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EN
The article describes the problems of Polish military forces in the context of a relatively new type of threat, commonly described as “hybrid warfare”. The first step of the analysis is a description of such threat, based on data gathered by Polish and foreign analytical centers. The next step is a presentation of the current state of Polish military forces – in terms of doctrine, organization, training and materiel (e.g. equipment). This kind of data analysis offers relevant information about defense capabilities that the Polish Armed Forces have and those which they lack. These capabilities are then compared to the challenges posed by hybrid warfare, thus providing insights on potential new capabilities which should be acquired as well as those which are unnecessary in the context of hybrid war.
EN
The main objective of the article is to prove the need for the state to have a centralised legal strategy to ensure the protection of state interests on an international level during a hybrid conflict. Centralisation of control and the planning and implementation of legal actions on an international level are core elements of such a strategy, especially for actions under the jurisdiction of international institutions. This article provides an analysis of treaties and of the practice of adjudication in Ukraine during the conflict with the Russian Federation. The findings of the study show that the legal dimension of hybrid conflict has some sub-levels: legal actions of states in hybrid conflicts taken at interstate level; the level of enterprises controlled by the state; and the private level. The practice of Ukraine shows that the exercising of a multilevel legal encounter during a hybrid war faces a number of problems including the intersection of actions (sometimes even direct conflict), even among authorities involved in the legal protection of state interests; and problems with collecting and analysing the information necessary to protect state interests in the legal dimension; state authorities that are not directly involved in a legal encounter may exercise actions which will complicate the legal position of the state. One of the first steps taken by the state in a hybrid conflict is, therefore, to create special authority or entrust an existing one with the coordination of the functions of lawfare. The next step of such an authority is the strategic "programming" of the opponent's legal actions with the aim of achieving an advantage in the legal dimension of a hybrid conflict.
EN
The course of present armed conflicts indicates the use of different instruments of power, whose major purpose is to gain control over the society and then exploit its resources. The nomenclature mentions hybrid warfare more and more frequently while seeking effective countermeasures against it. This topic is related to the creation of a new structure in the Polish Army – the Territorial Defence Force. The article presents the determinants conditioning the creation of the discussed formation and its assigned tasks. It analyses the expected objectives of the Territorial Defence Force as regards the adopted organisational structure, capability to perform its tasks and the established recruitment and training system. The article focuses in particular on countering tools of attack used in hybrid actions. The author refers to the course of events during modern asymmetric armed conflicts, for example in eastern Ukraine. Methods used by a potential enemy and the possible countermeasures exercised by the Territorial Defence Force are taken into consideration. The conclusions include an assessment of the importance of the new formation for Polish national security and defence.
EN
The article aims to analyze the role of economic sanctions in the People’s Republic of China’s overall approach to achieving its security objectives in the international arena. During the last two decades, Beijing used this instrument on numerous occasions to exert pressure on a varied group of actors. China’s current strategy toward a range of disputes and conflicts it is engaged in (the South China Sea territorial disputes most prominently stand out) is often described using the popular vocabulary of “hybrid warfare” or “grey zone conflicts”. Putting the conceptual complications aside, the author agrees that the PRC’s approach can be viewed as part of a growing trend for great powers to employ what can be called “hybrid strategies” toward its opponents. As part of a broader category of economic statecraft, economic sanctions form an important element of this approach. Considering current scholarship on both “hybrid” (or “grey area”) warfare and economic sanctions, the article answers the question of why the PRC increasingly resorts to hybrid strategies (including economic coercion) and identifies the main characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions. It also provides preliminary conclusions on their effectiveness.
