Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 13

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  genus
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2021
|
vol. 10
|
issue 2
321-350
EN
This paper examines St. Thomas Aquinas’s and Immanuel Kant’s notions of measurement and judgment, particularly measuring and judging beauty, to demonstrate their respective conclusions about the highest achievement of man. For St. Thomas’s view, I draw from a variety of St. Thomas’s writings as well as rely on Peter Redpath’s research into St. Thomas’s understanding of measuring and judging. For Kant’s view, I focus on Kant’s perspective as written in The Critique of Judgement. In this paper, I argue that by examining the way both St. Thomas and Kant measure and judge beauty, we can see that, for Kant, man’s highest achievement is to live the moral life, while for St. Thomas, man’s highest achievement is to know the good and God. Interestingly, for both philosophers, their conclusions about man’s highest achievements wind through their understanding of beauty and the way beauty is measured and judged.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2018
|
vol. 7
|
issue 2
159-179
EN
An understanding of the philosophical genus contributes to the perfection of the act of the philosophical habit of the human soul because reality is constituted by a multitude of overlapping genera. Because genera are constituted by a multitude of species unequally related to their generic aim, St. Thomas’s teaching on virtual quantity facilitates an understanding of the diversity of being. Analogy is an act of judgment that expresses an unequally proportionate relationship between beings. Like genus, analogy has to do with a multitude of beings unequally related to a primary subject; as such, analogy is the language of philosophy. To see ‘a city come into being in speech’ in Book II of The Republic is to be trained to observe the relation between real beings, to make correct judgments about those relationships, and to thereby be properly oriented toward reality.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2021
|
vol. 10
|
issue 4
789-812
EN
The paper addresses the matter of differences of aesthetic judgment by examining Shakespeare’s Tempest through the Thomistic understanding of substance and of beauty. It seeks principally to explore three elements of aesthetic inquiry: (1) what characterizes the subject who perceives beauty? (2) what characterizes the object of aesthetic experience? and (3) how do aesthetic judgments differ from sensual perceptions? The Tempest serves as particularly fruitful territory for such exploration in virtue of the persons of Miranda and Caliban, who by the limitations of their experience delineate the generic borders, the degrees of virtual quantum excellence, which characterize the beautiful object. Their education at the hand of Prospero likewise elucidates somewhat the process of aesthetic training.
EN
The names of plants are presented as an example of the way in which terminological items are treated in the Academic Dictionary of Contemporary Czech (ASSČ). The general principles applied are accuracy and comprehensibility of explanation, while specific rules include the proper choice of the genus proximum and theparaphrasing of botanical terms necessary for the description of the plant. The treatment of the genus and the treatment of the species differ in the position of the botanical name in the entry. We also discuss the treatment of polysemic lexemes of this semantic group, as well as the treatment of plant families. The principles are illustrated using examples of completed entries.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2019
|
vol. 8
|
issue 3
515-545
EN
The term “genus” has evolved over time. This paper traces development of the word from the common usage of Ancient Greece, through the pre-Socratic philosophers and Plato, and up to the more technical use in Aristotle. It began in common use to mean a class or race of people, most specifically referring to people with a common parentage. The pre-Socratics applied the term to refer to things that were generated. Plato used the term to refer to groups of people generated by a common interest or aim. Aristotle employed it in different ways based on his predecessors. This paper makes comparisons between these usages and the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. It argues that understanding the development of “genus” facilitates understanding how Thomas Aquinas used it.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2020
|
vol. 9
|
issue 2
209-236
EN
Parmenides was not a metaphysician (he was a materialist), so there is no such thing as Parmenidean metaphysics. Plato’s Parmenides, however, offers metaphysical insights otherwise overlooked by readers unfamiliar to what St. Thomas Aquinas offers concerning the One and the Many. This article highlights some of these insights and will interest students of St. Thomas. It might also acquaint students of Plato to a more perfect metaphysics, and it could even corrode the beliefs of others who maintain that there is no such thing as metaphysics. The fact that none of the sciences may dispense with the first science is brought heavily to bear upon the reader of the Parmenides, who finds it otherwise impossible to resolve any of the difficulties attendant upon reconciling the One and the Many. The many apparent contradictions between the One and the Many displayed in Plato’s Parmenides really cannot be solved without sound metaphysics, and sound metaphysics cannot proceed unaided by St. Thomas and his inheritors. Go to Thomas to understand Plato’s Parmenides.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2019
|
vol. 8
|
issue 2
351-399
EN
