Search results

1

Plato: Smp. 212e4-223a9. Alcibiades: An Eulogy of Which Socrates? That of Plato, That of Antisthenes and Xenophon or That of All Three?

100%

Mazzara G.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

|

2016

|

vol. 7

|

issue 1

25-54

EN

In the Symposium, there are two revelations: one is that of the woman of Mantinea, the other that of Alcibiades. The former (201d 1–212e 3) proposes a Socrates reshaped by Plato, but what Socrates does the latter (216a 6–217a 3) express? Can the praise for Socrates contained in the latter also be considered a tribute by Plato to his teacher? The opinions are divided. I looked at two scholars: Michel Narcy (2008) and Bruno Centrone (20142), whose judgments, as they are set out and argued, are irreconcilable. The contrast may be determined by a certain ambiguity in Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades. Part One – In order to clarify this ambiguity and to overcome the contrast between the two scholars I have tried to show how in the praise of Alcibiades there overlap different portraits of Socrates that refer to the tradition, to different experiences of various Socratics and of Plato himself in Apologia, and how this differs from the others and from himself by proposing a whole new portrait of Socrates as a representative of an Eros megas daimōn, revealed by the woman of Mantinea, in contrast to an Eros megas theos. Part Two – As instead regards the accusation of hybris, the hypothesis is this: for Plato his colleagues, and especially Antisthenes and Xenophon, offering an image of Socrates founded exclusively on his way of life and not also on the erotic aspects alluding to the super-sensible world, seem to end up arousing laughter and looking like “fools” (nēpioi), like Alcibiades, who at the end of his speech, after making the audience laugh, is unmasked by Socrates for his clumsy attempt to impart a “life lesson” to Agathon, which he did not need at all, paying at his own expenses for his ignorance of the revelation through arriving late at the party.

IT

In the Symposium, there are two revelations: one is that of the woman of Mantinea, the other that of Alcibiades. The former (201d 1–212e 3) proposes a Socrates reshaped by Plato, but what Socrates does the latter (216a 6–217a 3) express? Can the praise for Socrates contained in the latter also be considered a tribute by Plato to his teacher? The opinions are divided. I looked at two scholars: Michel Narcy (2008) and Bruno Centrone (20142 ), whose judgments, as they are set out and argued, are irreconcilable. The contrast may be determined by a certain ambiguity in Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades. Part One – In order to clarify this ambiguity and to overcome the contrast between the two scholars I have tried to show how in the praise of Alcibiades there overlap different portraits of Socrates that refer to the tradition, to different experiences of various Socratics and of Plato himself in Apologia, and how this differs from the others and from himself by proposing a whole new portrait of Socrates as a representative of an Eros megas daimōn, revealed by the woman of Mantinea, in contrast to an Eros megas theos. Part Two – As instead regards the accusation of hybris, the hypothesis is this: for Plato his colleagues, and especially Antisthenes and Xenophon, offering an image of Socrates founded exclusively on his way of life and not also on the erotic aspects alluding to the supersensible world, seem to end up arousing laughter and looking like “fools” (nēpioi), like Alcibiades, who at the end of his speech, after making the audience laugh, is unmasked by Socrates for his clumsy attempt to impart a “life lesson” to Agathon, which he did not need at all, paying at his own expenses for his ignorance of the revelation through arriving late at the party.

2

Człowiek nie-zniewolony. Od hellenistycznych wychowawców stoików do ponowoczesnej orgii pragnień

80%

Olchanowski T.

Parezja. Czasopismo Forum Młodych Pedagogów przy Komitecie Nauk Pedagogicznych PAN

|

2016

|

vol. 1

PL

Artykuł stanowi próbę zderzenia z sobą ideału człowieka postulowanego przez Epikteta i Marka Aureliusza z ponowoczesną tyranią sukcesu i maniakalno-narcystyczną wizją ludzkiej natury. Wyjściem do rozważań jest stanowisko Petera Sloterdijka, który stwierdził, że w kulturach wysoko rozwiniętych wychowanie i edukacja podlegają wpływom hamującym i pozbawiającym hamulców. Istota ludzka, która budziła przerażenie w okresie hellenistycznym, jako naruszający „hybris” szaleniec, obecnie funkcjonuje jako imagopata, idealny produkt, żyjący w świecie możliwości i zacierania się granic między realnym a wirtualnym.