EN
Since 2014 the term hybrid warfare and threats has become catchword. This term (hybrid warfare) was introduced to academic discourse by William J. Nemeth in 2002 in relation to the wars in Chechnya and popularised in 2006 by Frank G. Hoffman in relation, among other things, to the second Intifada. In 2014 after the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of fighting in  eastern Ukraine, the terms hybrid war and hybrid threats were transferred from scholarly discussion to politics and official documents. The author seeks to answer the following question: is the invention of so called hybrid warfare and hybrid threats something new, or rather a confused reaction to  European Union and NATO astonishment at  Russian activity in  the eastern and southern frontiers of Ukraine. The fact that armed conflict includes mixed elements of regular and irregular forms of armed combat, guerillas and terrorists, criminal acts, use of new technologies to conduct armed, information, psychological or economic warfare is not new. Scholars who investigate hybrid conflicts give examples of historic wars starting from the war between Rome and the Germans ( Publius Quinctilius Varus campaign in 9 AD against German tribes led by Arminius), through the war of independence in the USA, to the Chechen wars. Nowadays, greater and greater dependence on technology, information delivered in almost real time and the creation of more elaborate and complicated procedures and decisive processes in Western countries have increased the vulnerability to hostile actions other than military ones and ones that use military force.
EN
Unrest, conflicts, and wars in various parts of the world have created huge political and business opportunities for private military companies. They can gather intelligence, provide security for rich and powerful political actors, and provide mercenaries to interest groups worldwide. Private Russian military forces with close ties to President Vladimir Putin are used in war zones and continue expanding their presence in many regions worldwide. The Wagner Group is the most famous Russian mercenary unit. It gained notoriety mainly by supporting Russian forces in the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. At that time, it also provided one of the services that the authorities in the Kremlin particularly appreciate in their actions, and that is the lack of attribution for conducting armed conflicts, thanks to which mercenaries play the role of separatist fighters. Since then, the organisation has been deployed in many countries, including Syria, Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Venezuela, always to covertly support representatives of regimes favoured by Putin. Like all other mercenary units in Russia, the Wagner Group does not officially exist, because Russian law does not allow mercenary activities. The article has two main objectives: first, to present an analysis of the activities of the Wagner Group, using the currently available information; second, to prove that the concept of hybrid warfare could best explain the Kremlin’s use of Russian mercenaries.
EN
This paper deals with the concept of political topology in the light of geopolitics and hybrid warfare. Traditional geopolitics can be regarded as a point of departure for the search for better tools for political decision making. Comparison and confrontation of different, theoretical and practical, concepts of hybrid warfare can be heuristically inspiring and lead to a compact system of politically relevant knowledge – to political topology.
EN
The article deals with the problem of usage of “energy weapon” in hybrid war. The author makes retrospective review of “energy weapon” usage by Russia against Ukraine. Author shows the historical roots of confrontation, starting from the revolutionary times (1917–1921).
EN
The course of present armed conflicts indicates the use of different instruments of power, whose major purpose is to gain control over the society and then exploit its resources. The nomenclature mentions hybrid warfare more and more frequently while seeking effective countermeasures against it. This topic is related to the creation of a new structure in the Polish Army – the Territorial Defence Force. The article presents the determinants conditioning the creation of the discussed formation and its assigned tasks. It analyses the expected objectives of the Territorial Defence Force as regards the adopted organisational structure, capability to perform its tasks and the established recruitment and training system. The article focuses in particular on countering tools of attack used in hybrid actions. The author refers to the course of events during modern asymmetric armed conflicts, for example in eastern Ukraine. Methods used by a potential enemy and the possible countermeasures exercised by the Territorial Defence Force are taken into consideration. The conclusions include an assessment of the importance of the new formation for Polish national security and defence.
EN
Russian hybrid approach is based on their understanding of threats; Russians feel themselves as victims of Western policies, sanctions and information policy. According to Russian military doctrine and theory, information warfare is conducted continuously in peacetime and wartime alike. The Russian elite consider comprehensive hybrid approach as one of the most important elements in foreign affairs. It uses a combination of tools, such as wide-ranging political and diplomatic commitment, the leverage of the energy, economic retaliation, strengthening of the military capabilities, development assistance, propaganda, intelligence and cyber activities. The priorities of Russian information operations are promoting special bilateral relations with EU member states while exploiting the different interests and contradictions within EU. The goal of mediacampaigns and propaganda is to undermine dominant Western media sources and narratives. As part of information operations Russia has begun to cooperate with and support radical and anti-establishment groups in the EU. The effectiveness of Russian information policy abroad comes at high costs but it is still limited in its outcomes. Russian policy in the EU will be increasingly directed towards polarization of different institutions, countries, parties and particular interest groups.
