the free choice and can realize his own desires.
EN
In the article, I try to present an outline of the theory of responsibility. Its double root – based on the logical distinction between criterion and testimony – is derived from Abelard’s anthropology of action and the theory of personhood developed by Timothy Chappell. Initially, I discuss the metaphysical difficulties related to the problem of freedom (especially linked with determinism). Afterwards, following Abelard, I try to indicate an anthropological justification of punishment based on guilt. The last part of the paper is devoted to the attempt to enter the free will into a broader view of Chappell’s theory. The aim of the work is to prepare the ground for future studies on the proleptic notion of personhood and its further application within the philosophy of law.
EN
Ancient philosophy distinguished three meanings of the notion of freedom: an individual man's freedom of choice and decision, freedom of social-political life and freedom (sovereignty) of the state. This latter meaning was considered the most important form of freedom. In his conception of an “ideal state” Plato advised abolition of private property and monogamy for the political élite (the so called “guards”), which is a feature of a totalitarian state. He distinguished three models of state: monarchic, aristocratic and democratic. He accepted the latter model, but he warned against maximising individual freedom, as it leads to anarchy in social life, which in turn is a source of tyranny. Aristotle appreciated democracy more, as it best puts into effect the postulates of freedom, equality and justice. The other form of freedom, according to his approach, is freedom understood as enabling a man to choose rationally, which should be preceded by reflection. His conception of man's existential freedom (proaíresis) is close to the theory of free will (liberum arbitrium) in the Christian thought. The Stoics concentrated their attention on inner-moral freedom that they identified with the attitude of keeping a distance to man's existential vicissitudes. Some of them (Marcus Aurelius) joined the idea of inner freedom with philosophy of naturalistic pantheism, others (Epictetus) considered God as the source of moral freedom. Plotinus was also mainly interested in man's inner freedom, which he explained in the context of the pantheistic conception of the absolute.
Roczniki Teologiczne
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2020
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vol. 67
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issue 7
111-139
EN
The article focuses on two topics of Martin Luther’s theology - his vision of God and the understanding of freedom of will. It does so through the prism of two contemporary interpretations of the Reformer’s theology prepared by Oswald Bayer and Hans-Martin Barth, reputable researchers of Martin Luther. Their analyses, which differ in their perspective and order, show the theology of Martin Luther as imbued with the radical vision of an almighty God and passive man who has no freedom of will regarding salvation. These reconstructions were inscribed in the diagnosis of key structures of Martin Luther’s theology by Albrecht Beutel: its rooting in the Christocentric interpretation of the Bible, its understanding in terms of the art of discrimination, and its basing on experience.
PL
Artykuł skupia się na dwóch wątkach teologii Marcina Lutra – jego wizji Boga i pojmowaniu wolności woli. Czyni to przez pryzmat dwóch współczesnych interpretacji teologii Reformatora przygotowanych przez renomowanych luterologów – Oswalda Bayera i Hansa-Martina Bartha. Ich odmienne w swej perspektywie i uporządkowaniu analizy ukazują teologię Marcina Lutra jako przepojoną radykalną wizją Boga wszechmocnego i pasywnego człowieka, który nie posiada wolności woli w kwestii zbawienia. Te rekonstrukcje teologii wittenberczyka zostały wpisane w pochodzącą od Albrechta Beutela diagnozę kluczowych struktur teologii Marcina Lutra: jej zakorzenienie w chrystocentrycznej wykładni Pisma Świętego, jej pojmowanie w kategoriach sztuki rozróżniania oraz jej oparcie na doświadczeniu.
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