EN

The article is an attempt to juxtapose the ideal of man postulated by Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius with postmodern tyranny of success and manic-narcissistic vision of human nature. The basis for discussion is the standpoint of Peter Sloterdijk, who said that in highly developed cultures, upbringing and education are influenced by inhibitory factors and depriving of the brakes factors. A human being, who frightened in the Hellenistic period, as a violation of “hubris” madman, now functions as imagopathy, a perfect product, living in a world of possibilities and the blurring of the boundaries between the real and the virtual.

3

Kwestie peloponeskie. Demokracja przeciw prawu. Hybris radykałów

61%

Oniszczuk J.

Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego Studia i Prace

|

2018

|

issue 4 (36)

29-63

EN

The defeat of the Hellenes in the Peloponnesian war in the 5th century B. C. happened a number of centuries after a deathly silence following the Trojan War and so called dark ages (lasting three centuries) as well as after popular stories on heroes of Mycenae and after poetic (Homer) times of storytelling. Those stories created an idea organizing a new world of archaic Greeks. The Peloponnesian events closed – in a way again – the certain order; this time it was the order of democrats characterized by the hubris of aristocracy (Athens) and the order of oligarchs characterized by the arrogance of democrats (Sparta). While the Trojan war prepared the fall of king Agamemnon, the Athens’ war prepared the king’s come back, this time the Macedonian one, who – craving for the fame of an Achaean hero -followed the path of a Mycenae ruler. Finally, the Peloponnesian war did not bring success of some Greek poleis or the whole Greece. Results of this war are expressed by a conclusion on the common Peloponnesian failure. It was a clash of interests of oligarchic order with democracy. What is important, a serious conflict arose: populist (majority) democracy against law and justice. This conflict was possible due to the lack of any institution of a public arbiter or moral authority, which could prevent a fall of moderation as an essential (sine qua non) feature of democracy (Solon). There is no democracy without moderation and self-resistance.

PL

Klęska Hellenów w wojnie peloponeskiej V w. p.n.e nastąpiła po wielu wiekach od zaistnienia martwej ciszy po wojnie trojańskiej i po trwających później trzy stulecia tzw. wiekach ciemnych oraz opowieściach ludowych o mykeńskich herosach, po poetyckich (Homer) czasach opowieści, które zbudowały ideę organizującą nowy świat Hellenów. Wydarzenia peloponeskie zamknęły – niejako ponownie – pewien ład; tym razem był to porządek demokratów cechujących się pychą arystokratów (Ateny) i porządek oligarchów o bucie demokratów (Sparta). Ale też, o ile wojna pod Troją przygotowała upadek króla (Agamemnon), to wojna pod Atenami przygotowała powrót króla, tym razem Macedońskiego, który złakniony pysznej sławy bohatera achajskiego, podążył drogą mykeńskiego władcy. Wojna peloponeska ostatecznie nie skończyła się sukcesem jakichś sprawiedliwych poleis greckich czy całej Grecji. Rezultaty owej wojny wyraża myśl mówiąca o powszechnej klęsce peloponeskiej. Walczyły między sobą interesy ustroju oligarchicznego i demokratycznego. Co jednak niezwykle ważne, pojawił się poważny konflikt: demokracja populistyczna (większościowa) przeciw prawu i sprawiedliwości. Ów konflikt okazał się możliwy z powodu braku jakiejś instytucji publicznego arbitra czy moralnego autorytetu, które zapobiegłyby upadkowi umiarkowania, będącego konstytutywną (sine qua non) cechą demokracji (Solon). Bez umiarkowania nie ma demokracji.

Refine search results

1 Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego Studia i Prace

1 Parezja. Czasopismo Forum Młodych Pedagogów przy Komitecie Nauk Pedagogicznych PAN

1 Peitho. Examina Antiqua

1 Mazzara G.

1 Olchanowski T.

1 Oniszczuk J.

1 2018

2 2016

Plato: Smp. 212e4-223a9. Alcibiades: An Eulogy of Which Socrates? That of Plato, That of Antisthenes and Xenophon or That of All Three?

Człowiek nie-zniewolony. Od hellenistycznych wychowawców stoików do ponowoczesnej orgii pragnień

Kwestie peloponeskie. Demokracja przeciw prawu. Hybris radykałów