EN
The “Russian world” concept is constantly employed in political and media discourse. Despite its active use, no single comprehensive definition exists in scientific literature. In this study, a brief version of the “Russian world” term conceptualization was presented, including two categorical series of semantic formations (social groups and value systems) and three axiological conceptual functions of the “Russian world”. In addition, newly formed narratives in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war encountered only within the framework of Ukrainian discourse were identified. As research material, Russian and Ukrainian-language texts from the Ukrainian media reflecting the consequences of Russia’s military actions on the territory of Ukraine through the prism of the “Russian world” concept were adopted. The work was conducted applying semantic analysis, contextual analysis, and the substitution method.
EN
The term ‘hybrid warfare’ proved to be very popular among academics, military thinkers and professionals leading to a variety of definitions and approaches. It was linked with the new generation concept popularised by Russian military thought. The essence of the hybridity is not new, as using a combination of military and non-military instruments is as old as mankind and is recognised but interpreted differently. The paper examines both the concept and its implementation based on case studies and theoretical considerations. It debates possible ways of using it to confront targeted nations by a combination of a variety of tools and approaches.
13
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Digital Subversion

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EN
The aim of this article is to review and identify main attributes of a new form of subversion, so called digital subversion. Digital subversion is relatively new phenomena frequently used as vital part of nowadays resistance movement and hybrid warfare tactics. The article looks at subversion from the point of history through resistance movement and current use of hybrid warfare tactics where digital subversion can be considered as a vehicle for the deployment and achievement of other elements, tools and objectives of hybrid warfare. Within the digital subversion operating concept can be identified such elements and tools like online trolling, digital and social media, digital activism, digital media and marginally also cyber operations. Conclusion is focused on strategic and institutional perspective of how to counter digital subversion. An article expands today view on subversion as a vital element of resistance movement and hybrid warfare fused with cyberspace to a digital subversion.
EN
Article is devoted to studying of specifics of the military-political conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The analysis is based on idea of what the classical theory of a political conflict is extremely limited approaches studying of all brinks of a political conflict. Leaving linearity and staging of political process (a phase of tension, instability, a contradiction and collision), the modern political conflict on the example of the East of Ukraine can have some unusual aspects. First of all it is informal support and the help from other state, this imposing by method of blackmail by one of participants of the conflict of own benefits in exchange for the terminations of open collisions. The conflict problem in the East of Ukraine has peculiar, poorly studied line: modeling and development of the conflict by intelligence agencies of other state. The political conflict in the East of Ukraine has no latent phase as in it is mute lines unusual for the classical conflicts are mixed: intervention of other state, informal military support of one of participants of the conflict, promotion of concrete ultimatums to authorities by the indirect participant of the conflict, mixing of electoral and political technologies (radicalism of electorate on the basis of political myths). In it is a high time in the analysis of the conflict in the East of Ukraine many experts too specifics of the organization of the political power in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions don’t join. It is first of all about the interested financial and industrial groups which in the activity have carried out synthesis of complete control over financial and economic activity of the region before direct influence on the electoral choice of his population. In view of orientation of economic contacts and mental orientations towards Russia, the political elite of the East of Ukraine in the investigation of disagreement with the movement of «Euromaidan» has appeared in a desperate situation: she has ceased to have authority among the population; wishing to keep the economic capitals, the elite as a result has lost control over a situation; and in she is a high time too I have reached oppositional position to the new power. The specified factors in the sum have led to opening of mental space for handling technologies from interested parties. Without wishing to lose from the geopolitical field Ukraine, the hybrid political conflict has also been introduced. Complexity of his studying consists in an absence factor in him two key factors: first of all latent phase and mechanism of his full permission. Instead the multistage mechanism of his suppression, but not permission is offered by politicians and scientists. The essence consists in the fact that according to «game theory» the scenario «the world in war on the terms of the winner» is offered. At the same time winners both Ukraine, and Russia equally want to see themselves. In practice it leads to the fact that any technology of permission of a political conflict in the form of negotiation process, a mediator, involvement of the third party won’t have qualitative effect. A paradox of a situation is that the parties don’t wish to go on compromises. Each of the parties by method of tightening of time expects when the second party is forced to offer a string of concessions and weakening of tension. In this context the research is also devoted to studying of the specified technologies from outside of both foreign, and domestic scientific developments.