The author makes an attempt to show why (1) Darwin’s teaching in The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection and The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex cannot be “scientific” in a modern, classical, or any, sense and that, consequently, in them, (2) Darwin did not scientifically prove the reality of evolution of species. He claims that, while the question of the origin of genera and species is principally and primarily a metaphysical problem, Darwin’s ignorance of the nature of philosophy and metaphysics and the complexity of the problem of the nature of genera and species caused him mistakenly to frame this metaphysical problem as one of physics, more precisely as one of biology, which Darwin reduced to a natural history of living, physical beings.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2019
|
vol. 8
|
issue 3
681-716
EN
The chief aim of this article is to show that St. Thomas Aquinas’s Fourth Way of demonstrating God’s existence can only be made precisely intelligible by comprehending it as a real, generic whole in light of its specific organizational principles. Considered as a real, generic whole, this argument is one from effect to cause (from a real order of more or less perfectly existing generic, specific, and individual beings [habens esse] more or less perfectly possessing generic, specific, and individual ways of being within qualitatively different, hierarchical, orders of existence to a first cause of this order of perfections). In addition, this article maintains that, to comprehend this complicated argument, readers mush be familiar with philosophical principles that St. Thomas repeatedly uses throughout his major works, but with which most of his contemporary students tend to be unfamiliar. Consequently, a secondary aim of this paper is to introduce readers unfamiliar with them to some of these principle so that they may be able better to comprehend what St. Thomas is saying in this demonstration and in other teachings of his as well.
10
71%
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2016
|
vol. 5
|
issue 1
33-53
EN
In this article the author discusses Peter A. Redpath’s understanding of the nature of philosophy and his account of how erroneous understandings of philosophy have led to the decline of the West and to the separation of philosophy from modern science and modern science from wisdom. Following Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, Redpath argues that philosophy is a sense realism because it begins in wonder about real things known through the senses. Philosophy presupposes pre-philosophical knowledge, common sense, which consists of principles rooted in sensation that make human experience, sense wonder, and philosophy possible. Philosophy is certain knowledge demonstrated through causes and thus philosophy is the same as science. Redpath understands science as a habit that we acquire through repeated practice. More precisely, a scientific habit is a simple quality of the intellect that enables us to demonstrate (prove) the necessary properties of a genus through their causes or principles. In this way, science is the study of the one and the many. Redpath argues that metaphysics is the final cause of the arts and sciences, providing the foundation for all of the arts and sciences and justifying their principles. Finally, he argues that with modernity’s loss of belief in God and its rejection of metaphysics as a science, utopian socialism has become an historical/political substitute for metaphysics.
Studia Gilsoniana
|
2020
|
vol. 9
|
issue 4
625-650
EN
This paper is written to articulate in a summary form 14 evidently-known essential and personalistic principles from the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas needed, especially by Pope Francis, to understand a third period of neo-Thomism we are now in: Born-again, or Ragamuffin, Thomism. It maintains that, without application of these principles to the Church’s “new evangelization,” this movement will fail. With that failure the Church will be unable to halt the cultural suicide in which the West is presently engaged.
EN
This article argues that, strictly speaking, from its inception with the ancient Greeks and for all time, philosophy and science are identical and consist in an essential relationship between a specific type of understanding of the human person as possessed of an intellectual soul capable of being habituated and a psychologically-independent composite whole, or organization. It maintains, further, that absence of either one of the extremes of this essential relationship cannot be philosophy/science and, if mistaken for such and applied to the workings of cultural institutions, will generate anarchy within human culture and make leadership excellence impossible to achieve. Finally, it argues that only a return to this “common sense” understanding of philosophy can generate the leadership excellence that can save the West from its current state of cultural and civilizational anarchy.
EN
Since most pressing today on a global scale is to be able to unite religion, philosophy, and science into parts of a coherent civilizational whole, and since the ability to unite a multitude into parts of a coherent whole essentially requires understanding the natures of the things and the way they can or cannot be essentially related, this paper chiefly considers precisely why the modern world has been unable to effect this union. In so doing, it argues that the chief cause of this inability to unite these cultural natures has been because the contemporary world, and the West especially, has lost its understanding of philosophy and science and has intentionally divorced from essential connection to wisdom. Finally, it proposes a common sense way properly to understand these natures, reunite them to wisdom, and revive Western and global civilization.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.