EN
The article is devoted to the mass-media manipulation of information in Russia, in Russian-Ukrainian conflict with the help of the media controlled by government. The authors point out that the Kremlin has always manipulated the content of information, and with the beginning of the Revolution of Dignity manipulation and disinformation has gained unimaginable momentum, treating Maidan as a negative event, as a coup. At the moment of aggression in the network appeared hundreds of websites and social network groups, which “objectively” are informing about the events. The message of this campaign has become uprising against the new, legitimate government in Kiev.
EN
This paper deals with the problem of foreign and cryptoforeign funding of civil society organizations (CSOs). The question of foreign funding of CSOs is presented in the light of political marketing (inter alia: identification of global, regional and local market mechanisms (donors – clients)), hybrid warfare (real aims / interests of donors (the question of specific intelligence and counterintelligence)) and praxiology (effects, effectiveness).
EN
Since the beginning, informational conflict was an intrinsic component of the hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine, serving a number of well-defined goals. Although the main narrative pole was directed against the pro-Western Ukrainians, there are constant references to the EU and NATO member states, including Romania and Poland. Using discourse analysis, cognitive-emotional maps and scenario method, applied to content selected from the Romanian media from August 2014 to September 2015, we aimed to identify the main narrative threads about the two countries. The goal is to identify potential risks and threats addressed to the two U.S. strategic partners that are hosting on their territory elements of the U.S. missile shield.
EN
Iran has been waging a hybrid war against Israel since the Islamic revolution of 1979. In an era when conventional wars have given way to a different method, hybrid warfare, the main challenge facing states is how to deal with this new type of security threat. Thus, while states have previously faced security threats from regular enemy states’ armies, nowadays hybrid warfare in which non-state actors play a key role has become a widespread security threat that requires democratic states to use very different strategies and tactics to overcome it. Using securitisation theory, which explores how normal issues transform into security threats, this article analyses how the State of Israel has securitised Iranian hybrid warfare which has been mainly executed through its proxy terror organisations of Hezbollah. It does so by applying a revised version of the Copenhagen School’s securitisation framework, which focuses on security practices and is underpinned by an understanding of security as belonging to a continuum. The proxy terror organisations have moved towards the end point of the continuum, which is characterised by survival, existential threats, and militarisation, albeit without completely reaching the end point.
EN
The advancement of information technology makes societies increasingly vulnerable to disinformation and manipulation. A skillfully conducted disinformation campaign may weaken the state’s potential and make it vulnerable to external influences. The article presents an outline of the possibilities of influencing mass behavior. An attempt will also be made to answer the question of whether the combination of knowledge in the field of neurobiology, mathematics, sociology, and other sciences combined with the use of artificial intelligence and big data allows for the development of a new type of cybernetic weapons influencing the subconscious.
PL
Artykuł prezentuje problematykę obecnie dość popularnego określania konfliktów i wojen jako hybrydowe i pełzające, głównie w kontekście konfliktu ukraińskiego. Scharakteryzowano pojęcie hybrydowy i jego znaczenie w teorii konfliktów zbrojnych rozumiane często jako połączenie różnego rodzaju regularnych i nieregularnych działań (militarnych i niemilitarnych) prowadzonych przez przeciwnika unikającego odpowiedzialności i niezgodnie z prawem międzynarodowym. Skonkretyzowano określenie pełzanie i wojna pełzająca – szczególny rodzaj działań podejmowanych przez Federację Rosyjską, cechujący się głównie skrytością i nieregularnością działań, niezgodnych z prawem międzynarodowym i stosowaniem propagandy. Kwestie podjęte w artykule stanowią jedynie zarys tej problematyki.
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